The constitutional authority of the President to commence hostilities without a Congressional declaration of war. by Latzer, Barry,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1977
The constitutional authority of the President to
commence hostilities without a Congressional
declaration of war.
Barry, Latzer
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Latzer, Barry,, "The constitutional authority of the President to commence hostilities without a Congressional declaration of war."
(1977). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1883.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1883

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
COMMENCE HOSTILITIES WITHOUT A CONGRESSIONAL
DECLARATION OF WAR
A Dissertation Presented
By .
BARRY LATZER
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1977
Political Science
(c^ Barry Latzer 197
All Rights Reserved
iii
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
COMMENCE HOSTILITIES WITHOUT A CONGRESSIONAL
DECLARATION OF WAR
A Dissertation Presented
By
BARRY LATZER
Approved as to style and content .by;
Loren P . Beth, Chairman ot Committee
--Gien Gordon, Member
Howard Quint, Member
y Glen Gordon, Department Chairman
Political Science
ABSTRACT
The Constitutional Authority of the President to Conmence
Hostilities Without a Congressional Declaration
of War
(September 1, 1977)
Barry Latzer, B.A.
,
Brooklyn College
Ph.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Loren P. Beth
This study examines Presidential authority to order United States
armed forces to participate in major armed hostilities in the absence
of a Congressional declaration of war.
The study is based upon an analysis of (1) the \dews of the
Framers of the Constitution, (2) actual practice as revealed by
seven significant undeclared "wars" over the course of American
history, (3) the views of the United States Supreme Court, wiiich
are, of course, authoritative regarding the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and (4) statutory limitations upon the President, mth special
emphasis upon the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
Relying upon post-Constitutional Convention comnentaries , it was
found that Congress and not the President was intended to have the
power to initiate war (as opposed to hostilities short of war) except
in cases of attack upon the nation.
Congressional power was affirmed in the undeclared Naval War with
France (1797-1800) , in which the legislature authorized in advance
the
conduct of hostilities.
In the Barbary conflicts of 1801-1802 and 1815, Presidents ordered
the navy abroad in shows of force without Congressional authority, and
although Congress authorized hostilities, the authorizations delegated
broad discretionary powers to the President.
The Boxer Expedition of 1900 was the paradigm case of the intro-
duction of troops into hostilities on sole Presidential authority in
order to protect Americans abroad.
In the Tanpico incident of 1914, President Woodrow Wilson ordered
the blackade of a Mexican port simultaneous with a resolution of support
from Congress. In 1916, Wilson again sent troops to Mexico following
Poncho Villa's raids on American border toms, and although the legis-
lature was not informed in advance, it gave indirect approval.
Wilson was also President during the north Russian and Siberian
interventions of 1918. These interventions grew out of the First World
War but were aimed at Japan and the Russian coinnunists rather than
Germany, the declared enemy.
The Korean War (1950) was conducted without reliance upon either
treaty or statute, although the United States was carrying out United
Nations resolutions, and Congress appropriated money and drafted troops
to conduct the war.
Although some believed the Vietnam War to have been begun on sole
Presidential authority, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the Southeast
Asia Treaty provided Congressional authorization for the initiation of
the conflict after 1964.
The 1973 War Powers Resolution attenpts to restrict Presidental
authority to introduce troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities,
vi
but probably encroaches upon the President's powers as the Commnder
in Chief.
The Supreme Court has not yet authoritatively decided where the
line between Presidential and Congressional war-commencing authority
should be drawn. Although the Court has left open the possibility
that such an issue could be decided in future cases, it does not seem
likely that such decisions will actually be rendered.
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CHAPTER I
THE POWER TO MKE WAR: THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING
Introduction
The Supreme Court justices themselves have not always
agreed upon the weight to be attached to the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution. Consider Chief Justice
Taney's view that
it speaks not only in the same words, but with the
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it
came from the hands of its framers...!
Contrast Mr. Justice Frankfurter's assertion in uhe
Steel Seizure Case.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them.?-
Although Taney's formula is too rigid, it is never-
theless essential to a thorough analysis of the meaning of
the Constitution that we examine not only its language but
the original understanding of its authors.
What was meant by the Framers when they empowered
Congress "To declare War," "To raise and support Armies,"
and "To provide and maintain a Navy," "To make Rules for
^Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.)', 393, 426
(1857) .
^Youngs tovm Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610 (1951).
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
and "To provide for calling forth the Militia to.
.
.repel
Invasions?"^
And what further was meant by the statesmen who wrote
the following? "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America,"- "The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into actual service of the United States." "He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls..," And finally,
"he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers:
he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."^
In order to interpret these phrases from the Consti-
tution we will examine not only the debates within the
Constitutional Convention, but also law and practice prior
to the Ratification of 1789, and significant commentary
upon the issue immediately thereafter. We turn first to
the period preceding the Constitution.
3u.S. Const, art. I, sec. 8, els. 11-13, 15.
4lbid. , art. II.
3War-Making Before the Constitution
Regarding British practice, Blackstone is unambiguous:
the power to commence war is part of the Royal prerogative.
With regard to foreign concerns
, the king is thedelegate or representative of his people In theking therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of h5
s
people are united, and form, by that union, a consis-tency, splendour, and power, that make him feared and
respected by foreign potentates; who would scruple
to enter into any engagement, that must afterwardsbe revised and ratified by a popular assembly. W^atis done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign
powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done
without the king's concurrence is the act only of pri-
vate men ... j f
Upon the same principle the king has also the sole
prerogative of making war and peace...
So that, in order to make a war completely effectual,
it is necessary, with us in England, that it be public-
ly declared, and duly proclaimed by the king's author-
ity; and then, all parts of both the contending nations,
from the highest to the lowest, are bound by it. And,
wherever, the right resides of beginning a national
war, there must also reside the right of ending it, or
the power of making peace.
^
Locke distinguished executive power in domestic mat-
ters from the "power of war and peace, leagues and alliances,
and all the transactions with all persons and communities
without the commonwealth." This power over external mat-
ters Locke termed "federative," and then cautioned against
reading too much into the distinction.
.Though, as I said, the executive and federative
^Blackstone ' s Comjr.entarie s by St. George Tucker 5 vols,
(1803; reprint 'ed., Buffalo, N.Y.: Dennis and Co,. 1965),
1:252, 257, 258.
4power Ox every coiranunity be reallv distinct in them-selves, yet they are hardly to be' separated and placedat the same time in the hands of distinct persons. 6
In short, Locke considered the power to commence war
to properly rest with the same institution charged with the
exercise of the executive power.
And in Montesquieu's tripartite scheme of powers, so
influential with the Americans, the power to make V7ar is
considered executive by its very nature.
In every government there are three sorts of power:
the legislative; the executive in respect to things de-
pendent on the law of nations; and the executive in
regard to matters that depend on the civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate
enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and am.ends or ab-
rogates those that have been already enacted. By the
second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives em-
bassies, establishes the public security, and provides
against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals,
or determines the disputes that arise between indivi-
duals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power,
and the other simply the executive power of the state
As Corwin points out, however, acceptance of these
views by the Framers of the United States Constitution "was
qualified at the outset by the allocation of the war-de-
odaring power to Congress.' How great a qualification
^John Locke, Of Civil Government , intro. W.F. Carpenter
(London: Everyman' s Library
,
1947) , bk. 2:146,148.
^Baron de Montesquieu, The Spir it of the Laws , trans,
T. Nugent ('New York: Haffner Publishing Co. , W^5J
,
bk. 11:6.
^Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers ,
1787-1957
,
4th rev, ed. (New York: New York University
Press, 1957)
,
p. 418.
this was we have yet to discover. It is clear, however
.
£Mt the Euro_£_ean thinkers most influential in /mierica
consider ed, war-making an executive function
. We must next
examine the Am.erican colonial governorship.
The British colonies in North America (1607-1775)
had, at first, governorships with an ill-defined political
role. By mid-18th century, England tightened control over
its possessions, and the Crown appointed the governors in
eight of the thirteen colonies, and got to approve propri-
etary appointments in three others. The "royal governor
became the primary political link between the King and his
colonial subjects."^
But the governors did not rule alone; they had to
work closely with the colonial assem.blies, the upper cham-
ber of which served as the governor's council. The lower
chamber held the purse strings, an effective weapon in dis-
putes between the colonists on the one side, and the Crown
and its representative, the governor, on the other. Much
of the mistrust of executive power in evidence just after
independence can be traced to this unhappy colonial exper-
ience. '•^
As to military powers, the Royal governors, or "cap-
^Joseph Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive (New
York; Harper a Row Publishers, Inc., VJbbj , p, ^.
"-^Ibid., 5; Alfred II, Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison,
The American Const itut ion: Its Or igins and Development , 3d
ear TNew Yortcl W,W. Norton 6c Co. , lnc.,'^6J)', pp,^+-35.
tains general," as they were often titled, had complete
authority over the colonial military force, but usually
found themselves dependent upon the assembly for supporting
legislation. Furthermore, as subordinates of the Crown,
the governors could not declare a colony to be at V7ar
, ex-
cept perhaps against Indians, and then only with advice of
Council and immediate notification of the home government
.
Following the outbreak of the French and Indian VJars
in 1754, Great Britain established a permanent standing
army in America to be headed by a Commander in Chief. The
latter officer eventually assumed most of the military pow-
er heretofore exercised by the colonial governors, as well
as becoming the principal administrator of i.mperial affairs
in America, The Commander in Chief and the sizeable force
he commanded were increasingly resented by the colonials
for what they considered encroachments on their liberties
and usurpations of civil authority,-'-'^
1
1
Leonard Woods Labaree
,
Royal Governmen t in America :
A Study of the British Coloni al System Before" 1783 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.) pp. 92 and note 1, 107-
108; Evarts Boutell Greene, The Prov incial Governor in The
Engli sh Colonie s of North America ~(TB9b; rep rm t ed.
,
New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1966), pp. 105-7.
12Labaree, pp. 108-109; Clarence E. Carter, "The
Office of Commander in Chief : A Phase of Imperial Unity
on the Eve of the Revolution." in Richard B. Morris, ed.
The Era of the American Revolution (New York. Columbia
University Press, W5/y.
In addition to contributing to the causes of the
American Revolution, the Commander in Chief and his forces
probably convinced the Americans that standing armies were
undesirable and that the military must be made subordinate
to civilian authority. Under the Constitution, the latter
was accomplished by making the President, a civilian, the
Commander in Chief. -'^
Turning to the period follov7ing the Declaration of
Independence, we find thirteen sovereign states, each hav-
ing weak executives in varying degrees of subordination to
their respective legislatures, all loosely bound by the
Articles of Confederation after 1781. During the Revolu-
tionary War the state governors exercised power more freely
in military affairs than in other areas. With approval of
the council (the irpper chamber of the legislature; this in-
stitution was carried ever from the colonial period) a
governor could call out the state militia and even assume
personal command. Moreover, once the militia was mobilized,
the Revolutionary governor, being the commander in chief,
had "sole direction of their use."-^'^'"
Although the new states, the colonial experience
fresh in mind, intentionally kept their executives weak in
l^U.S. Const, art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
"'^^Margarct Rurnham Macmillan, The War Governors in
the Anr^erican RcvTolution (New York: Columbia University
Press";~l'9TI)T p. '62V"KaIlenbach, p. 21.
8almost every respect, they uniformly made them commanders
in chief. This was in part due to the exigencies of the war;
under such pressures the South Carolina legislature once
delegated sweeping emergency powers to its executive.!-'^
The early state constitutions demonstrate the breadth
of military power vested in the governors. Article 9 of the
1776 Delaware Constitution provided thai: "The president,"
as it styled its executive,
with the advice of the privy council, may embody the
militia, and act as captain-general and commander-in-
chief of them, and the other military force of this
State, under the laws of the same. 16
Article XXVI of the South Carolina charter of the
same year is interesting because it is the only state con-
stitution explicitly prohibiting its executive from making
war
.
That the president and commander-in-chief shall have
no power to make war or peace, or enter into any final
treaty, without the consent of the general assembly
and legislative council.
Contrast the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
Chapter II, Section I, Article VII, whose words are repeated
almost verbatim in the New Hampshire organic law of 1784.
l^Kelley and Harbison, pn. 34-35, 96> Kallenbach,
pp. 18, 21, 27.
^^Ben: Perley Poorc, ed. The Federal and State Consti
tutions, Colonial Chartt^rs and otner Organic L avjs o"f the
Uni;tcd States , 2~volc. . , 2d. cT. (New York: Burt Frarlclin,
T572), 1:275.
^^Ibid. , 2:1619.
Not only were these executives authorized to personally
lead the militia of their respective states, but they were
given "full power,"
for the special defence and safety of the common-
wealth, to assemble in martial array, and put in war-like posture, the inhabitants thereof.,. 18
The early state governors did not betray the trust
reposed in them in regard to military affairs. Furthermore,
their general weakness (i.e., in other than military af-
fairs)
,
combined with legislative inefficiency and growing
conservative fears of overly-democratic assemblies all
served to dissipate the colonial legacy of executive mis-
trust. In fact, by the time the United States Constitution
was V7ritten, the pendulum had swung back in favor of in-
creased executive power. Thus it is said that the model
for the national presidency was the governorship of New
York, the strongest of the state governorships
.
That legislative power was feared more than executive
at the time of the Framing is evident from. Madison's ex-
tensive comments on the subject in Federalist No. 48, in
which we find the following statement.
The legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into
l^ibid,, 1:965. For New Hampshire, ibid., 2:1288.
•^^Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presideiicy
1775-178 9 , Johns Hopkins UniverVity StVdI-es 'i'h "Historical
and PoTItical Science, ser. XL, no. 4 (1922; reprint ed.
,
New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), pp. ^-)9, 51-52, 76.
10
its impetuous vortex. ^0
And Jefferson, who could not be accused of any con-
servative bias against popular assemblies, comments in his
Notes_on_the State of Virg.inia as follows.
All the powers of governm.ent
,
legislative, executive
and judiciary, result to the legislative body The '
concentrating tnese in the same hands is precisely thedefinition of despotic government. It will be no al-leviation that these powers will be exercised by a plur-
ality of hands and not by a single one. 173 despots
would surely be as oppressive as one.^l
But before we turn our full attention to the Framers
'
views on executive power, let us examine the forerunner of
their handiwork, the Articles of Confederation. Under the
Articles, which "governed" the newly independent states
from 1781 to 1789, ultimate military pov7er lay with the
Congress in which each state had one vote. However, Con-
gress could not "engage in a war," among other significant
governmental acts, "unless nine states assent to the same."^^
On the positive side, the Articles provided the follow-
ing in regard to war-maki.ng.
"^^Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The
Federalist Papers
,
ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New
American Library, 1964), p. 309.
^^Thomas Jefferson, The Portab le Jefferson, ed.
Merrill D. Peterson (New York : The Viking Press, 1975),
p. 164.
22Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the
United States During the Confederation, T78 1-i7^ (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., T^TOr, p. zT; Articles of Confedera-
tion, art. IX,
11
The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power cf determining onpeace and war except in the cases mentioned in the sixth
article ... 23
The relevant section of the sixth article referred
to reads as follows.
No state shall engage in any war without the consent
of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such
state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have
received certain advice of a resolution being foraied
by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay, till
the United States in Congress assembled can be consult-
ed ... 24
Note the use of the phrases "engage in.., war," and
"determining on... war," as opposed to vzhat appears on its
face to be the narrower power to "declare War" vested in
Congress by the Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court had occasion to comment on the extent of Congress'
military powers under the Articles in the case of Fenhallow,
et, al. V. Doane's Administrators.'^-^
Penhallow turned on the authority of certain prize
tribunals established by the Continental Congress. In up-
holding their jurisdiction Justice Paterson commented as
follov7S
.
Congress was the general, supreme, and controlling
council of the nation, the centre of union, the centre
of force, and the sun of the political system. ..In
Congress vjere vested, because by Congress were exer-
^^Articles cf Confederation, art. TX.
2^Ibid. , art. VI.
^^3 Dall. (U.S.) 54; 1 L. Ed. 507 (1795),
cised wiuh the approbation of the people, the riphts
peace... In every givernmenf
.here inust be a supreme power or will; the riehts ofwar and Peace are component parts of this supremacy..It It be asked, by whom, during our revolutionary
war, was iociged, and by whom was exercised this sud-reme authority? No one will hesitate for an answe?.it was lodged in and exercised by Congress ... 26
Of course, one of the problems with the Articles of
Confederation, aside from the fact that too little power
was given to the central government, was that they did not
provide for an executive branch. Administration was handled
at first by ad hoc committees, later reduced in number and
supplanted in major areas (e.g., VJar, and Foreign Affairs)
by permanent departments. Still there was "lack of execu-
tive unity" with no one agency "to formulate a common policy
and control a number of co-ordinated ministries . "^^
This attempt to administer by committees subordinate
to Congress "failed, and failed lamentably," and led to the
conclusion that a strong separate executive was necessary.
This conclusion was reinforced by experiences with state
governments during the same period. Thus, the Great Conven-
tion aimed at asserting executive strength and independence
of Congress. "The idea... that the jealous)^ of kingship was
a controlling force in the Federal Convention," one analyst
points out,
26] L. Ed. 518. See also Mr. Justice Blair's opinion
at 1 L. Ed. 531.
27Kelley and Harbison, pp. 102, 107.
13
ini^^'; ""T^ ^^''^ The majority of thedelegates
_
brought with thera no far-reaching distrust-'
of executive power, but rather a sobering consciousnessthat.
. .iL^was necessary for them. ..to secure a sfronealbeit sate, national executive. 28 ' ^'
^1^IJ1^^}S^^'& and the Constitutional Convent
i
on
In the Convention of 1787, those delegates favoring
a strong independent executive, modeled after the more pow-
erful of the state governors, generally prevailed, Wliile
this gives us a sense of the general course of the Conven-
tion with regard to the Presidency, it tells us little about
the war-making power in particular . 29
In its first two months the Convention was preoccupied
with the scheme of government outlined in the Virginia
Plan. It also considered the alternative Nevj Jersey Plan,
a draft by Pinckney of South Carolina, and an able speech
by Alexander Hamilton, detailing that statesman's own ideas
for a government.
The Virginia Plan provided for the institution of a
"National Executive" which "ought to enjoy the Executive
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation," On its
face this resolution begs the question of the division of
war-making power between the Congress and the President,
because it is not clear whether the Framers thought such
28Thach, pp. 52, 52
2 9Ibid .
,
passim..
^'^Kallenbach
,
p. 37
14
power to be executive or legislative in nature. 31
It will be recalled that Blacks tone, Locke and
Montesquieu believed war-making to be essentially executive.
If the views of these authorities, all well known to the
Framers, were accepted, adoption of this resolution would
imply the vesting of war-making in the National Executive. 32
Perhaps this is v;hy some delegates expressed reserva-
tions about accepting the resolution when it was introduced
to the Committee of the VJhole on June 1, 1787. Madison
described the proceedings as follows.
Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was
afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress
might extend to peace and war which would render the
Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towi.t an elec-
tive one.
Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a
single person. .
.
Mr. Rutlidge
. . . said he was for vesting the Execu-
tive power in a single person, tho' he v;as not for
giving him the power of war and peace. ..
Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving
most energy dispatch and responsi.bility to the office.
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British
Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a legisla-
tive nature. Among others that of war and peace. The
only pollers he conceived strictly Executive were those
of executing the laws, and appointing officers . . . 33
In Georgia delegate William Pierce's account of the
same proceedings, Wilson is to have said, in addition:
31virginia Plan, Res. 7, in Max Farrand, ed. The Re-
cords of the Federal Convention of 1787, 3 vols. (New Haven:
YZT'e' University'Press , iTIll , TTTl..
32see pp. 3-4, supra.
33Farrand, Records, 1:64-6, brackets omitted.
15
Making peace and war are generally determined bvWriters on the Laws of Nations to be legislativepowers, -J^ ^
And in the notes of Rufus King of Massachusetts, the
following is attributed to Madison:
Mad: agrees wth, VJilson in his difinition of execu-
tive powers--executive powers ex vi termini, do notinclude the Rights of war & peace &c . but the powers
shd. be. contined and defined... 35
Thus, among those v7ho spoke to the issue at the Con-
vention that day, none would concede to the Executive the
powers of war and peace. This suggests that the Framers
were inclined to break with Blackstone, Locke and
Montesquieu, although the issue was not resolved that day,
and the power to make peace was ultimately vested in the
President and Senate in the form of the treaty-making
authority
.
The New Jersey Plan, which was presented as the sm.all'
state alternative to the Virginia Plan, provided for a
plural executive (a course rejected early on), with the
power, among others,
to direct all military operations; provided that none
of the persons composing the federal Executive shall
on any occasion take command of any troops, so as to
personally conduct any enterprise as General, or in
other capacity.^'''
34ibid.
,
pp. 73-74.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 70,
36ij.s. Clorst, art. II, sec. 2, cl . 2,
37rarrand, Records, 1:244.
16
Under the New Jersey Plan, Congress was to retain all
powers vested in it by the Articles of Confederation, ex-
cept where expressly modified. This implies that the direc-
tion of foreign affairs and the commencement of war, as
opposed to the direction of military operations, were to
remain v/ithin the power of Congress. 3^
Pinckney's Plan, the most detailed of those discussed
so far, modeled its section on the executive after the New
York State Constitution. The Pinckney draft was used by
the Committee of Detail (discussed below) in the preparation
of much of what came to be article II of the United States
Constitution. 39
Pinckney's article 7 provided that "The Senate shall
have the sole and exclusive power to declare V/ar." His
eighth article vested the "Executive Power,.. in a President,"
and provided that "He shall be Commander in chief of the
army 6c na\^ of the United States & of the Militia of the
several states. "^0
Hamilton's proposals were not formally before the
Convention, but were outlined in a speech in opposition to
the New Jersey Plan, His ideas are interesting because
he was an advocate of a strong executive, and later, writing
38see New Jersey Plan, Res. no, 2, ibid., p. 243.
^^Hax Farrand, The rraminp, of the Const i tiition of t:he
United St aces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962),
pri29.
^^Farrand, Records , 3:599-600.
17
under the pseudonym "Pacificus," argued for extended Pres-
idential power in foreign affairs Z'^-
In the course of his address to the Convention of
June 18, 1787, Hamilton suggested that the Executive "have
the direction of war when authorized or begun," but that
the Senate "have the sole power of declaring war."^^^
One plausible interpretation of the phrase "author-
ized or begun," is that the President was only to direct
wars "authorized" by Senatorial declaration of war or
"begun" by foreign invasion of the United States, in which
case the President may act without v/aiting for a declara-
tion. This interpretation suggests: (1) that Hamilton did
not wish the President to have the power to commence hos-
tilities except in defense against attack, and (2) that he
understood the term "declaring" war to mean "authorizing"
it. ^3
Whatever Hamilton meant, it is nevertheless true that
his plan provoked neither discussion nor support. The
Convention moved into its second phase, in which a five-
man Committee of Detail carefully wove excerpts from the
Pinckney and New Jersey plans, and the New York. State Con-
^llbid., p. 617^ Farrand, Framing , pp. 87-88.
"Pacificus" is discussed below.
^"^Far rand, Records . 1:292.
^^See Charles A. Lofgren, "VJar-Making Under the Con-
stitution: The Original Understanding" in Richard A, Falk,
ed. The Vietnam War and International Law , 4 vols.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76),
4:581.
stitution into those elements of the Virginia Plan already
approved by the Convention . '^"^
It was out of this Coinmittee that the first details
of the various war-power provisions appeared. The Committer
report, presented to the Convention August 6, 1787. listed
among the powers of Congress the power "To make war." At
the same time it vested the "Executive Power of the United
States... in a single person," to be styled the President.
Apparently, the Committee of Style considered the power to
"make war" legislative as opposed to exec:utive in nature,
or at least better left in the hands of Congress. The re-
ported draft authorized the President to "receive Ambassa-
dors," and provided that "He shall be commander in chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia
of the Several States." But the Senate alone was authorize
to "make treaties . "'^5
All through August, 1787, the draft of the Committee
of Detail was reviewed by the v.^hole Convention, article by
article, clause by clause. It was during this process,
on August 17, that the most important exchange of all re-
garding war-making took place. Below is reproduced Madison
account of the debate as it appears in Farrand's Records of
'^^Farrand, Framing
, pp. 89, 125-126, 128-129.
^^Farrand, Records , 2:182. 183, 185.
^^Farrand, Frmning^, p. 134.
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g|Jlder|l_towentic^ The editor's notes and brackets
"To make war"
Mr Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in theLegislature. Its proceedings were too slow It wdmeet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps, would be too
numerous for such deliberations. The Senate xvould bethe best depositary, being more acquainted with for-
eign affairs, and most capable of uroper resolutionsit the btates are equally represented in Senate so
as to give no advantage to large States, the power
will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their
all at stake m such cases as well as the large States.
It would be singular for one-authority to make war
and another peace.
Mr Butler. The Objections agst the Legislature
lie in a great degree agst the Senate. He was for
vesting the power in the President, who will have all
the requisite qualities, and will not make wax but when
the Nation \<f±ll support it.
Mr Madison and Mr Gerry moved to insert "declare,"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the ExecuHve"TFie
power to repel suZden attacks.
Mr Sharman thought it stood very well. The Execu-
tive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.
"Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the
power too much.
_Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elseworth. there is a material difference be-
tween the cases of making war
,
and making peace . It
shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into~it,
X^Jar also is a simple and overt declaration, peace at-
tended with intricate & secret negociaticns
.
Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the
Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it;
or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be
entitled to it. He v/as for clogging rather than faci-
litating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred
" declar e' to 'make".
On the Motion to insert declare --in place of Make
,
it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mas. abst. Cont . no." Pa ay. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo-ay.
Mr. Pinkney' s motion to strike out vzhole clause,
disagd. to without call of States.
Mr Butler moved to give the Legislature power of
peace, as they were to have that of v/ar.
Mr Go-rry 2ds. him.
.
.
^7
The last motion failed, 10-0, and then the Convention
adjourned for the day. The asterisk following Connecticut's
vote on the motion to substitute "declare" for "make," re-
fers to an interesting footnote of Madison's, It reads as
follows,
'^On the remark by Mr. King that "ma;k_e" V7ar might
be understood to "conduct" it which was' an Executive
function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection and the
vote of Cont was changed tO'-ay.'^S
With Connecticut voting in the negative, the vote
total was 7-2; with Connecticut in the affirmative it was
8-1. Indeed, in Madison's original Journa l of the Conven-
tion, and in his separate "Detail of Ayes and Noes," he
shows that the motion was voted upon twice. However, the
vote tallies show that the motion lost on the first vote,
4-5, while gaining 8-1 approval the second time. There is
no separate record of a 7-2 vote.^^
It should also be noted that Madison's recording of
the vote breakdowns in the original Journal and in the De-
tail of Ayes and Noes was sometimes innaccurate, sometimes
difficult to understand. Furthermore, if two separate
votes took place, as seems likely, we don't know when dur-
ing the debates they occurred, since in the full account
^'Farrand, Records , 2:318-319.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 319.
-^^ibid.
,
p, 313.
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(quoted above) only one vote is recorded along with
Connecticut's switch. ^0
Lacking this information we cannot say for sure what
led the delegates to approve the measure to substitute
"declare" for "make." Was Connecticut alone persuaded by
the argument that "make" included "conduct," an executive
function; and therefore was this argument in Madison's
footnote relatively insignificant?
Or was this the argument that caused a rejected motion
to be reconsidered and adopted; in v/hich case it is extreme-
ly significant? Since we do not know, and since we do not
know the point in the proceedings at which the proposal
was rejected (if it was), or approved, we cannot speak with
certainty about the intention of the delegates. ^1
But if we cannot draw conclusions with finality be-
cause of some uncertainties in the Convention records, can
we nevertheless formulate some generalizations from the
record available? The opening comment by Pinc'Kney of South
Carolina seems clear. Consistent with his own plan of
government, he would have vested the war-making power in
^^Ibid.
, pp. xiii-xiv; Lofgren, in Falk, 4:577-578.
• 51ibid.
,
p. 5/8. I also find it odd that Massachusetts
was recorded as "absent" for both votes even though Gerry,
a Massachusetts delegate, cosponsored the proposal. See
Farrand , Becords
,
2:VjA, 319.
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the Senate, rather than the entire legislature as provided
for in the Committee of Detail plan.^^
Pierce Butler, also part of the South Carolina dele-
gation, disagreed, and argued that the war-making power
should lie with the President. Butler's was the most
forthright claim in behalf of executive war-power, and it
is significant in that it was not adopted. It was probably
Butler's comment vjhich delegate Gerry said he "never ex-
pected to hear in a republic . "^"^
Gerry then offered his own proposal, which Madison
cosponscred, substituting "declare war" for "make war;
leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."
Next follov/ed the curious comment of Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, an early proponent of an executive subordinate
to the legislature.^*^
Sherman "thought it stood very well" with the words
"make war," and objected to changing it to "declare war"
on the grounds that this would narrow Congress' power too
rauch. He may also have felt that the substitute motion
would leave to the President the power to "commence war,"
55
and this he opposed.
George Mason of Virginia preferred "declare" to
^^Farrand, Records, 2:182, 3:599.
Farrand, Records , 2:318.
^^Farrand, Record s
,
1:5, 2:318,
^'Farrand, Records
,
2:318.
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"make" and did not trust the Executive with "the power of
war." Mason apparently believed it would be too easy to
go to war if such authority were lodged with the President
alone
.
Next, Madison records a vote on the motion to substi-
tute "declare," and he footnotes the coiranent of Rufus King
to the effect that "make war" might include the power to
c^^'^HCt war, properly an executive function. The substitute
was accepted, perhaps as a result of, perhaps without regard
to King's remarks.
Pinckney's motion to strike the vjhole clause, probably
preparatory to a proposal to vest the war-making power in
the Senate alone, was then rejected. Also voted down was
Butler's motion to give Congress the "power of peace, as
they were to have that of war."^^
Given the doubts about the accuracy of the voting
record and the confusion about the point in the debate at
which the votes were taken, what minimum conclusions may
be drawn from these crucial proceedings?
First, Butler's idea to grant the President sole
war-making power was rejected. Gerry spoke against it
after having offered his motion to reduce som.ev/hat Congres-
^^Ibid.
,
p. 319
57ibid.
^^Ibid.
slonal war power. Mason also spoke against it while urg.-
ing adoption of the Gerry motion. Therefore, to its
sponsors and supporters, the reduction of Congress' £ower
to "make" war cHd not thereby vest the ver^ same power in
the_ Presided. Butler admitted as much following the vote
to substitute "declare" for "make" war, when he confessed
that the legislature was to have the power of war.
Second, Congressional power wa£ najrrowed in some
fashion when the Madison-Gerry motion was adopte d. Sherman
opposed the motion for narrowing the power too much. Gerry
wished to transfer to the President "the power to repel
sudden attacks," and this certainly was intended. It also
seems likely that King's suggestion that the President have
authority to conduct war once begun met with general ap-
proval.
However, it is not clear
,
as is sometimes asserted,
that this debate demonstrated a desire on the part of the
Framers to limit the President to solely the power to re-
pel sudden attacks and to conduct war once begun. The
thrust of the motion was to reduce Congressional power to
the advantage of the Executive. The extent of the reduc -
tion is not entirely clear from thi s debat e . ^
^
Third, Pinckney's motion to strike the whole war-
power clause, perhaps preliminarily to a proposal to vest
59But see Raoul Berger, "War-Making by the President"
in Falk, 4:604.
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the power in an institution other than the whole Congress,
was rejected. This indicates that the Framers were deter-
mlued to. mainjtain the power of the le^lative_ branch to
declare war
.
Beyond the three propositions above, the intent of
the Framers is not clear. But of course the crucial ques-
tion remains unanswered: which agency was empowered to
commence or ini_tiate hostilities? Relying upon Congress'
powers to declare war, and grant letters of marque and re-
prisal, Lofgreii concludes that "Congress would have nearly
complete authority over the commencement of war."60
Lofgren reasons that undeclared wars were common
enough at the time of the Framing so that the Founders
would not "leave such an 5.mportant power unvested." In
addition, the practice of issuing letters of marque and
reprisal had fallen into disuse by the time Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 11 was established. He therefore finds it
"plausible" that the letters of marque clause was designed
to give Congress (as opposed to the President) whatever
war- commencing power did not inhere in the declaration of
war clause.^
However, Lofgren offers no evidence to substantiate
his interpretation of the letters of marque and reprisal
clause, and I could find none in the record of the Conven-
^^U.S. Const, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11 ^ Lofgren, in
Fall;, 4:601.
^•-Lofgren, in Falk, 4:594-8.
tion proceedings. Furthermore, he admits that the great
European treatises on international law, with which the
Framers were familiar, distinguished between declared or
"perfect" vjars and undeclared or "imperfect" wars. In
adopting the word "declare" in the Constitution, the
Framers may well have been using the word in this narrow
sense, thus limiting Congress' power to "perfect" wars
alone. ^2
The fact is that a number of contradictory interpre-
tations are compatible with the evidence discussed so far;
and that is because the evidence we have reviewed up to
this point does not enable us to_ conclude with certainty
which branch was empowered by the Framers to initiate hos-
tilities .
.
.
Unfortunately, the "make/declare war" debate was the
last significant act of the Constitutional Convention with
respect to Presidential war-making power. Most of the per-
tinent Presidential powers (e.g., executive power, command-
er-in-chief, and power to receive ambassadors) had been
recommended by the Committee of Detail and did not generate
controversy . "-^
The only modifications in the work of the Committee
62xbid. ; 590-3, See Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases
Made Bad Law:' The War Powers Act" m Falk, 4:768-769.
^^See p. 18, supra.
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of Detail with respect to Presidential war powers x.ere as
follows.
1. His powers as Commander in Chief of the State
militia were restricted. They were only to take effect
when those forces were "called into the actual service of
the United States. "^^
2. Presidential power over foreign affairs was ex-
tended. The power to make treaties, which had been lodged
in the Senate alone, was transferred to the President, with
the proviso that the Senate give its "advice and consent,"
and that two-thirds of the Senators present approve the
treaty
,
The Federal Convention completed its work in September,
1787, without any further debate over the issues concerning
us. The debates we have examined reveal precious little
about the Framers
' intentions with regard to the commence-
ment of war. Perhaps it is best to withhold our conclusions
until after we have analyzed post-Convention commentaries
on the subject. It is to these commentaries that we now
turn our attention,
Post-Convention Commentaries on War-Making
By far the most famous of commentaries upon the newly
fashioned Am.erican system of government were those essays
^^Farrand, Records , 2:426-427.
65ibid.
,
pp. 498-499.
by Hamilton, Madison and John Jay, known collectively as
Ike_Z£^eralist
.
And yet here too are fex^ words about war-
making
.
There is Hamilton's comment in the 23rd paper to
the effect that national security powers "ought to exist
without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee
or to define the extent and variety of national exigen-
cies..," But this was hardly a plea for unlimited Presi-
dential or Congressional war power; it was rather a brief
for federal power over national defense unhampered by
state interference.^^
In No. 41, Madison contents himself with the con-
clusion that the power of declaring war is necessary, and
needs no defense, and so he never considers the relative
roles of the President and Congress in war -making . ^
The 69th essay is, for us, the m.ost interesting,
Here Hamilton draws a comparison between the war powers
of the Presidency on the one hand, and the war powers of
the British monarch and certain state governors on the
other
.
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army
and navy of the United States. In this respect his
authority would be nominally the same with that of th
king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior
to it. It would amount to nothing more than the sup-
reme command and direction of the military and naval
66Rossiter, Federali s t Papers
,
p. 153
67ibid.
,
p. 256.
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forces as first general and adip.iral of the Confeder-acy; while that of the British king extends to theoeclaring of war and to the raising and reRulatin^^ offleets and armies.-.all whichTl^e ConilfEufl^^nLrconsideration, would appertain to the legislative . 68
In this view, the President, as ConTmander in Chief,
is no more than a top military officer, with power to make
major decisions in war-time, but without the pox^er to de-
clare vzar. Wliile Ham.ilton does not say that the President
may never commence hostilities, the narrow definition of
his Commander in Chief pov/ers suggests that he may not do
so under that authority. Or, to state the same thing dif-
ferently, the Pre sident
' s power s as Commander in Chief do
not provide him with authority to commence war. 69
It should be kept in mind that this is the view of
the same "Publius" who extolled the virtues of a "vigorous
executive" in Federalist No. 70. "Energy 5-n the Executive,"
declared Hamilton,
is a leading character in the definition of good gov-
ernment
. It is essential to the protection of the
communit}?- against foreign attacks.., 70
But was executive "energy" to be displayed in the ini-
tiation of hostilities without a declaration of war?
"Publius" does not say; but when he enumerates the various
administrative activities to be superintended by the Pres-
^^Ibid.
, pp. ^il7-A18, footnote omitted.
^^Corwin, The President
,
p. 228.
70Rossiter, Federalis t Papers, p. 423,
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ident, no such power is listed.
The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the pre-paratory plans of finance, the application and dis-bursement of the public moneys in conformity to thegeneral appropriations of the legislature, tne arranpe-
ment of the army and navy, the directions of the oper-
ations Ox- V7ar-~ these, and other matters of a like na-
ture, constitute what seems to be most properly under-
stood by the administration of government.'^
Nowhere in this list, and nov7here in The Federal ist
is it suggested that the President may commence war on his
own authority. And Hamilton's treatm.ent of the Commander
in Chief clause in the sixty-ninth paper suggests by impli-
cation that the President has no such power.
All told, the Federalis t is not very helpful. VJlien
we turn to the debates in the state conventions considering
adoption of the Constitution, we find one James Iredell,
delegate to the North Carolina convention reiterating the
Hamiltonian view. Iredell thought Presidential military
powers comparable to those of the state governors, but not
to the king of England.
The President, therefore, is to command the military
forces of the United States, and this power I think a
proper one: at the same ti.me it will be found to be
suffi.ciently guarded. A very material difference may
be observed between this power, and the authority of
the king of Greau Britaia under similar circumstances.
The king of Great Britain is not only the commander-in-
chief of the land and naval forces, but has power, in
time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He has also
the authority to declare v^ar. The President has not
the power of declaring war by his ovm authority, nor
that of raising fleets and armies. These powers are
^^Alcxandcr Hamilton, Federalist No. 72, in Rossiter,
Federal ist Papers
,
pp. 435-A36,
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vested in other hands. The power of declarine. war is
expressly given to Congress, that is, to the twobranches of the legislature ... 72
At the South Carolina convention. Pierce Butler, who,
it will be recalled had suggested at Philadelphia that war-
making be vested in the President, described the rejection
of his proposal as follows.
It was first proposed to vest the sole power of making
peace or war in the Senate; but this was objected to
as inimical to the genius of a republic, by destroying
the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve.
Some gentlemen were inclined to give this pov/er to the
President; but it was objected to, as throwing into
his hands the influence of a monarch, having an oppor-
tunity of involving his country in a war whenever he
wished to promote her destruction. 73
One William Wilson, delegate to the Pennsylvania
convention, urged the adoption of the Constitution for
these reasons.
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calcu-
lated to guard against it. It will not be in the pow-
er of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve
us in such distress; for the important power of declar-
ing war is vested in the legislature at large; this
declaration must be made with the concurrence of the
House of Representatives: from this circumstance we
may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our
national interest can draw us into a war. 74
Wilson's comment is interesting because he uses "in-
72jonathan Elliot, ed. , The Debates in the s everal-
State Conventions, on the adoption of tKe Federal "Cons titu-
tion, as recommended by the General Convencion at Philadel -
phiaj in T78T7Td ed. 5 volc"TPhiladelphia : J.B".
LT^p'incott CO. , 1863-1891), 4:107-108.
73ibid.
,
p. 263.
74Elliot, Debates, 2:528.
volve us in" war and "declaring war" interchangeably,
thereby suggesting a broad construction of the Congress-
ional power to declare war. But the testimony of a single
delegate is not much to go by, and the debates in the
state conventions seem to have offered no other pertinent
remarks. (New York proposed two Constitutional amendments,
one requiring a two-thirds vote in Congress for a declara-
tion of war; the other prohibiting the President from per-
sonally assuming command of an army in the field. Neither
were adopted.
Events in Washington's administration soon provided
the backdrop for further elucidation of the President's
powers in foreign affairs. Since the occasional papers
surrounding these events are so close to the framing of
the Constitution in time, and involve some of the same per-
sonages, they may be considered a part of the views of
the Fiamers
,
The event was President Washington's Proclamation of
1793, issued on Presidential authority, calling for neutral-
ity (although it shunned the word) on the part of the United
States in the V7ar between France and England. Pro-French
S3nnpathizers considered the Proclamation an unwarranted "tilt
tovjard Great Britain, thus i.nspiring Hamilton, writing as
"Fdcificus," tu publish a series of newspaper articles de^.
^^Elliot, Debates, 1:330.
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fending the Proclamation 7
^
*'Pacificus" No, 1 aims at setting out the consuitu-
tional basis for the President's action in response to the
charge that Congress' power to determine on peace and war
as established by Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 had been
usurped. Hamilton's defense rests upon the' proposition
that Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, "The executive Pow-
er shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America," is an affirmative grant of general power to the
President . '^'^
This broad undifferentiated grant of power is only
partially detailed in the remainder of Article II, which,
along with other parts of the Constitution (e.g., Article
I, Section 8, Clause 11), contains certain exceptions to
this power. Finally, since a proclamation of neutrality
is "merely an Executive Act'' the President was warranted
in issuing same.^^
As for the charge that Congress' power to declare
war is undermined, Hamilton retorts:
The answer to this is, that however true it may be,
^^Corwin, The President
, pp. 178-179,
''^Ibid.
,
p. 179; Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of
Alexander Hamil ton, ed, Harold C. Syrett (Nev7 YonT! Colum-
bia University Press, 1961--). 15 (1969): 39.
7SHamilton, Papers
,
15:39-40.
that the right of the Legislature to declare war in-
cludes the right of judging v/hether the Nation be un-
"^^^'^ ''^^ not--it will not foliothat the^ executive is in any case excluded from a simliar rignt_^of Judgment, in the execution of its own
Hamilton develops this response with a hypothetical
example. Wliat if, he asks, there had been a treaty obli-
gating the United States to fight alongside' France in case
that ration went to war? And what if a new government came
to power in France with policies openly hostile toward
Great Britain? X\fould not the President, if he extended
recognition to that new government by virtue of his author-
ity to "receive ambassadors," have placed the Legislature
under an obligation to declare war?^^
"Pacificus" continues as follows,
This serves as an example of the right of the Exec-
utive, in certain cases, to determine the condition of
the Nation, though it m.ay consequentially affect r,b,e
proper or improper exercise of the Power of the Legis-
lature to declare war. The Executive indeed cannot
control the exercise of that power--further than by the
exercise of its general right of objecting to all acts
of the Legislature; liable to being overruled by two
thirds of both houses of Congress. The Legislature is
free to perform its own duties according to its own
sense of them- -though the Executive in the exercise of
its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent
state of things which ought to V7eigh in the legislative
decisions. From the division of the Executive Power
there results, in reference to it, a concurrent author-
ity, in the distributed cases. 81
79ibid.
,
p. 40.
SOibid.
,
p Al.
Sllbid.
,
pp. 41-42.
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In short, although the President cannot declare war.
his foreign affairs powers, rocted in the Executive Power
vested in him, enable the President to confront Congress
with faits accoinpli^ which the Congress may or may not
support. 82 T^^ys^ Hamilton concedes that Congress has the
final word on war and peace.
The legislature alvone can interrupt those blessings
/ of peace j, by placing the Nation in a state of War. 83
But he concedes no more to Congress than the final
word
,
It deserves to be remarked, that as the parricipation
of the senate in the making of Treaties and the power
of the Legislature to declare war are exceDtions out
of the general 'Executive Power' vested in' the Presi-
dent, they are to be construed strictly--and ought to
be extended no further than is essential to their ex-
ecution.
To sum up: it was Hamilton's view that only Congress
can commence war, in the sense of authorizing protracted
hostilities. However, the initiative in foreign affairs
lies with the President and he may, as a result, create
situations which lead to war.
Such clai-ms for Presidential povjer did not sit well
with the pro-French faction, led by Jefferson, who, on
another occasion had expressed his understanding of war-
making under the Constitution.
82corwin, The P
8
-^Hamilton, Papers . 15:42.
84ibid.
,
p. 42,
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^^"^^^^l^^jdy given in example one effectual checkto the Dog of x^ar by transferring the power of let-
^ Executive to the Legislativebody, .Lrgm those who are to spend to those who areto pay,
Although Jefferson had approved of the Proclamation
of neutrality he implored Madison to rebut "Pacificus .
"
Nobody ansvjers him and his doctrines are taken for
confessed. For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your
pen, select the most striking heresies and cut him
to pieces in face of the public. 86
Madison responded with his own series of articles
signed "Helvidius," and published late in the summer of 1793.
First off Madison rejects the
extraordinary doctrine that the pox^^ers of making war
and treaties are, in their nature, executive, and
therefore comprehended in the general grant of exe-
cutive power, where not especially and'strictly ex-
cepted out of the grant,
"Helvidius" contends that executive power can only be exer-
cised where there is already law to be executed ; that making
a treaty or declaring war require no pre-existing laws; and
that therefore such powers are more legislative than executive
88m nature.
Furthermore, the Framers of the Constitution must
have considered war-making a legislative power because they
^^Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September
1789, Portable Jefferson , p. 451.
^^Quoted in Corwin, The Pres iden t, p. 180.
^
'James Hadlyoii, "Helvidiub" No. 1, Letters and__other
writings cf James Madison , 4 vols. (PhiladelpHia : ~J7~B . Lip
plncott L Corr~T5l35TT~Tn:i2"613
.
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 6iA-615
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listed the pov7er to declare war among the powers of Con-
gress "without any other qualification than what is common
to every other legislative act."^^
Secondly, whatever the extent of executive power, it
cannot extend to "authority clearly placed by the consti-
tution in another department." "The declaring of war,"
Madison points out,
is expressly made a legislative function. Whenever,
then, a question occurs, whether war shall be declared,
or whether public stipulations require it, the ques-
tion necessarily belongs to the department to which
those functions belong; and no other department can be
in the execution of its proper functions if it should
undertake to decide such a questionT^Ti
Thirdly, v/hen "Pacificus" suggests that the right to
judge whether or not the United States is obligated to go
tc war is concurrent (i.e., shared by both Congress and
the President), he is inconsistent, imprudent and in error.
He is inconsistent argues "Helvidius", because he had included
the power of judging whether or not the United States is
obligated, to go to V7ar within the power to declare war,
which be admitted is vested in the legislature.^-^
He is imprudent because the branches m^ight reach con-
tradictory conclusions, thus embarrassing the United
States before the world. Finally, argues "Helvidius,"
^'^^Ibid.
,
p. 616
^^Jamco Madison, "Helvidius" no. 2, ibid., p. 623.
^llbid.
,
p. 622.
"Pacificus" is in error because the notion of such a con-
current power finds no warrant in any of the provisions of
the Constitution, and violates the principle of separation
of powers
.
In suiDinary, Madison tries to refute all of Hamilton's
major contentions. lie rejects Hamilton's claims for Pres-
idential power in foreign affairs as encroachments upon
Congressional war power.
...the legislature is the only competent and consti-
tutional organ of the will of the nation, that is of
Its disposition, its duty, and its interest, in rela-
tion to a commencement of war.
.
.
In exercising the constitutional power of deciding a
question of war, the legislature ought to be as free
to decide, according to its own sense of the public
good, on one side as on the other side.^^
Presidential fait s accompli s would rob the Congress
of its power to freely decide for war or peace, and are
therefore without constitutional warrant.
However, while Hamilton and Madison disagree about
the extent of Presidential power over foreign policy, they
agree upon a question of fundamental importance to our
study. Both Hamilton and Madison agree that the last word
on the commencement of war rests with Congress and not the
President. That this is Madison's view cannot be doubted;
the passage just quoted settles the issue.
^^"Helvidius" ncs . 2,3, ibid., pp. 622-39
^^"Helvidius" no. 5, ibid., pp. 648-649.
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As for Hamiltcn. recall that it was "Pacificus" who
remarked as follows.
The legislature alone can interrupt those blessings/of peace/, by placing the Nation in a state of War. 94
Thus, even the foremost proponent of Presidential
power in foreign affairs of his day concedes that only Con-
gress may place the United States "in a state of War."
This is most significant and will weigh heavily in the con-
clusions we are about to draw.
Conclusions
1. Under British law and theory the war power was
part of the Executive power, and resided in the CrowTi.
Montesquieu and Locke considered the war power to be execu-
tive in nature. At the Constitutional Convention the Pres-
ident was initially granted all of the executive powers
formerly invested in the Continental Congress, but this was
objected to in part because it would have given the Pres-
ident the power of war and peace.
2, In Convention, the Committee of Detail vested the
"executive power" in the President, while giving Congress
the power to "make war." The full Convention changed the
phraseology to "declare war," leaving certain war-powers
to the President, While the full significance of the
change is not clear, one effect vjas to empower the Presi-
9 ^Kami 1 1on
,
Papert> , 1 5 : 4.
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dent to respond unilaterally in case of attack on the na-
tion
.
3. Post" Convention commentaries, such as the Fed-
eralist Papers, the record of the debates in the state rati-
fying conventions, and the "Helvidius-Pacif icus" debate
suggest that contemporaries believed that the Constitution
gave Congress the final word on the comm.encement of war.
While there are a number of uncertainties, the origi -
understanding, of the Constitution seems to have been
that Congress aiid Congress alone had the power to initiate
war unless the country was attacked, or perhap s , in immi-
nent danger of attack
.
Perhaps "Helvidius" was right when he exclaimed:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be
found, than in the clause V7hich confides the question
of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the ex-
ecutive department . ^5
Nevertheless, "Pacificus"' message should not be for-
gotten;' and it is that the Congress will have to take into
account what the President has done in foreign affairs when
it considers whether or not to commence war. For the Pres-
ident has a right, says "Pacificus,"
in certain cases, to determine the condition of the
Nation, though it may consequently affect uhe proper
or improper exercise of the Power of the Legislature
to declare vjar. The Executive indeed cannot control
the exercise of that power ... though the Executive in
^5James Madison, "Helvidius" no. 4, Letters, 1:543.
the exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things which ought to
weigh in the legislative decisions. 96
Hamj.lton, Papers
, 15:41-42
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CHAPTER II
THE UNDECLARED NAVAL WAR WITH FRANCE. 1797 -1800
Introduction
America's first undeclared war began in 1797, quite
early in the nation's history. However, it was hardly an ex-
ample of excessive claims on behalf of Presidential war power.
On the contrary, Congress authorized nearly every hostile
act undertaken in the Adams administration.
The roots of the so-called Quasi War lay in the war
between France and England which began in 1793. The United
States wished to maintain its profitable sea-trade with both
of the great European powers, as well as with their Carib-
bean possessions. Naturally, both France and Great Britain
resented any third party trading with the enemy. The newly
independent United States, a military weakling with no navy
or standing army, rapidly became a pawn in the great power
struggle . '-
Although the United States was bound by treaty to
2France Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the
European conflict in his famous Proclamation of April 22,
•^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomat i c History of the Ameri-
can People
,
9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
,
Inc.
,
1974)
,
pp. 66-91.
^United States, Department of State, Treaties and
Other International Agreements o f the Uni ted States, 1776-
1949
,
comp. Charles iT Bevans (Washington : Government Print
-
Tng~Office, 1971), 7:763, "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," TS
No. 83, 17 July 1778; "Treaty of Alliance, "TS No. 82, 17 July
1778.
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31793. (This was the Proclamation that prompted the "Helvi-
dius-Pacificus" debate.^) The Proclamation did little good,
because immediately thereafter Great Britain seized American
vessels and their crews carrying on a profitable food trade
with France.^
Americans were not yet over their outrage at British
depredations when France began to retaliate by seizing Ameri-
can merchant ships carrying supplies to England.^ Early the
followD-ng year, 1794, Britain eased its seizure policy and
even offered indemnification for American losses. Conse-
quently, the United States began negotiating with England,
out of which issued the Jay Treaty.^
The Jay Treaty, ratified by Washington August 14, 1795
aroused great opposition from both France and her supporters
in America, amongst whom most of the Jeffersonian Republican
could be numbered. The reasons for their anger are readily
apparent: England had forced the United States to make con-
g
cessions which V7ere clearly unfavorable to France,
3
James D. Richardson, ed
.
, A Compilation of the Mes-
sages and Papers of the Presidents , "KT^vols . (New Yorlcl Bu
-
reau o±~nationai Literature, Inc., 1897), 1:148-149.
4See my chap. 1, supra.
^Bailey, p. 73.
^Ibid.
,
p. 74.
^U. S. Treaties and Or.her Tnterna t Tonal Agreements ,
12 : 13
,
"Treaty with (ireat Britain oi Amity , Commerce and Nav
igation," TS No. 105, 28 October 1795; Bailey, pp. /4-8?..
^Samuel F. Bemis , Jay's Treaty (New Raven: Yale Uni
versity Press, 1962), pp. TSS^GlTrw^SO
.
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In fact, a number of Jay Treaty provisions appear to
be inconsistent with articles contained in the Franco-
American Treaties of Alliance and of Amity and Conmierce.
For example, Article 24 of the Treaty of Amity and Com-
merce prohibited the neutral signatory (the United States)
from granting port privileges to the privateers of any
nation at war (England) with the other signatory (France) .
^
But Article 25 of the Jay Treaty stipulated that British
war ships and privateers were to have port privileges in
the United States. 10
In addition, by Article 17 of the Jay Treaty, the
United States form.ally acquiesced in the British policy
of disrupting sea trade with France. This clause permitted
seizure of cargoes belonging to or destined for an enemy,
the American merchant to be indemified
.
By contrast, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with
France embodied a principle long urged by the Americans:
"Free ships make free goods." This meant that the merchant
ships of an ally were free to carry any goods, regardless
of ovmership
,
origin or destination, provided only that war
material not be transported to an enemy,
^U . S . Treaties and Other Interna tional Agreements , 1 -.111
IQu.S. Trea ties and Other International Agreements ,
12:28-29': -
"
l^Ibid.
,
pp. 25-26.
1 ^U.S. Treaties and Other In teinatio'^al Agreements ,
7:771, art. 25.
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The Ouas i War
As noted above, French attacks on American shipping
had begun in 1793, before the Jay Treaty. In early 1795
they subsided, but in the last months of Washington's ad-
ministration, following proclamation of the Jay Treaty,
depredations vjere renewed. On July 2, 1796, France decreed
that, henceforth, she shall treat the vessels of neutrals
"in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to
treat them."^^
Within one year of this proclamation. Secretary of
State Pickering reported, France had seized 316 American
vessels. 1^ To make matters worse, Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, whom Washington had appointed as the new minis-
ter to France was rebuffed by the French Directory. And
the President of the five-man Directory, Monsieur Barras,
made a public address openly insulting the American govern-
ment. Thus, by the time Adams took office, diplomatic re-
15lations with France had been severed.
On March 2, 1797, two days before Adams' inaugura-
tion, France issued another decree, this one clearly aimed
at American commerce. Enemy goods in neutral ships were
^^Gardner W. Allen, Our Naval War with France (1909;
reprint ed . , Hamdon , Conn.: Archon Books, 196/), pp. 30-31,
•'"^Bailey, p. 93.
IVilen, p. 22; Bailey, p. 93
declared subject to seizure. Furthermore, any i^^erican
serving on an enemy ship "shall be from that act alone de-
clared a pirate and treated as such"; in other words,
hanged, even if he had been forcibly impressed into the
British navy. Finally, any American vessel not carrying a
^'gqi4_£a£e--a list of the crew prepared in a form
deemed proper by French authorities—was to be considered
good prize
.
On March 25th, Adams called for a special session of
Congress to be convened May 15. "'"'^ His goal was to get
Congressional approval for new negotiations with France
coupled with measures for national defense,-'-^
Republicans were alarmed, fearing Adams was going to
ask Congress for war measures against France, Many Fed-
eralists, on the other hand, were opposed to negotiations.
Hamilton was not, as he secretly advised Adams' cabinet.
As a result, Adams' address to the Special Session of the
Fifth Congress, on May 16, 1797, accurately reflected
Hamilton s views.
Adams' message dealt only with France. He decried
the rebuff of C.C. Pinckney and the speech of Monsieur
l^Allen, pp. 32-33, 298-299.
^^Richardson, 1:222-223.
18/^lexander De Conde, The Quasi- War (New York
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966"), p. 18
.
19 Ibid.
, pp. 18-25,
Barras as having "inflicted a wound in the American
breasc", but vowed, in the interest of peace, to "insti-
tute a fresh attempt at negotiation." At the same time,
attacks on American vessels require, Adams told the Con-
gress, some measures of defense. In the long run, a navy
seems essential, he noted; for now. Congress should equip
the three frigates begun during Washington's administra-
tion and not yet made sea-worthy, and provide smaller
ships which, along with the frigates, could convoy unarmed
merchantships
.
In addition, he urged Congress to augment
the regular artillery and cavalry, revise the laws for the
organization of the militia, and form a "provisional army."
Not much was accomplished in that special session.
The House spent the rest of May haggling over the formal
response to the President's speech. (A formal reply was
customary then.) On June 5, 1797, a series of resolutions
establishing the principles (details were to be v7orked
out by legislative committee) of Adams' defense program
were offered. The Republicans opposed the program as be-
ing likely to lead to war with France; they urged delay
until completion of the negotiations,'^-^
20Thomas H. Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of
Congres_s (New York: D. Appleton, 1857), 2:114-17.
^^U.S., Congress, Debates and Proceedings j-n the
Congress of the Uni ted S tates
,
17_89-1824 (Washington:
Gales ancfSeaton T5"Tff:' / Hereinafter
cited as "Annals" 7
Some debate on the war-powers of the President did
take place. The Federalists wished to give Adams a rela-
tively free hand in using whatever naval power Congress might
authorize; the Republicans wished to constrain him. Federal-
ist Congressman Otis offered a representative argument in
response to a Republican amendment limiting the use of the
navy to the jurisdiction of the United States.
KR. OTIS sais ha objected to the amendment, because
it appeared repugnant to the powers placed in the
President by the Constitution. If a naval force was
raised, it would rest with the President how it
should be employed, as he was commander-in-chief.
The Legislature could say whether the vessels should
be employed offensively or defensively, but to say
at what precise place they were to be stationed,
was interfering with the duty of comniander-in-chief
;
and although he would have no right to send these
vessels to the West Indies, or as convoys yet he
might defend the seaccast as he pleased.
The amendment was defeated, 49-38. The Republican
position was made clear during debate on a bill already ap-
proved in the Senate, providing a naval force for the pro-
tection of trade,
MR. NICHOLAS . . . denied the right of the President
to apply the naval force of the United States to any
object he pleased. Wlien a force was raised for a
particular object, he agreed that it was his business
to direct the manner in which this forces should be
used; but to say he had the right to apply it at his
discretion, was to make him master of the United
States; if that were the case, he said, the powers
of the House V7ere gone. When they raised men for
the protection of the frontier, would the Presi-
dent, he asked, send them to any other place? He in-
sisted upon it that they had a right to say the veP'
sels should be kept in the ri^^er Dclav^'are, if Lhey
Annals, 7:2.90.
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pleasd; the President: might afterwards direct theirconduct If a contrary doctrine were to prevail if
.hey did not give up the right of declaring war / theygave up the power, which would inevitably lead to war 23
Congressman Harper, a Federalist from South Carolina,
cleverly argued that the use of the navy ought to be left to
the President because he had no authority to employ it in any
but peaceful manner; to do otherwise "would be a breach of
his power." "He, therefore, could not," Harper conceded,
"repel any violation of our rights by force, except previous-
ly authorized by Congress . "^^^
The Republicans were not convinced. Representat5-ve
S. Smith pointed out that "{i}f the power of em.ploying the
frigates was v7holly left with the President, though he had
not the power of declaring war, yet he might so employ them
as to lead to war.""^ Though the Republicans were outnum-
bered, they combined with moderate Federalists to force com-
promises and inaction.
As a result, the only legislation enacted that is
pertinent to this study is as follows. Privateering by Amer-
icans against nations V7ith which the United States is at
peace or against other Americans was outlawed. Arms and
ammunition exports were banned, and their importation en-
~ 23^nals, 7:362-363.
2^Ibid., p. 364.
^^Ibid.
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couraged. Port and harbor defenses were improved. A de-
tachment of militia was authorized: eighty thousand men
to be called up from the various states. Taxes on vellum,
parcliment, paper, and on salt were established. And the
act "providing a Naval Armament" was passed. '^"^
The Naval Armament Act empowered the President,
"should he deem it expedient, to cause the frigates United
States, Constitution, and Constellation, to be manned and
employed." This act also authorized the President to use the
Treaury Department's revenue cutters "to defend the seacoastl'^^
A frigate, incidentally, was a three-masted sail ship carry-
ing between twenty-eight and forty-four guns on one or two
decks. Cutters were much smaller vessels, carrying less
than twenty guns. The British and other European navies
were vastly superior, since they had whole squadrons con-
28
sisting of ships-of-the-line
,
i.e., seventy--four gun ships.
Perhaps the m.ost important action of this first ses-
sion of the Fifth Congress was the confirmation by the
Senate of Adams' selections of the men to make up the new
comiTiission to France. Adams wanted a three-man commission
of moderate views. His Cabinet, on the other hand, wanted
^^Annals, 9:3685-3701. 1 Stat. 520-23.
^''l Stat. 523-5 (1797).
^^Harold H. Sprout and Margaret Sprcit , The Rise of
American Nava l Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
K-ess, 1939), p. 43.
three. Federalists. Adams nominated C.C. Pinckney (still
in Europe after his rejection by France). John Marshall,
a Federalist lawyer and later Supreme Court Chief Justice,
and Francis Dana, a Massachusetts judge. When Dana de-
clined to serve, Adams replaced him-~without consulting
his Cabinet-
-with Elbridge Gerry, a moderate Republican.
The Senate confirmed, and Marshall and Gerry left for
France in late July, 1797.29
The commissioners were instructed as follows. They
were to negotiate a new treaty with France designed to
supersede all prior pacts; the new agreement was to last
for ten or twenty years. The United States was to accept
no blame for the current crisis, nor was it to agree to
anything inconsistent with the Jay Treaty. Compensation
for losses due to French depredations v/ere to be sought:,
but were not to be considered indispensable to a treaty
agreement. The United States could grant France the same
privileges granted England in the Jay Treaty, including
abandoning the "free ships, free goods" principle. Finally,
the United States was to eliminate a clause in the Treaty
of Alliance obligating it to guarantee French possessions
in America; and the provision in a consular convention
signed in 1788, calling for prize courts in American ports.
29De Conde, pp. 28-29, 35
30ibid.
,
pp. 44-45.
The Americans would have to negotiate with France's
new Minister of Foreign Relations, the wily Charles Maurice
de Talleyrand-P^ripord. Talleyrand was responsible to the
five-^rnan Executive Directory. He was instructed to aban-
don requiring American ships to carry a role d'equipage.
but to delay indenmification for American losses. Further-
more, he was to end future depredations only if France
were granted the same rights given England by the Jay
Treaty
.
The envoys met Talleyrand in Paris in early October,
1797. He was polite, but refused to start negotiations.
Later that month, Talleyrand's agents contacted the envoys
informally, and requested as a prelude to negotiations a
bribe for the French officials, a promise of an American
loan to France, and a retraction of some of Adams' comments
before the special session of Congress, last May 16th.
(Soon thereafter, the Americans were shocked to learn that
the bribe demand totaled about a quarter of a million dol-
lars.) The comjnissioners were not morally outraged; they
would pay the customary diplomatic douceur - -but only after
a treaty V7as agreed to, not as a preliminary to negotiations
As November drew near, Napoleon's triumph over
Austria strengthened France's bargaining position with the
31lbid,
,
p, 43.
-"^^ibid.
,
pp. 46-47
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United States; her domination over Western Europe was as-
sured. The rest of 1797 saw nothing but repeated demands
for bribe money, coupled with repeated American refusals.
The envoys also refused to agree to the loan because they
felt it would violate American neutrality. Furthermore,
they refused to disavow any of President Adams' speech.
When the Fifth Congress opened its second session in mid-
November, the legislators knew nothing of the diplomatic
stalemate
.
On November 23, 1797, Adams urged the second session
of the Fifth Congress, in light of "increasing depreda-
tions" by France, to approve of the "precautionary meas-
sures" he had recommended last May. But the Congress pre-
ferred to await news of the progress of the negotiations
D.n Paris. On March 4, 1798, the administration received
a number of dispatches, some in code, detailing the fail-
ure of the mission, the solicited bribes, and an account
of a new French decree aimed at American commerce. ^'^
Adams asked his cabinet if he should recommend a
declaration of war to Congress. Secretary of State
Pickering favored it, but Hamilton counseled Secretary of
War McHenry to urge defensive measures. At first, feel-
ing the United States had no choice, Adams drafted a war
message: later he scrapped it, in part because he thought
33ibid.
,
pp. 48-52.
^"^Annals, 7:631; De Conde, p. 66,
the Congress would not approve a declaration of war.^S
On March 5. the President forwarded one of the un-
coded dispatches to Congress, explaining that it was so im-
portant he wanted it to be "inrniediately made known." The
dispatch stated "chat there exists no hope
. . . that the
objects of our mission will be in any way accomplished."
It also included details of the latest French decree. Adams
reported receipt of other disptaches, yet to be deciphered.
On January 18, the Directory had declared that a
ship's cargo is no longer covered by its flag. In other
words, goods once transported from an enemy (British) port
are subject to seizure-
-even if on board a neutral (Ameri-
can) ship and ovmed by a citizen of a neutral state. This
new decree was broadly enough interpreted to include items
other than cargo --such as navigational instruments --which
had been manufactured in England.
On March 19, 1798, Adams sent a message to Congress,
repeating his call for defensive measures to protect mer-
chantships and "exposed portions" of United States terri-
tory. He told Congress that after examination and consid-
eration of all the envoys' communications, "I perceive
. ^^De Conde, pp. 67-68.
^^Annals, 7:1200-1202.
^''De Conde, p. 53.
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no ground of expectation that the objects of their mission
con be accomplished on terms compatible with the safety,
honor, or the essential interests of the nation." Further-
more, he rescinded an order of Washington's prohibiting
the arming of American vessels.
Congressional Republicans were alarmed; they feared
that the Administration would lead them into war with
France. Congressman Sprigg of Maryland proposed three
resolutions, one of which declared "that under existing
circumstances, it is not expedient for the United States to
resort to war against the French Republic." This touched
off a debate on the war-making power.
Representative Sitgreaves opposed the resolutions;
since Congress alone could declare vzar, he reasoned, sim-
ply forebearing "is a sufficient expression of their senti-
ment that such a declaration would be inexpedient." Repre-
sentative Bladwin disagreed; we should, he suggested, turn
to the Constitution for direction. Baldw5.n "did not be-
lieve it was intended that this House should merely be
the instrument to give the sound of war; the subject seemed
to be placed wholly in the hands of the Legislature. That,"
he went on
,
^^Annals, 8:1271-1272
3'Ibid., p. 1319ff.
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was the understanding of the country when there wasno Government m existence, and he believed this
was the meaning of the Constitution But
some persons declare that the present state of thingsIS already a state of war; ... if the House does
not believe this to be a true position, this reso-lution ought to be agreed to
. .
.^0
Mr. Otis, a Federalist, countered with a proposal to
use "the Constitutional words" in the resolution, substitut-
ing "declare" for 'iresort to." Representative Nicholas rose
to protest that in its original wording "the mischief was
met, whilst the other meant nothing." He explained that
if gentlemen were ready to say we v/ere not prepared
to declare war, and at the same time were not ready
to say it is not expedient to resort to war, it proved
that they thought war might be made without beinp de-
clared. ^1 ^
Then Nicholas spoke to the heart of Republican fears.
Has not the Executive, he asked rhetorically, taken measures
which would lead to war, leaving Congress with no choice on
the matter? He was certain the Constitution gave Congress
the power over the progress of vjhat led to v^ar, as
well as the power of declaring war; but if the Pres-
ident could take the measures which he had taken,
with respect to arming merchant vessel?,, he, and not
Congress, had the power of making war.^"^
The Sprigg resolutions died; but they were quickly
overshadowed by the effects of a new, and successful, Re-
publican-supported resolution. This measure, offered by
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 1320-1321.
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 1321-24.
^+2ibid.
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extreme Federalists to embarras France and her American
sympathizers, called for the President to release all the
dispatches referred to in his March 19th message to Con-
gress. The extreme Federalists, unlike the Republicans,
were apparently aware in advance of the explosive nature
of the dispatches. The House resolution passed on April 2,
1798.^3
Adams hastily complied the very next day, He for-
warded the envoys' instructions along with their decoded
dispatches, using the initials, W, X, Y, and Z in place
of the names of Talleyrand's bribe-demanding agents. The
Republicans vv^ere stunned, the Federalists emboldened.
Soon, newspapers published or reported about the ''XYZ dis-
patches", and Congress had copies printed for distribution.
Thereafter, Congress and the public turned against France. '^^
In the meantime, the mission to France broke up.
Talleyrand, desirous of negotiating with the envoy most
sympathetic to France- -Mr. Gerry- -successfully alienated
Marshall and Pinckney by repeatedly demanding an American
loan. In addition, he flattered Gerry into believing he
was the last hope for a Franco-American rapprochement. So
in the Spring of 1798, Marshall sailed for America, to be
treated like a hero, Pinckney remained with his family in
43De Conde, pp. 71-72,
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 72-75.
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southern France, and Gerry, although without authority to
negotiate a treaty on his own, remained in Paris.
The Envoys did not know it, but their dispatches
would be used to whip up an ant i
-French frenzy in America.
The Federalists promoted the hysteria in order uo obtain
support for their war program, and, not incidentally, to
discredit and destroy the Republican party.
Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1798, the Con-
gress continued to debate various war measures proposed
by the Federalists. As is often the case with legislatures,
the immediate issue was sometim.es masked by discussions of
abstract principles of constitutional and international
law. Debates turning on the question of the war-making
power are of particular interest.
On April 18, the House took up a bill already passed
by the Senate, which authorized the President to procure
up to sixteen vessels rated at no more than twenty-two
guns, to be employed as convoys or however the President
thought proper. Representative Harper, a Federalist,
supported the measure on the grounds that once the ships
were provided the President has the Constitutional author-
ity to employ them as he pleases "conformably to the state
of peace." It is the business of the Congress, Harper
argued, "to f the state of the country, and provide
^•^Ibid. . D. 53-58, 92-93
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force; that of the President to employ the force, accord-
ing to that state. "^^
The next day, Congressman Dayton, Federalist, sup-
ported Harper's argument, noting that the President derived
his authority from the Constitutional provision making him
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. Mr. Gallatin, Re-
publican, disagreed. There is a difference, he declared,
hetv/een the power to command, which the President has, and
the "application of a force," which is a legislative func-
tion. "Besides," he added,
if this power of granting convoys in the President
be taken for granted ... a distinction must be
assumed which is not recognized in the Constitution,
vi.7.
: between the power of making war, and the
power of committing hostility. Because it neces-
sarily results from, the power of granting convoys,
that the President also has the power of author-
izing the commision of hostilities. Convoys are
granted for the protection, by force, of our trade,
and any attack is hostility; and until the distinc-
tion
. . . was assumed, it was impossible to allow
that the President had any such power.
Representative Dana, Federalist, took issue with
Gallatin's assertion that authorizing convoys will produce
V7ar. He suggested that convoys are measures of defense,
and, citing Vattel, added that "defense is not hostility;
nor do mere reprisals amount to war." GaliatD.n retorted
that Dana was making mere verbal and legal distinctions,
that convoys would likely mean fighting, and there is "no
^^Annals, 8:1445-1446.
^^IbiJ., p. 1456.
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difference in fact betvjeen fighting and war."^S ultimately,
the Republicans managed to delete any reference to convoys,
and to reduce to tvjelve the number of ships to be procured.
But a Republican measure to prohibit convoying was defeated.
In May and June, under great pressure from extreme
Federalists and fearing for the safety of his envoys who had
yet to return from France, Adams again considered asking for
a declaration of war. Not all Federalists agreed, however.
Hamilton, for one, felt that Adams should put the onus on
Congress by declaring that his authority went only "so far
and no farther, " but that our trade required "a more exten-
sive protection." Hamilton went on, in the same letter to
Secretary of War McHenry, May 17, 1789, to describe the
limits of Presidential authority as follows.
Not having seen the law which provides the Naval
Armament
,
I cannot tell whether it gives any new
power to the President that is any power whatever
with regard to the employirient of the Ships. If not,
and he is left at the foot of the Constitution, as
I understand to be the case, I am not ready to say
that he has any other power than merely to employ
the Ships as Convoys with authority to repel force
fo^ce (but not to capture) , and to repress~Tibs-
tilities within our waters including a marine lea-
gue from our coasts-
-
Anything beyond this must fall under the idea of re-
prisals & requires the sanction of that Department
^^Ibid., pp. 1.503-1504, 1510-1511.
^^Marsha 1 1 Sme 1 s er , The Congres s Fouiids _th_£ Navy
,
1787-1798 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University oF'Notre Dame Press,
r93l577''pp. 145-146; Act to provide an additional Armament,
1 Stat.* 552 (1798).
50De Conde, p. 89
r.i
wtiich is to declare or make war.
In so delicate a case, in one which involves soimportant a consequence as thai: of War--my opinion
IS that no doubtful authority ought i ) be exercisedby the President
.
-'l
Adams never did ask for a declaration of war, and
Congress continued to pass war legislation.
A Senate bill authorizing the President to raise a
"provisional army" also roused strong Republican opposition,
and some debate on Presidential poxsrer. The Republicans
argued that the Constitution empowered the Legislature alone
to raise an army, but this bill turned that power over to
the President. Gallatin warned: {I}f Congress were once to
admiit the principle that they have a right to vest in the
President powers placed in their hands by the Constitution,
that instrument would become a piece of blank paper. "^^
The Federalists responded that the bill was not in-
tended to transfer any Congressional pov^ers , that the Pro-
visional Army would be raised by the Legislature, and that
the President could act only in the evert of certain contin-
gencies
,
viz., a declaration of war against the United
States, an invasion, or, imminent danger of invasion. Re-
publicans thought the last contingency too vague, but on May
11 the bill passed the House. The Republicans were
^'"United States, Office of Naval Records and Library,
Naval Documents relating to the Quasi War with France, 7 vols
(VJashinf^ton : (ToverninentPrmtmg Orfice, 1933-38) .L (1935) :
75.
^^Annals, 8:1520.
able to reduce the size of the force from the twenty thou-
sand approved by the Senate, to ten thousand. ^3
As public indignation over the XYZ dispatches mounted,
so did the aggressiveness of the Federalist war program.
On May 22, Representative Sitgreaves introduced a series
of resolutions instructing private armed vessels to "take
or destroy" any French cruiser attacking an American ship,
and to retake any American craft so captured. Also, public
armed ships would be ordered to "take or destroy" French
cruisers found within blank miles of the American coast.
The Republicans angrily opposed the measures as being tan-
tamount to war. "It is true," Gallatin fumed,
they are not a declaration of war; but they go to the
making or partial war. Was it ever heard that letters
of marque were given to public vessels? /_ These re-
solutions J are instructions to our public" vessels to
make war . ^4
The Sitgreaves resolutions were abandoned however,
because the Senate had already completed and forwarded to
the House a bill designed to do the sam.e thing; clear the
coast of French cruisers. On May 28, 1798, "An Act more
effectually to protect the commerce and coasts of the U.S."
was approved by Congress. By this act the President was
authorized to instruct the navy to "seize, take and bring
into port" armed vessels that have committed depredations
•^^ibid. , 1641-89.
^^Ibid.
,
1783, 1809.
63
or are found "hovering" on the American coast for that
purpose. 55 Thus. Adams became the first Chief Executive
to preside over a limited, but undeclared war.
John Marshall arrived in America in mid- June, 1798.
He was feted, and a toast at one of the parties in his
honor became a patriotic Federalist rallying cry: "Mil-
lions for defense, but not a cent for tribute." It referred,
of course, to the refusal of the commissioners to meet the
bribe and loan demands of Messieurs W,X,Y,and Z. Marshall
then advised Adams that, in his opinion, the French Direc-
tory did not want full-scale war with the United States.
Adams, who bad be now been caught up in the war hysteria
himself, postponed his decision to ask Congress for a
declaration of war.
Adams instead sent a special message to Congress on
June 21, announcing the end of the mission to France, his
pleasure at Marshall's safe return, and his refusal to
send any more ministers to France unless assurances of their
proper and respectful treatment were given. 5 The extreme
Federalists were disappointed; they were hoping that Adams
would ask for a declaration of war. On July 5, Congress-
Allen, Federalist, offered a resolution to establish aman
55l Stat. 561; Annals, 9:3733; Smelser, pp. 165-166
56De Conde, pp. 92-95.
57Richardson , 1:256.
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committee to declare the state of relations between the
United States and France. But the moderate Federalists
and Republicans killed the measure. They also defeated
extreme Federalist attempts to make unarmed French ships
legitimate subjects of attack; such measures would have
altered America's defensive posture,
As it was, the tumultuous second session of the
Fifth Congress enacted over a score of bills related to
the Quasi War. The principal legislation established a
separate Navy Department , 59 authorized procurement of twelve
twenty -two -gun ships, ^0 and ten smaller vessels (gallies),61
permitted the President to accept an additional twelve ships
as gifts or loans in exchange for six percent bonds, 62
empowered the President to raise a Provisional Army^^ ^^^^
enlarge the regular military, 64 authorized the seizure of
French armed ships, ^5 fortified ports and harbors, p^.^^
^^Ibid.
,
PP , 95, 103-106
^^1 Stat . 553 (1798).
60ibid. P- 552.
61lbid. P- 556.
^^ibid. P- 575.
Ibid.
,
p. 558.
6^-1 Ibid.
, P- 604.
65ibid. D .
i.
561.
66ibid. P- 554.
vided arms and ammunition
, established a Marine Corps,
suspended trade with France and her dependencies,^^ and
abrogated all treaties with France. In addition, it
adopted the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts, aimed at
repressing opponents of Federalist policies 7''"
Of the legislation produced in the second session,
the following are pertinent to the war -making power of the
President. An act providing "an additional regiment of
artillerists and engineers" empowered the President to em-
ploy same "in the field, or the fortifications upon the
seacoast, as, in his opinion, the public service shall re-
70
quire.
"
The Provisional Army Act author i2:ed the President to
enlist up to ten thousand men "in the event of a declara-
tion of war against the United States, or of actual invasion
. . . or of imminent danger of such invasion discovered, in
his opinion, to exist, before the next session of Congress.'"^
^'''ibid.
,
p. 555.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 594.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 565.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 578.
-^^Ibid., pp. 566, 570, 577, 596.
^^Ibid., pp. 552-553.
^^Ibid., p. 558.
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The law "more effectually to protect the commerce and
coasts of the United States" pointed out that French cruisers
had "committed depredations" against American merchant ships
in violation of Franco
-American treaty agreements. Therefore,
the President vjas authorized to order the navy to "seize,
take, and bring into
, . . port
. . . armed vessel{s} which
shall have committed, or which shall be found hovering on the
coasts of the United States for the purpose of committing, de-
predations" against American vessels; and to retake any Amer-
ican ship so captured.''^
This last piece of legislation, enacted late May,
was supplemented in July by the "Act further to protect the
commerce of the United States." The latter empowered the
President to instruct the navy to "subdue, seize, and take
any French armed vessel, vjhich shall be found within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States or elsewhere, on
75the high seas." Section two enabled the President to grant
"special commissions" to private armed vessels to act in
76
similar fashion.
Finally, in mid-July, "An Act to augment the Army of
the United States, and for other purposes," was approved,
^'^
74Ibid., p. 561
^^Ibid.
,
p. 578.
^^Ibid., p. 579.
'^''ibid.
,
p. 604.
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Section two authorizes the President to enlist twelve infan-
try regiments and six troops of "light dragoons" (mounted
troops)
,
"for and during the continuance of the existing
differences between the United States and the French Repub-
lic. "^^
The two acts to protect commerce are. the most impor-
tant in authorizing the hostilities of the war. The war has
been called a "quasi war," and these acts are said to be
"half-measures," in part, because the United States never
formally declared war against France. But they are "half-
measures" in another sense as V7ell, as evidenced by the lim-
ited nature of the hostilities they permit. In both the May
Act and its July supplement, attacks are permitted on French
armed vessels only. This omits unarmed, French merchant ves-
sels, which would be normal subjects for attack in a war.^"^
Secondly, although preparations for a ground war are
the objects of the Provisional Army and Army augmentation
legislation, no provision is made for the use of these troops
in hostilities. Actually, the Provisional Army was never re-
cruited, and in early 1800, Congress effectively revoked
these measures.
-^^Ibid.
^^De Conde, p. 96
80Ibid.
,
pp. 255-256.
Third, not only are naval hostilities alone permitted,
but these are limited in locale as well as subject. Even
the "Act further to protect commerce" excludes attacks on
French ships in their o\m territorial waters. Incidentally,
this raises some question about the legitimacy of American
naval operations off the coasts of French possessions in
the West Indies (discussed below)
.
Under the July Commerce Act over a thousand "special
commissions" V7ere issued to American private armed ships.
But because they could not attack any but armed French ves-
sels, unarmed merchant ships being proscribed, there was
not enough private profit incentive for real American pri-
vateering. This was especially true since the British
navy had practically cleared the seas of French merchant
ships
.
By the Fall of 1798, the infant United States Navy
and American armed merchantships had discouraged French
corsairs from operating off the American coast. Operations
V7ere then expanded to the Caribbean, where French privateers
had been feasting off burgeoning United States trade. The
American Navy operated out of St. Domingue (Haiti), where
we had m.ajor sugar interests, and Guadeloupe. Both were
French possessions, although French rule in St. Dom.ingue
was only nominal after Francois Dominique Toussaint
81Ibid.
.
p. 127
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(L'Ouverture) led a black slave revolt there. 82
The French cruisers had been based off these islands,
so the principal action of the war took place there. By
the beginning of 1799, the United States Navy was success-
fully convoying a resurgent American commerce in the West
Indies. On March 14, 1799, the French governor-general
of Guadeloupe declared war on the United States, and formal-
ly ordered the seizure of American ships. But this had no
effect on the war because the United States Navy had, by
then, restrained French privateers in the Caribbean. 83
Even before the Navy curtailed their privateers,
France had resolved to avoid a complete rupture with the
United States. Several factors contributed to the French
decision. On August 1, 1798, Admiral Nelson destroyed
the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, Egypt, France needed
supplies which could be shipped in American bottoms, and
did not want to lose the revenue from trade with the
United States. Furthermore, an expansion of the war would
jeopardize Republican chances in the next American Presi-
dential elections, and might even have led to an Anglo-
American alliance to wrest French possessions in America.
Finally, the XYZ affair created a scandal in France, caus-
ing Talleyrand to disavow his own agents. From that point
82ibid., pp. 126-128; Allen, pp. 34-35.
83De Conde, pp. 128-30.
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on, Talleyrand sought peace. ^4
The French Minister of Foreign Relations proceeded
to contact William Vans Murray, United States Minister to
the Batavian Republic (Netherlands)
, and through him for-
warded a conciliatory message to Adam.s
. But the same day
the letter was sent-~July 9, 1798--the Directory ordered
an embargo on American ships in French ports. On July 31,
after an appeal from Talleyrand, the Directors reversed
themselves, and in addition, revoked the commissions of
their West Indies privateers, recalled corrupt prize court
judges, repealed the requirement of the role d' equipage
,
and called for neutral and allied vessels to be respected. ^5
On December 8, 1798, Adams addressed the Fifth Con-
gress at the opening of its third session. He announced
that France "appears solicitous to impress the opinion that
it is averse to the rupture with this country," but that
nothing in its conduct ought cause us to relax defensive
measures. If appropriate assurances vjere to be given that
he would be received, Ad.ams would send another minister to
France. And, if France agrees to "make reparation" for
American commercial damages, and to "desist from hostility",
"friendly intercourse" can be restored. Finally, Adams re-
commended that the Navy be increased.
84ibid.
, pp. 140, 144, 161
85ibid.
,
pp. 147, 151, 153
86Annals, 9:2A20-24.
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During that session, Congress enacted legislation to
augment the Army, Navy and Marines, and provided relief for
American seamen. It authorized the President to retaliate
against captured Frenchmen for the harsh treatment afforded
captured Americans impressed into the British navy. It
outlawed diplomacy by private citizens, such as that at-
tempted by the idealistic Quaker, Dr. George Logan. Final-
ly, it further suspended trade with France and her depend-
encies, while allowing the President to make exceptions.
(The last-mentioned clause was added to enable the Uniued
States and Tous saint L'Ouverture to work out an agreement
8 7
of mutual interest.")
After receiving word of additional conciliatory ges-
tures by Talleyrand in a dispatch from William Vans Murray,
Adams decided to seek peace. He nominated Murray to be the
new Minister Plenipotentiary to France, but then expanded
the mission to three, adding Supreme Court Chief Justice
Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick Henry. Henry declined because
of advancing age, and was replaced by William Richardson
Davie, a Federalist governor of North Carolina, Despite
extreme Federalist opposition to any new peace initiative,
the Senate confirmed, late February, 1799. A few days
88
later, the Fifth Congress adjourned.
87ibid., pp. 3795-.3693; De Conde , p. 136.
8«De Conde, pp. 174-85.
Negotiations were delayed because of the instability
of the French government: the Directors were purged in
the Summer of 1799, and on November 9 (18 Brumaire) of
that year, Napoleon overthrew the Directory and replaced
it with a Consulate of three. That same month, the new
American commission to France sailed to Europe. Napoleon,
the First Consul, was virtual dictator of France, and
Talleyrand, who had been forced out in the Summer purge,
was reinstated as Minister of Foreign Relations.
Despite desires for peace on both sides, the naval
war continued. In fact, the United States Navy captured
more French armed vessels in 1800 than in any other year
of the war. In addition, the Adams administration sought
to undermine French influence in Santo Domingo by aiding
Toussaint L'Ouvcrture. The Navy first blockaded, then
bomharded the port of Jacmel, controlled by Toussaint 's
rival. Having assured the rival defeat, the United
States then reopened trade with those parts of the island
under Toussaint 's control.
As a prelude to negotiations, in December, 1799,
Napoleon nullified all the remaining anti-neutral decrees
of the Directory, Negotiations began April 2, 1800. They
stalled however, over the status of the Franco -American
S^ibid.
,
pp. 214-25.
^^Ibid.
.
pp. 210-211.
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Treaties of 1778 and the Consular Convention of 1788, as
well as the question of indeimities
. (The Congress had
nullified the Treaties, but France would not recognize the
validity of the abrogation unless the United States dropped
indenfliification claims.)
The Americans broke the deadlock by offering to nego-
tiate an end to the current hostilities while postponing
indefinately the treaties and indemnities questions.
Napoleon liked the idea and a treaty known as the Convention
of Mortefontaine was completed in September, 1800.^-'-
1800 was a Presidential election year in the United
States, and the Federalist party entered it badly split.
The breach between the Hamiltonians and Adams had widened
beyond repair. Early in the year the President dismissed
his Secretaries of War and State (McHenry and Pickering)
,
and replaced them with more moderate Federalists. In the
Spring, the Federalists caucused and selected Adams and
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to be their Presidential and
Vice-Presidential standard-bearers, respectively. But
the Hamiltonians were secretly hoping that Pinckney would
receive more electoral votes than Adams.
Adams heard little from the negotiators. He feared
^^-Ibid.
,
pp. 231-55; U.S. Treaties and Other Inter -
r. a t i o na 1 Agre en.eri t s
,
7:801, IS No. 85, 31 July 1801.
92De Conde, pp. 2/0-72
France might stall until after the elections, in the hope
of a Republican victory. As a result, he again considered
asking Congress for a declaration of full-scale war, but
V7as dissuaded by his new Secretary of State, John Marshall.
When the Presidential electors were chosen on October 14,
word of the Convention of Mortefontaine had not yet reached
the United States. In November, news of the agreement was
published in American newspapers; but on December 3, 1800,
the electors denied the Federalists control of the Execu-
tive branch.
On December 11, 1800, the day before Adams learned
of his defeat, Governor Davie, one of the negotiators, ar-
rived in the United States with the official text of the
Convention. Article 1 declared "a firm, inviolable, and
universal peace, and a true and sincere Friendship" between
the signatories. The second article confessed the inabili-
ty of the parties "to agree at present" on the status of
the Franco-American Treaties or on indemnity claims, and
called for further negotiations "at a convenient tim.e."
Meanwhile, Article 2 stipulated, the Treaties "shall have
no operation," and relations between the countries are to
be governed by the Convent ion . ^'^
Other provisions concerned commicrce (to be on a m^ost
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 280-85.
^^Ibid., pp. 288, 352-353; U.S. Treaties and Other
Internat ional Agreements , 7:802.
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favored nation basis), and neutral rights (no roles
d' equipage required, free ships make free goods-except
for an explicit, narrow list of contraband, and stricter
stop-and-search procedures) .^^
On December 15, 1800, Adams submitted the Conven-
tion to the Senate with a recommendation for consent.
Moderate Federalists and Republicans generally approved;
the more extreme Federalists were opposed. As a result,
the Senate at first failed to give the necessary two-thirds
approval, Upon resubmission, the Senate reversed itself
with the reservation that Article 2 (respecting the Treaties
and indemnities) be expunged, and that an eight-year expira-
tion date be added to the pact.
Adams reluctantly agreed with the Senate '.s modifica-
tions, and recalled American warships from the West Indies.
Talleyrand, meanwhile, called upon French prize courts to
adopt the "free ships, free goods" principle, and asked
the Minister of Navy and Colonies to curb privateers.
Adams left the exchange of ratifications to his successor,
97but the Quasi War with France was now over.
France refused to exchange ratifications with the
Jefferson administration because of the Senate's provisions.
95]3e Conde, pp. 234, 353-70; U.S. Treaties and Other
Int ernationa l Agreements, 7:801-11.
^^Richardson, 1:303,
^^De Conde, pp. 288-95.
She wished neither to pay indemnities, nor to agree to the
abrogation of the Treaties. She offered to accept the Con-
vention with the reservations only if the United States
dropped indeiTinification claims altogether. The Jefferson
administration agreed, and ratifications were exchanged
on July 31, 1801.^^
The_^aas i War and the Pre sident_^s_War Powers
When John Adams ordered naval operations against
France, he acted with express authorization from Congress.
Furthermore, his orders did not exceed the boundaries of
the authorization, except perhaps for the naval operations
in the territorial waters of France's possessions in the
Caribbean. Postponing for the moment discussion of the
operations off the French West Indies, let us examine the
war powers granted President Adams.
Since the Quasi War was a naval V7ar, the most perti-
nent acts were the two designed to "protect commerce" by
the use of private and public armed vessels, Under the
May 28, 1798 Act, the President was empowered to order the
Navy to seize French armed vessels "which shall have com-
mitted or which shall be found hovering on the coasts of
the United States, for the purpose of committing depreda-
^^U.S. Trea ries and Other International Agreem.ents >
7:801, and notes 1, 2.
^^See notes 74-78 and accompanying text, supra.
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tions on" American ships.
The Act of July 9, 1798 authorized the President to
instruct the Navy and cornmanders of specially conimissioned
private armed vessels to seize any armed French ship found
either within the jurisdictional limits of the United
States or on the high seas.^^^
By these Acts, especially the July legislation, the
Congress authorized limited warfare against France. Ac-
cordingly, President Adams could and did order American
vessels to attack armed French ships in the United States
territorial waters or anywhere on the high seas. As has
been noted, above, the Congress did not authorize land op-
erations against France, attacks on unarmed French vessels,
including merchant ships, or naval operations within the
territorial waters of France and her possessions. Their
limitations notwithstanding, these Acts mark the first
time in American history that a President was authorized
to conduct warfare without a declaration of war by Con-
gress.
This undeclared war did not, however, result in a
growth in Presidential power, because the President acted
almost exclusively within the bounds of prior legislative
prescription. It may in fact be argued that the Quasi War
establishes a precedent for some kind of prior legislative
^^"^1 Stat. 578
101 Ibid.
,
p. 604,
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approval before the President orders the conduct of hosti-
lities without a declaration of war.^^^
^^^^^
we may note that the Constitution is by no means unambigu-
ous regarding the pov^er of Congress to authorize hostili-
ties without a declaration of war. Article 1, Section 8,
Paragraph 11 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to "declare War, {and} grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal."
The Constitution does not discuss explicitly hostili-
ties without a declaration of war. Some have taken the "let-
ters of marque and reprisal" clause to establish by implica-
tion Congressional authority in this area.-'-^'^ However, the
meaning of the phrase is unclear, since the practice of is-
suing such letters was obsolete when the Constitution was
written, and the Kramers never commented on the clause. The
private vessels commissioned under the July 9, 1798, Act are
said to be "letters of marque" or privateers, but the Consti-
tutional phraseology was never used in the legislation . "^^^
The uncertainty of the Constitution regarding hosti-
•^^^See, e.g., Merlo Pusey, The Way We Go To War
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 4^53; ArtHir M.
Schlesinger, Jr.
,
The Imperia l Presidency (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1973)T~ppT~TT^2T
103
See, e.g., Schlesinger, p. 21.
^^'^Grob, pp. 238-239. The President was authorized
to grant "special commissions." 1 Stat. 570 (1798).
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lities without a declaration of war was exploited by both
proponents and opponents of the Quasi War with France.
Albert Gallatin opposed the section of a bill that empowered
the President to convoy merchant ships on the grounds that
convoying meant hostilities, and therefore, in order for
the President to have such a power, "a distinction must be
assumed which is not recognized in the Constitution, viz:
between the power of making war, and the power of committing
hostility, "105
The Federalists responded that the President, as Com-
mander-in-Chief, could use whatever military or naval force
Congress provided as he thought best, provided he do so in
conformity with the "state" (i.e., state of war or of peace)
in which Congress places the nation.
Alexander Hamilton's views on the question, at that
time, are most interesting, especially in light of his pre-
viously published broad interpretation of Presidential
war-pov.Ter, (Hamilton adopted a broad construction in a
series of articles under the pseudonymn "Pacificus."
James Madison, writing as "Helvidius," defended a narrower
interpretation.) In his May, 1798 letter to Secretary of
War McHenry , Hamilton argued that the President could only
undertake what amounted to defensive measures when acting
^^^See note 47 and. accompanying text, siipra.
•lO^see note 48 and accompanying text, supra.
on his own, i.e., without Congressional approval.
Specifically, Hamilton reasoned, convoying was per-
missible, provided that attacking ships were merely repelled
and not captured. Furthermore, hostilities in American
territorial waters could be repressed under color of presi-
dential authority. But anything beyond this, Hamilt(:on
cautioned, requires legislative sanction 107
From the positions of Gallatin, the Congressional
Federalists, and Hamilton we may distill three contrasting
viev7S of the power of the President to conduct hostilities
without legislative approval. Gallati.n's is the narro\^7est
interpretation, for if the Constitution does not distin-
guish between war and hostilities, and the power to make
war is legislative, then the executive has no authority to
order hostilities unilaterally. The second position, that
of the Congressional Federalists, is the broadest: the
only restriction on the President's use of the navy is
that he must not place the country in a state of war with-
out Congressional sanction. Under this view, the President
may order hostilities short of war without Congressional
approval. Hamilton's view falls somewhere in between; he
seems to feel that the President may undertake purely de-
^See text accompanying note 51, supra. Later,
Hamilton, writing as "Lucius Crassus," did a complete about
face and scorned President Jefferson for adopting the very
posit:ion Hamilton himself espoused in the McHenry letter.
See my chap. 3, infra.
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fensive measures on his own, but that he requires Congress-
ional approval for anything beyond them.
As it turned out, President Adams, with one possible
exception, did nothing without prior authorization by the
Congress. Thus it was established as practice that without
a declaration of war, but with the appropriate enabling
legislation, the President may order American vessels to
attack and seize the armed vessels of another nation.
The possible exception to Adams' strict adherence to
the language of Congressional war-measures came during the
naval operations in the West Indies, The July 9, 1798 Act
further to protect commerce authorized American ships to
seize any French armed vessel "within the jurisdictional
limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the high
seas." While it is not apparent that Congress considered
the coastal V7aters of the United States to be part of the
"jurisdictional limits," the idea that states had a mari-
time boundary, the "marine league", would seem to have been
1 DP,
well established at the time of the Quasi VJar.-^'^°
Since American naval operations off the shores of
French possessions in the Caribbean did not take place,
strictly speaking, on the high seas, they may well have ex-
ceeded the directions of the Legislature. A clearer viola-
1 AO
Charles G, Fenvjick, International Law , 4th ed. ,
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , 1965) , p. 443,
tion was the American intervention in the civdl war in
St, Domingue. In early 1800, United States naval vessels
first blockaded, then bombarded, the port of Jacmel,
St, Domingue, in order to defeat Tou&saint L " Ouverture
'
s
rival. 109
The authority to bombard a port for strategic (or
economic) advantage, not having been granted by Congress,
was simply assumed by the President. These operations
clearly exceeded the terms of Congressional authorization.
By contrast, whatever naval operations took place within
the maritime boundary of Guadeloupe after March 14, 1799
would seem to be justified by the declaration of war
against the United States issued by the island's governor
on that date.
Out of claims of salvage rights for captured ships
and damages suffered by merchants arose some court cases of
interest. The first of such cases, Bas v. Tingy, no was
decided by the Supreme Court in February, 1800, while hos-
tilities were being conducted. Captain Tingy 's claim for
one-half allowance for an American ship he recaptured
from a French privateer was challenged on the ground that
the 1799 law granting such an allowance for ships and goods
'"retaken from the enemy'" was not applicable to France.
109see text accompanying note 90. supra.
^^°4 Dall. (U.S.) 37; 1 L. Ed. 731 (1800)
France, the plaintiff reasoned, was not an "enemy- within
the meaning of the Act because it and the United States were
not really at war."*"-^-^
Thus the case turned on whether or not the United
States and France were at war despite the lack of a formal
declaration. Four Supreme Court justices opined, seriatim,
that war indeed existed, although a limited or "imperfect"
war. Justice Chase noted that "Congress is empowered to de-
clare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited war;
limited in place, in objects, and in time." He went on to
describe the limitations adopted by Congress in the Franco-
American conflict. "There is no authority given to commit
hostilities on land; to capture unarmed French vessels, nor
even to capture French armed vessels, lying in a French port
,.112
Chase, like his fellow justices, assumed that Con-
gress has the authority to initiate hostilities without a
declaration of war. His dictum that armed French vessels
in a French port were not legitimate objects of capture sup-
ports our contention that American naval operations within
the maritime boundaries of the French West Indies exceeded
Congressional guidelines.
^'"•^John B. Moore, A Digest of Int ernat ional Law, 8
vols. (1906; reprint ed. , New York : MS~ Press'"," 1070)" 7 ;
15G.
•'•'^1
L. Ed. 731, 734.
A year and a half after Tingy received his favorable
judgment, the Supreme Court reviewed the merits of another
salvage claim in Talbot v. Seeman.^^^ Captain Talbot of th(
"U.S,S. Constitution" claimed salvage rights on a ship ori-
ginally owned by a Hamburg merchant, seized by France, and
recaptured by the plaintiff. In August, 1801, Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall wrote a decision in Talbot's favor.
The legitimacy of Talbot's action, Marshall noted,
depends upon the state of Franco-American relations at the
time of the recapture. To determine this, the jurist con-
tinued in a revealing bit of dictum, one must examine the
relevant acts of Congress. To use Marshall's own words,
L t__/he whole powers of war being, by the constitution
of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of
that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in
this inquiry, It is not denied, nor in the course of
the argument has it been denied, that congress m.ay
authorize general hos tilities , , . . or partial hostili-
ties . . . ll'^
After reviewing the legislation in question, the
Court found the United States to have been 5.n a "limited
state of hostilities . "''-^ Furthermore, since Congress in-
tended that French armed vessels be captured, and Talbot's
prize appeared to be just such' a vessel, the recapture
was lawful.
l^^i cr. (U.S.) 1; 2 L. Ed. 15 (1301)
1^^2 L. Ed. 15, 24.
ll^ibid.
,
p. 25.
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Those claiming losses due to French depredations
against their merchantships did not fare as well, however.
France had obtained United States renunciation of indem-
nity claims against her upon the exchange of ratifications
of the Convention of Mortefontaine . 1 16 Throughout the
nineteenth century, the United States government continual-
ly refused to accept any liability on its part for the dam-
ages. Rills for relief were twice vetoed, by Presidents
Polk (1846) and Pierce (1855), respectively. Finally, in
1885, Congress authorized the Court of Claims to take up
what had come to be knovrn as the "French Spoliation Cases. "117
The Court of Claims was prohibited from awarding
judgments, but it could offer an advisory opinion regard-
ing the liability of the Federal government. In Gray v.
United States, the Court of Claims, relying principally
upon the instructions to the commissioners who negotiated
the Convention of Mortefontaine , held that the hostilities
with France had not placed the United States in a state of
war. Bas v. Tingy, which held to the contrary, was decided
before the instructions were prepared, the Court noted, ^
Since no war existed, damage claims for property
losses were valid; and since the United States government
•^^^See note 98 and accompanying text, supra.
^^'^Moore, Digest
,
6:10.22-25.
11821 Ct. CI. 340 (1886),
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let France out of its obligations for diplomatic considera-
tions, it should make good the losses. Despite the Gray de-
cision, French spoliation claims dragged on well into the
1 1 Qtwentieth century. "
Finally, we consider the case of Little v. Barreme,
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the author-
ity of Congress to restrict the Commander-in-Chief.-^^^
It seems that by Act of Congress, American vessels,
including those disguised as ships of another nation were
subject to seizure if found sailing toward a French port.
As a consequence, one Captain Little seized and brought to
port a vessel, the "Flying Fish," which he believed to be
American-owned
.
Unfortunately for Little, the ship vjas owned by Danes,
and furthermore, was returning from a French port rather than
headed toward one. In the ensuing litigation, Chief Justice
John Marshall spoke for the Supreme Court in finding that
Little had exceeded the law, and that even Presidential com-
mands to the contrary would be unavailing. Marshall wrote
as follows.
It is by no m.eans clear that the President of the
United States, whose high duty it is to 'take care
that the laws be faithfully executed, ' and who is
commander in chief of the armies and navies of the
United States, might not, without any special auth-
^^^Grob, p. 53.
^^^2 Cr. (U.S.) 169, 8 L. Ed. 243 (1804).
^^^1 Stat. 613 (1799),
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ority for that purpose, in the then existing stateof things, have empowered the officers coimnlndingthe armed vessels of the United States to seize Ldsend into port for adjudication, American vesselswhich were forf^jted by being engaged in this ii-iicit coininerce . -"^^
With these words, Marshall voiced tentative approval
of Presidential authority to seize the property of United
States citizens in war
-time
--even in the absence of an act
of Congress. However, he concluded as follows.
.
. .
the legislature seems to have prescribed that
the manner in which this law shall be carried into
execution, was to exclude seizure of any vessels
not bound to a French port. Of consequence, however
strong the circumstances might be, which induced
Captain Little to suspect the Flying Fish to be an
American vessel, they could not excuse the deten-
tion of her, since he would not have been authorized
to detain her had she really been American . -^^^
The sum and substance of the Little ruling is that
the Congress may regulate the conduct of hostilities if it
so desires, any orders of the Commander-in-Chief to the con-
trary notwithstanding. Had such a rule been applied to the
bom.bardment of the port of Jacmel, St. Dominique , '''^^ there
could be no doubt of the outcome.
Thus, in terms of legislative, executive and judicial
pronouncements on the subject, the Quasi War with France is
a clear victory for Congressional power over the commencement
and conduct of war.
^^-^8 L. Fd. 243, 245.
^^^Ibid., p. 246.
^^^See note 106 and accompanying text, supra
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CHAPTER III
HOSTILITIES ON THE BARBARY COAST
Historical S etting
The Barbary episode marks one of che earliest examples
of the threat of force for diplomatic purposes on sole Pres-
idential authority. The hostilities that ensued were fought
almost entirely on the seas, although there was one land
operation. Most of the actual fighting occurred subsequent
to an act of Congress designed to authorize naval hostili-
ties
,
The Barbary coast stretches across two thousand miles
of north Africa along the Mediterranean, This gave the
Barbary regencies, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli,
easy access to Mediterranean shipping lanes. As a result
of long-standing enmity between Christian Europe and Moslem
north Africa, the merchant ships of weaker European states
were always in danger of being seized and of having their
crews enslaved.
The Barbary nations would declare war, seize the en-
emy merchant ship on the high seas, and then sign a treaty,
the terms of which always called for an annual tribute, in
order to end the conflict. The Barbary rulers expected
presents as part of the negotiating process, and there were
often additional pa^^ments required in order to ransom crews
held captive. After a time, if payments were in arrears
89
or suddenly thought to be inadequate, the flagstaff of the
offending nation would be chopped down in a symbolic decla-
ration of war, merchant ships would be seized, and the
"diplomatic" process would begin anew.^
This practice had gone on continually since the six-
teenth century, and if the European nations had not been
competing with each other so fiercely, they might have com-
bined and subdued the Barbary once and for all. Instead,
each European country entered into the most advantageous
treaty it could obtain, all the while hoping that the
Barbary would continue to prey upon the ships of rivals.
Benjamin Franklin quoted British merchants as saying, "if
there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to
build one. "^
Thus, while the European nations referred contemptu-
ously to the Barbary as "pirates," they accorded them a
measure of international status by entering into treaties
with them.
As the Americans developed a thriving sea trade on
the Mediterranean, they too became vulnerable. No sooner
Ray W, Irwin, The Diplomatic Relat ions of the United
States With the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, N.C
University of North Carolina Press, 1931)
, pp. 1-19; Glenn
Tucker , Dawn Like Thunder; The Barbary Wars and the Birth
of the U . S Navy ( T n d i an a}.'' o I ] s : Th e Bobbs -Merrill Com.pany ,
Inc.
,
1963)
, pp. 43-56; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and The
Barbary Corsaii s (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co
.
,
i905)
,
pp . 2-6
.
-^Quoted in Irwin, p. 17.
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had the United States losl: the protection of the British
navy following the American Revolution than Algiers and
Morocco began menacing its merchant ships.
3
The United States was in a difficult position. It
was heavily in debt and could not e?sily pay for Barbary
diplomacy. It was also militarily weak, without any navy
whatsoever. In 1784, under the Articles of Confederation,
the Congress resolved to obtain treaties with the Barbary
states, commissioning Adam.s
, Franklin and Jefferson to
arrange them,'^
But Congress was less willing to provide the money
needed for negotiating with Barbary. Adams thought this
unwise. He wrote Jefferson on July 3, 1786 that it was
"wisest for Us to negotiate and pay the necessary Sum."^
Noting the value of American shipments in the Mediterranean,
Adams observed.
At present we are Sacrificing a Million annually
to Save one Gift of two hundred Thousand Pounds.
This is not good 0Economy...6
But Jefferson was more militant. If we must buy
3xrwin, pp. 20, 25; Allen, p. 13.
^Irv7in, p. 27.
5John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, The Adams-Je fferson
Le
t
ters; The Comp le te Corro
s
pcndence Between Thomas
Je"fTerson and Abigail ancl JolTn Adams ," ed. Lester J. Cappon,
2~l^ls .""IChapel Hill, NTC: "University of North Carolina
Press, 1959), 1;139.
^Ibid.
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peace, he responded t.o Adams on July 11, let us not delay.
"But," he went on, "I should prefer the obtaining it by war.'^
While still governed by the Articles, the United
Staces did manage to obtain a treaty with Morocco,^ but this
did not insure against attacks by the other Barbary states.
In 1793, Algiers, the most powerful of them, seized eleven
American vessels and took 109 men captive.^
'
Congress responded by voting for a naval armament,
with the proviso that ship construction stop should peace
with Algiers be obtained. President Washington signed the
measure into law on March 27, 1794."'"^ The preamble made
Congressional motives crystal clear.
.
. .
the depredations committed by the Algerine
corsairs on the commerce of the United States
render it necessary that a naval force should be
provided for its protection
. .
While construction of six ships was underway, a
12
rather expensive treaty with Algiers was obtained, and
Washington asked Congress whether it wanted him to stop
^Ibid.
,
p. 142.
o
United States, Department of State, Treaties and
Other Internationa l Agreements of the United States, 1/75-
T949
,
comp. Charles I 7 Bevans (Washington^ Government Print
-
Tng"Office, 1971), 9:1278; "Treaty of Peace and Friendship,"
TS No. 244-1, 15 July 1786.
9 Irwin, p. 60.
'^An Act to provide a naval armament, 1 Stat. 350 (1794)
i^ibid.
^^U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements,
5:32 "Treaty of Peace slid Amity , ''~TS~Ko . 1, 7 March 1796.
construction in light of the "loss which the public would
ti 1
3
incur." Ir, a compromise, Congress authorized completion
of three of the ships; the "Constitution." the "United
States," and the "Constellation."!'^
This was the beginning of the United States Navy.
And none too soon, because the expensive settlement with
Algiers only served to whet the appetites of the other
Barbary rulers. First Tunis, and then Tripoli commandeered
American vessels in 1796. After intervention by Algiers
an agreement with Tripoli was arranged in the following
year. But it took nearly the v/hcle period of the Adams
administration to arrive at a satisfactory pact with Tunis.
While Adams was President (1797-1801) relations with
Barbary were complicated by the naval war with France. The
Quasi VJar so preoccupied the United States that it could not
respond anywhere else militarily. During this period, prob-
lems in the Mediterranean mounted.
^^James D. Richardson, ed
,
, A Compilation of the Mes -
sages and Papers of the Pre sidents" 1789-1897
,
10 vols~
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), 1:193.
''^An act supplementary to an act entitled "an act to
provide a naval armament," 1 Stat, 453 (1796).
15
Irwin, pp. 84-91.
l^U
.
S. Treaties and Other International Agreements
,
11:1070 ^^reaty of Peace and Friendship," TS No. 358,
10 June 1797.
•'''ibid., p. 1088 "Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Nav-
igation," TS No. 360, ratified 10 January 1800,
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In 1799, the Bey of Tunis, angered by the failure
of the United States to deliver certain supplies as pro-
mised, demanded new gDfts and threatened war.^^ ^-^^^
same time, the Pasha of Tripoli, envious of what he re-
garded as the more favorable treatment of Algiers and
Tunis, threatened and made new demands upon the American
consul
.
•'-^
In September, 1800, an American brigade was seized
by Tripoli and held for nearly a month, ^0 Finally, the
United States was humiliated by the Dey of Algiers, who
impressed an American frigate and forced it to sail to
Turkey under the Algerine flag. 21
Were it not for the Quasi War, the Barbary coast
hostilities might well have occurred during the Adams ad-
ministration. Consider this excerpt from a letter of
Adams' Secretary of State,
The importance of sending a naval force into the
Mediterranean, to shew the Barbary powers our capa-
city to defend our commerce, and to annoy them, lias
been repeatedly urged;... and should our differences
with France be settled by our Envoys now at Paris,
and either of the Regencies break their peace with
^^Irwin, pp. 98-99.
19
Ibid.
,
p. 96,
20ibid.
,
p. 97.
21lbid.
, pp, 94-95,
us, OUT whole naval force may be sent against them... 22
On the other hand, as a result of the pressures of
the Quasi War, Congress, in 1798, authorized the President
to buy, build, borrow or accept as gifts additional fri-
gates and up to two dozen smaller war ships. Furthermore,
a separate naval department was created. ^3
By the conclusion of the Adams administration in
March, 1801, the United States had obtained treaties with
all of the Barbary states. Despite this, diplomatic re-
lations were deteriorating, and American commerce in the
Mediterranean was increasing . 24 i\ost portent ious of all
was the fact that the United States had built up a naval
force during the Quasi War v/ith France, and by late 1800
that war was over.
The Tripolitan War
Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of President in
March, 1801. By April, he had already decided to send
some United States warships on a cruise to the Mediterra-
nean. 25 "It is conceived," Samuel Smith of the Navy De-
22u,S., Office of Naval Records and Library, Naval
Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Bar -
barv Power s , "6 vollT (Washington : Government Printing
Office, 1939-44), 1(1939) :343,
^^See my chapter two, supra.
2^Irwin, p. 101.
25so wrote Samuel Smith on April 1, 1801. Smith was
performing the duties of the Secretary of the Navy. Naval
Documents, 1:425.
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partiP.ent wrote on April 10, 1801, "...that such a squadron
Cruizing in view of the Barbary Powers will have a tendency
to prevent them from seizing on our Commerce, whenever
Passion or a Desire of Plunder might Incite them thereto. "26
On May 2.0, 1801, Secretary of State James Madison
sent the following message to the United States consuls at
Tunis and Algiers
:
The proofs which have been given by the Bashaw /Pasha/
of Tripoli of hostile designs against the United Stateshave, as you will learn from Commodore Dale, determ-inedthe President to send into the Mediterranean a squadron
of three frigates and a sloop of war, under the com-
mand of that officer. Should war have been declared
or hostilities commenced, tnis force will be immediate-
ly employed in the defence and protection of our com-
merce against the piracies of that regency... 27
Madison then explained why they had decided to send a naval
force to the Mediterranean at this time.
The present moment is peculiarly favorable for the
experiment, not only as it is a provision against an
immediate danger, but as we are now at peace and amity
with all the rest of the world, and as the force em-
ployed would, if at home, be at nearly the expense,
with less advantage to our mariners ... 28
On the same day, orders were given to Captain Richard
Dale from the office of the Secretary of the Navy. "I am
therefore instructed by the President to direct," the or-
ders stated.
26ivjaval Document s, 1:429
27lbid.
, p, 460.
2^Ibid.
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that you proceed with all possible expedition withtne squadron under your command, to the Mediterraneanit wixl be proper for you to touch at Gibraltar onyour arrival at Gibraltar you will be able to ascer-tain whether all or any of the Barbary Powers shallhave declared War against the United States...'29
Should he find that all is "tranquil," Dale's instructions
were to proceed to each Barbary port in turn, informing the
American consuls there that his intentions are "perfectly
friendly," deliver presents to Algiers, and present let-
ters to the rulers of Algiers and Tunis and a message from
President Jefferson to the Pasha of Tripoli, explaining the
purpose of the mission. 30 "But," Dale's orders continued,
should you find on your arrival at Gibraltar that all
the Barbary Powers, have declared War against the
United States, you will then distribute your force in
such a manner, as your judgment shall direct, so as
to best protect our commerce and chastise their in-
solence- -by sinking, burning or destroying their ships
and Vessels vjherever you shall find them... 31
Finally, Dale was instructed to establish a block-
ade off the ports in question if Algiers alone or Tunis
and. Tripoli, either separately or in combination, had de-
clared war, "so as effectually to prevent any thing from
-30
going in or coming out.'
The Congress, it should be noted, was not in session,
having adjourned in March, 1801, not to meet until December
29ibid.
,
p, 465.
30ibid.
,
pp. 46.5-466.
31lbid.
,
p. 467.
32ibid,
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of that year. 33 Therefore, Jefferson undertook this ac-
tion on his own authority.
While Dale was receiving his orders, unbeknownst to
the administration at the time, the Pasha of Tripoli de-
clared war against the United States, symbolically chop-
ping down the American flagstaff on May 14, 1801.34 T^cn
Dale arrived at Gibraltar, July 1, the American consul
there led him to believe that Tripoli had commenced hosti-
3 5llties. Dale felt his f;uspicions confirmed by the pre-
sence of two Tripolitan ships at anchor. And, although
the Tripolitan commander denied being at war with the Uni-
ted States, Dale was convinced that the cruisers were
headed for the Atlantic in search of American merchant-
ships. -^^ Accordingly, he ordered an American frigate to
remain at Gibraltar to keep watch over the Tripolitan
vessels.
Dale then sailed to Algiers and then to Tunis; both
stops were uneventful. On July 24, 1801, he reached Tri-
poli and informed the Pasha that in response to his decla-
33u , S .
,
Congress , Debat es and Proceedings in the Con-
gress of the United States, 1789- 1824 (Washington: Gales
and Seaton, '1834-56)
,
10:1082, ll':10. /Hereinafter cited
as "Annals^;^/.
34j^^i^^ p 3^06.
3^Naval Documents
,
1:497.
36ibid.
ration of war, he would coimnence hostilities against any
Tripolitan vessels he encountered. In fact, however, very
little occurred, and Dale lifted the blockade shortly there-
after
.
-^^
One exchange between the American schooner, "Enter-
prise," and a Tripolitan vessel resulted in the defeat of
the Barbary craft, which was stripped of gear and left
free to limp back to port.^^
Excepting the victory of the "Enterprise," Dale's
fleet accomplished little else in 1801, other than block-
ading the two Tripolitan ships at Gibraltar, and convoying
American merchantmen through the Mediterranean
.
When the seventh Congress opened its first session
in December, 1801, President Jefferson forvjarded his an-
nual message. In it he informed Congress of hostilities
with Barbary. "To this state of general peace with which
we have been blessed," he noted,
one only exception exists. Tripoli, the least con-
siderable of the Barbary States, had come forward
with demands unfounded either in right or in compact,
and had permitted itself to denounce war on our fail-
ure to comply before a given day. The style of the
demand admitted but one answer. I sent a small squad-
ron of frigates into the Mediterranean, with assurances
to that power of our sincere desire to remain in peace,
but with orders to protect our commerce against the
threatened attack. The measure was seasonable and
37Allen, Barbary, pp. 97-99.
^^Irwin, pp. 109-110.
39ibid. . p. 109.
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salutary. The Bey /sic7 had already declared warHis cruisers were out. Two had arrived at Gibraltar
?hnt''T?^'^\i? Mediterranean was blockaded andt a of the Atlantic m peril. The arrival of oursquadron dispelled the danger. 40
Jefferson went on to describe the successful en-
counter of the "Enterprise" with a Tripolitan cruiser, ex-
plaining the failure of the American ship to take the
prize as follows.
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction
ol Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, the
vessel, being disabled from committing further hosti-lities, was liberated with its crew. The Legislature
will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing meas-
ures of offense also, they will place our force on an
equal footing with that of its adversaries. I com-
municate all material information on this subject,
that in the exercise of this important function con-
fided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclu-
sively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge
and consideration of every circumstance of weight. ^1
Writing as "Lucius Cassius," Hamilton derided
Jefferson's explanation of the failure to seize the Tri-
politan vessel. 42 Hamilton rejected the "extraordinary
position" that the President was somehow limited by the
Constitution in ordering a response to a declaration of
r by another country. The Constitution, Hamilton ob-wa
'^Opresident Jefferson's First Annual Message,
December 8, 1801 , Richardson , 1:326-327.
^Ijbid.
,
p. 327.
42Alexander Hamilton, "Lucius Cassius No. 1 , " in
The Works of Alexander Hamilton
,
ed. Henry Cabot Lodge,
12 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam ' s Sons , n . d
. ) , 8 : 246-52
.
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served, contains no such "express prohibitions" upon the
President
.
That instrument has only provided affirmatively
that. The Congress shall have power to declare'
war; the plain meaning of which is, that it istne peculiar and exclusive province of Congress
^il^- the nation is at ^ace , to change that stateinto a state ot war; whetFer from calculations
of policy, or from provocations or Injuries re-
ceived; in other words, it belongs to Congress
only, to go to war. But when a foreign nation
declares or openly and avowedly makes war upon
the United States, they are then by the very
fact already at war , and any declaration on the
part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least
unnecessary
.
^-^
In short, while Hamilton concedes that only Congress
can commence a war on behalf of the United States, he in-
sists that the President needs no legislative authorization
to order a full response to V7ar commenced or declared by
another nation.
Nearly a week after Jefferson's address, the Commit-
tee of the Whole of the House of Representatives proposed
that the President be authorized "further and more effec-
tually to protect the commerce of the United States against
the Barbary Powers . "^^ Debate ensued the next day, December
15. An amendment was offered to expunge the words, "further
and more," as they might be interpreted as authorizing the
President to increase the navy at his discretion. The amend-
ment failed, however, and a comniittee was formed to propose
43 Ibid., pp. 249-250, emphasis in the original
^^Annals, 11:325-326.
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appropriate legis lation
.
On Thursday, January 7, 1802, Representative. Smith
reported a bill "for the protection of American commerce
and seamen in the Mediterranean," empowering the President
to equip and employ vessels as he sees necessary, to com-
mission privateers, and to capture Tripolitan ships.
The House Committee of the Whole debated the bill briefly
on the 21st, rejecting amendm.ents to broaden it to cover
the other Barbary states, ^7 The debates reported in the
Annals of Congress raise the constitutional question of
the President's war-power only obliquely. We can infer
that there was some unrecorded debate of such nature from
the comments of Representative Bayard of Delaware. It is
reported that Bayard
wished it left to the direction of the President to
exercise the power vested in him when he should think
proper.
. .He wished tlie President to do this by the
authority of law; this would prevent those doubts
that have been expressed, by some, of the constitution-
ality of his measures ... The gentleman from Connecticut
, . . says there are no doubts on his mind but that the
President has a Constitutional right, as the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to do as he has done;
but it should be remicmbered that many have doubts... '^S
Early in February, 1802, the House agreed to certain
^5ibid.
, pp. 326-39.
^^ibid.
,
pp. 405-406.
^7ibid.
,
pp. ''(32-433.
48ibid.
,
p. 432,
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Senate amendments to the proposal, entitled, "An Act for
the protection of the Coirmerce and Seamen of the United
States, against the Tri.politan Cruisers , '"'+9 ^^e measure
became law on February 6, 1802. Its preamble and first
two sections read:
Whereas the regency of Tripoli, on the coast of
Barbary, has commenced a predatory warfare aeainst
the United States
:
Be it enact ed.
. .That it shall be lawful fully to
equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed
vessels of the United States, as may be judged requi-
site
_
by the President of the United States, for pro-
tecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof
on the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoin-
ing seas
.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall
be lawful for the President of the United States to
instruct the commanders of the respective public ves-
sels aforesaid, to subdue, seize, and make prize of
all vessels, goods, and effects, belonging to the Bey
/_sic7 of Tripoli, or to his subj ects
. . . and also to
cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or
hostility as the state of war will justify, and may,
in his opinion, require. 50
The last three of its five sections deal with priva-
teers and the length of service for American seamen.
In accordance with the statute, the President and
Secretary of the Navy signed orders to all ships of war,
directing them, to seize and make prize of Tripolitan ves-
sels. 51 Plans were readied to send a relief squadron to
the Mediterraneans-Dale's fleet was still there--and
^9ibid.
,
p. 474.
502 Stat, 129 (1802)
.
5lNaval Documents, 2:60
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Captain Richard V. Morris was ordered to take command on
March 11. 1802.52
On March 20, Morris was ordered to seize and make
prize of all Tripolitan vessels, to blockade the port of
Tripoli and convoy American vessels as far as could be
done consistent with the blockade. ^3
On April 20, the administration decided to reaffirm
its desire for treaty negotiations. Instructions from
Secretary of the Navy Smith, received months later in the
Mediterranean by Morris included the following.
The President conceiving that the period has arrived
when negotiations for peace with the Bashaw /Pasha/
of Tripoli may be opened under circumstances which
promise an advantageous issue... i_7t has been deter-
mined to lay all our Naval force under your command
before Tripoli ... Holding out the olive Branch in one
hand 6c displaying in the other the means of offensive
operations, may produce... an advantageous treaty... 54
Morris arrived at Gibraltar on May 25, where he re-
mained through August, occasionally convoying American
ships through the Straits, blockading one of the Tripolitan
cruisers at Gibraltar, repairing his ship, the "Chesapeake,"
and standing by in response to reports of Moroccan threats. 55
During this summer (of 1802) relations with Barbary
52ibid.
,
P- 82.
^^Ibid. p. 92.
^^Ibid., p. 130
55 Irwin P- 114
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deteriorated rapidly. Morocco, heretofore peaceful, de-
clared war on the United States in June, when both Com-
modores Dale and Morris refused passports to ships carry^
ing grain from Morocco to Tripoli. Tripoli, taking advan-
tage of the large number of American merchantships in the
Mediterranean, captured a brig on June 17, took it to
Algiers, and presented its crew to the Dey as a gift. The
Bey of Tunis meanwhile, repeatedly demanded that an American
warship be built for him. Finally, Algiers continually
protested the delay in payment of annuities as stipulated
by treaty; the Dey refused cash instead of military and
naval stores; and he demanded that the /Vmerican consul be
replaced
,
That summer, too, Sweden, which had been at V7ar with
and consequently was blockading Tripoli, made peace, and
S 7
removed its vessels. ' The two remaining American ships
were soon forced to leave for supplies; and when no ship
from Morris' fleet replaced them, Tripoli's harbor stood
unobstructed.
By all accounts the Morris mission was a failure,
although it would seem that full blame could not fairly
be attributed to the Commodore. Nevertheless, the admin-
56ibid,
,
pp. 119-120.
57jbid.
,
p. 123.
58A].len, Barbary
,
p. 111.
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istration despaired of losing whatever advantage the more
militant policy was to have given them, and planned, in the
spring of 1803, major concessions to obtain peace. 59 Con-
gress, meanwhile, appropriated money for the construction
of four smaller, swifter craft, like the "Enterprise,"
apparently hoping such vessels would be more effective.
Morris established his long-delayed blockade of
Tripoli in late May, 1803. After a skirmish with some
Tripolitan boats, and additional unsuccessful negotiations
with the Pasha, the Commodore lifted the blockade (June 26,
1803)
,
believing it unnecessary, and fearing renewed hosti-
lities with the other Barbary states. 61
Morris was then recalled by the Secretary of the Navy,
censured by a court of inquiry for lack of "'diligence or
activity'" in operations against Tripoli, and had his com-
mission revoked by the President. A new squadron, to be
headed by Captain Edward Preble, V7as readied in the spring
and summer of 1803, to replace Morris' fleet. The Preble
squadron consisted of seven ships, five of which were small
gunboats. Preble's orders were essentially like Morris',
6 2
with emphasis on maintaining a blockade of Tripoli.
' 59ir^in, p. 128.
60Act of February 28, 1803, 2 Stat. 206; Allen,
Barbary
,
p, 136.
61lrwin, p. 127.
62ibid.
,
p. 129.
106
While Preble's squadron was sailing (each ship left
the United States on its own, at about two-week intervals
throughout the summer of 1803)
,
Morocco seized an American
merchantship. One of Preble's ships caught the Moroccan
vessel however, freed the American captives, and hauled
the boat to the port of Tangier to negotiate with the Em-
peror. Negotiations proved successful; Morocco agreed to
ratify the treaty of 1786 and recognize the blockade of
Tripoli. 63
Tv^o of Preble's fleet, the frigate "Philadelphia,"
and the smaller "Vixen" were dispatched to Tripoli to es-
tablish a blockade in October, 1803. The smaller ship left
after a few weeks to search for Tripolitan vessels. Two
weeks later, the "Philadelphia" ran aground pursuing a
Tripolitan ship, and was captured with its crew of over
three hundred. The Pasha then raised his price for ransom
and peace substantially. But in February, 1804, Stephen
Decatur and a small band of followers successfully executed
a bold plot to destroy the "Philadelphia . "^^
This angered the Pasha, but did not bring him to
terms; and, of course, he still held the crew. Negotia-
tions between Preble and the Barbary ruler continued without
progress in June. In July, Preble brought his whole squad-
63ibid.
,
pp. 132-133.
6^Ibid.
,
pp, 132-35.
107
ron to Tripoli, along with eight vessels belonging to the
King of the Two Sicilies, also at war with Tripoli. In
August a battle ensued in which three Tripolitan vessels
were captured and the city of Tripoli was shelled. There-
after, the Pasha reduced his demands considerably, but still
no agreement could be reached.
During this time period--spring and summer of 1804--
tensions V7ith Tunis mounted. The Bey of Tunis had been
angered when a Tripolitan vessel carrying property owned
by a Tunisian subject was captured by the "Enterprise" in
the fail of 1803. Commodore Morris went to Tunis to try
and negotiate. After going on shore and agreeing to re-
turn the seized goods, additional demands were made.
Morris V7as detained and held until he agreed to the pay-
6 6
ments. Upon learning of the capture of the "Philadelphia"
by Tripoli, the Bey threatened war and prepared during the
winter and spring for attacks upon American commerce. \Jhen
Preble arrived in the Mediterranean, he wrote home for ad-
ditional ships to meet the Tunisian threat and V7ent to Tunis
to negotiate--bu.t remained on his ship, Preble wrote the
Bey, assuring him satisfactory indemnification for his
seized goods; by the end of April, 1804, an agreement was
65ibid.
, pp. 138-139,
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 124-125.
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reached.
In May, 1804, the Bey of Tunis renewed his theats
at the report of Tunisian craft captured by the United States
Nothing come of this however, and by summer's end a grain
shortage in Tunis wholly diverted the Bey's attention. Thus
ended the Tunisian threat.
Back home, the eighth Congress briefly debated and
passed an extension of the act to protect commerce and sea-
men of 1802. In addition to itn authorization of an import
duty to defray the cost of naval operations, the act of
March 26, 1804 empowered the President to order naval opera-
tions against any hostile Barbary power. The first section
explains that its purpose is to defray the expense of
equipping, officering, manning, and employing such
of the armed vessels of the United States as may
be deemed requisite by the President
. . . for pro-
tecting the commerce and seamen thereof, and for
carrying on warlike operations against the Regency
of Tripoli, or any other of the Barbary Powers,
which may commit hostilities against the United
States. . .^9
The Act was to remain in effect until three months
after the President ratified a treaty of peace with Tripoli,
"unless the United States should then be at war with any
other of the Barabary Powers. "'^^
^^Ibid., pp. 140-141.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 141, 142.
^^Annals, 13^1210-25; 2 Stat. 291 (1804).
^^2 Stat. 291 (1804).
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The Tripoli question was still unresolved wh(
William Eaton, former United States consul to Tunis.,
cured in 1803, the President's permission to conduct land
operations in Tripoli, 71 The plan, hatched by Eaton and
James L. Cathcart, who served as consul to three of the
Barbary states, had been outlined as early as 1801.72
called for American support for a coup d'etat by a brother
of the Pasha of Tripoli, in the hope that the brother, in-
debted to the United States for helping him to power, would
do nothing counter to American interests in the Mediter-
ranean .
'^'^
Another relief squadron of four frigates was sent to
the Mediterranean, with Samuel Barron to replace Preble as
squadron commander. The administration left it up to the
fleet commander to decide whether or not to adopt the plan
to aid the rival brother. Barron arrived in the Mediter-
ranean- -with Eaton aboard- -in September, 1804. The Pasha,
meanwhile, had driven his brother into exile, but Eaton
persuaded Barron to let him go to Egypt to arrange for the
rival's return. The "Argus" took Eaton to Cairo on Decem-
ber 8, 1804.74
71irT,.7in, p. 143,
72ibid.
, pp. 110-111, note 25, p. 111.
73ibid.
7^Allen, Barbary, pp. 220, 229.
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Meanwhile, the brother, named Hamet Karamanli. V7
engaged in an uprising in Egypt against Ottoman rule; this
delayed their meeting until early February, 1805, Hamet
and Eaton worked out a written convention providing for the
United States to do everything consistent with its honor
and interest to establish Hamet as sovereign of Tripoli.
For his part, Hamet agreed to indemnify the United States
for its expenses with tribute money from other states, to
release Americans held prisoner in Tripoli, and to form a
permanent peace treaty with the United States without tri-
bute.^^
A force of approximately four hundred men (three hun-
dred Arabs, only ten Americans and about ninety others of
various nationalities) was formed, with Eaton as commander.
The plan was to march overland to Derne , an eastern pro-
vince of Tripoli, where they would attack, and with the help
of American sea forces which were to meet them, put Hamet
into power. After an arduous trek over about five hundred
miles of Libyan desert, Eaton's force attacked the city of
Derne, on April 27, 1805, v/hile three small American gun-
boats shelled the other side of town. The Pasha's rein-
forcements were barely beaten off and the to\«7n was held.
No sooner had this occurred V7hen a message was recei.ved
75ibid. , 230-32
76ibid.
Ill
stating that a treaty with the Pasha had been obtained and
that Eaton 'n forces were to be vjithdrawn from Derne.^'''
Throughout the winter and spring of 1804-05, the
Un:ited States maintained a blockade of Tripoli Com-
modore Barron, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly dis-
satisfied with Eaton's plan to restore Hamet, Barron had
no confidence in Hamet; he thought the approximately five
hundred-mile march from Derne to Tripoli too long and haz-
ardous; he feared for the American prisoners, should the
Pasha be pushed too hard; he did not think he was author-
ized to commit the United States to the restoration of
Hamet; and finally, his ov^ti failing health, made him an-
xious to conclude a treaty with Tripoli and quit the Medi-
79terranean
,
In early 1805, the Pasha seemed anxious for peace.
Consul-General to Barbary Tobias Lear arrived at Tripoli
May 26, 1805 to begin negotiations, An exchange of pri-
soners was agreed to, with the United States paying sixty
thousand dollars since it had the fewer captives. The
treaty called for the Americans and Hamet to withdraw im-
mediately from Derne, and for the restoration of Hamet 's
family to him. A secret clause, however, gave the Pasha
77irwin, pp. 147-148.
^^Allen, Barbary
,
p. 221.
79irwin, pp. 149-52,
four years to release the family. The treaty established
peace between Tripoli and the United States, without an-
nuities or payments beyond the customary gifts upon an ex-
change of consuls. It also provided that captives would
not be enslaved in future conflicts, that passports for
ships would be provided. The agreement was completed in
early June, 1805.
The treaty aroused controversy in the United States.
It vzas suggested by some that the sixty thousand dollars
ransom fee was unnecessarily high, or not necessary at all.
Another stir was created over treatment of the Pasha's
brother, who claimed, in a letter "to the People of the
United States," that his compact with Eaton included as-
surances that the throne would be recovered for him. There
might have been more commotion had the secret clause grant-
ing the Pasha four years to return Hamet's family been
made public. (The secret agreement was revealed in 1807,
and even the Jefferson administration expressed surprise
at its existence.) Finally, m.any felt that Barron and
Lear acted hastily in prohibiting Eaton from attempting a
siege on the city of Tripoli.
Nevertheless , the Senate ratified the treaty, 21-8,
on April 12, 1806, thus formally ending hostilities with
SOlbid.
,
pp. 152-54.
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 154-59.
113
Tripoli. 82
Later Relations with Barbary
While Tobias Lear was negotiating an end to the
Tripolitan war in 1805. troubles were brewing with Tunis
once again. In late April, 1805, a sir.all Tunisian craft
with two prizes it had taken tried unsuccessfully to run
the blockade at Tripoli. Tunis then threatened war when
the American squadron commander. John Rodgers
, who had
succeeded the ailing Samuel Barron, refused to release
them. 83
Once the treaty with Tripoli was negotiated, Rodgers
decided to settle with Tunis. By August, 1805, the bulk
of the United States squadron was in Tunis harbor. The
Bey of Tunis now agreed to renew the treaty of 1797, and
send an ambassador to the United States to dispose of the
issue of the captured Tunisian vessels. These negotiations
proved difficult, but no hostilities ensued, and in Jan-
uary, 1807. under pressure of V7ar with Algiers, the Bey of
Tunis accepted ten thousand dollars as indemnification for
his losses. After this relations with Tunis remained
OA
fai.rl}'' satisfactory."^
^^Ibid.
.
p. 154; U.S. Treaties and Other International
Agreements 11:1070 "Treaty of Peace and Amity," TS No.
35'9, " 17 Ap'ril 1006.
8-^Irwin, p. 161.
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 166-167,
114
Shortly thereafter, when relations between the
United States and England worsened, the American fleet was
gradually withdrawn from the Mediterranean altogether.
With the protection of the American navy gone, shipping
was once again vulnerable. In 1807, the Dey of Algiers
seized three merchantships when the United States failed
to deliver naval supplies as stipulated by treaty. Later,
the Dey released the ships in exchange for cash. In 1808
he renewed his demands for naval stores, and might have
taken further action had not an American storeship arrived.
From 1808-12, relations with Algiers were good.^^
In the summer of 1812, at the instigation of the
British, Algiers rejected as insufficient the tribute
brought by an American ship, ordered Consul-General Lear
to depart, and threatened to keep the supply-ship and en-
slave all Americans if the difference were not made up im-
mediately in cash. Lear borrowed the m.oney and obtained
release of the ship, and then left Algiers. The Dey then
sent his cruisers out in search of American merchantships.
In late August, 1812, Algiers seized an American brigade
and its crew of eleven. With the War of 1812 now underway,
the United States was unable to pass through the Straits
of Gibraltar, which were blocked by the British navy. As
85ibid.
,
pp, 168-71.
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a result it could neither meet Algiers' threats, nor con-
tinue to trade heavily in the Mediterranean . 86
\^en the war with England ended, the administration
of James Madison sought to reckon with Algiers. On Febru-
ary 23, 1815, Madison sent a message to Congress reminding
that body of the Dey's mistreatment of Lear, other "acts
of... overt and direct warfare," and the holding and rough
treatment of American citizens in Algiers, Madison went
on to note that the end of the war with England would
mean renewed Air.erican trade in the Mediterranean, "within
the range of the Algerine cruisers." He concluded by re-
commending to Congress "an act declaring the existence of
a state of war between the United States and the Dey and
Regency of Algiers. "^^
On March 2, 1815, the Congress passed "An Act for
the protection of.
. .Commerce.
. .against the Algerine crui-
sers," whose wording was much the same as the Act of
February 6, 1802, except that it was directed at the Dey
of Algiers instead of the Regency of Tripoli.
Additional motivations for the aggressive American
policy at this juncture were the small size of Algiers'
navy, and her hostile relations with Italy, Spain, Holland,
^^Ibid.
, pp. 171-73.
87j^.|<.ha^^so^,
^
1;554.
S^Annals, 28:1275-80; 3 Stat. 230 (1815).
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Prussia, Denmark and Russia--all at the same time.. Ac-
cordingly, two squadrons were formed, one to be headed by
William Bainbridge, the other by Stephen Decatur. The com-
manders were instructed to obtain an early peace without
tribute or presents and to arrange the release of American
prisoners
.
Decatur's flotilla arrived at Gibraltar June 15, 1815,
and proceeded to capture two Algerine vessels. He then
sailed to Algiers, agreed to return the vessels and demand-
ed ratification of a treaty calling for the abolition of
tribute, release of American prisoners, indemnification for
the ship seized in 1812, restoration of other American
property, and the treatment of future captives as prisoners
of war rather than slaves. The Dey agreed to the treaty. 90
Early in 1815, Tunis and Tripoli permitted prizes
seized from the British by Am.erican privateers and brought
into the Barbary ports, to be retaken by England. The
United States protested this action, claiming a violation
of treaties, but to no avail, So after concluding the
pact with Algiers, Decatur, on his o\\Ti authority, sailed
to the other Barbary ports where he successfully demanded
indemnification for loss of the prizes. Bainbridge fol-
lowed Decatur with a show of force in Tunis
,
Tripoli and
S^Irwin, pp. 176-177
90ibid.
, pp. 177-79.
Algiers, and both squadrons sailed for home in October. ^1
Late in December. 1815. the Senate approved and the
President ratified the new treaty with Algiers. But the
Dey chafed under the agreement, which he considered humi-
liating, and complained that one of the vessels captured
by Decatur was never returned. As of the spring of 1816.
the Dey refused to exchange ratifications of the treaty.
Hostilities might have been renewed had not a third party
intervened. That summer a fleet of Dutch and British ship
under Lord Exmouth attacked Algiers, virtually destroying
their fleet and doing considerable damage to the city. 92
When an American flotilla appeared in October, 1816,
Algiers was still in disarray. After receiving instruc-
tions, the American negotiators sent the Dey an ultimatum
with which he reluctantly complied. The result was a re-
newal of the treaty which the Dey had agreed to, then re-
jected. The most advantageous American negotiations with
Barbary were thus concluded in December, 1816. (Curiously
enough, this last treaty, by some error, was not approved
and ratified until 1822.) After this date, American rela-
tions with Barbary remained peaceful.
91Ibid.
, pp. 180-181.
92ibid.
, pp. 182, 184--185.
93ibid,
, pp. 185-186.
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Conpjjosio^ f 1 i c t s
an d the Cons^itutin
n
The principal constitutional issues surrounding the
conflicts with Barbary concern: (1) che international
status of the Barbary powers, and the effect of their sta-
tus (if any) on the decision to use force against them;
(2) President Jefferson's unilateral decision to order
Dale's fleet to the Mediterranean, and the hostilities at-
tendant to Dale's mission; (3) the nature of the Congress-
ional acts of February 6, 1802 and March 2, 1815; and, (4)
the actual conduct of the Barbary wars.
(1) If, as was often bitterly alleged by their vic-
tims, the Barbary were no more than pirates, then the
war- declaring power of Congress (Article I, section 8, para-
graph 11) might be considered irrelevant on the grounds
that war is only declared against states
,
not pirates. On
the other hand, the power of dealing with piracy was ex-
plicitly granted to the Legislature by Article I, section 8,
paragraph 10 of the Constitution, which gives Congress power
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations
.
Pirates were generally viewed as individual miscreants,
roaming the seas purely for personal gain. They were dis-
tinguished from those seafaring predators who acted as
agents of a state. Pirates were, by their crimes, "dena-
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tionalized"^~associated with no state-which is why they
were subject to lawful capture by the ships of any nation. 54
As was the custom of the day, the United States Constitution
provided for the granting of letters of marque and reprisal
(Article I, section 8, paragraph 11), which were govern-
mental commissions for private ships to prey on the vessels
of its enemies. Ships thus commissioned were distinguished
from mere pirates.
Judging by their practice of selective depredations
in accordance with the foreign policy of their rulers, the
Barbary corsairs seem more like privateers than pirates.
The fact that the United States entered into diplo-
matic relations with the Barbary powers is further evidence
that they were states and not mere pirates. Prior to Com-
modore Dale's mission in 1801, the United States negotiated,
and ratified with Senate approval as is constitutionally
required, three treaties, each with a different Barbary
regency. 96 xhus
, as of 1801, all of the Constitutional
procedures for engaging in relations with a foreign state
were strictly observed with the Barbary powers.
94citing Grotius, Fenwick states that "a body of
pirates did not constitute a state and... the laws of war
did not apply to their acts..." Charles G. Fenwick, Inter-
national Law 4th ed. (New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts
.
1^65)
,
p. 5^14
.
^^Fenwick, p. 505,
^^See notes 12, 16 and 17, supra. A fourth treaty,
with Morocco, was made during the period of the Articles of
Confederation. See note 8, supra.
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Furthermore, in his message to the Congress justify-
ing Dale's mission. President Jefferson never suggested
that the United States confronted simple piracy. To the
contrary, he noted that Tripoli had declared war, that h
had ordered defensive measures, which is why no prizes
were taken, and that the legislature was invited to autho
ize measures of offense. ^7
We conclude, therefore, that the Barbary corsairs
were not pirates, and that the Constitutional procedures
for engaging in hostilities with a foreign state applied
to them,
(2) Dale's small fleet of warships was ordered by
President Jefferson to the Mediterranean while Congress
was not in session. Thus, the decision to undertake hosti-
lities against the Barbary states was initiated by the Com-
mander in Chief (of the Navy) rather than the Congress.
This statement is subject to som.e qualification, how-
ever. When Congress established the naval force in 1794,
it explicitly declared its purpose to be the protection of
American commerce against "the depredations of the Algerine
corsairs . "^^
However, this act was to go out of effect after the
1795 treaty with Algiers, and so Congress passed a supple-
O 7
See notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text, supra,
98see note 10, supra.
mentary act in 1796, authorizing the President to "continue
the construction and equipment" of three of the war ships.
The 1796 supplement said nothing about the use of the ves-
sels. 99
;ome
While it may be argued that Congress intended s.
degree of Presidential discretion in the use of the naval
force when it first authorized construction, the naval ar-
mament acts could hardly be considered explicit approval
for Dale's mission. In addition, there is no evidence of
any prior consultation by the President with Congress or
its members.
"Jefferson justified his orders to Dale on the grounds
that he never directed anything "beyond the line of de-
fense. "100 Writing as "Lucius Crassus," Hamilton ridiculed
this line of argument. But Hamilton's charge was that
Jefferson had underrepresented Presidential power, rather
than that he exceeded his authority.
Jefferson had instructed Dale to be prepared for hos-
tilities. He was directed to destroy foreign ships and
blockade foreign ports only if war had been declared or if
attacks on American ships had begun. I^ile such instruc-
tions clearly contemplate defensive action, the dispatch of
war ships all the way to the Mediterranean may in itself
^^See note 14, supra.
lOORichardson, 1:327,
have been provocative. At the least, the mission was in-
tended as a show of force in order to intimidate the Barbary
rulers
.
Since there is no evidence that Congress challenged
Jefferson's action or questioned his explanation, the prac-
tice of Presidents unilaterally ordering the armed forces
abroad in a show of force gained approval. Jefferson's ac-
tion, in fact, if not in law, enhanced the war making powers
of the President,
(3) Congress did formally approve hostilities with
Tripoli on February 6, 1802, although Hamilton was surely
correct in saying that a Congressional declaration is un-
necessary if the other party has declared war. Nevertheless,
the "Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of
the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers," how-
ever clear its intent, may not have been, in form, a de-
claration of war.
The Act stated that Tripoli had "commenced a preda-
tory warfare against the United States," and that in re-
sponse, the President may, as he sees fit, employ armed
vessels to "subdue, seize and make prize of" Tripolitan
ships, or undertake other acts of hostility "as the state
of war will justify, and may, in his opinion, require . "-^^-^
And again, on March 2, 1815, sim.ilar words v/ere used
•^^^See note 50, supra.
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to authorize the President to undertake hostilities to pro-
tect conferee from the Algerine cruisers even though Presi-
dent Madison expressly requested a declaration of war. Why
the Congress resorted to this form is not entirely clear.
Perhaps it reflects the limited nature of the conflict, or
perhaps the desire of Congress to permit the President to
determine whether or not. when, and in what amounts force
was necessary.
Whatever the motivation, the form of these acts con-
trasts clearly with the form of the act authorizing hosti-
lities with England in 1812. Here the Congress explicitly
trumpeted that "war be and the same is hereby declared to
exist" between the United States and Great Britain; even
the title of the legislation was: "An Act declaring war
between the United Kingdom.
.. and the United States ... "1^2
In conclusion, the Acts of February 6, 1802 and
March 2, 1815 would seem to be Congressional authoriza-
tions of hostilities just short of a declaration of war,
further establishing that Congress may authorize hostili^
ties without declaring v/ar.
(4) Finally, we consider the constitutional issues
raised by the actual conduct of uhe Barbary wars. Three
10^2 Stat. 755 (1812). This Act also states "that
the President of the united States is hereby authorized
to use the whole land and naval force of the United States
to carry the same into effect..."
belligerent operations in particular are of questionable
legality. First was Dale's blockading of two Tripolitan
vessels anchored at Gibraltar.
Dale was ordered to stop at Gibraltar and learn the
disposition of the Barbary powers toward the United States.
He was only to take bellicose action upon learning that
war had been declared. The American consul at Gibraltar
informed him of Tripoli's hostile designs, but the admiral
of the Tripolitan vessels denied that war existed. Never-
theless, Dale proceeded to block the ships.
Given the contradictary claims of the Tripolitan and
the American consul, was Dale's action warranted? We would
have to conclude that it was. Despite their commander's
protests, the Tripolitan vessels were, themselves, evidence
that the Pasha of Tripoli had dispatched his cruisers in
search of prey. The warnings of the consul only confirmed
this. In fact, Tripoli had declared war against the United
States a month and a half before Dale arrived. In sum, the
constitutionality of the decision to send Dale to the Med-
iterranean notwithstanding, this particular phase of his
mission was legal.
The second activity of dubious constitutionality is
Eaton's land mission in Tripoli, Was the plan to instigate
and support a coup d'etat in order to place into power
103See text accompanying notes 29-36, supra
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someone sympathetic to American interests warranted by the
Act of February 6, 1802? The Act fell short of a declara-
tion of all-out war and called, essentially, for naval ac-
tion to protect United States merchantships and crews. On
the other hand, the second section authorized the President
to instruct the commander of the naval squadron "to cause
to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility
as the state of v^ar will j ustify . . . "^0^
President Jefferson approved Eaton's plan in 1803;
once again, without any consultation with Congress. It
was left to squadron commander Samuel Barron to decide
whether or not to pursue the plan, and by the fall of 1804
he had been persuaded. Was Eaton's mission, then, an "act
of precaution or hostility" justified by the state of war,
in the words of the Act of 1802?
Broadly interpreted, these words of the Act would
seem to warrant any action suitable to wartime at Presi-
dential discretion. It is possible, however, that the Con-
gress was thinking merely of a naval blockade of the port
of Tripoli, The legality of Eaton's land mission thus de-
pends upon one's interpretation of the imprecise words of
the legislation.
The third issue surrounds Stephen Decatur's action as
coimnander of the American fleet in the Mediterranean in ac-
10'^2 Stat. 129 (1802), emphasis added.
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cordance with the Act of March 2, 1815, The Act was speci-
fically directed at Algiers, but Decatur, after having dealt
with the latter state, proceeded to Tunis and then to Tri-
poli. His fleet conducted a show of force at both these
ports, but engaged in no hostilities. Decatur undertook
this action on his own initiative , 105 ^ut of course he acted
under color of Presidential authority.
William Bainbridge, who commanded the second American
squadron in the Mediterranean at the time, followed Decatur
with a similar display of might in Algiers, Tunis and Tri-
poli. .Were these actions before Tunis and Tripoli warranted
by the 1815 legislation? We would conclude in the negative.
The success of the missions--treaties were obtained from
Tunis and Tripoli without any hostilities--made any cri-
ticism unlikely. Nevertheless, Madison's commanders clear-
ly exceeded their orders pursuant to an act of 'Congress.
(5) To summarize, the Barbary conflicts set a pre-
cedent for an expanded Presidential v/ar making power, prin-
cipally because the 1801 naval action ordered by Jefferson
and the 1815 incidents under Madison went virtually un-
challenged.
- Congress set a precedent for a more flexible mode of
authorizing hostilities than the formal declaration of war.
But this, too, redounded to the President, because the acts
10
-^Irwin, p. 180.
of February 6, 1802 and March 2. 1815 delegated to
broad discretion in the use of force.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BOXER EXPEDITION
^-L^i.?a]^Backgrqund
After the middle of the 17th century China was ruled
by the Manchus, a people of northern Asia, who pierced
the Great Wall, conquered China, and established a new
dynastic order, the Ch'ing. To consolidate their power
the Manchus left the uld administrative system virtually
intact, and adopted traditional Chinese customs. As a
consequence, when confronted with new ideas from the West,
the Manchus reacted quite conservatively.^
Trade relations with Europe were fairly good, des-
pite inevitable frictions, until the mid-1800's, when the
British government took over from the East India Company
control of trade with China. Even the propagation of
Christianity by missionaries V7as relatively unhindered for
over one hundred years. In the early 18th century, when
the Emperor issued anti-Christian edicts, it was in res-
ponse to missionary threats to his authority.
^
The Opium War (1840) and the Arrow War (1856) were
fought to secure more favorable trading advantages in
China for the British government. Afterwards the depen-
^Christopher Martin /"pseud ^Edwin Palmer Hoy t . The
Boxer Rebe llion (London: Abelard-Schum.en
.
Ltd., 1968)";
pp. 1'^2l,
Co
o
^Chester Tan. The Boxer Catastrophe (New York:
lumbia University Press
,
1967)
, pp. 3-7.
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dencies ringing the Chinese Empire fell, under Western
(^•barbarian", as the Chinese now called them) control.
In the northeast Russia seized huge tracts of land north
of the Amur River (1858). In 1862. Portugal had solid
control over the southeastern port of Macao. In that
same year France occupied Annam to the south (what is now
Laos and North Vietnam)
,
and Great Britain annexed Lower
Burma in the southwest. (France secured the rest of what
it called Indo-China by 1887, and England claimed Upper
Burma by 1886.) In the northwest Russia claimed Hi, a
large tract of land in Chinese Turkestan (1871) , but re-
stored part of it nine years later in exchange for a huge
indemnity. In 1379, Japan took the Liuchiu Islands in the
East China Sea.^
The weakness of the Manchu dynasty at the hands of
the Western imperialists encouraged many Chinese to seek
internal reforms. A young scholar, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, in-
fluenced by Christian ideas, formed a sect which soon
sought the overthrow of the Ch ' ing regime. This touched
off the T'aip'ing Rebellion (1850), which the Manchus in
combination with conservative support took fourteen years
to suppress.^
-"Peter Fleming, The Siege at Peking (New York
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 195'^
%artin, pp. 25-26; Tan, p. 9.
1.30
In response to the T'aip'ing revolt the Chinese de-
veloped a deep suspicion for anything Western-
-especially
Western religious and social ideas, and later, manifes-
tations of its industrialization, such as the railroad and
telegraph. The Manchu Court shared this revulsion, but as
piece after piece of its empire was hacked off, it realized
it would have to modernize sufficiently to withstand the
Western onslaught .
^
In the 1880 's a campaign was launched to build rail-
ways, open mines, construct dockyards, build naval vessels,
establish naval acadamies
,
reorganize the army, and send
students to Europe to study military operations and muni-
tions manufacturing. Ironically, the first great chal-
lenge came not from the West, but from the newly mxodern-
ized Japan .
^
The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 was a disaster for
China, The decisive victory by Japan, which had imperial
designs of its own, opened China's eighteen provinces to
a fierce competition among the European povTers for com-
mercial concessions. Were it not for this competition
among the imperialists, China proper might well have been
carved up into colonies
. The European rivalry created a
^MarLiu, p 26
^'Tan, p. 9,
balance of power, which, if unbalanced,
-would result in
China's dismemberment.
As it was, China was compelled to grant additional
humiliating concessions, and sign conventions giving the
European powers, Russia and Japan so-called "spheres of
influence." These spheres consisted of whole regions of
China in which the Manchus were compelled to give one or
another of the Powers exclusive privileges.
7
Nominally, the Manchu Emperor ruled China, Actually,
China was ruled by a combination of the Imperial Court,
which was most influential in the, central provinces, re-
gional viceroys who had sx.orn allegience to the Emperor
but were fairly independent, and local leaders. And the
Court itself was dominated by the crafty old Empress
Dowager, aunt of the Emperor, Kuang-hsu.
In the 1890 's, once again through the efforts of a
young Chinese scholar well versed in Western thought, a
new reform movement sprang up. Only this time the external
threat to China proper was graver than ever, and the ideas
of the reformers found favor with the Emperor. For one
hundred days in 1898, decrees were issued commanding var-
ious ,reforms--only to have the Empress Dowager combine with
the conservative faction to abort the movement and virtual-
ly imprison the Emperor. The Empress then proceeded to
''ibid.
, pp. 11-14.
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abolish the institutional refonns. and, turning to military
reorganization, prepared for armed resistance to foreign
encroachments .
^
Such were the conditions in China at the start of
the Boxer rebellion. We turn briefly to Sino-American re-
lations. The United States obtained its first treaty
with China after her defeat in the Opium War. The Treaty
of Wang Hiya, 1844, opened five Chinese ports to American
commerce on a most-favored nation basis. ^ The pact was
revised with some concessions favorable to the United
States in the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) . This agreement
opened additional ports to American commerce (Article 14),
gave the American Representative the same residence pri-
vileges at Peking, the capital, as any other foreign minis-
ter (Article 6)
,
and required Chinese officials to defend
Americans in China "from all insult or injury of any sort"
(Article 11). Finally, the Chinese government agreed to
allow foreign Christians and native converts to practice
and teach their religion unmolested (Article 29)
.
In short, United States policy toward China was to
pursue whatever comjiiercial advantages arose as a result
^Ibid.
, pp. 15-32.
9Paul H. Clyde, United States Poli cy TowardChina
:
Diplomatic and Public Documents. 1839-1 939 (New ToFk
'
Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 13-21.
10Ibid.
, pp . 47-57
10 '>
of European oriental policies, but neither to ally itself
with any of the European powers, nor to wring concessions
by American force of arms.
Three American "interest groups" were particularly
concerned with China. First, there were the Christian
missionaries. The American missionary movement began in
the 1830's. and by 1900 over a fifth of American invest-
ments in China consisted of missionary property there.
The movement weakened however, as a result of the Depression
of 1893, which hurt the churches economically, and because
of critical attacks by lay writers. Nevertheless, the pub-
lic was sympathetic to the victims of isolated antimission-
ary riots in China.
^
Second were business interests. Investments in China
were relatively small (an estimated two percent of United
States foreign trade), 12 b^t; were growing. China purchased
almost half of all United States cotton exports, and bought
substantial amounts of kerosene and wheat flour as well.
Still, China's greatest value to American business was as
a potential market for United States goods . '^
'-'-Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American
China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvafT Univer-
sity Press, 1968;, pp. 76-87.
12Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomati c History of the
American People
,
8th ed. (New^Yofk;' Appie ton ^'Century-
Crofts, 1969)
,
p. 479.
l-^Young, pp. 54-6.
1'^ I
!e men,
-ca a;
The third
-group" with an eye toward China were the
navalistc. In tune with, or perhaps ahead of the super-
nationalistic., expansionist views of the day, thes,
led by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, envisioned Ameri,
a great world power, and necessarily, because of geography,
a great naval power. And now (190C)
, as a result of the
Spanish-American War, the United States was an Asian power,
with a substantial army and navy fighting a brutal (and
increasingly unpopular) war to secure control of the
Philippines. (We should note that the Philippine Islands
were Spanish possessions until the United States war with
Spain--which was declared by Congress.) As early as 1897
some naval elements sought a coaling station for the United
States Navy in a Chinese port. Their designs did not have
much impact on United States policy toward China, however. '^'^
The effect of these interests on United States poli-
cy was by no m.eans negligible, however, and the influence
of the mercantilists can be seen in the most important
policy statement to precede the Boxer outbreak. The state-
ment, first detailed in diplomatic messages to the European
powers and Japan in September 1899, became known as the
"Open Door Policy." The memos were the brainchild of
W.W. Rockhill, an advisor to McKinley ' s Secretary of State,
John Hay. Rockhill was in turn influenced by a British
^^Ibid.
, pp. 5-6, 103-106.
135
Far East expert, A,E, Hippisley.
While the Open Door was presented to and accepted by
the American public as a statement of noble principle-in
behalf of China's threatened territorial integrity-it was
in fact aimed at serving America's self-interest. The
September 1899 notes did not oppose the spheres of influ-
ence, they accepted the spheres as facts. The aim was to
get each of the European Powers to agree that within their
particular sphere, future American coi.nmercial rights would
not be jeopardized. Only the memo to England revealed con-
cern with "maintaining the integrity of China. "15
.
The Powers either interpreted the note's ambiguities
to their own advantage, or responded evasively. The Open
Door had more of an effect upon the electorate in the Pres-
idential elections of 1900 than it did upon hapless China.
The_Boxer Rebellion
Natural disasters often have political repercussions;
so it was with the Boxer movement. In the central provinces
of Shantung and Chihli (where Peking is), flood and famine
took a particularly savage toll on the Chinese population
in 1898 and 1899. It is in these districts that the anti-
foreign, anti-missionary riots known as the Boxer Rebellion
took place
.
l^Young, p. 131; Clyde, pp. 201-15; Bailey, pp. 479-81
l^Tan, pp. 33-34.
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It was not simply that the Chinese blamed foreigners
for the ravages of nature; rather, the misery attendant to
the flood and famine made foreign abuses that much harder
to bear. During the Hundred Days reform movement the people
were warned about the danger of foreign encroachments in
China. And in the northern provinces, where foreign powers
held leases, mistreatment of Chinese by foreigners was not
uncommon. After all, Germany began the rush to obtain
spheres of influence in China by landing troops at the
port of Kiaochow, Shantung, and seizing the city by force
of arms
.
^
But not only did the foreigners seize Chinese terri-
tory forcefully; they also burned villages and shot Chines
at the slightest provocation. Still, most of inland Chin
was visited by no foreign troops. Missionaries, however,
did trav/el inland. They set up schools and hospitals and
converted many Chinese to Christianity. But when Chinese
converts were prohibited from practicing traditional cus-
toms
,
and when they obtained favorable treatment in legal
disputes due to pressure from the clergy, public indigna-
18
tion rose.
It was in this period of great social dislocation
that the secret society, I Ho Ch'uan, or "Fists of Right-
^^Fleming, p. 29
^^Tan, p, 35,
e
a
.ve
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ecus Harmony" was formed and flourished. Its avowed aim
was to rid China of the foreign devils by killing them
off; and for this purpose it practiced martial arts. The
"Boxers", as the English called them, touched a response
chord in the Chinese of the northern provinces, and th(
movement spread rapidly. Inland foreigners and Chinese
Christians now feared for their lives. In 1899, vigorous
anti-Boxer measures by the Acting Governor of Shantung
suppressed the movement in that district. But in Chihli
province, seat of the Court and foreign legations, the
story was dif ferent . •'-^
The Empress Dowager, conservative in her own right,
and since the collapse of the reform movement under the in-
fluence of reactionary elements, was indecisive. She did
not want another T'aip'ing revolt, but she too hated the
foreigners; she knew that foreign armies might well invade
China using the threat to their nationals as a pretext,
yet she could not bring herself to suppress the Boxers. ^0
Apparently there is evidence of an anti-Ch'ing fac-
tion among the Boxers. It is argued that initial orders
to suppress the movement were aimed at this group, that
this element was eliminated, and that later pacifying de-
crees v7erG part of a dynastic plan to use the Boxers
l^Ibid.
, pp. 49-51.
^^Ibid.
, pp, 56-70,
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against the foreigners . 21 Whatever the case my be, the
Boxers went wild in Chihli province in 1900,
Fearing that the Chinese government was either un-
able or unwilling to quell the disturbances, the foreign
ministers in Peking began to urge their own governments
to act. As early as March 9, 1900, the United States
Minister to China, Edwin Conger, telegraphed Secretary of
State Hay advising a "naval demonstration by war vessels
of each Government .., in North China waters" should the
situation not improve. 22
Desirous of protecting American citizens, but not
wishing to be part of an allied threat to China, Secretary
Hay replied six days later as follows.
Navy Department will detail ship for independent pro-
tection American citizens and interests in China.
Commander will communicate with you, probably from
Taku. 2
J
Taku was on the China coast, Peking about ninety
miles inland. An American ship arrived at Taku on April 7,
1900, but left at the end of the month telling Minister
Conger to communicate with Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff,
aboard the U.S.S. Newark, commander of the American fleet
^^Young, p. 144.
2?
U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United Statec;
,
l900 (.V^achington:
Government FrinTing Oft ice, 1^02), p. ITJT.
2^1bid.
,
p. 110.
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north of Hongkong. ^4
When the situation did not improve Conger requested
a warship and K«mpff arrived at Taku aboard the Newark in
late May
.
Before May ended the foreign ministers requested
legation guards
;
the Chinese foreign office agreed to thir-
ty guards per ministry, but the growing foreign fleet off
Taku dispatched 340 men for six legations. Kempff sent
fifty marines. 2^
In early June 1900. Conger wired Hay that the minis-
ters and their families along with the many Chinese con-
verts who had rushed to Peking might be beseiged by the
Boxers with the possibility of rail and telegraph lines
being cut off. This proved an accurate prediction. 26
On June 10, Kempff contributed about one hundred
marines tc a 2000-man force comm.anded by British Admiral
Seymour headed to Peking (by rail) to relieve the legations.
They never arrived. Half-way to Peking strong resistance
from Boxers compelled them to retreat. Their journey and
the Boxer victory was catalytic; pandemonium set in all
along the railroad and Boxers rushed into the Forbidden
City of Peking,
24ibid.
, pp. 119-120,
^^Tan, pp. 53-54.
26u.S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p, 141.
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China now moved toward war, carried along by the rush
of events. The Imperial Court issued decrees to the Chinese
Army to stop the Seymour expedition and prevent any further
troop landings, Compelled to choose between suppression
of the Boxers and, in effect, uniting with them against
the foreigners, the Throne had chosen the latter course. ^7
On June 16, the Court again ordered the Army to resist
foreign encroachments, and called for the recruitment of
young Boxers. 28 Meanwhile, the naval commanders off Taku,
now out of touch with Seymour (Boxers had cut the telegraph
lines)
,
prepared an ultimatum calling for the Chinese to
surrender the forts guarding the mouth of the Pei-Ho River,
the water- route to Peking, Admiral Kempff refused to sign
or to participate in the bombardment that followed: the
United States did not consider itself at war with China. ^9
After the shelling began, an old American gunboat,
the U.S.S. Monocacy, was fired on, probably by accident;
it headed upriver without returning fire. But now that
hostilities had ensued Kempff changed his mind about Amer-
ican involvement. The Secretary of the Navy received the
following wire from Kempff on June 20.
^^Tan, pp. 70, 74
28Ibid.
,
p. 72.
^^Young, p. 150
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Monocacy fired on by Taku fn-rho r^r.
cally exists. 30
^^^^equate
... State of war practi-
The Administration had already decided on its course
of action. After June 11 nothing more had been heard from
Minister Conger; the legations were, in fact, completely
isolated and would not be heard from again until mid- July.
On June 16. General MacArthur was ordered to send an infan-
try regiment from the Philippines, where he was conducting
military operations, to Taku. China. And on the 22nd. over
his protests, he was told to send another regiment. 31
In Peking, the Empress Dowager had decided upon her
course of action as well. Enraged by a newly received set
of four demands which would have meant her virtual sur-
render, and encouraged by early favorable military reports
from Taku, an edict declaring war against the Powers vjas
issued. June 21. (The "Demand of Four Points" was likely
forged by one of the reactionaries to goad the Empress
30U.S., Adjutant-General's Office. Correspondenc e re-
lating to the War with Spain and conditions growing ouT~oT
the same including the insurrection in th_e_Phi
I
ippine is^
lands and the China relief e?g3e_ditj^n^JT3ctw^
general of the army an d "military "coiTimand'e fs in tTie United
States. Cuba. Porto Rico'._ China ! and the" Philippine islands
,
r?om April 15. 1898. to July/307~T9'D77'TVoT3T (•WasKinTtoi^
Government Printing Office7u)(r2")' . T:9 ,
31 Ibid.
,
1:412.
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into war; the military report was overly optimistic.) m
addition, the Ro-x-pvq rir^t-^ -u^ 1, L.11C uuAers were to be or^p-m ^ori -pj t.^.ganized to fight against
the foreigners
.
The McKinley administration was in a difficult posi-
tion, The Congress was not in session. If it joined in
concerted military action the United States might end up
in a war with China of unpredictable dimensions. The
anti-imperialists, who were sniping at the Republicans for
America's sordid involvement in the Philippines, would
surely make a war in China an issue in the upcoming elec-
tions. On the other hand, if the United States did nothing
while its citizens and a couple of thousand Chinese converts
were massacred in Peking, the public would be outraged.
That Chinese declaration of war, noted above, was
for domestic purposes only; neither the United States nor
any other country was told that China considered herself
at war. Diplomatic relations between the United States
and China were maintained throughout the troubled period.
But after the fall of the forts at Taku, the foreign troop
build-up and the hostilities continued. Several hundred
United States soldiers participated in the battle of
Tientsin, largest city between Peking and the coast, and
just west of several foreign settlements now menaced by
Boxers
.
32Tan, pp. 73-75, 93-94.
143
On July 1 news spread that Baron von Ketteler, the
German minister who was among the beseiged at Peking, was
murdered by a Chinese soldier. Rumor had it that all the
ministers had been or would be killed. Fearing China's
total dismemberment in reprisal, the viceroys of the cen-
tral and southern Chinese provinces promised to keep the
peace in their areas. One magistrate issued a personal
appeal to McKinley, urging the United States to take the
lead in restraining the Powers. After an emergency Cabi-
net meeting Secretary Hay issued the July 3 circular. ^3
In this memo to the European Powers and Japan, the
United States reaffirmed its desire to be at "peace with
the Chinese nation," but noted that Peking was in a con-
dition of "virtual anarchy." The note stated American
intentions to work with the Powers to open communication
to Peking, to protect American lives, property and inter-
ests, and to keep the disorders from spreading to other
parts of China. It concluded by declaring that United
States policy
is to seek a solution which may bring about perma-
nent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese
territorial and administrative entity, protect all
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and
international law, and safeguard for the world the
principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts
of the Chinese Empire. 34
33Young, pp. 161-162.
3^U.S. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 299
Upon ,ho direction of ,:hc President, no express re-
nunciation of American territorial desires in Cl.inn „.s
included in flip cdmiln-r ;
i
i-ne iicuia . This may have reflected naval
desires for a coaling station on the Chinese coast. 35
Four days later, on July 7, General MacArthur was
ordered to dispatch additional American troops from the
Philippines to Taku. General Adna Chaffee was appointed
commander of all American land forces in China. While
General Chaffee was sailing to China, two American infantry
battalions joined an international force of about 5000 in
capturing Tientsin on July 13. A few days later the
Chinese government declared a truce, and Minister Conger
was beard from again for the first time in over a month. 36
On July 20, four days after it was sent. Secretary
Hay received the following telegram from Conger. "For one
month," the Minister declared,
we. have been besieged in British legation under con-tinued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick re-lief only can prevent general massacre. 37
Now that Tientsin had fallen (July 13) , and there was
evidence that the ministers still lived another internation-
al relief expedition was formed. On August 3, the allied
35Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York-
Harper & Bros.. 1959), p:~^7T.
36Young, p, 166; Leech, pp, 520-521; Tan, p. 102.
37u.s. Foreign Relations. 1900, p. 156.
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commanders at Taku, including General Chaffee, planned an
advance on the Imperial city. Foreign troops in China now
numbered about twenty thousand; around one-fourth of these
were American . 38
The allies were never certain about the number of
troops necessary for a successful expedition; after all,
since the bombing of the Taku forts they had to fight the
regular Chinese Imperial Army as well as the Boxers. Al-
though estimates vary, approximately sixteen thousand
troops left Tientsin for Peking on August 4, 1900. Half
of the expeditionary force consisted of Japanese soldiers.
There were 2,500 Americans under General Chaffee. 39
The Relief Expedition marched northwest along the
banks of the Pei-Ho River toward Peking, meeting stiff re-
sistance along the way. On August 14, the force arrived
at Peking, and after a skirmish the legations were relieved
It was considered a miracle that the victims of the two-
th seige were still alive. (President McKinley latermon
38F^itz Grob, The Relat ivity of War and Peace (NewHaven: Yale University Press7~T949)
, pp. 67 -W.
on
Colonel Richard E. Dupuy and Major General William
H. Baumer, TheJLittle Wars of the United States (New York-
Hawthorne BooFs
,
Inc., 1968), "^p. 115rn-^ UTS
. ,
Department
ot War, Arrangem.ent of the Annual Reports of the War Depart-
ment for the vear ending .Tnnp "^0 TO'rTTl T^TTl r: n"^^^<-^ir
L (jj. j:.tigineering anci v,.niei: or uram ai
Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 12
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reported to Congress that sixty-five of the defenders were
killed, 135 wounded, and seven children died of disease. ^0)
One historian has suggested that one of the Chinese offi-
cials intervened on the ministers' behalf. 41
The Empress Dowager hurriedly moved her Court west-
ward, as foreign troops rampaged throughout the Forbidden
City. As in Tientsin before it, Peking was subjected to
rampant looting, burning and atrocities of all sorts at
the hands of the foreign troops, Thus was the relief of
the legations tarnished.
The Administration now faced the dilemma of what to
do next. Europe, and Germany in particular, was calling
for the punishment of the Boxers and their supporters in
the Manchu government. (Indeed, scores of punitary expedi-
tions in China were conducted by Europeans well after Sino-
European negotiations were begun in October 1900.) Pun-
ishment of the Boxers could well be the pretext for more
depredations against China and an end to both Chinese in-
tegrity and the Open Door.
On the other hand, MacArthur needed more troops in
the Philippines, and the anti-imperialists would surely
make political capital of a more protracted involvement in
China, Privately, Secretary of State Hay summed up the
^^U-j,.^,goggi8"_ Relation's, 1900
,
p. xii.
^^Tan, pp. 112-15.
American situation; 'Ve do not want to rob China our-
selves, and our public opinion will not permit us to in-
terfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing
her, "^2
Without making any declarations of policy. American
troops were gradually withdrawn from Peking to Tientsin.
Enough remained in China for the United States to have a
bargaining chip in the negotiations. The United States
managed to restrain some of the harsher demands for retri-
bution offered in the talks, the United States Navy never
did get its coaling station, and McKinley was re-elected
President
.
The China
_Relief Expedition and the Constituti on
The Congress had adjourned on June 7, 1900, just
before American military personnel were dispatched to
China. Congress was never convened in special session,
nor was there any suggestion that it be convened. By the
time the second session of the Fifty-Sixth Congress had
begun, December 3, 1900, the United States had only a
token force in China.
The Expedition was successful in that casualties
were light, the beseiged Americans were rescued, and a
more extensive Asian conflict was avoided. All this may
42Quoted in Young, p. 186.
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serve to explain the lack of Congressional response to
President McKinley's detailed account of the intervention
in China in his opening day Message of December 3, 1900.^3
American military operations in China were the sub-
ject of court consideration in Hamilton v. McClaughry,
Warden. Hamilton was stationed in China in December, 1900,
when he was convicted by a court-martial convened in Peking
for killing a fellow soldier. The Fifty-Eighth Article
of War called for punishment by such tribunals for murder
"/r7"n time of war." Hamilton appealed on the ground that
the court-martial had no jurisdiction because the United
States was not at war in China at the time of the act.^^
The Federal court ruled against Hamilton. Judge
Pollock, who wrote the decision, declared that "the exis-
tence of a condition of war must be determined by the poli-
tical department of the government; that the courts take
judicial notice of such determination and are bound thereby.
By "political department," the judge evidently meant Con-
gress, for he notes that the political department never
formally declared V7ar against China. Moreover, he con-
cluded that Congress recognized a "condition of war"
when it raised the pay of the troops in China to that
^^34 Cong. Rcc. 2-13ff.
•'-^^136 F. 449 (C.C. Kan. 1905).
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received in war-time. ^5
The Court relied upon Vattel's definition of war,
cited in the Prize Cases (1862)
, as "that state in which a
nation prosecutes its right by force." Pollock reasoned
that since a nation has the right to protect its citizens,
especially its accredited representatives, abroad, the
United States government could legitimately, and indeed
did, prosecute its right in China. Thus, Hamilton's act
was committed in the time of war because the United States
was pursuing its right as a sovereign state to protect
Its citizens abroad by force of arms 46
.
To summarize the reasoning of the federal court;
(1) a war exists when the nation pursues its rights in
international law by force: (2) Congress must determine
that a condition of war exists if a court is to take judi-
cial cognizance of it; (3) a formal declaration of war
is not necessary to constitute such a determination; and
(4) Congress may determine that a condition of war exists
well after the war has begun.
What inferences may be drawn, from the above with re-
gard to Presidential war power? It would seem that while
Congress may make the political determination that the
United States is at war, it need not make such a determina-
^^136 F, 449, 451
^^Ibid.
, p. 449.
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tlon before or during the outbreak of hostilities. A
pay raise for the troops long after the fighting has died
do-vm will suffice. What the court leaves tantalizingly
unanswered is whether or not the President may legitimately
prosecute the nation's rights by force (i.e.. initiate and^
conduct a war) without the prior consent of Congress. And
if so, under what circumstances?
For one answer to these questions, perhaps the an-
swer insofar as the facts of the Chinese intervenrion are
concerned, one must turn to another episode some half cen-
tury earlier: the American bombardment of Greytown,
Nicaragua. As a result of this incident a Federal court
decided the case of Durand v. Rollins.
The discussion in the Hamilton case of the duty of
the state to protect its citizens so reminds one of the
opinion in Durand v. Rollins, that it is hard to believe
that the latter was not cited as a precedent.
The importance of the Durand case and the events
from which it issued justify the exploration of both in
some detail. Rollins, a United States naval commander,
bombarded and razed by fire the town of Greytown, Nicaragua,
July 13, 1854. The underlying cause was the Anglo-American
^^8 F. Cas. Ill (No. 4, 186) (C . C , S . D . N . Y . 1860).
"^^Compare 136 F. 449, 450 with 8 F. Cas. Ill, 112.
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im-
mer-
rivalry in Central America over the territory where a
prospective inter-oceanic canal was to be built. The
mediate cause was the avaricious conflict between the
chants of Greytown and the American-owned private company
in the profitable business of transporting people across
Nicaragua on their way to California . ^9
While the United States and England agreed in the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) to renounce exclusive con-
trol over the canal expected to be built in Nicaragua,
sovereignty over the coastal region at the Port of San
Juan, where the canal would meet the Atlantic, remained
in doubt. The United States considered Nicaragua, from
whom an agreement concerning construction of the canal by
an American firm was obtained (1849), as rightful sover-
eign. Great Britain reasoned that all of Nicaragua's
Atlantic coast was part of the protectorate it had estab-
lished over the Mosquito Indians (1847). By 1848, England
had forcefully ousted the Nicaraguan officials from the
port tov.^ of San Juan, replaced them with the Mosquito fun-
ctionaries, and renamed the place Greytov^n.
The international rivalry took on more commercial
overtones after 1848 when gold was discovered in California
Now it became profitable to transport fortune-seekers ac-
ross Central America via Nicaragua's rivers ^nd lakes and
^'-^The following account is based upon: David L.
Folkman, T]he_NjLcaraj^ua_^ojite (Salt Lake City, Utah: Univer-
sity of Utah Press. 1972'), pp. 13-21, 59-68.
152
on to the American west coast by steamer.
Soon an American-owned transport company was operat-
ing successfully out of Point Arenas, across San Juan har-
bor from Greytown. The location proved critical, because
as a result. Greytowi. merchants did not get to deal with
the travellers to and from California. Friction between
the Greyto.^ authorities representing the merchants there
and the transport company steadily mounted in the 1350' s.
The desperate Greytowners
.
who declared themselves
an independent city in 1852, first tried to cajole, then
to coerce the transport company to conduct its operations
in a manner more profitable to Greytown, In 1853. after
some of the newly constructed transit company buildings on
Point Arenas were demolished by Greytovmers and the rest
were threatened with destruction, the U.S.S. Cyane
,
Hollins
commanding, was dispatched to Nicaragua. A small party of
marines was landed to protect the business; the Greytoxs^ers
backed down and the Cyane and marines soon departed.
On April 14, 1853, the Navy Department took the
opportunity to inform Hollins that his action to protect
the transit company had been founded upon the rights of
American citizens interested in the business, the charter
of which had been granted by the government of Nicaragua.
San Juan, or Greytovm
, the memo went on, is considered
part of Nicaragua; the United States recognizes no other
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government there. 50
A year later, 1854, the conflict between Greytown
and the company resumed. In March, 1854, the company re-
fused to move its operations from Point Arenas to Greytown.
In May, company property was stolen and Greytown officials
refused to return it. That same month, an American steamer
captain shot and killed a native in a dispute over a ship
collision. The United States Minister to Central America,
Solon Borland, interceded on the captain's behalf and pre-
vented his arrest by brandishing a rifle. Later that day,
a group of Greytowners tried to arrest Borland; someone
tossed a broken bottle and the Minister's face was cut.
Borland managed to return to Point Arenas the next
day. He hired fifty men to protect company property
there, and boarded a steamer for the United States. Grey-
town meanv7hile organized a militia for its defense.
On June 10, 1854, the Navy Department gave Hollins
the following orders. He was to return to Greytown, "in
pursuance of the wishes of the President," because .Amer-
ican-owned property (i.e., transport company property)
was "unlawfully detained," Minister Borland had been
"treated with rudeness and disrespect," and "further out-
rages" were feared. "Now, it is very desirable," Hollins
5^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Exec. Doc, 8, 33d Cong.,
1st sess., 1853-1854, pp. 7-9.
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was told,
have the power and the determination'to
' check thenIS, however, very much hoped that you can effectThepurposes of your visit without a resort to violenrPand destruction of property and loss of Ufr?!^''''^
The Cyane arrived in early July, 1854, Demands
were presented to Greytown for $24,000 in reparations, an
apology to Borland, and assurances of future good behavior.
Wh.en the demands were not met, Rollins issued an ultimatum
warning that the town would be bombarded. The next day,
July 13, the shelling began. Later that day, when all the
residents had withdrawn, marines burned GreytowTi to the
ground. No one was killed.
President Pierce was criticized for exceeding his
war powers, and Congress overwhelmingly approved a request
for a full report on the Greytown affair. The State Depart-
ment never disavowed the action at Greytown; President
Pierce even defended it in his Message to Congress of
December 4, 1854. Overall, repugnance at the harshness
of the bombardment, and concern over possible excesses of
Presidential authority, were balanced by a satisfaction
that the Monroe Doctrine had been reaffirmed against
British encroachments.
Such V7as the background to the federal case that
^lu.S., Congress, Senate, S. Exec. Doc. 85, 33d
Cong., 1st sess., 1853-1854, p. 21.
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arose when one Durand, who owned property in Greytovm.
sued Rollins for damages sustained during the bombardment.
In his defense, Hollins argued that he was bound to obey
the orders of the President and the Secretary of the Navy.
Supreme Court Justice Nelson, riding the circuit, ruled
in Hollins
' favor.
Nelson reasoned that as chief executive, the Presi-
dent had full power to protect "by negotiation or... force"
citizens and their property abroad. Furthermore, the deci-
sion to undertake such an "interposition" abroad must "rest
in the discretion of the president." As to the specifics
of the Greytown affair, whether or not it was the "duty
of the president to interpose for the protection of the
citizens at Greytown against an irresponsible and marauding
community..,, was a public political question
., .which be-
longed to the executive to determine . "^2
Arthur M. Schlesinger has criticized Nelson's deci-
sion on the ground that the bombardment of Greytown was
more a "calculated retaliation" than an "emergency inter-
vention. "^3 The facts bear out Schlesinger ' s contention.
The same historian also points out that the President
never "specifically ordered" the bombing, and that the
action in question was not directed at a "sovereign
52Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas . at 111-112 (No. 4, 136)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860),
-^Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
,
The Imperial Presidency
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973r;~p. ~5l , '
"
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state., "54 xhe first point is only true in tho technical
sense that Pierce did not explicitly sign Rollins' orders.
This is irrelevant, however, since the Secretary of the
Navy, an executive officer responsible to the President'
did sign them; and the orders were issued, to use the
phraseology of the memo itself, "in pursuance of the wishes
of the President . "55
While Justice Nelson spoke of an unqualified Presi-
dential right (nay, "duty") to "interpose
... abroad" to
protect American lives and property, the Durand case did
involve a "marauding community" as opposed to a sovereign
state. Thus, the implication that Presidential war-power
resting upon Durand v. Hollins rests upon narrower grounds
than the language of the case suggests, may be warranted.
Taken at its narrowest, Durand establishes as a Presiden-
tial prerogative the authority to intervene to protect the
lives or property of American citizens abroad threatened
by a marauding group or comjnunity.
Let us end our long discursus into the Greytown af-
fair by noting the relevance of the holding in Durand v.
Hollins to the United States intervention in China in
1900, The United States decision to intervene in China in
the summer of 1900 was solely an executive decision; Con-
5^Ibid.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Exec. Doc. 85, 33d
Cong., 1st sess., 1853-1854, p. 21.
gress was not in session, nor was it called into special
session. Over five thousand troops were dispatched to
China, half of which actually fought. There were plans
to send in thousands
.ore if needed. Fighting took place
against Chinese government troops as well as Boxer "irregu-
lars"-many of whom were led by regular army officers un-
der orders from the Empress. Although diplomatic relations
were never broken, and war was never declared, the United
States and China were, de facto, at war.
Although not the only motive, and perhaps not even
the paramount motive, the relief of the beseiged American
•legation in Peking was a central aim of the United States
policy. Thus, the Durand rule, that the President may in-
terpose at his discretion to protect American citizens
abroad threatened by a "marauding community", would seem
apt in this case.
The China intervention is complicated by tv/o factors.
First, there were other motives. The United States did
not act simply to protect its citizens in China. There
was concern lest China be carved up and the United States
denied trading privileges. There was also concern for the
missionary movement. Finally, there were even territorial
designs on China; the navalists wanted a coaling station.
The Chinese intervention was not solely to protect Americans
abroad
.
!se
'on
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Secondly, the United States fought Chinese gove:
ment troops as well as Boxers organized by the Chine:
government. Thus, what began as an executive interpositi
against an irresponsible and marauding community-which the
Boxers surely were before they were organized and given of-
ficial support-ended up as an undeclared war against a
sovereign state. (Although, strange as it may seem, the
American military presence in China served China's inter-
ests: it was a welcome counterpoise to the European,
Russian and Japanese powers, who sought to dismember her.)
In short, the Chinese intervention lies on the fron-
tier of Presidential war power, in that no-man's land be-
tween the executive authority to protect citizens abroad
and the Congressional authority to declare war.
One other facet of the Chinese intervention needs to
be discussed. We have considered it so far as an example
of intervention for the protection of American citizens
abroad. But it might be pointed out that the United
States did not fight against Chinese government troops or
government-organized Boxers until after the old American
gunboat, the Monocacy, was fired upon.
,
Might it not be argued that the shelling of the
Monocacy was an act of war against which the President
might justifiably order a response? The American fleet
coniruander
,
Kempff, seemed to suggest this possibility.
The fact is that the Monocacy 's commander did not view the
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stray hit as provocative; he never returned fire. It was
Kempffs idea to use the incident as a cas_us belli . 56
The McKinley administration never took up Kempffs
suggestion, because it never considered itself at war with
China. The July 3, 1900 Circular announced that, "We ad-
here to the policy... of peace with the Chinese nation."
And in his December 3. 1900 Message to Congress, President
McKinley reaffirmed the July 3 Note, and added, "Our de-
clared aims involved no war against the Chinese nation. "57
The Monocacy episode was incidental as far as Washington
was concerned. It was neither the motivation nor the pretext
for the subsequent hostilities in China.
Conclusion
The Boxer Expedition is the paradigm case of the
Commander in Chief introducing armed forces into hostili-
ties in order to protect Americans abroad. Congress was
not consulted, nor did it give after-the-fact approval.
The success of the mission insured against public or legis-
lative criticism. The President successfully asserted his
power to deploy forces to protect United States citizens
overseas without authority in treaty or law.
-'^^oung, pp. 151-1S2.
^^ IJ.S. Foreign Relations. 1900. pp. 299, xiv.
160
CHAPTERV
UNITED STATES INTERVENTIONS IN I4EXIC0
1914-1917
Historical Background
When Woodrow Wilson ordered United States marines to
land and occupy Vera Cruz in 1914, he added' to an already
long record of American military operations in Mexico.
Most significant was the unfortunate War of 1846-1848,
which raises some questions about Presidential war-power
*
in its own right.
The focus of the dispute in 1846 was Texas
, which
had been Mexico's rebellious northernmost province. Mexi-
co had in fact claimed as hers the entire American south-
west, but she had never established control over most of
the territory. Her fatal mistake was to encourage American
settlers to come to east Texas in the 1820 's and 1830' s.
In 1835, Texas rebelled and declared itself independent,
and although Santa Anna's army suffered a setback in 1836,
Mexico refused to recognize an autonomous Lone Star State.
^
The independent Texans promptly claimed wildly in-
flated boundaries. Whereas the Nueces River had served
as the province's southern and western border, Texas noy
^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
8th ed. (Englewood-CTifliTirjTl Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1969)
, pp. 237-48.
claimed all the land up to the Rio Grande. Mexico ignored
this pronunciamento, reasoning that all of this territory
still belonged to her.
Meanwhile, the United States did not sit idly by.
Gripped by that land lust known as "Manifest Destiny,"
Americans dreamed of an empire extending to. the Pacific,
and including Oregon and Texas, both of which were in dis-
pute. There was, however, fierce opposition to the annexa-
tion of Texas by abolitionists who feared the addition of
slave-holding states to the United States.
As a result, annexation was postponed until early
1845, when it was approved by a joint Congressional resolu-
tion. (There was no precedent for annexing territory by
such method. A year earlier, the Senate had refused to
grant the necessary two-thirds approval to an annexation
treaty with Texas
.
)
•
Mexico protested the annexation, and as she had vowed,
broke off diplomatic relations with the United States. The
new American President, James K. Polk, who had campaigned
as an expansionist, irnmediately offered to drop long-stand-
ing American claims against Mexico, for which the Latin
nation was long in arrears, if she would sell to the United
States all the land west of Texas, This only served to fan
the flames of Mexican nationalism, and so Mexico refused
even to negotiate.
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Polk promptly ordered General Zachary Taylor, who had
been stationed on the southern bank of the Neuces River, to
move his troops south across the disputed territory down to
the Rio Grande. The orders were given January 13, 1846, but
because of delays, Taylor did not complete the trek until
late March. Warned by the Mexican army to retreat to the
Nueces, Taylor refused, and even built a fort to blockade
the Rio Grande.^
On April 25. a column of American soldiers was ambushed
by Mexican troops who had crossed the Rio Grande for that
'
purpose; eleven Americans were killed. When Polk received
the news he had already begun work on a war message to Con-
gress; now he would have a pretext.
On May 11, 1846, Polk told the legislature, somewhat
disingenuously, that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the
United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American
blood on the .-American soil." The next day, a Congress united
in indignation over the American losses, resolved that "by
the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists be-
tween that government and the United States."^
Many in Congress came to regret that vote. It was not
long before opposition Whigs (like freshman Congressman
Abraham Lincoln) and abolitionists were condemning "Polk's
2Robert Leckie, The Wars of America (New York: Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc.
,
196S)
,
p. 326.
-^Ibid.
, p. 327.
war. At one point, i„ early 1848. the House of Representa-
tives even declared the war •unnecessarily and unconstitu-
txonally begun by the President/' But when the Senate re-
fused to go along, the House rescinded the amendment.
^
Although the Constitutional forms were observed, there
is little question but that the President initiated the Mex-
ican War. This is a paradig:n case of the policy-making ini-
tiative, in spite of the Constitution, having passed into
the hands of the President.
«
As a result of the war, the Mexican clique that had pro-
moted the conflict lost prestige and splintered, thus leav-
ing Mexico divided into two opposing factions of roughly
equal power., Two decades of civil strife followed. During
this period, American loss of life and property in Mexico or
near its border was especially severe. In December, 1859,
President Buchanan proposed that Congress authorize military
intervention in Mexico as a means of "obtaining indemnity
for the past and security for the future."^
Ironically, the territory gained as a result of the Mex-
ican War moved the United States closer to its Civil War as
it found itself unable to resolve the dispute over slavery
in the newly acquired land. While the United States was
S., Congress, Congressional Globe
. 30th Cong. 1stSess., January 3, 1848, p. 95.
^Quoted in Sailey, p. 349.
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distracted, the French army invaded Mexico and set up Maxi-
milian of Hapsburg as the unlikely Emperor of Mexico. The
United States resented this monarchical challenge to the Mon-
roe Doctrine, and doubly so because Maximilian sympathized
with the South during the Civil War.
After his defeat of the Confederacy, General Grant or-
dered General Sheridan and 50,000 troops to the Texas-Mexi-
can border, and even sent General Schofield south of the bor-
der to form an army out of former Union and Confederate sol-
diers
.
^
When Napolean III withdrew French forces in 1867, Max-
imilian was easily toppled, leaving impoverished Mexico in
a state of anarchy. Bandits freely rol5bed and killed with-
out much regard for international boundary lines.
In 1877, President Hayes' administration issued an or-
der authorizing United States troops to chase marauders
across the border and pursue them in Mexico. Mexico stren-
uously objected, and the order was rescinded in 1880. Never-
theless, between 1875 and 1885, American troops crossed the
Mexican border about 20 times.
^
The border crossings and the anarchy ended when Mexico
turned to a strongmen, Porfirio Diaz. Diaz ruled Mexico
without interruption from 1884 to 1911, when he was over-
"This occurred 1865-66. Bailey, pp. 351-55.
''ibid.
. pp. 393-393.
^1, - 165tnrown. Diaz gave Mexirr. a . ,S ico long period of internal and e-c-
ternal peace, but his cientifico doctrine, while encourag-
ing foreign development of Mexico's resources and creating
a Middle class, did little to allevaite the destitution of
the mass of Indians and Mestizos.
Startlingly, when a middle class reformer, Francicso
I. Madero, challenged the old despot in 1911, the regime
collapsed like a house of cards. During the Di'az years the
United States had developed a considerable co^nercial inter-
est in Mexico; investments were estimated at about a billion
dollars. In addition, approximately 40,000 American nation-
als resided in the Latin republic.^
It is interesting that the
"Dolla:;-Diplomacy" adminis-
tration of William H. Taft merely looked on as the challenges
to the Diaz regime grew bolder. Taft did send troops to the
border as a warning to both Porfiristas and Maderistas that
he intended to safeguard American interests
. But when Diaz
fell, most of the troops were withdrawn.
On the other hand, the American ambassador to Mexico,
Henry Lane Wilson (no relation to Woodrow)
,
repeatedly urged
more aggressive United States action, and when m.ore vigorous
instructions xvere not forthcoming he acted on his own. Am-
bassador Wilson's activities were long a source of embarrass-
S, .
^
Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (PrincetonN. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968) ~p
—349
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ment to the United States.
After Madero was fonnaUy elected President of Mexico
in November, 1911, and the United States afforded recogni-
txon. A^nbassador Wilson did everything he could to under-
mine hi™. Madero^s coalition gradually fell apart, and Wil-
son's diplomatic dispatches always emphasized his weakness
and the strength of his enemies, mile a coup d'etat was un-
der way in the capital in February, 1913, Wilson, still act
ing without instructions, threatened to land marines if Amer
ican lives were not safeguarded. In addition, he persuaded
the British and German ministers to join him in urging
Madero to resign.
Finally, Wilson helped arrange the
./'truce" between the
rebels and General Victoriano Huerta, who had been selected
by Madero to crush the revolt. It soon became apparent that
Huerta, with Wilson's support, had betrayed Madero. Huerta
presented himself as the preserver of order and civil peace.
He announced that he x.ould serve as Provisional President
until the next elections. Madero and his Vice President
were arrested and later found shot, although Huerta always
denied any responsibility.^
Ambassador Wilson urged the Taft administration, in its
waning days, to grant de jure recognition to Huerta, but
9Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cam-bridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 113-34- pEdward Haley, Revolution and Intervention : The Diplomacy
of Taft and Wilson with MexTEo ri910-1917 (CambridL. Mas s.:
M.I.T. Press, 19/0;, pp. 11-73.
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this was withheld. Such a decision would be left to the in-
coming Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson. The new
President, however, had no intention of recognizing Huerta.
He was morally outraged by the betrayal of what he consid-
ered popular, constitutional government. President Wilson
was determined to restore rightful rule to the Mexican
masses. His contempt for Huerta
' s
-government of butchers-
was comparable to, though more noble than. Ambassador Wil-
son's loathing of Madero.
United States Interventions, 1914-19 17
Huerta tried to establish a military dictatorship in
the face of both internal and external- opposition
. At home,
Madero had become a martyr, and many Mexicans rallied to the
cause of the Constitution for which he had died.
An unstable anti-Huerta coalition formed, with Venusti-
ano Carranza, governor of Coahuila province as "First Chief"
of the "Constitutionalist Army." This coalition had its
power base in the less populous north, west and south of
Mexico. Guerrilla chiefs like Emiliano Zapata and Francisco
"Pancho" Villa swore nominal allegiance to Carranza. But
these rural guerrillas, a cross between romantic revolution-
ary terrorists and outright bandits, were united with Car-
ranza only by their common desire to oust Huerta, the "U-
surper .
"
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A more potent source of Carranza's power was the sup-
port, while he had it. of the well-organized northwestern
army led by Alvaro Obregon."'-^
From abroad Huerta would face consistent pressure from,
and ultimately intervention by, the Wilson, administration.
The last thing President Wilson wanted was a war with Mexico;
but the first thing he wanted was a restoration of constitu-
tional government. He was tempted by a plan offered by Amer-
ican commercial interests. This plan called for 1., recog-'
nition of the Provisional President in exchange for his pro-
mise to hold elections, and 2
. ,
mediation by Ambassador Wil-
son betvzeen the Constitutionalists and Huerta.
Wilson was reluctant to act without more information
about affairs in Mexico. He also began to mistrust Ambas-
sador Wilson, who was now being linked by the press to
Madero's overthrow.
As a result, the President, who took personal charge of
United States policy toward Mexico, dispatched a series of
special emissaries south of the border. The first of these,
sent in late May, 1913, was the President's friend, journal-
ist William Bayard Hale. Hale's reports from Mexico City
confirmed Wilson's negative opinions of both Huerta and Am-
•^Cline, pp. 136-38.
•'•'Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, pp. 350-53.
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bassador H. L. Wilson. Following Hale's reports,
.he a.-
bassador was dismissed in July, 1913.
A second observer, Reginald Del Valle, was sent to
northern and western Mexico to report on the Constitution-
alists But Del Valle was so inept that he was quickly re-
called. ^
Without consulting any of the Mexican factions, Presi-
dent Wilson next sent former Governor John Lind of Minnesota
to present the United States plan for settlement of Mexico ^s
problems. Lind, who was anti-Catholic, spoke no Spanish
and had no diplomatic experience, left in August, 1913.
He was instructed to seek an immediate cease-fire,
early and free elections in which Huerta would not be a can-
didate, and the agreement of all parties to abide by the
election results. The Huerta regime resented Lind's pre-
sence as an unwarranted intrusion in Mexican internal affeirs
Lind threatened that the United States would sell arms to
the Constitutionalists, and even resort to military inter-
vention. He then offered a "loan" to the de facto govern-
ment. But the Huertistas remained adamant. The Lind mis-
sion was an abysmal failure. "^"^
^^Ibid., p. 354. Haley, p. 94.
13Link, Wilson: The New Freedom
, p. 355.
^^Ibid., pp. 356-60.
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During the suiter of 1913, the 63rd Congress, to the
limited extent that it was concerned with Mexico, divided
along partisan lines. Senator Fall. fro. the border state
of New Mexico, led the Republicans in urging
.ore vigorous
Unxted States action to protect American lives and property
in Mexico. Resolutions were offered whose ai™ was to en-
courage arms sales to the Constitutionalist faction, to au-
thorise mediation by the United States and the A. B.C. Powers
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile), and even to authorize armed"
intervention by the United States. These resolutions all
died in the Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations Committees
of Congress
On August 27, 1913, Wilson went before Congress to in-
form it about the failure of the Lind mission. He explained
that although the prospects were not hopeful, peace would
come to Mexico only after the establishment of "honest con-
stitutional government." The United States had offered its
friendly offices, (i.e., the Lind mission), but they were
declined. "We can not," the President added philosophically,
"thrust our good offices upon them."-^^
Wilson then urged all Americans to leave Mexico, but
warned of United States vigilance in behalf of those who re-
mained. He announced a renewal of the arms embargo in accor-
....
^^^^ 2222-36, 3567-71. 2627, 3531, 2907,
3128, 3133, 3384-87 (1913).
16
Ibid.
, p. 3803.
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dance with a joint Congressional resolution of March 14.
1912, and closed by proclaiming the "moral right" of tolri-
can policy,
Wilson considered his policy one of "true neutrality":
selling arms to neither side while standing ready to mediate
between them. But he was actually serving Euerta's interests,
because the latter received supplied from Europe via the sea-'
ports in his control, while the landlocked Constitutionalists
were at a disadvantage. Huerta tried to prolong his advan-
.
tage by holding out the (false) hope that he would not be a
candidate in the upcoming Mexican elections. ^8
But events in Mexico soon led to the abandonment of
"true neutrality." Constitutionalist military successes and
the open hostility of the Mexican Congress (dominated by
Maderistas) led Huerta to disband the parliament and jail
over 100 of its deputies in October. Later that month he
permitted the seating of a new, pro-Huerta legislature, but
voided the Presidential elections for lack of sufficient
voter turnout, Huerta declared that he would remain as Pro-
visional President. '^
With all hope of free elections gone, Wilson decided
to do everything he could to unseat the Mexican dictator.
'^'^Ihid,
, p. 3804,
18Link, Wilson: The New Freedom, pp. 361-63: Haley
pp. 101-3.
^'
^^Cline, p. 147.
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MeanwhUe Great Britain, who had heen supporting Huerta all
along in exchange for protection for its much-needed Mexican
oil holdings, incurred Wilson's wrath. The day after the
arrest of the deputies the new British minister
.ade an os-
tentatious display of presenting his credentials to the de
^acto government
.
At first Wilson prepared a stinging rebuke of England
accusing her. in effect, of subverting America's Mexican
policies. State Department Counselor John Bassett Moore con-
vinced Wilson of the unwisdom of presenting such a diploma-
tic note, and the President turned instead to more subtle
methods. As a result, England agreed to reduce its support
for Huerta.
•
While awaiting J. B. Moore's comments. Wilson presented
the gist of his position in his famous Mobile, Alabama ad-
dress, on October 27, 1913. Thinly disguising his mistrust
of England in Mexico, the President warned that foreign com-
mercial interests threatened constitutional liberty in Latin
America. The United States, by contrast, will not be guided
by expedient material interest, but by morality. Moreover,
Wilson vowed, "the United States will never again seek one
additional foot of territory by conquest."^-'-
20
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom
, pp. 366-77.
149
Bailey, p. 556; Haley, p. 109; Cline, p.
ss-
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John Lind remained in Mexico City to bargain unsucce
fully with Huerta. Meanwhile, starting in mid-October, Wil-
liam Bayard Hale began negotiating with Carranza. While
threatening possible United States intervention. Hale pro-
mised a resumption of arms shipments if the Constitution-
alists would agree to a neutral interim government and early
elections. Carranza was obstinate; under no circumstances
would he negotiate with Huerta, nor would he agree to any-
•
thing short of the complete overthrow of his regime. By
November 15, 1913, both sides had rejected Wilson's peace
proposals.
Wilson did not seem to understand that Mexico was in
the throes of revolution or, at least, 'civil war, and that
such a conflict could not be resolved by ballot. Further-
more, foreign interference in Mexican affairs, generally
associated with foreign investments, of which the United
States had the greatest share, was one of the major issues.
Whether willing or not, no Mexican leader could maintain his
credibility and openly endorse American interference.
But by the new year (1914), Wilson had become less con-
cerned with the obstacles and, rather, obsessed with seeing
Huerta 's demise.
Meanwhile the military contest in Mexico was see -sawing
^^Haley, pp. 111-19.
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back and forth. In mid-January the President tried to al-
ter the balance by permitting arms to "slip through" cus-
toms and into the hands of the Constitutionalists. And
after communicating with a persuasive Carranza agent later
in the month, Wilson repealed an earlier arms embargo on
February 3, 1914.
Nevertheless, the military stalemate continued, because
of differences between Carranza and Villa, and because the
Church and propertied elements in Mexico rallied to Huerta.*
Wilson had told the Congress that his Mexican policy con-
sisted of "watchful waiting;" waiting presumably for Huerta
to quit or the Constitutionalists to defeat him militarily . 24
By April Wilson could wait no longlr. A momentary Con-
stitutionalist advantage and a trivial incident formed the
backdrop to United States intervention. Congressional Repub-
licans were impatient with the Democratic President's policy
--"deadly drifting," they called it- -and urged intervention
to protect Americans and their interests. They were, if any-
thing, more "hawkish" than the Administration
.
Wilson hoped to deprive Huerta of control over the east
23 Ibid., pp. 125-29; United States, Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
,
iyi4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp.
447-448
.
24
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom
,
p. 392.
^^See, e.g., 51 Cong. Rec . 3927-29, 3973-76, 4048-50,
4510-28, 5144, 5495-5496 (1914).
coast ports of Mexico, especially the valuable port of Tam-
pico, site of numerous oil refineries. He intended to so
weaken Huerta thereby, that a Constitutionalist victory
would be inevitable.
The Constitutionalists had attacked Huertista forces at
Tampico when an American whaleboat, the U. S. S. Dolphin
,
flying its flag, docked without permission behind Government
lines in order to buy gasoline. Since this area was closed
to all but Mexican government personnel, the paymaster and
*
the crew of seven were arrested. This took place on the
morning of April 9, 1914.
By that afternoon, the men had been released, and the
local commander had apologized. But this did not suit Ad-
miral Mayo, commanding the American naval fleet off Tampico.
He demanded a formal apology, punishment of the arresting
officer, and the hoisting of the American flag followed by
a 21-gun salute. Mayo acted on his own authority.
The next day, Wilson approved Mayo's ultimatum, and the
American charge at Mexico City was instructed to enforce the
demands upon the threat of "the gravest consequences."^
Huerta was in a bind. If he met the American demands
^%nited States Foreign Relations, 1914 , pp. 448-50;
Link, Wilson: The New Freedom , pp. 394-96; Robert E. Quirk,
An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of
Vera Cruz (Lexington: University ot Kenuucky Press, i9bZ)
,
pp. 19-33.
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he would discredit himself for having consented to Mexico's
humiliation. If he refused, he faced the prospect of direct
American military intervention. Hoping to ride the crest of
anti-foreign sentiment certain to follow an overt American
interference, Huerta chose the latter course.
Wilson already had his course mapped out . Robert Lan-
sing, a State Department counselor, searched Department files
for a precedent to serve as a rationalization for American
intervention. Lansing noted the 1854 shelling of Greytown;
Nicaragua, and suggested that the President had the author-
ity to use force in order to enforce demands or exact repri-
T 28sals.
Two other minor and unrelated incidents played into Wil-
son's hands. On April 11, an American naval mail orderly
was mistakenly arrested in Vera Cruz, and an ignorant Mexi-
can censor delayed a diplomatic cable from Mexico City to
Washington. Wilson would later present these petty occur-
29
rences as part of a general Mexican scheme of effrontery.
On April 14, Wilson ordered a large battleship fleet,
troop transports filled with marines, cruisers and destroy-
ers to sail for Tampico. There were no instructions to land
27Quirk, pp. 41, 53
^^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
29United States Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 453-55, 465
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the marines. That same day the press was informed.
Historians cannot agree over the mood of the American
public in response to this movement toward war. Robert E.
Quirk sees "warm and wholehearted support," while Arthur S.
Link finds a "tidal wave of denunciation.""^^ While the
fleet prepared to depart, Wilson called the senior members
of the Congressional foreign relations committees to the
VJhite House to inform them, on April 15. He told them that
unless all demands were met the fleet would be ordered to
*
block the Tampico and Vera Cruz ports through which Huerta
received supplies from Europe. Ke added that Congress would
be asked to approve his plans but not to declare war.^^
Meanwhile, Republicans in the House accused the Presi-
dent of exaggerating the Tampico incident in order to create
"an excuse to intervene." They charged Wilson with acting
on grounds of "personal prejudice and enmity" for Huerta,
while ignoring the depredations against Americans by Consti-
33tutionalists in northern Mexico.
After a series of diplomatic exchanges in which Huerta
called for a simultaneous salute to both flags, and Wilson
^^Ibid., p. 459; Quirk, p. 53; Link, Wilson: The New
Freedom
,
p. 396.
^^Quirk, pp. 58-59; Link, Wilson: The New Freedom , pp
403-5.
^^Link, Wilson, The New Freedom
,
p. 397.
^^51 Cong. Rec. 6751-6752 (1914).
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refused to compromise, the American President went before
Congress on April 20, 1914. At 3 P.M. Wilson solemnly pre-
sented the facts of the U.S.S. Dolphin incident to a joint
session of Congress. He insisted that the occurrence was
neither trivial nor isolated: other events (the arrest of
the mail orderly and the delay of the cable) combined with
it to form a pattern "of slights and affronts in retalia-
tion" for American refusal to recognize Huerta. "No doubt,"
Wilson declared,
I could do what is necessary in the circum-
stances to enforce respect for our Government
without recourse to the Congress, and yet not
exceed my constitutional powers as President;
but I do not wish to act in a matter possibly
of so grave consequence except. in close confer-
ence and cooperation with both' the Senate and
House. -^^
This interpretation of Presidential power may have re-
flected Lansing's research, noted above. It directly pre-
ceded Wilson's request for approval to
use the armed forces of the United States in
such ways and to such an extent as may be neces-
sary to obtain from General Huerta and his ad-
herents the fullest recognition of the^rights
and dignity of the United States . . .
An hour earlier, the Secretary of the Navy instructed
the fleet to head to Vera Cruz prepared to land its marines
.
-^^United States Foreign Relations, 1914 , p. 476.
35ibid.
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Wilson had told Congressional leaders that he hoped to pre-
vent a German arms shipment already en route from reaching
Huertistas
.
Following Wilson's speech. House Joint Resolution 251
was offered and debate ensued along partisan lines. The
Resolution declared,
That the President of the United States is justi-fied m the employment of armed forces of theUnited States to enforce the demands made uponVictoriano Huerta for unequivocal amends to theGovernment of the United States for affronts andindignities committed against this Governmentby General Huerta and his representatives,^'^
House Democrats called upon the Congress to "sustain
the President" in a time of crisis, and insisted that House
Joint Resolution 251 was not a declaration of war. The Re-
publicans were less confident about its status and what it
might lead to. They urged amending the Resolution by in-
serting "within the limit of his constitutional powers"
after the word "employment." They reasoned that such a modi-
fication was necessary "to make sure that this is not a de-
O Q
claration of war."
But this amendment, a weaker substitute resolution, and
•^^Quirk, pp. 70, 74.
^^51 Cong. Rec. 6934 (1914)
^^Ibid.
, pp. 6934-37, 6943.
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an amencJment explicitly denying that House Joint Resolution
251 was a declaration of war were all beaten back. Late
that day, the Resolution was approved, 337 to 37."^^
On the evening of the 20th, the Senate received the
House-approved measure. But Republican opposition, led by
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, succeeded in delaying
the Resolution until the next day by having it sent to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the meantime, late
that evening, President Wilson ordered marines to seize the.
customshouse at Vera Cruz, thus intercepting the German arms
shipment
.
On April 21, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
offered House Joint Resolution 251 with.^the following amend-
ment
,
That the United States disclaims any hostility
to the Mexican people or any purpose to make
war upon Mexico. ^1
In addition. Lodge tried to include a broad preamble,
citing the depredations against Americans and the "unre-
strained violence and anarchy" in Mexico, as well as the
insults to the United States, as the rationale for United
States intervention. The Lodge preamble was rejected,
39ibid., pp. 6939, 6948, 6957.
^^Quirk, pp. 76-77.
^^51 Cong. Rec. 6964 (1914).
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47-36.^2
An amendment declaring that "a state of war exists" al-
so suffered defeat, as did a proposal to add the words, "to
protect American citizens" to the body of the Resolution.
The latter proposal lost by only a three-vote margin.
The Senate then approved the Resolution with the Foreign
Relations Committee amendment, by a 72 to 13 vote. The fol-
lowing day, April 22, the House agreed to the upper chamber's
44
version.
During the Senate debate of the 21st, Republican Sena-
tor Clapp of Minnesota noted with dismay and resignation
that while Congress had the Constitutional authority to de-
clare war, "nevertheless, the power to make war, unfortunate-
ly, is in the hands of the President, as has been demonstrated
by the activities and events of the last 24 hours . "'^^ But
apparently a vast majority of the Congress as well as the
Administration did not agree that war had either begun or
been declared.
House Joint Resolution 251 "justified" the President's
use of force against Huerta, but disclaimed hostility or any
^^Ibid.
, pp. 6964. 7006.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 7004, 7007.
'^^Ibid., DD. 7014, 7076-78; Joint Resolution Justifying
the employment* by the President of the armed forces of the
United States, 38 Stat. 770 (1914).
^^51 Cong. Rec. 7002 (1914).
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intention to make war on Mexico. In an April 22nd dispatch
from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to various
American diplomatic missions, the Secretary gave the Adminis-
tration's interpretation. "Please note," he said,
that the word 'justified* is used instead of
'authorized. ' This was done to emphasize the
fact that the resolution is not a declaration
of war but contemplates only the specific re-
dress of a specific indignity.
These words were sincere to the extent that VJilson truly
did not want a military conflict with Mexico. But he had
underestimated the strength of Mexican nationalism, which re-
vealed itself in the instantaneous outcry by all of Mexico--
including the Constitutionalists--against the American inter-
vention. Wilson was aghast to learn that the Mexicans re-
sisted the landing with the result that casualties were suf-
fered by both sides. '^^
Parenthetically, the arms shipment got through to Mexi-
co City anyway. The captain of the German vessel simply de-
layed for several days, then made his delivery at a port
48
south of Vera Cruz
.
Perhaps the unexpected fighting in Mexico, along with
Carranza's firm withholding of support--Carranza informed
^^United States Foreign Relations, 1914 . pp. 482-483
^^Link, Wilson: The New Freedom , p. 402.
^^Quirk. p. 151.
183
Wilson that the United States
-invasion" at Vera Cruz "may
indeed drag us into an unequal war"-Ied the President to
restrict American military operations. At any rate, al-
though he sent reinforcements to hold occupied Vera Cruz,
he vetoed Army plans to march to Mexico City, and on April
25, 1914, accepted an offer of the A. B.C. powers to mediate
.
An important, and perhaps calculated, exception to the
nearly universal Mexican condemnation of the United States
came from Pancho Villa. Presaging his split with Carranza,
Villa told an American agent that the United States "could
keep Vera Cruz and hold it so tight that not even water
could get in to Huerta" and he would have no obj ections
.
Villa was undoubtedly anticipating Huerta 's downfall,
and by widening the rift between the United States and Car-
ranza, he hoped to keep the latter from assuming poxjer.
Wilson, meanwhile, tried to use the A. B.C. mediation
(which began May 20, 1914, in Niagara Falls, Canada) to get
Huerta 's agreement to resign, and the Constitutionalists to
support the establishment of a reform-minded provisional
government acceptable to all parties. Huerta was concilia-
tory; American control of Vera Cruz and Constitutionalist
military advances had fatally weakened him. The Constitu-
^^United States Foreign Relations, 1914
. p. 484: Link,
Wilson: The New Freedom
,
pp"^ 401-402
.
^^Special Agent Carothers to the Secretary of State,
United States Foreign Relations, 1914
,
p. 485.
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tionalists, on the other hand, sraelled victory and adanantly
refused to negotiate a settlement of Mexico's internal con-
flict.
In order to force Carranza's hand, and to prevent a pos-
sible clash between the Constitutionalists and American
troops on the Mexican border, Wilson embargoed arms sales
to the Constitutionalists and withheld recognition of them
as belligerents. Nothing positive came of this, however;
Huerta resigned in July, 1914, and Carranza occupied the
capital the next month.
Washington was jubilant at Huerta 's demise. But the
Mexican Revolution had only gone through its first phase.
Before long Wilson would intervene again, but this time re-
luctantly
.
Carranza was not in Mexico City long before the shaky
Constitutionalist coalition fell apart completely, plunging
Meixco further into civil war. A confusion of factions
emerged, but the basic and irreconcilable split was between
Villa and Carranza, with Zapata temporarily allying himself
52
with the former and Obreg6n siding with the First Chief.
With the conflict between Villa and Carranza now open,
5lLink, Wilson: The New Freedom , pp. 407-16; Haley, pp.
139-49.
^^Henry B. Parkes , A History of Mexico (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Company, 1938) , pp. 353-354.
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the United States, in November, 1914, withdrew its remaining
troops from Vera Cruz.^"^ Until the Spring of 1915, control
of the capital changed hands a number of times, when, in
April, Obregon's forces dealt the Villistas a crushing de-
feat, marking the start of their retreat to the northernmost
provinces of Mexico.
A Pan American Conference had been convened in the sum-
mer of 1915 at Wilson's behest to consider what action to
take in regard to the chaos in Mexico since Huerta's decline
But by the Fall, Carrancista military strength left the con-
ferees with little choice. In October, 1915, the United
States granted de facto recognition to Carranza, and sus-
pended arms exports to all other factions in Mexico.
Wilson would still have liked to control the direction
of the Mexican Revolution, but had learned some lessons
about the dangers of intervention from Vera Cruz. Moreover,
he became increasingly distracted by the war in Europe, and
since he was never sympathetic to the American capitalists
in Mexico, he did little in response to the murder of an
estimated 76 Americans south of the border between 1913 and
^United States Foreign Relations, 1914 , pp. 621-622
^Sarkes, pp. 353-354.
^^Haley, pp. 165-82.
1915. ^
But by year-end. an embittered Pancho Villa, driven
north by Obregon. and without hope of regaining power, sought
to punish the United States for recognizing and permitting
arms sales to Carranza. Villa and his rag-tag "army" pro-
moted border warfare ultimately issuing in another American
intervention. ^'^
In the United States Congress, the persistent Senator
Fall of New Mexico led mounting Republican pressure in that
Presidential election year of 1916 for more vigorous protec-
tion of American lives and property in Mexico. On January
5, Fall offered a resolution which was approved by the Sen-
ate on the following day. (A similar measure did not pass
the House, however.) Senate Resolution 42 requested that
the President, "if not incompatible with the public inter-
ests," transmit to the Senate the following information and
documents
.
Is there, the Resolution queries, a government in Mexico?
Is it recognized by the United States? VJho are its leaders?
Is the government constitutional? By what means was its
recognition brought about? What assurance has this govern-
^^United States, Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (VJash-
ington : Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 476.
^''Parkes, p. 356.
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ment given regarding protection of American lives and prop-
erty?j regarding claims for damages to same?
;
regarding the
right to free exercise of religion? What instructions have
been issued to American border officials and armed forces
concerning such protection? Finally, the Resolution re-
quested a full report on the Vera Cruz occupation and evac-
uation, and virtually all diplomatic documents of the Wilson
58
administration concerning Mexico.
Before the Wilson administration could respond. Villa
realized that he could embarrass both Wilson and Carranza by
giving credence to the charges that Americans in Mexico or
near her borders were unsafe. On January 10, 1916, Villa
halted a train at Santa Ysabel, Mexico, and murdered 16 Amer-
59icans associated with an American-owned mining company.
In Congress Wilson was sharply criticized for his lack
of concern for American citizens in Mexico. Various measures
were introduced (all of which ultimately died in committee)
authorizing armed intervention for the purpose of providing
60protection.
The Senatorial debate of January 18 throws some light
on contemporary thinking in regard to Presidential war -making
^^53 Cong. Rec. 501, 589-603 (1916).
^^United States Foreign Relations, 1916 , pp. 652-653
^^53 Cong. Rec. 1004, 1060, 1189 (1916).
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power. The exchange was sparked by Senator Lippitt's (R.
I.) assertion that if he were President he would have immed-
iately sent troops into Mexico to punish the perpetrators
of the Santa Ysabel massacre.
Upon being reminded by Senator Stone (Mo.) that the
President "has no constitutional right to order an invasion"
under such circumstances, Lippitt recalled that the Presi-
dent landed marines at Vera Cruz while the upper chamber
was in the midst of debate over the justifying legislation.
Lippitt suggested that if the President had the authority
to land marines to intercept a cargo of arms, he could also
"send American troops over the border."
Stone insisted that to pursue bandits all over Mexico
would bring the United States army into conflict with the
Mexican government forces and would thus mean war. Stone
appealed to Senator Brandegee (Conn.) to give his opinion
on the constitutionality of Lippitt's suggestion regarding
the dispatch of troops. Brandegee replied that
it depends . . . entirely upon the extent to
which it is done. I think, of course, it goes
without saying that the President has no auth-
ority to make war against a foreign nation with-
out the consent of Congress, It is exclusively
in the control of Congress to declare war and
to make peace. But it has been repeatedly held
^•Ibid.
, pp. 1189-92.
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.
. .
that a mere intrusion to rescue citizens
or to protect the property of citizens is not
an act of war, and the President has repeatedly
and unquestionably exercised such authority bythe landing of marines and then retiring afterthe object has been accomplished. ^2
On February 17, 1916, the m±te House responded to the
Fall Resolution. The President refused on grounds that it
was "incompatible with the public interest to transmit to
the Senate, at the present time, the voluminous correspon-
dence called for." Secretary of State Lansing (Bryan had
resigned in June, 1915), who prepared the response, admitted
that the de facto government of Carranza was "military" and
not constitutional, that it had promised to protect lives
and property and had done a "reasonably adequate" job of it
in the areas under its control, but that due to the diffi-
culty of restoring order after years of lawlessness, "spo-
radic outrages" could be anticipated.^^
No sooner had interventionist sentiment waned in the
Congress when Villa struck again. On March 9, 1916, about
500 to 1,000 Villistas attacked and burned Columbus, New
Mexico, killing and wounding several American soldiers and
civilians . A small detail of American troops pursued them
^^ibid., p. 1192.
^^United States Foreign Relations, 1916
,
pp. 469ff
^^Ibid.
, pp. 470-471.
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over the border into Mexico.
The American public was absolutely outraged. On March
10, members of both parties made martial speeches in Con-
gress, and submitted resolutions calling for military inter-
vention. Senator Ashurst of Arizona demanded "grape-shot
instead of grape juice," a reference to Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan, a teetotaler and a pacifist.
Wilson knew that he had to act firmly and quickly to
assuage public demands. He also wished to avoid Congress,
which he feared might force the country into a full-scale
war with Mexico. Finally, only a prompt military response,
it was felt, could prevent Villa from successfully eluding
capture in the vast territory he knew so well.
Unfortunately, Carranza had his own "hawks," or more
precisely, nationalists, who opposed American troops on Mex-
ican soil under any circumstances. On the other hand, there
had been cooperation in the past between the United States
and Carranza regarding the pursuit of bandits across inter-
national boundaries. In the Fall of 1915, the United States
had permitted Carrancista troops to be transported across
American territory during the civil war against Villa. And
during that same period, an informal military agreement was
^^Ibid.
,
pp. 480-481.
6653 Cong. Rec. 3882-84, 3905ff . (1916)
.
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obtained granting reciprocal rights of pursuit of bandits
up to 15 leagues (45 miles) beyond the border.
On the 10th of March, a day after the Columbus raid,
Wilson ordered a military force under the command of Briga-
dier General John Pershing to pursue Villa into Mexico and
break up his band of marauders. He set public expectations
a bit higher, however, by telling the press that the expe-
dition was aimed at capturing Villa.
Thus neither Carranza nor the United States Congress
were informed in advance of the orders to send troops into
Mexico. Carranza was in no position to approve the inter-
vention. He redoubled his own efforts to capture Villa,
hoping to obviate any extensive American effort. He warned
that war might result, and that only a reciprocal arrange-
ment regarding the entry of forces into each other's terri-
69tory would be acceptable.
The Congress, for its part, voiced no objections to
not being consulted. On the contrary, on March 14, 1916,
the day before Pershing's force crossed the border, the
House approved, 236 to 1, an Army Emergency Bill. VJhile not
explicit approval of the President's action, the intent, as
^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises 1915-
1916 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964),
p7n:96.
^^Haley, pp. 189-190; United States Foreign Relations,
1916
,
p. 484!
^^Link Wilson: Confusions and Crises, pp. 209-210;
United States Foreign Relations, i9ib, pp7 485-486.
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the following exchange makes clear, was unmistakable. The
resolution raised the size of the army, "if in the judg-
ment of the President any emergency arises which makes it
necessary . "^^
Mr. HAY. As 1 say, the reason for this resolu-
tion is that it is immediately necessary that
the border shall be protected while this expe-
dition is going on ... .
Mr. DIES. Do I understand the gentleman from
Virginia to say that these nineteen thousand
odd soldiers would be dropped at the expira-
tion of the Mexican trouble?
Mr. HAY. At the expiration of the emergency,
yes; the Army vzould be reduced to the strength
now allowed by law. '
^
The one "nay" vote came from a Congressman who said
he was motivated by opposition to the Punitive Expedition,
72
as it came to be called. The Senate approved the Army
73Emergency Bill on March 15, 69 to 0.
More explicit, if belated, Congressional approval was
granted on March 17, when the Senate unanimously agreed to
Senate Concurrent Resolution 17. This measure had the warm
support of the White House. Its preamble indicated Congres-
sional uncertainty about whether or not American troops had
already been ordered to cross the Mexican border, and mis-
^°53 Cong. Rec. 4097 (1916).
71lbid.
,
p. 4098.
^^53 Cong. Rec. 5020-5021 (1916).
^^Ibid.
.
pp. 4105-8.
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takenly noted the "consent" of the Carranza government.
Its approval of the expedition contained detailed qualifi-
cations
.
RESOLVED.
. .
That the use of the armed forces
of the United States for the sole purpose of
apprehending and punishing the lawless bands
of armed men who entered the United States
from Mexico on the ninth day of I^rch, 1916,
committed outrages on American soil, and
fled into Mexico, is hereby approved; and that
the Congress also extends this assurance to the
de facto Government of Mexico and to the Mexi-
can people that the pursuit of said lawless
band of armed men across the international
boundary line into Mexico is for the single
purpose of arresting and punishing the fugi-
tive band of outlaws; that the Congress
. . .
joins with the President in declaring that
such military expedition shall not be per-
mitted to encroach in any degree upon the sov-
ereignty of Mexico or to interfere in any manner
with the domestic affairs of the Mexican people. ''^
In the House, however, the Resolution was referred to
the Foreign Affairs Committee, where it expired.''^ Nor was
the Carranza government fully persuaded by the Resolution.
The First Chief stuck to his demand for "strict reciprocity,"
but at first did little to oppose Pershing's force of 4000.
However, when Villa proved elusive, and when the Puni-
tive Expedition, bolstered to 6,675 men by April, plunged
deeper into Mexico--350 miles south of the border--the de
facto government grew restive.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 4274.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 4396.
^^Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, pp. 215-18
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The Carranza government called upon the United States
in late March, 1916, to sign a protocol regarding "hot pur-
suit" of bandits over international boundaries. The Mexi-
cans wanted limits (as to places of entry, depth of penetra-
tion, duration of stay), all of which the United States ac-
cepted, but interpreted prospectively, so as to exclude the
Pershing expedition
.
As tensions with Germany mounted, Wilson became espe-
cially anxious to avoid a wider conflict with Mexico. But
this became increasingly difficult. On April 12, 1916, anti-
American sentiment in Mexico led to an attack upon some Amer-
ican soldiers who had entered the town of Parral. Carranza
called upon United States troops to withdraw or risk future
incidents
.
Pershing, meanwhile, frustrated by local opposition
and Carrancista non-cooperation, called for expansion of
his military operation. Hoping to avoid an open break with
Mexico, and yet escape the humiliation of withdrawal, the
Administration decided to concentrate Pershing's force in
northern Mexico while negotiating with the Carranza govern-
ment for cooperation on border protection.
The negotiations, between United States General Scott
^^ibid., pp. 218-219; United States Foreign Relations.
1916
, pp. 502, 503, 507.
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The following account is based upon Link, Wilson:
Confusions and Crises, pp. 282-317; and- Haley, pp. 198-223.
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and Obregdn, begun at the end of April, 1916, were a fail-
ure. Meanwhile, Mexican bandits struck at two Texas towns
in early May, and were chased 180 miles into Mexico by
American cavalry. Mexico protested vigorously and insisted
that all American troops withdraw. VJilson called up the
militia of the states bordering Mexico; Carranza mobilized
his forces to resist any further American intrusion.
In mid-June the situation grew worse. Mexican irregu-
lars conducted border raids and again were pursued over the
border by United States forces. The Mexican military in-
formed Pershing that if he moved in any direction other than
north they would attack. Wilson then mobilized the entire
national guard of over 100,000 men, while Secretary of State
Lansing sent a long note to Mexico justifying the Expedition
and warning of "grave consequences" should the de facto gov-
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ernment attempt to resist it by force.
On June 22, 1916, an incident occurred which brought
Mexico and the United States to the very brink of war. A
small American reconnaissance mission, ordered to march
about 90 miles east by General Pershing, clashed with de
facto government troops near Carrizal, resulting in several
deaths on both sides and the capture of 25 Americans. This
was the first time, since the Vera Cruz landing two years
^^United States Foreign Relations, 1916 , pp. 581-92.
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earlier, that American forces engaged troops of the Mexican
government
.
On the 25th of June, Washington demanded the release
of the prisoners, and an early statement of Mexican inten-
tions in light of its seemingly "formal avowal of deliber-
ately hostile action. "^^
Wilson then consulted with Congressional leaders, and
set to work on a war message for Congress. The message was
never delivered. (It would not have asked for a declara-
tion of war because Mexico lacked, Wilson now reasoned, a
properly constituted authority. Instead it requested the
power to use the armed forces to protect the border and es-
tablish a constitutional Mexican government which would pre-
serve order.)
American public sentiment was strongly against war with
Mexico. Thus, there must have been a general sigh of relief
when it was learned that the Carrizal prisoners were re-
leased. Wilson made an eloquent speech for peace before
the New York Press Club, June 30, and the United States and
Mexico exchanged conciliatory diplomatic notes.
In early July, 1916, both sides agreed to the estab-
lishment of a Joint High Commission to resolve mutual griev-
ances . The upcoming Presidential elections were apparently
^°Ibid.
,
p. 595.
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foremost in Wilson's mind. He wished to keep Pershing in
Mexico so it would not look like he was forced to abandon
his vigorous defense of Americans on or south of the border.
At the same time Wilson hoped to avoid an open break with
Mexico
.
Thus Wilson was not disturbed at the failure of the
United States and Mexico to agree upon an agenda for the
conference to be held at New London, Connecticut, in the
Fall of 1916. He had the advantage, and he used it to press
for a broad agenda including Mexican social and economic re-
forms. The Carranza representatives resisted any attempt
by the United States to meddle in Mexico's domestic affairs;
they wished to limit the discussion to troop evacuation and
8
1
border problems.
The Commission met from September, 1916, to January,
1917, when it adjourned without agreement. Meanwhile, Wil-
son was re-elected President. In January the White House
decided to withdraw the "Perishing" Expedition, and by Feb-
ruary, 1917, United States troops had been completely evac-
uated. Wilson even resumed diplomatic relations with Mexico,
despite the objections of mining and oil interests who feared
that the new Mexican Constitution endangered their holdings.
o 1
This account follows Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Cam-
paigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton,
N. jT: Princeton University Press, 1965), op. 51-55, 120-
23, 328-38; and Haley, pp. 230-47.
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III. The Mexican Intervent ions and the Constitution
I have said that the Mexican War of 1846 raised con-
stitutional questiona even though Congress had declared that
a state of war existed. The facts are that President Polk
had already ordered American troops to enter the disputed
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, that these
forces had established a blockade of the Rio Grande, an act
of war in international law, and that fighting between the
armies of the respective governments had already begun be-
fore the Congress was consulted,
Furthermore, Polk misled Congress when he insisted
that the ambushed American troops were killed on "American
soil." United States claims to the territory were dubious
at best, and Polk would have been more honest had he refer-
red to it as "disputed" territory.
All this having been said, it must be noted that Con-
gress was ignorant of neither the Polk administration's pro-
vocative activities nor of what could be expected from the
Mexican government in response. And still it overwhelmingly
approved a resolution of war. Although the legislature was
left with little choice other than to approve or condemn a
Presidential fait accompli , it followed through in good con-
stitutional form.
But to the extent that Article I, section 8, clause
11 looked to the participation of Congress in the decision
to go to war, surely the spirit of the Constitution, if
not
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its letter, was violated in 1846.
In 1914, President Wilson dispatched a fleet to Mexi-
can waters allegedly to obtain redress for insults to the
American flag, but actually to depose a Mexican regime of
which he disapproved. Marines were ordered to land just
moments before the President went before Congress to ask for
its support, and only the House had acted prior to the out-
break of fighting.
Wilson did not reveal his real motives in addressing
Congress, but rather outlined in misleading fashion an al-
leged pattern of indignities. The Congressional leadership
was informed about the Administration's real intentions;
blocking the arms shipment to Huerta en route to Mexico.
The Republican minority tried to broaden the resolution to
include protection of Americans in Mexico, but were unsuc-
cessful .
Thus, although Congress knew that the alleged indig-
nities were merely a pretext, it went along with the cha-
rade. The President went on to insist that under the cir-
cumstances he had the constitutional authority to order the
use of armed force "without recourse to the Congress." The
Congress seemed to acquiesce in the .Aidministration' s inter-
pretation of Presidential power, as indicated by the debates
on the Hill, and the use of the word "justified" rather
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than "authorized" in House Joint Resolution 251.^^
On the other hand, Wilson did in fact request legis-
lative approval, and Congress did feel warranted, if not
constitutionally obliged, to grant that approval. Thus,
the Vera Cruz landing does little to clarify the boundaries
of executive versus legislative war-making power.
It does, however, establish a clear precedent for the
President to order the occupation of a foreign port with
the support of Congress short of a declaration of war.
House Joint Resolution 251 expressly disclaimed any hostile
or war-like intent on the part of the United States govern-
ment, and therefore could not have been designed to be a
declaration of war.
As to the circumstances under which the President may
so act, according to the Wilson administration and the 63rd
Congress, affronts and indignities committed against the
United States government are sufficient, although as we
have pointed out, both branches knew this was a mere pre-
text .
To summarize: given certain alleged affronts and in-
dignities to the United States, the President, with the sup-
port of Congress, though not necessarily by its authority,
ordered the occupation of a foreign port.
82See notes 34, 37 and accompanying text, supra.
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Finally, we consider the constitutional implications
of the Punitive Expedition of 1916. When President Wilson
ordered 4000 American troops to cross the border vzith Mexi-
co on March 10, 1916, he acted without informing Congress.
In fact he had intentionally avoided the legislature for
fear that it would force the United States into a full-
fledged war with Mexico.
Within a week of the orders, however, both houses of
Congress had indicated some sort of approval of Wilson's
action. Both chambers ratified the Army Emergency Bill, but
only the Senate gave explicit endorsement to the Mexican
intervention. The reasons for the refusal of the House to
go along are not clear.
The Senate resolution, as was the case with the Vera
Cruz occupation, did not authorize any Presidential action,
rather it "approved" Wilson's course. However, unlike the
1914 intervention, this time Wilson did not feel obligated
to go before Congress. Perhaps in the 1916 intervention,
Presidential authority was less doubtful.
After all, this was not simply a case of intervening
to protect American citizens abroad. Villa's raids occurred
on the American side of the border; thus they were analogous
to an invasion of United States territory. And although
Villa represented no official government, the Mexican gov-
ernment was unable to control him. Under such circumstances
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the President's authority to order pursuit of Villa was com-
parable to his power to respond to a surprise attack on the
country
.
Yet such power would seem to be qualified by the very
great risk that, as a result of the violation of the other
nation's sovereignty by the pursuing force, war between two
sovereign states will result. In such a case, the President
will have run afoul of the Constitutional prerogative of the
Congress to declare war. The Carrizal incident, vzhere Ameri-
can and Mexican government forces clashed, highlights the
dangers involved.
Nineteenth century precedents tend to support the prin-
ciple that the President may take unilateral action in such
circumstances. In 1817, President Monroe commissioned An-
drew Jackson to punish the Seminole Indians, runaway slaves
and white bandits who committed sporadic outrages and then
retreated across the international boundary into Florida
(then a Spanish possession). Jackson's foray across north
Florida and his summary execution of two British subjects
nearly forced the United States into war. At no time was
Congressional authority requested, but afterwards, in the
wake of tumultuous Congressional debate, motions to condemn
83
Jackson were beaten back.
83Bailey, pp. 168-72.
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By contrast, before responding to border difficulties
with Mexico, President Buchanan went before Congress in 1859
to ask for permission to use force. But in the 1870 's and
1880 's the executive branch reassumed the initiative; troops
crossed the border with Mexico without Congressional auth-
orization at least 20 times.
What Constitutional principle then may be inferred from
these various cases so similar in circumstance to the Puni-
tive Expedition? It would seem that when marauding bands
based in an adjoining foreign country conduct raids across
the American border, the President may on his own authority
order pursuit by the United States armed forces even across
the international boundary.
Among the historical precedents, the only qualifica-
tions upon the President's power would seem to be Buchanan's
circumspect behavior in 1859, and the Senate resolution of
approval in 1916. I do not believe that the 1916 resolution
impinges upon the authority of the President to reply force-
fully and spontaneously to border raids. However, since
this measure enumerated in detail the limited intentions of
the Punitive Expedition, it may serve as a precedent for Con-
gressional, perhaps even Senatorial, restriction of such in-
terventions once they have been initiated by the President.
®^See note 7 and accompanying text, supra.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPEDITIONS TO SIBERIA AND NORTH RUSSIA, 1918
The American interventions in Russia-- two expeditions
to disparate geographical points--comprised one of the
strangest and most complex episodes in American military and
diplomatic history. It is indicative of the confusion sur-
rounding them that General William S. Graves confessed as
'
follows many years later:
I was in command of the United States troops sent
to Siberia and, I must admit, I do not know what
the United States was trying to accomplish by mili-
tary intervention.
To this day historians cannot agree on the motivation
or the subsequent aims of the interventions, and each hypo-
thesis suffers, it seems to me, some glaring defects. For
instance, one contends that the primary aim was to further
America's efforts against Germany in the First World War."^
But then how do we explain the decision to keep troops in
Russia after the Armistice had been signed?
At the other extreme is the contention that this was
^William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure, 1918-
1920 (New York: Peter Smith, 1965) , p. 3l)4.
^Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Inter-
vention in North Russia (1918) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1937), passTm.
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primarily an effort to contain communism.^ This claim
must be balanced against the abundance of primary evidence
demonstrating the overriding concern of the major policy-
makers with the German war effort. It also overlooks or
ignores Washington's repeated refusal to adopt the French
plan to topple the Bolsheviks.
A third factor has been held to be the key to under-
standing the Siberian (but not the north Russian) expedi-
tion: America's desire to maintain the Open Door in the
Far East against Japanese imperial designs.^ There is
little documentary evidence to support this claim. Further-
more, Japan was a war-time ally who was invited to inter-
vene jointly with the United States and was asked for no as-
surances regarding its future course in the area when the
United States unilaterally withdrew. Japan announced its
withdrawal two years later.
My purpose, however, is not to offer the definitive
historical narrative of these affairs, but to recount the
events with an eye toward assessing the constitutional sta-
tus of President Wilson's action.
^Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia
Since 1917 (New York: International Publishers, 1928), pas-
sim; William A. Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-
1947 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), passim.
^Betty M. Unterberger , America's Siberian Expedition,
1918-1920 (Durham, N.C.. Duke University Press, 19^6), pas-
sim; John A. VJhite, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton,
N.j! : Princeton University Press, 1950), passim.
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To accomplish this we must take account of the motiva-
tions for the expeditions. Were they the legitimate exer-
cises of a Commander-in-Chief deploying troops so as to de-
feat Germany against which Congress had declared war? Or
was the war with Germany a convenient cover for a constitu-
tionally questionable undertaking aimed at the Japanese or
the Bolsheviki?
Furthermore, we must examine the status of Russia vis-
a-vis the United States. Was Russia at the time of the ex-
peditions still America's war-time ally to which the Presi-
dent might legally send troops against the common enemy?
Or had Russia indeed become neutral, as the Soviet Govern-
ment claimed, but unable to resist American military inter-
vention?
It is these questions in addition to our standard in-
quiries into Presidential and Congressional action which we
must keep in mind as we try to sort out the historical tan-
gle surrounding the Siberian and north Russian expeditions.
I . Historical Background and the Decision to Intervene
By the end of 1914 Europe had divided into two armed
camps, and was about to embark upon a struggle of unprece-
dented proportions. On one side were the so-called Central
Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Opposed were
the Entente Powers, or simply the "Allies:" Russia, France,
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Great Britain, Japan, Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro.
Italy joined the Allies in 1915.
Provoked by attacks on American shipping, President
Wilson asked a special session of Congress to declare war
against Germany on April 2, 1917. Two days later the legis-
lature resolved
That the state of war between the United States
and the Imperial German Government which has
thus been thrust upon the United States is here-
by formally declared
. .
.5
Germany calculated that the war in Europe would be over
by the time the United States mobilized and dispatched an
appreciable number of troops. German calculations were
partly correct; it was not until Autumn 1917 that Americans
began to fight "over there.'
Meanwhile a great war -weariness swept Europe. An esti-
mated 4,000,000 men had been slain, millions more wounded.
The governments of Europe tottered on the brink of bankrupt-
cy.^ Nowhere was the revulsion greater than in Czarist Rus-
sia. In March, 1917, army mutinies, bread riots and indus-
trial strikes forced the Czar to abdicate. The United
^55 Cong. Rec. 200 (1917); Joint Resolution Declaring
that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Gov-
ernment and the Government and the people of the United
States and making provision to prosecute the same. 40 Stat.
1 (1917)
.
F. Lee Benns
,
European History Since 1870 , 4th ed.
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , lyi)!?) , pp. 364-67.
^Ibid., p. 371.
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States rejoiced to be allied with a liberal regime, and
quickly recognized the provisional government. Provisional
War Minister Alexander Kerensky vowed to continue the unpop-
ular struggle.
In July 1917, in Galicia, the whole Russian line col-
lapsed before the advancing German columns. This played di-
rectly into the hands of the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, whose
slogan was "Peace! Land! Bread!" Only a few months earlier
Lenin had been transported back to Russia from Switzerland
by the Germans, who hoped that he would further the disrup-
tion in Russia.
The Bolshevik program was nearly irresistible to the
war-sick Russians. In November, 1917, a successful coup
d'etat toppled the provisional government. A "Soviet of
the People's Commissars" was established, with Lenin as
chairman and Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Wash-
ington refused to recognize the new regime, believing it
weak and under German influence.
Soon after the Bolsheviks assumed power in Petrograd,
Trotsky circulated a memo calling for an armistice. The
Allies, of course, ignored the note, but the Germans, eager
to eliminate the eastern front in time to transfer troops
to France for a Spring offensive, responded quickly and
favorably. On December 15, 1917, an armistice between Rus-
sia and the Central Powers was agreed to at Brest-Litovsk.
20.9
But Germany was not content with an armistice; it wanted a
treaty ceding much of eastern Europe, including Russia's
Q
grain-rich Ukraine.
The Soviets, hoping to delay their capitulation, stal-
led and the peace talks dragged on through the Winter.
France and England xvere especially bitter as their intelli-
gence reported massive German troop m.ovements from the east
to the west. They were convinced that the Bolsheviks were
either agents of the Germans or their unwitting dupes. This
belief V7as widespread among the American public, and even
Q
found favor in official Washington.
Notwithstanding the reduction in troops and the Brest nego-
tiations, the Germans resumed their advance upon Russia in
the Ukraine to the south, and through Finland in the north
This was in late February, 1918. At the same time the Sov-
iets feared imminent Japanese intervention in the east. Aware
of Allied anxieties over the collapse of the eastern front,
Lenin and Trotsky opened informal contacts with Allied repre-
sentatives in Russia, dangling before them the hope of a
revived eastern front.
^Ibid.
,
pp. 376-377.
^George F. Kennan, Soviet -American Relations, 1917-1920,
Vol. 2: The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, , pp. 3-9.
^^Strakhovsky
,
Origins
, pp. 14-17.
^^Kennan, pp. 107-108.
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In their desperation the Soviet leaders attempted to
exploit war-time rivalries by playing one international co-
alition off against another. The peace with Germany was so
fragile, and the threat of Japanese expansion into Soviet
Siberia so great that the "breathing-space" essential to
consolidate the revolution appeared tenuous at best. In his
"Six Theses concerning the Current Tasks of Soviet Power,"
written in late April, early May, 1918, Lenin describes
their tactics.
The international position of the Soviet republic
is difficult and critical in the extreme, because
the most deeply rooted interests of international
capital and imperialism impel it . . . not only
toward military pressure on Russia but also toward
mutual agreement concerning the division of Russia
and the strangling of Soviet power.
Only the sharpening of the imperialist slaughter
of the peoples in western Europe and the imperial-
ist rivalry of Japan and America in the Far East
paralyze or restrain these tendencies . . .
For this reason the Soviet republic must . . .
follow a course of maneuver, of retreat, and biding
one's time until the moment when the proletarian
revolution . . . iif^a number of advanced countries,
comes to fruition.
On March 3, 1918, in their panic over the renewed Ger-
man advance, Lenin and Trotsky followed the course of "re-
treat" and agreed to the harsh Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This
act and the repudiation of Russian state debts on February 8
Quoted in ibid., pp. 132-133.
served to antagonize the Allies against the Bolsheviks . "^^
Nevertheless, because of a mutual anxiety with regard
to Germany (France and England were most upset over the im-
pending German Spring offensive on the western front which
was launched March 21; Trotsky was convinced that the Brest
peace vjould not end German penetration in Russia), some form
of Allied-Soviet collaboration seemed possible in March and
April
.
On March 5--two days after the Brest treaty was signed,
but before it was ratified--the Soviet leaders handed an in-
formal American representative a note asking "what kind of
support" the United States would give should the war with
Germany be renewed. It further asked what the United States
would do should Japan "attempt to seize Vladivostok and the
Eastern Siberian Railway.""*"^
The American representative, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond
Robins of the American Red Cross Commission in Russia, was
convinced that the Soviets would accept United States aid in
reconstituting the eastern front. Other Americans, such as
Ambassador David R. Francis, were more skeptical. Francis
had seen documents "whose authenticity I do not doubt," pur-
porting to prove that the Bolsheviki leaders were "in German
pay." Although Francis was probably sincere, these documents
'^C. K. Gumming and Walter Pettit, Russian -American
Relations, March 1917-March 1920: Documents and Papers (New
York: Harcourt, Brace 6c Howe, 1920), p. I 'l
.
^^Ibid., pp. 81-82.
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which were obtained by Edgar Sisson, director of the United
States wartime propaganda program in Petrograd, were undoubt-
15
edly forgeries
.
The Sis son documents, unearthed in March, 1918, rein-
forced the common though false theory that the Bolsheviks
were German agents. They helped thwart Robins' attempts to
attain Soviet -American cooperation. On March 11, the day
before Trotsky's queries to Robins were cabled to Washington,
a message from President Wilson to the Congress of Soviets
was delivered. The note expressed "sincere sympathy" for
the Russian people in light of the renewed German attack,
but declared that the United States "is unhappily not now
16in a position to render . . . direct and effective aid."
On March 19, Ambassador Francis was informed that Wash-
inton considers the President's message an "adequate answer"
to Trotsky's requests. Meanwhile, on the 16th the Congress
of Soviets ratified the Brest treaty. Despite this, infor-
mal contacts between Robins and the Bolshevik leaders con-
tinued through the end of April. In May Robins was recalled,
Washington having given no support to his efforts toward
Soviet -American collaboration.
Undoubtedly, American mistrust of the Bolsheviki in-
^^United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 19l"8, Russia , 3 vols. (Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1931), 1:371-78; Kennan. p. 179.
^^United States. Foreign Relations. 1918. Russia, 1:395
2:3
creased when in late April formal diplomatic relations be-
tween Russia and Germany were renewed. The arrival of the
new German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, so alarmed Francis that
he recommended Allied intervention even without Bolshevik col-
laboration, because "Mirbach is dominating Soviet government
and is practically dictator in Moscow. "^^
Diplomatically, the Bolsheviki remained personae non
gratae as far as the United States was concerned. In a memo
to Japan read just after the Brest treaty was signed, the
United States declared that
{i}t does not feel justified in regarding Russia
either as a neutral or as an enemy, but continues
to regard it as an ally. There is, in fact, no
Russian government to deal with. The so-called
Soviet government upon which Germany has just
forced . . . peace was never recognized by the
Government of the United States as even a gov-
ernment de facto . None of its acts, therefore,
need be oFficially recognized by this Govern-
ment . . .
During the period in vzhich the plans for cooperation
were being considered and rejected events were moving apace
in the northern region of European Russia. With its Baltic
ports closed by the war, Russia's Arctic coast ports became
her only maritime links to the Atlantic. Most important of
these were Murmansk, built principally with British aid in
1915, and Archangel, doubly important to the Allies because
^^Ibid.
,
p. 520.
l^ibid., p. 397.
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of a large cache of arms and supplies stored there for use
by Russia during the war.
The supplies at Archangel added another element to the
growing mistrust between the Allies and the Bolsheviks. In
February, 1918, as we have noted, the Bolsheviks repudiated
all the debts of pre -Soviet Russia. At the same time they
began to remove the supplies at Archangel which had been
purchased through the use of credits advanced by the Allies.
One can understand Allied dismay at seeing the Bolsheviki
take the supplies while at the same time disavowing their
debt and announcing Russia's withdrav7al from the war. This
helped fuel the German-agent theory because it was assumed
that the Soviets would transfer the goods to Germany as part
of the Russo-German peace agreement. There was no basis in
fact for this belief; the Bolsheviks wanted the supplies for
19themselves
.
The second crucial element preceding intervention in
the north was the Allied belief--and this too was false--that
the Germans would lead neighboring Finnish troops in an at-
tack on Murmansk in the Spring of 1918. But the Allies were
not alone in their misjudgments ; Trotsky, too, expected an
imminent German attack, and as a result drafted a hasty mes-
sage to the Murmansk soviet to "accept any and all assistance
from the Allied missions" to thwart the German advance. This
19Kennan, pp. 19-21
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command was later used to justify collaboration by Murmansk
officials with the Allies. In the 1930 's, Stalinist histor-
ians cited it to discredit Trotsky.
Allied alarm over the German threat to the north Rus-
sian ports led England and France to send warships to Mur-
mansk in late February while requesting that the United
States do the same. Upon receipt of intelligence reports
that a sizable German naval contingent was moving northward
in the Baltic, the British, after working out an agreement
with the Murmansk Soviet, quietly slipped a few hundred ma-
21
rines ashore. The date was March 6, 1918.
On March 5, the United States refused "for the present"
to send a war ship to the area. But after informal pleas of
Murmansk officials to balance the British presence (they did
not fully trust the British) , Ambassador Francis recommended
to the State Department and American Military Attach^, Colo-
nel James A. Ruggles, advised the War Department that an Amer-
ican vessel was needed. Accordingly, on April 4, President
Wilson agreed to send a war ship providing that the commander
be cautioned "not to be drawn in further than the present
action there without first seeking and obtaining instructions
from home.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 42-43, 46-47
^^Ibid., pp. 44, 48-52.
^^Ibid., pp. 44, 55-56.
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In late April, 1918, an American ship was dispatched
with orders to cooperate with the British Rear Admiral at Mur-
mansk to "further the Allied interests generally, and to as-
sist in recovering the Allied stores at Archangel." In ad-
dition, although he may not "commit himself to land military
operations away from the port," the commander may utilize
the crew "for the purpose of stiffening the local resistance
against the Germans." No mention was made about the Presi-
dent's caveat against being "drawn in" without instructions
23from Washington.
While the war effort against Germany was gradually in-
volving the United States in north Russia in the Spring of
1918, a more complex set of developments was ensnaring Wash-
ington in the Russian Far East. Military elements in Japan
were plotting a take-over of the Chinese Eastern Railway (a
link in the Trans-Siberian rail system) and of Eastern Si-
beria. This alarmed the United States which feared a threat
to its "open door" policy of equal commercial opportunities
24
for all in the Far East.
Thus, although the United States and Japan were osten-
sibly allied against Germany, the relationship was an uneasy
one due to the rivalry in eastern Russia. This rivalry pften
^^Ibid., pp. 56-57.
^\lnterberger
,
p. 231.
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revolved around the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the principal
source of supplies over the vast stretch of eastern Russia,
some 4,700 miles from Vladivostok on the Pacific to the Ural
Mountains. The rail system was so vital that when it began
to break down during the war the Kerensky government quickly
invited an American commission of railway engineers headed
by John F. Stevens to survey and recommend improvements. The
Stevens commission arrived in June 1917. In November of that
year, at the request of the Provisional Government, 300 Amer-
ican engineers were sent to assist operations along the rail
line. Their work was interrupted by the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion. The Stevens Commission proved to be the forerunner of
25American intervention.
Various independent anti-Bolshevik forces contested
Soviet power all along the railway zone. Most noteworthy, in
addition to General Dmitri L. Horvat of the Provisional (Ke-
rensky) government, who still claimed to be in authority,
were conservative naval officer Alexsander V. Kolchak, and
the brutal Cossack chieftains Gregorii Semenov and Ivan Kal-
mikov. Soon England, France and Japan aided and encouraged
these groups, the European allies trying vainly to revive
the eastern front, Japan attempting to sow discord in the
Far East. Actually, these White factions were almost as
25ibid., pp. 8-10.
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opposed to one another as they were to the Bolsheviki
.
Throughout 1917 Wilson was urged to help Russia re-
sist Germany by intervening in Siberia or by asking Japan to
intervene on the Allies' behalf. Thus the idea of interven-
ing was not simply a response to the Bolshevik Revolution.
Although after the Brest talks and especially after the Ger-
man Spring offensive began, the appeals to intervene grew
stronger. There were also pleas to intervene from the var-
ious American representatives in the Far East, most of these
men being influenced by their regular contact with the anti-
Bolsheviks. Wilson steadfastly resisted, his top military
advisers being opposed to it on military grounds, and there
27being reluctance to encourage unilateral Japanese action.
One of the major Allied concerns in the Far East was
the huge cache of x^7ar supplies (four times the amount at Arch-
angel) being stored at Vladivostok. As in the north this
materiel had been intended for Russia's use against Germany;
now it was feared that the Bolsheviki would transfer it into
German hands. As Bolshevik power in Vladivostok grew, so did
Allied alarm. In January, 1918, England and Japan sent war
ships to the port, and on March 1 they were joined by the
28
U. S. S. Brooklyn .
26xbid., pp. 14-18.
27ibid., pp. 18-27.
^^Kennan, pp. 59, 61.
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It might plausibly be asked how events in the Far East
could have influenced the fighting on the eastern front many
thousands of miles away. One answer is that there were an
estimated 1.6 million soldiers and officers of the Central
Powers being held as prisoners of war in Russia at the time
of the November Revolution, half of whom were in eastern Rus-
sia. Actually, less than a tenth of these were Germans, the
bulk belonging to the various nationalities comprising the
Austro -Hungarian Empire.
At the time of the Brest treaty, rumor had it that the
P. 0. W.'s were being re-armed by the Bolsheviki. The Sov-
iets did in fact conduct a brief campaign to recruit these
men on the grounds that class solidarity cuts across nation-
al boundaries. But this effort was not very successful; re-
ports of a P. 0. W. threat were gross exaggerations fed by
anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Furthermore, there were more
accurate reports of the P.O.W. situation available since two
first-hand investigations of the situation were conducted by
the United States in late March, 1918.
The data of both of these independent reports (although
the conclusions of one of them emphasized the potential
threat) contradicted the alarmist accounts being received by
the State Department. Nevertheless, on March 24, Secretary
of State Lansing wrote the President that reports of "mili-
tary prisoners in Siberia . . . being organized under German
22Q
officers" persist, and because of this German menace to the
Far East the United States should reconsider its policy re-
garding Allied intervention.^^
Franco-British pressure on Wilson must have been in-
tense, for on March 1, the day the Brooklyn arrived in Vlad-
ivostok, the President agreed to acquiesce in a Japanese
landing in Siberia. But only four days later Wilson reversed
himself, fearing that a Japanese intervention would drive
Russia into German hands, while United States approval would
damage America's moral standing.
But this decision did nothing to reduce Allied pressure
on Washington. On April 5, Japan and England landed small
contingents of armed men in Vladivostok where Bolshevik
strength was growing. The commander of the Brooklyn refused
to participate and Secretary of State Lansing turned down
another British plea for American involvement. Meanwhile,
the Soviet leaders in Moscow were alarmed, believing that
the long-rumored full-scale Japanese intervention had begun.
Thus we may summarize the situation as of May, 1918, as
follows. In the Far East Japan and England landed forces at
Vladivostok while the United States believed it had resisted
Allied pressure to participate. In the Russian north, the
^^Ibid., pp. 71-81; Unterberger, pp. 45-47; United
States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of ^hp, IMited
States; The Lansing Papers. 1914-19 2^. 2 vols. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 357-358.
30Unterberger, pp. 30-33.
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Bolsheviki had virtual control over Archangel and were
busily moving its stores inland, while British forces had
landed at Murmansk with the approval of the local Soviet.
Allied activity in the north began to alarm Germany, lead-
ing her to pressure the Soviets into protesting these al-
leged violations of the Brest treaty.
The Soviets had resumed diplomatic relations with Ger-
many, and as they gained confidence that Germany would not
destroy them, they rejected collaboration with the Entente.
On May 12 or 13, Lenin wrote that "we at the given moment
cannot enter on a military agreement with the Anglo-French
32
coalition.
"
Ironically, at the same time the United States atti-
tude toward the Bolsheviks had hardened, as evidenced by
the recall of Red Cross chief Raymond Robins. Despite the
favorable recommendation of his trusted aide, Colonel House,
Wilson rejected the British plan to send troops to Russia
with Soviet approval. As we have seen, by May 12 or 13,
33
such Soviet agreement could no longer have been obtained.
At this time fighting on the western front was fierce,
the Germans having made considerable progress in their drive
toward Paris, with great losses on both sides. This undoubt-
31Kennan, pp. 245, 251,
Ibid.
, pp. 127, 134.
Ibid., pp. 128-129.
258.
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edly led England to adopt in secret a plan to send an expe-
dition to the Russian north which was somehow to be linked
up with anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia in order to recon-
stitute an eastern front, France was much in favor of top-
pling the Soviets instead of collaborating with them. There
is no evidence that Washington was told of the plan.-^^
Without offering any details of their grand scheme for
fear of alienating the Americans, Great Britain stepped up
the pressure on the United States to intervene. But when
the British began to speak of the north Russian and Siber-
ian interventions together, Secretary of State Lansing re-
torted that the United States considered them two separate
questions. Lansing went on to say, as he described his con-
versation in a May 11 note to the President,
that intervention at Murmansk and Archangel would
receive far more favorable consideration on our
part than intervention in Siberia, for the reason
that vze could understand the military advantage
of the former but had been unable, thus far, to <,c
find any advantage in sending troops to Siberia.
On May 20 the President wrote Lansing that the two
questions "must not and cannot be confused and discussed to-
gether," and that his top military advisers thought it best
not to divert any American troops from the western front.
^^Ibid., pp. 263-66.
"^^United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:160
^^Lansing Papers . 2:360-361.
In late May Washington was bombarded with reports of
German encroachment in the Murmansk region coupled with
British pleas for assistance. Actually. Germany had step-
ped up its military and naval activity in the area in res-
ponse to the Allied buildup (!), but the reports received
by Washington greatly exaggerated the German threat.^''
Nevertheless, the reports must have had their effects,
because Lansing noted in a June 3 memo that President Wilson
was entirely willing to send troops to Murmansk
provided General Foch approved the diversion of
troops
. . .
°
French general Foch had recently been placed in command
of all Allied armies, and was actually in favor of interven-
tion against the Bolsheviki. So when the Allied Supreme War
Council, General Tasker H. Bliss representing the United
States, adopted Joint Note No. 31 on June 3, calling for an
Allied expedition to north Russia, it seemed that the die
had been cast.
Yet weeks of war-time confusion followed. England de-
manded of Washington more troops than General Bliss thought
he had agreed to. Washington was unsure of General Foch's
views on diverting men and ships from the western front
.
Finally, the senior military advisers opposed the expedition
485.
^^ennan, pp. 269, 370.
^^United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:48^
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"None of us," Secretary of War Newton D. Baker confessed,
"can see the military value of the proposal . "-^^
Actually, during this period of poor inter-Allied com-
munication, American troops had already been landed on Rus-
sian soil. We have noted the dispatch of an American ship
to Murmansk with instructions to obey the orders of the
British admiral in promoting Allied interests (see p. 216,
above)
.
So when English and French troops left the city to
quell a Germane -Finnish threat, 150 United States marines
were put ashore on June 11 to replace them. Since the local
Russians were collaborating with the Allies the Americans
did no fighting.
Incidentally, this collaboration between the Murmansk
soviet and the Allies had become by mid-June a real thorn
in the side of the Moscow Bolsheviki. At first, Moscow
issued half-hearted protests against the Allied presence in
order to placate the Germans without alienating the Entente.
But now Murmansk's independence was a challenge to Moscow's
authority, and as suspicions regarding Allied motives grew,
her actions had become downright treasonous. Thus, while
Washington procrastinated Murmansk had become more hospita-
ble toward the Allies and more hostile toward the Bolshe-
^\ennan, pp. 366-69, 377-378,
^^Strakhovsky
,
Origins
,
p. 51.
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By the end of June the United States had ironed out its
differences with England regarding the Murmansk expedition.
Wilson personally decided to send three battalions
--about
4,500 men--despite War Department opposition. Secretary of
War Baker later wrote that he had convinced the President
"that it was unwise, but he told me," Baker explained,
that he felt obliged to do it anyhow because the
British and French were pressing it upon his at-
tention so hard and he had refused so many of
their requests that they were beginning to feel
that he was not a good associate, much less a
good ally
. . .
.^^
Wilson's formal acquiescence did not come until July
17 in an Aide-M^moire to the Allies. Public announcement
was made on August 3, and a month later American troops ar-
rived in the freezing Russian north. The July 17 Aide-M^m-
oire also announced America's decision to participate in a
multi-national Siberian expedition, and it is to the genesis
of this decision that we now turn. One point seems clear:
the original motive for United States participation in the
.northern expedition was a desire to be a good ally and hope-
fully to combat German encroachment in the area. Little
thought seems to have been given in Washington to the posi-
tion of the Bolsheviki.
^•^Kennan, p. 371.
^^Ibid., p. 378.
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Recall that as of May, 1S18, the United States believed
it had closed the door on plans for a Siberian intervention,
declaring it unrelated to the north Russian question and of
even less military value. And yet Washington was convinced
that something ought to be done to meet the threat of the
German P.O.W.'s and Bolsheviki-German collaboration (neither
of which were authentic threats) without encouraging Japanese
imperialism.
The final piece to the puzzle was supplied by the Czech
Legion in Russia in late May, 1918, (although Washington did
not become aware of the situation until mid-June. Even be-
fore the World War there was a Czech colony in Russia, and a
Czech unit fought in the Czarist army. When war ensued many
Czechs, ardent nationalists, deserted the Austro -Hungarian
army to fight on the Russian side, dreaming of an independent
Czech nation. Czarist Russia, a multi-national empire, did
nothing to encourage national self-determination movements,
but the Kerensky government permitted the formation of a
Czech Corps
,
In February, 1918, when the German army began its ad-
vance in the Ukraine the Czechs resolved to cross Russia via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok where Allied .ships
were to transport them to France to fight on the western
front! Units of this force of 70,000 began to move east with
hastily granted Soviet permission.
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The Czechs were the only stable fighting force loyal
to the Allies on the eastern front. This fact seems to have
dawned upon the Bolsheviki and the Allies at roughly the
same time. While England was proposing to the Allies that
the Czechs be used to reconstitute the eastern front (by
splitting the Corps and linking them with the Allies in the
north and the Japanese in the east) mutual animosity was
developing between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks
.
The Bolsheviks had second thoughts about permitting
such a heavily armed fighting force to traverse Russia and
so they tried to get them to give up some of their arms
.
The Czechs suspected that this action was German-inspired,
and anyway they still felt a sense of obligation to the Rus-
sian Whites who had encouraged their formation. By the end
of May Czech-Bolshevik antagonism had ripened into armed hos-
tility all along the rail line. This was the spark that
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touched off the Russian Civil War.
During the month of June the Czechs seized control of
western Siberia, and the ten to fifteen thousand Czechs who
had already arrived at Vladivostok (where they found no Al-
lied ships- to take them to France) , determined to move west-
ward to the aid of their fellow soldiers fighting the Reds.
Anti-Bolshevik Russians and Allied and American agents in
^•^Ibid., pp. 136-65; Unterberger, pp. 54-60; William
H. Chamberlin, The Rus s ian Revo lut j-O" > 1917-192
1
,
2 vols.
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1935), 2:1-Z3.
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Russia did everyting they could to encourage the Czechs to
stay in Siberia and fight the Eolsheviki,
When a confused and somewhat distorted picture of the
Czech situation trickled into Washington in mid-June, Presi-
dent Wilson, who was "sweating blood" over the Siberian ques-
tion, now moved toward a major decision. The Czech struggle
introduced, in Lansing's words, "a sentimental element,"
the perfect justification for intervention. Three events
then took place around the end of June which clinched Wilson's
decision.
First was a message from Generalissimo Foch urging
United States support for an expedition to Siberia, which he
considered "a very important factor for victory." This came
on the heels of a Japanese statement that it would not inter-
vene unilaterally in the Far East, but would only act after
agreement with the Allies and the United States. Finally, on
July 2, the State Department received a wire reporting the
overthrow of the Vladivostok Soviet by the Czechs and the
landing of armed detachments by Japan and England. The com-
mander of the U.S.S, Brooklyn landed a small armed guard to
protect the American Consulate . '^^
On July 3 the Supreme War Council's lengthy plea for
^\ennan, pp. 381, 395.
^^Ibid., p. 391; Lansing; Papers , 2:365; United States
Foreign Rerations, 1918, Russia, 2:235
.
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extensive intervention to "save the Czecho-Slovaks . " insure
Allied control of Siberia "to the Urals." and to recreate an
eastern front in order to "win the war in 1919{!}," arrived
at the State Department. Three days later the President pre-
sented his plan for Siberia at a conference with Lansing and
top military leaders
.
At this conference it was agreed that
the establishment of an eastern front through
a military expedition, even if it was wise to
employ a large Japanese force, is physically
impossible ...
Furthermore, it was decided that the Czechs should be
aided by having Japan furnish small arms, by landing avail-
able forces to hold Valdivostok, and by assembling there a
force of 7000 Japanese and 7000 Americans in order to
guard the line of communication of the Czecho-
slovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk
. .
.
Irkutsk, scene of clashes between the Czechs and the
Bolsheviks
,
was some 1500 miles west of Vladivostok on the
Trans-Siberian Railway. Finally, it was agreed that the
United States and Japan would publicly announce their inten-
tion to aid the Czechs "against German and Austrian prison-
ers," and not to interfere in Russia's internal affairs or
impair her political or territorial sovereignty. "
That same day the U.S.S. Brookl3m was told to hold
Valdivostok as a base of safety for the Czechs and "as a
^%nited States Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia . 2:241-
46, 262-7^3:
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means oJ^ egress for them should the necessity arise. "^-^ No-
where is there any mention of the Bolsheviki, the real adver-
saries of the Czechs. The stated intention was to protect
the Czechs moving westward to help their compatriots
; but
was this the aim of having them hold Siberia or ultimately
leave via Vladivostok for the western front? The instruc-
tions to the Brooklyn (quoted above) suggest that they might
not be leaving, or at least not right away.
America's aims in Siberia seem to have been to thwart
both Japanese and alleged German designs in the area, vzhile
hoping to mollify its interventionist war-time partners.
Little consideration was given to the Bolsheviks as an indi-
genous independent force in Russia; either they were under-
estimated or passed off as German collaborationists. It is
clear that the United States had no intention of marching in-
to central Russia to re-establish an eastern front.
On July 17 the United States announced its policy to
the Allies in President Wilson's Aide-M6moire , a summary and
paraphrase of which was made public two weeks later (August
3) . This document is a rather remarkable combination of Wil-
sonian idealism and misrepresentation of the situation in
Russia. It begins by reaffirming America's dedication to win
the war against the Central Powers by fighting on the western
front, and rejects full-scale military intervention in Russia
^7ibid., p. 263.
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in order to bring her back into the war. It goes on to ap-
prove "military action" in Russia, but
only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate
their forces and get into successful coopera-
tion with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady
any efforts at self-government or self-defense
in which the Russians themselves may be willing
to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok
or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legi-
timate object for which American or Allied
troops can be employed ... is to guard mili-
tary stores which may be subsequently needed
by Russian forces and to render such aid as
may be acceptable to the Russians in the or-
ganization of their own self-defense.
The note concludes with a solemn pledge to the Russian
people not to interfere with Russia's political sovereignty,
nor intervene in her internal affairs , nor impair her terri-
torial integrity. Finally, it calls upon "all associated
48in this course of action" to grant the same assurances.
Most remarkable is the degree to which the Aide-Memoire
completely ignores the reality of Bolshevik power in Russia.
The fact is that Wilson could not help the Czechs without
opposing the Bolsheviki, against whom they were locked in
mortal combat. And he could not "steady any efforts at
self-government" without choosing between communist and anti-
communist factions. There was in fact a flat contradiction
between the President's policy of aiding the Czechs and
"steadying" the Russians, and his pledge of non-interfer-
Ibid., pp. 287-290.
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ence in Russia's internal affairs,
Wilson seems to have chosen this course as a compromise
between Anglo-French demands for large-scale military inter-
vention to reestablish an eastern front and his own desire
to thwart the Germans without sanctioning unilateral Japan-
ese action or diverting large numbers of American troops.
II. Congress, the Bolsheviks and the Japanese
The United States Congress played little role in the
decision to intervene. Back in March, 1918, when Wilson
first agreed to endorse a Japanese landing one Congressman
filed a resolution of protest, but this proved meaningless
when Wilson reversed himself a few days later. (See p. 220,
above.) That Spring the only other Congressional sentiment
regarding Russia, and one destined to grow in popularity,
was that the Bolsheviks were German agents actively betray-
49ing the Russian people.
By the first week in June, when talk of intervention
and perhaps an economic commission to Russia was in the air.
Republicans began making public speeches favoring interven-
tion. The Administration feared that Russia would become
a partisan issue. On June 10, Senator King of Utah, a Icyal
Wilsonian Democrat, offered a proposal for an anti-German
49 56 Cong. Rec. 2590-2591, 3028, 3030 (1918)
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propaganda commission and an Allied-Japanese-American mili-
tary expedition to go to Russia. The resolution died in
the Foreign Relations Committee.
In late June the recalled Red Cross chief, Raymond
Robins, arrived in Washington anxious to warn against inter-
vention and to promote his plan for economic cooperation
with the Bolsheviks. He found mistrust of the Soviets so
great, however, that he was forced to work through his old
political friends, Progressive Republican Senators William
E. Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of California. The lat-
ter tried to soften the increasingly strident anti-Bolshe-
vism of some of their colleagues
.
There was no further Congressional action on Russia
that Summer and Fall, during which time United States troops
were dispatched. By September, 1918, when the American
forces landed in Russia (4500 at Archangel, under British
command, and 9000 at Vladivostok under General William S.
Graves) a number of realities imposed themselves upon Wil-
52
son's fanciful plans.
First, there were no supplies left to guard at Arch-
angel where the Bolsheviki had been overthrown by the Brit-
^^Ibid., p. 7557; Kennan, pp. 385-386, note 7, p. 386.
^^Williams, p. 146; 56 Cong. Rec. 9053-58 (1918).
^\ennan, pp. 379, 414; United States Foreign Relations ,
1918. Russia, 2:346.
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ish in early August, because the Soviets had removed them
to the interior. Second, there were no Germans to defend
against in north Russia, and so, subject to British com-
mand, the Americans were used to chase the Bolsheviks south.
Russia was now torn by full-scale civil war, in which the
Allies, Czechs and various White factions opposed the Reds
who had control over central Russia. '^^
Third, the Japanese, who were pursuing their own in-
terests in the Far East, rapidly escalated their troop
strength (to over 70,000 by November) thus alarming Washing-
ton. Japanese policies, which were designed to promote un-
rest in the region, soon came into conflict with American
plans to insure the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The American policy, incidentally, worked to the advantage
of the White Russians, who depended upon the rail system for
their supplies.
Fourth, on November 11, 1918, a scant two months after
the Americans landed in Russia, Germany signed an armistice
effectively ending the First World War. Thus the Expeditions
quickly lost whatever justifications they may have had in
terms of an anti-German effort. A new sentiment--isolation-
ism, or withdrawal from the world's strife--arose to com-
pete with anti-Bolshevism.
^\ennan, pp. 419, 424-27.
^\nterberger
, pp. 105, 231, 117.
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Anti-Bolshevism received a shot in the arm when, in
the late Summer and Autumn of 1918 the Soviets officially
sanctioned a terror campaign to be conducted by the Cheka
against suspicious elements of the Russian population. (Ac-
tually, the Whites launched an equally bloody reign of ter-
ror during the Russian Civil War, but anti-communist propa-
gandists in America played this down.) Furthermore, on Sep-
tember 15 the Administration released the Sisson Documents,
purporting to prove that the Bolsheviks were really German
agents. (See p. 212, above.
Anti-Bolshevism was reflected in the Senate resolution
offered by King of Utah, which after condemning the Bolshe-
viks as pro-German traitors called for recognition of the
(White) Kolchak government at Omsk and an Allied-American
expedition to aid Russia and "overthrow Bolshevist tyranny
and anarchy." The proposal never got past the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
Meanwhile the end of the war was an understandable
blow to American troop morale. American soldiers in Russia,
who never understood why they were sent there in the first
place, grew especially restive after the Armistice. But by
this time, the port at Archangel was frozen and the Japanese-
American rivalry in the Far East was at its worst. In addi-
tion, Wilson wished to consult with the Allies before making
^^Chamberlin, 2:66-83; Williams, p. 155
^^56 Cong. Rec. 11609 (1918).
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any policy changes. As a result, the Russian question was
postponed until the Paris Peace Conference was convened in
January, 1919.^'^
Wilson was inclined to withdraw from north Russia, bal-
ance off the Japanese in Siberia, and leave the general piob-
lem of Russia to his proposed League of Nations, But the
European Allies were alarmed by the specter of Bolshevism;
they feared the spread of communism in the Balkans as a re-
sult of the power vacuum created by the defeat of the Cen-
tral Powers. Churchill, Foch, Clemenceau and elements in
the State Department favored crushing the Bolsheviks and
dismembering Russia, or establishing a cordon of non-commun-
c o
1st states to surround her.
Wilson, spurred on by the War Department and the rising
tide of isolationism in the Congress, repeatedly opposed en-
larging the intervention, or creating a cordon. He sup-
ported Lloyd George's proposal for a conference of the Sov-
iets, Whites and Allies. But the conference, set to be held
on the Prinkipo Islands, never came off because Churchill
and various French anti-communists undermined it by convinc-
^^Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp.
104-105; John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Ver-
sailles Peace (Princeton, N . J . : Princeton University Press,
1966), pp. 49-50, note 39, p. 50.
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Thompson, pp. 49-61.
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ing the Whites that they need not attend.
On the other hand, Wilson openly supported the White
leader, Admiral Kolchak, just short of formal recognition.
In addition, he scuttled a secret mission to the Soviets
conducted by William C. Bullitt which might have resulted
in a modus vivendi with the Bolsheviks. (Lenin was willing
at the start of 1919 to agree to "a second Brest," i.e.,
concessions to buy time.) These acts, hostile to the Sov-
iets, reflected Washington's distaste for Bolshevik extrem-
ism, the growth of the Red Scare in America, and the desire
to cooperate with the Allies who were alariaed by the commun-
ist ascension to power in Hungary and the left-wing Sparta-
cist movement in Germany.
On December 12, 1918, a month after the Armistice, Sen-
ator Johnson of California launched a Congressional effort
to end the American intervention in Russia. He proposed a
resolution calling for all documents bearing on Russo-Ameri-
can relations "so that the Senate and the Jfation may know
why . . . oursoldiers are in Russia." Johnson argued that
"what actually exists is war, and yet I know of no declara-
61
tion of war by the Congress."
^^Ibid., pp. 35, 101, 122-24, 145. 375.
^^Ibid., pp. 164, 235, 307.
^^57 Cong. Rec. 342-44 (1918).
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On December 30 Senator Townsend of Michigan reported
hundreds of complaints from relatives and friends of sol-
diers who had enlisted to fight Germany, but were now being
kept in Russia. In the House, Lundeen of Minnesota intro-
duced a resolution instructing the President to withdraw
all troops in Russia; this went to the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee on January 4, 1919, Three days later, in a Senate
speech, LaFollette of Wisconsin asked why United States
armed forces were "making war upon Russia." On January 13,
Senator Johnson introduced another measure calling for with-
drawal from Russia "as soon as practicable." When it came
to a floor vote a month later the Senate split evenly and
the Vice-President had to cast the deciding negative vote.
Finally, a February 1 House resolution, also sentenced to
a committee death, warned the President that he was "with-
out authority of law" to dispatch armed forces "except to
62protect American lives and property."
Although the Republicans were strengthened after the
Congressional elections of November, 1918, a combination of
Democratic partisans and militant anti-Bolsheviks helped
stem the growing anti-Expedition mood. (The ant i-Bolsheviks,
led by Senator McCumber of North Dakota, made wild speeches
against the "arch-beasts" Lenin and Trotsky who "sold out"
62 Ibid., pp. 864, 1060, 1101, 1313, 2544, 2566, 3342.
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to Germany. This culminated in the Overman Committee hear-
ings on German and Bolshevik propaganda in the Spring of
1919. These hearings gave some legitimacy to even the most
outrageous anti-Bolshevik charges. )^-^
Although the 65th Congress adopted no anti-Expedition
measures, Senator Johnson's efforts were not without effect.
Wilson considered, then dropped, a plan to fully explain
his Siberian policy to Johnson's committee. This was in
late January, 1919. On February 18, a letter to the chair-
man of the Congressional military committees was made public
announcing the withdrawal of Americans from north Russia "at
the earliest possible moment that weather conditions in the
spring will permit."
All American soldiers were evacuated from north Russia
by June 30, 1919. But the Administration refused to with-
draw from Siberia for fear of the Japanese threat to the
Open Door. The 66th Congress bottled up various proposals
to force withdrawal from Siberia as well. However, on June
27, 1919, the day before the formal signing of the Treaty
of Versailles, the Senate approved another Johnson resolu-
tion calling upon the President to "inform tiie Senate of the
^%illiams, p. 164; Schuman, pp. 123-25.
^^Unterberger, pp. 136-137; United States, Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1919, Rus-
sia (Washington: Government Printing Ottice, 1361), p. 6i/T
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reasons for sending" and maintaining United States soldiers
in Siberia. The President sent a message to the Senate a
month later explaining that troops were originally sent to
aid the Czechs against enemy P.O.W.'s and to steady Russian
efforts at self-defense, but were now necessary to maintain
the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railways upon which the
Siberian population and Admiral Kolchak are "entirely de-
pendent" for supplies.
Aside from the fact that the White House reiterated the
false tale of the German P.O.W. threat, the most glaring as-
pect of the message is the absence of even a hint of concern
over Japan's role. It was not until August 1919 that an
Assistant Secretary of State informed a House committee of
this angle. By the summer of 1919, isolationist sentiment
had surpassed even anti -Bolshevik feeling in America. But
more important, Kolchak 's White army had suffered major re-
verses that Slimmer and autumn. And in November of 1919,
when Omsk, the Admiral's "capital," fell to the Red Army his
defeat was imminent.
Kolchak 's collapse and the advance of the Red Army into
Siberia where contact with American forces seemed likely was
the main factor in the decision to end the Far Eastern Expe-
^^Thompson, p. 219; 58 Cong. Rec. 1864 (1919).
^%nterberger, pp. 138-40; Chamberlin, 2 : 191-203
.
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dition. On December 23, 1919, Secretary of State Lansing
wrote the President that "if we do not withdraw we shall
have to wage war against the Bolsheviki." On January 9,
1920, Japan was informed that the United States intended
to withdraw its men, and by April 1 the last contingent of
Americans had sailed away from Valdivostok
.
The Russian Interventions and the Constitution
At the start of this study we noted a need to answer
several questions in order to assess the constitutionality
of President Wilson's actions. (See p . 206, above.) VJere
the expeditions aimed at defeati-ng Germany, against which
Congress had declared war? In regard to north Russia the
answer is yes; in Siberia we can offer a qualified yes at
best. This is because we do not know how sincere the United
States was when it publicly justified its action on the
ground of the German war prisoner threat in Siberia.
On the one hand we know that Washington had contradic-
tory (and more accurate) reports available if the decision-
makers had only wished to consult them. On the other hand,
war-time confusion and stress was responsible for various
errors in judgment based upon faulty factual accounts. For
example, the decision on north Russia was predicated upon
^^Lansing Papers 2:392-393; Unterberger, pp. 178, 183.
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the absolutely false assumptions that the German threat to
the region was grave and imminent, and that the Bolsheviki
were transferring the Archangel stores to the Germans.
However, if we look beyond intentions, it is clear that
the Russian expeditions developed into something far removed
from any anti-German effort. They were in fact anti-Bolshe-
vik and anti-Japanese. Thus, troops ostensibly mobilized
against the enemy in a declared war ended up being used for
an entirely different purpose. Actually, they v^ere used to
thwart a professed ally of the United States, Japan, and a
major faction in the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviki.
Hence, even if we grant that the President has the au-
thority to commit troops to a new theater of war pursuant
to a Congressional declaration of war, need we grant as well
his authority to use those troops for an entirely different
purpose, against another enemy once that war ends? Several
additional facts should be considered.
Regarding the north Russian affair, Wilson was truly
misinformed, and when the Armistice was agreed to in Novem-
ber, 1918, the port was too frozen to evacuate the troops.
The next June (1919)
,
following the thaw, the Americans were
removed. Nevertheless, while there they did help secure
the region against the Red Army, losing 144 men and taking
over 300 casualties in the fighting.
^^R. Ernest Dupuy and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars
of the United States (New York: Hawthorne Books, 196b) , p. i^U.
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In Siberia, by contrast, although American troops re-
mained for one and a half years they did little fighting
except for skirmishes against Red bands along the rail line
which they were ordered to protect. General Graves, the
American commander, was so steadfastly neutral pursuant to
his orders that he became the target of much criticism from
ardent anti-Bolsheviks in the State Department as well as
White Russians. Afterwards Graves wrote as follows.
The United States never entered into a state of
War with Russia, or any faction of Russia. It
was equally as unconstitutional to use American
troops in hostile action in Siberia against any
faction of Russia, as it would have been to {use}
. . .
them in hostile action against the R.ussians.
The General went on to deny a New York Times report
that his troops were "fighting the Red armies."
If I had permitted American troops to be used
in fighting 'Red armies,' as stated, I would
have taken an immense responsibility upon my-
self, as no one above me, in authority, had
given me any such orders . The fact that I did
not permit American troops to be so used was
responsible for nine-tenths of the criticism
directed against us, while in Siberia.
Thus, we are left with the paradox that troops sent to
north Russia to defend against Germany were used to fight the
Bolsheviki, while the forces sent to aid the Czechs and guard
the rail line in Siberia avoided fighting them. Therefore it
would seem that the President stood on firm legal ground when
Graves, p. 93.
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he ordered troops to the north, but not when he permitted
them to fight the Reds under British command. In contrast,
while his authority to send troops to Siberia was doubtful,
it could hardly be said that they were engaged in a "war"
against the Bolsheviks.
The question of Congressional action is more clear-cut.
There is no evidence that Congress participated at all in
the decision to dispatch troops. Actually Congress was
never told why armed forces were sent to north Russia, and
it was not informed of the real policy in Siberia until a
year after the troops arrived. Debates in Congress indicate
that up until the time when they were so informed supporters
of the expeditions assumed they were designed to overthrow
the Bolsheviks who were considered to be German agents.
Legislative debates indicate scarcely a challenge to
the President's authority, although there were increasing
attacks on the wisdom of his Russian policy after the Armis-
tice. The only definitive Congressional action, however,
was approval of Hiram Johnson's rather discreet request for
information on United States policy in Siberia. Resolutions
ordering withdrawal were either defeated or else never came
to a floor vote.
The last question concerns the relationship between
the
United States and Russia in international law. As
noted
(p. 213, above), the United States considered
Russia a war-
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ally but refused to recognize the Soviet government. It
even went so far as to approve a formal agreement with the
renegade regional Soviet at Murmansk on October 14, 1918,
and publicly announced its willingness to assist Admiral Kol-
chak on June 13, 1919. The former, entered into as it was
with a regional government, had dubious validity in inter-
national law; the latter fell short of de facto recognition .70
Thus the United States recognized no government in Rus-
sia other than the defunct Kerensky regime, with which it
maintained the fiction of "diplomatic relations" for many
years. The official American claim of non-interference in
Russia's internal affairs rested upon the corresponding legal
fiction that the Soviet government did not exist.
How then does this episode affect the war -making powers
of the President? It is a precedent for the use of armed
forces in a manner inconsistent with, and perhaps intended
to be inconsistent with, a prior declaration of war by the
Congress. This is partially mitigated by the possibility
that the President may have indeed intended to pursue the
policy established by Congress (i.e., war against Germany).
The historical record is ambiguous here.
^Quhited States Foreign Relations 1918. Russia , 2:556-
57; United States roreign Relations. i9iV, Russia , pp. 378,
386.
^•Charles G. Fenwick, International Law , 4th ed. (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, lyb!); , p. and note 37,
p. 192.
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Second, it is a precedent for Presidential decision to
use the armed forces without the prior approval of Congress.
Again such approval would not be necessary if these forces
were intended for use against Germany, the declared enemy.
Finally, (disregarding the original motives), it is an
example of the Presidential use of American troops to effect
a policy without informing the Congress over an extended
period of time of the true aims of the policy. Congress, of
course, knew of the ant i -Bolshevik nature of United States
policy, but because they were not fully informed the legis-
lators gave this factor more weight than it deserved. One
historian observed that "Wilson's supporters in Congress
. . .
knew no more about the policy than did the opposition. "^^
In sum, in the Russian interventions, the President
used troops originally deployed pursuant to a Congressional
declaration of war in military operations (1) after an armis-
tice ending the war has been agreed to, (2) to aid or thwart
various factions of foreign armies involved in the civil war
of a third state, (3) without fully informing Congress of the
policy aims, and (4) without subsequent formal Congressional
approval
.
^^Unterberger
,
p. 136,
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CHAPTER VII
THE KOREAN WAR
I. Background
The mountainous Korean peninsula, which juts out of
tne Manchurian (Chinese) mainland had been annexed by Japan
in 1910 with covert American agreement obtained five years
earlier. The fiercely independent Koreans remained part of
the Japanese Empire until the end of World War Two. During
the War the Allies vowed to liberate them and grant inde-
pendence "in due course" (Cairo, 1943). Privately, Presi-
dent Roosevelt favored a period of Allied trusteeship.'^
Actually little thought had been given to tiny Korea,
and when Japan capitulated in August 1945, the United States
and its ally, the Soviet Union, immediately agreed to divide
the peninsula in order to facilitate acceptance of the
Japanese surrender. The Russians would operate in the
north, the Americans in the south. At the suggestion of a
young military officer named Dean Rusk, the 38th parallel.
Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political
History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1957)
, pp. 15, 26-27, 31-37; Soon Sung Cho , Korea in World
Politics 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibil -
ity (Berkley: University of California Press, 1967), pp.
Ii-23.
2^:S
running across the middle of the country was adopted as a
2dividing line.
Although unprepared for occupation, Lieutenant Gen-
eral John R. Hodge landed the first 72,000 Americans in the
south Korean zone in September 1943. Hodge received orders
from General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, Commander in Chief
Far East and Supreme Commander Allied Powers. The Russians
had already placed an estimated 125,000 men north of the
38th parallel.-^
The Americans almost immediately alienated the
Koreans by keeping on the hated Japanese civil servants and
by insisting that the United States military was the sole
governing authority in its zone. By contrast, the better-
informed Russians expropriated the Japanese and let indige-
nous administrative organizations function, while placing
Soviet-trained Korean communists returning from the Russian
Far East into positions of power.
^
Realizing that the division of the country was un-
natural, unpopular and economically disastrous, the United
States sought Soviet cooperation in replacing the zonal
arrangement with a trusteeship. An agreement was worked out
^Cho, pp. 53-55; Dean Acheson, Present at the Crea -
tion: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, A Signet Book, 1969), p. 581.
^Cho, pp. 62-63, note 5, p. 63.
^Ibid., pp. 61-62, 68-70, 79, 81-82. 88.
in Moscow in late December 1945 calling for a four-power
trusteeship of five years' duration and a provisional Korean
government, all to be implemented by a joint Soviet-American
Commission.
^
Meeting on and off from January 1946 through the
summer of 1947, the Joint Commission accomplished next to
nothing principally because the Americans and the Russians
were unable to agree on the Korean groups to be consulted.
The Russians were of course partial to communists and left-
ists, the Americans to moderates. It was gradually becom-
ing clear that both sides preferred two Koreas rather than
one wholly communist or anti- communis t nation.
Throughout 1946-1947, the situation in the south
deteriorated. Long-time nationalist Syngman Rhee organized
right-wing factions against trusteeship, favoring instead
immediate independence. Leftists staged frequent revolts
which Hodge openly suppressed. Inflation raged. The United
States sought a way out without compromising its newly
adopted (spring 1947) policy of containing Communism.'^
After a fact-icinding mission in the summer of 1947,
General Albert C. Wedemeyer recommended building up a south
Korean army and arranging with the Union of Soviet
^Ibid.
, pp. 92-95, 100-103.
^Ibid.
, pp. 119. 1Z3, 146-50.
^Ibid., pp. 106. 133, 152, 165. 193.
250
Socialist Republics for mutual troop withdrawals. In
September 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President
Truman that from a "military security" standpoint the
United States has "little strategic interest" in maintain-
ing ground troops in Korea, unless as a consequence of
withdrawal, "the Soviets establish military strength in
south Korea capable of mounting an assault on Japan. "^
The United States therefore undertook to establish
an independent south Korea with United Nations support. In
the north the pro-Soviet conununists, led by Kim Il-sung had
already solidified their power in 1946 with the aid of
Russian advisors. They undertook popular land reform, and
thus laid the groundwork for a stable communist state. The
contrast with the chaotic southern zone embarrassed the
9
United States
.
In the fall of 1947, the United States brought the
Korean question to the United Nations, which America domi-
nated. Over Soviet objections and refusal to participate,
the United Nations General Assembly approved establishing
a Temporary Commission (UNTCOK) to oversee nationwide
elections (November 1947) . The Soviets countered (unsuc-
cessfully) with a proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , vol. 2: Years of Trial
and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Company, 19:36), pp.
325-326.
9
Cho, pp. 12/-31, 166.
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all foreign troops. It was embarrassing for the United
States to reject the popular Russian resolution, but there
was reluctance to withdraw until a native army was developed
in the south. ''"^
Barred from the north, UNTCOK's thirty observers
watched over elections in the American zone, May 10, 1948.
Rhee's party gained a plurality; a constitution was adopted
in July, and in that month the Assembly chose Rhee Presi-
dent of the Republic of Korea (ROK)
. Meanwhile the north
Koreans conducted a purge, prepared a constitution and held
elections of their own, thus establishing the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
. As of September 1948,
there were two Koreas.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea then in-
vited all foreign troops to leave the peninsula. The Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics accepted, withdrawing by the
end of December 1948, though leaving behind advisors and
pro-Soviet Koreans in all major positions of power. In
March 1949, the National Security Council recommended com-
plete United States evacuation by the end of June of that
year, except for a five hundred-man military advisory
'^Ibid.
, pp. 180-181.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 208-12; Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko,
The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign
Policy, 1945-1954 (Nev; York: Harper and Row Pub 1 i s her s ,
Inc., 1^72), pp. 297-298.
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group, and military aid for the Republic of Korea for fis-
cal 1950. President Truman approved. ''^
The Republic of Korea army was built up, although
inadequately supplied, from 18-20,000 men in the spring of
1948 to 98,000 at the outbreak of the war two years later.
Offensive weapons, i.e., tanks, heavy artillery, fighter
planes, were withheld. In response to the President's re-
quest in June 1949, $150 million in economic aid was
granted. But in January 1950 the House defeated by a nar-
row margin a request for a $60 million supplement. How-
ever, Congress passed the measure a month later when it was
tied in with aid to Formosa. Finally, as part of the
United States communist containment policy, Korea was
granted over $10.9 million in March 1950, almost none of
13
which had arrived when the war broke out.
Congressional reluctance to aid Korea could be
traced to: (1) dissatisfaction with the Administration's
China policy, i.e., refusal to help Chiang Kai-shek regain
mainland China where he had lost all power by 1949;
(2) partisan politics, viz., the bulk of the opposition
was Republican; (3) fiscal conservatism; and (4) fear that
^^Cho, pp. 213-214, 233-234.
^"^Ibid., pp. 249, 251, 253-254; Kolko, p. 558;
Truman, p. 329; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New
York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 35, 70.
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the aid would end up in conmunist hands anyway when the
shaky Republic of Korea collapsed . '^
Less is known about Russian aid to the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. By June 1950, their army had
been built up to over 135,000, including 16,000 veterans
of Chinese Communist or Soviet campaigns. They had had a
large number of Soviet military advisors, and were supplied
with planes, tanks and heavy artillery. Thus, they were
both better trained and better equipped than the South
Koreans. In his memoirs, Nikita Krushchev declares that
Kim II- sung initiated the idea of attacking South Korea at
a meeting with Stalin in Moscow in late 1949. Although
Stalin reportedly "had his doubts," he encouraged Kim,
hoping a swift victory would preclude United States inter-
vention. At the last minute, Stalin withdrew the Soviet
advisors, fearing that their capture would provide evidence
of Russian participation.'^^
Meanwhile, the Cold VJar received new impetus as
Americans were shocked to learn that the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics exploded an atom bomb in August 1949.
^^Cho, pp. 241-242; Paige, pp. 35-36, 68; Kolko,
p. 569.
'"^Cho, pp. 255-57; Edward Crankshaw, Krushchev
Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970) , pp
.
367-70; Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The
Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 38.
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Two months later the Chinese communists proclaimed their
People's Republic. In a speech to the National Press Club
on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson tried
to explain Chiang Kai-shek's collapse and the United
States' refusal to alienate China by aiding the National-
ists .
Acheson went on to describe the United States
"defensive perimeter" in the Pacific, including the
Philippines and Japan, but excluding both Formosa and
Korea. This was a reiteration of a position taken by
General MacArthur in 1949. Pacific areas outside the
defense perimeter, Acheson said, cannot be guaranteed
against attack; if invaded they must rely first upon their
1 c
own ability to resist, and then upon the United Nations.
The sense of United States ambivalence regarding
South Korea's defense was heightened by the comment of
Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.), chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and an unofficial spokesman
for the Truman administration. Connally told an inter-
viewer in May 1950 he was afraid that the United States
would have to seriously consider abandoning Korea because
Russia was in a position to "overrun" her and Formosa
"when she gets ready to do it."''"^
^^Paige, pp. 57, 67; Acheson, pp. 463-66; Cho,
pp. 259-260.
17
Paige, p. 68.
The Democrats' Far East Policy and the people who
made it came under increasingly emotional attack in early
1950. Former State Department employee Alger Hiss was
convicted for perjuring himself when he denied passing
government papers to the Soviet Union. Hiss' conviction
in late January was followed by Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy's (R-Wis
. ) charge that the State Department
employed communists. Later McCarthy added that the
Department's "softness" on communism caused the "loss" of
China. "^^
While the Administration publicly defended itself
against McCarthy and the "China lobby," it was privately
developing a major new defense policy, NSC- 68, which was
premised upon global threat presented by the Soviet Union.
NSC-68 would require defense budget increases three to
19four times current levels
.
It was in this atmosphere of intensifying Soviet-
American hostility, and increasing polarization between
Congressional Republicans and the Democratic administration
that North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel, June
24, 1950, Washington time.
II. The Korean War
United States Ambassador John J. Mmccio's cable,
which concluded that an "all-out offensive against the
^^Acheson, pp. 469-74; Paige, pp. 37-41.
^^Acheson, pp. 488-92; Paige, pp. 58-61.
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Republic of Korea" had been launched, caught Washington by
surprise. Spring intelligence reports of a possible
invasion had been discounted either because they were con-
tradictory or because they had heretofore cried wolf too
often. Furthermore, the State Department, which immediately
viewed the attack as an example of "Soviet probing," had
expected the challenge to come first in areas other than
Korea. 20
It was immediately decided to work through the
United Nations by requesting an emergency session of the
Security Council. The Soviet Union had been boycotting the
Council since January 1950, condemning its actions as
illegal as long as the Nationalists rather than the Com-
munists occupied China's seat there. Without a Soviet veto,
the Council was to become a weapon of American diplomacy-- .
leading some historians to view the boycott as a major
Russian blunder, others to see proof that the Democratic
2
1
People's Republic of Korea acted rather independently.
Following President Truman's approval, the United
Nations Security Council resolved on June 25 that "forces
20
Paige, pp. 91, 97-98; John W. Spanier, The
Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge,
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1959), pp. 21-22; Acheson, p. 527.
21
Paige, pp. 92-93; Acheson, pp. 466, 525; Whiting,
p. 39, note 10, p. 182, I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of
the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1^59;,
from North Korea" had committed a "breach of the peace"
against the Republic of Korea. It called for a "cessation
of hostilities," a withdrawal of northern forces to the
38th, and the assistance of all members in executing the
above while refraining from aiding the North.
That evening, (June 25), President Truman met at
Blair House with State and Defense Department officials
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The "common conviction"
was that this was aggression analogous to pre-World War
Two instances. Truman later recalled thinking on the
plane to Washington earlier that day that "Communism was
acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese
had acted . . . ," and if unchallenged. Communist leaders
"would be emboldened. "^^
At the conference most of Secretary Acheson's
proposals were adopted. A crash program of military aid
over and above Congressional authorization, air cover for
the evacuation of American civilians, and the despatch of
the Seventh Fleet toward the region were approved. The
conferees "had no doubt whatever" that the Soviet Union was
9 L
behind this whole affair.
^^Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of United
States Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1956; reprint ed. , New York: Krauss'
Reprint Co., 1972), pp. 221-222.
23
Truman, p. 333; Paige, p. 137.
^Saige, pp. 127. 132, 137-40.
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The next morning, Monday, June 26, the Defense and
State Department Secretaries, scheduled to testify before
a Senate committee regarding the Far East, did so, but
refused to discuss possible courses of action in Korea.
At the same time Senator Tom Connally was assuring
President Truman, at the White House, that he had the
authority to commit American forces in Korea without prior
Congressional consent. Connally recalled comparing the
situation to that of a burglar entering your house; you
can shoot him, he claims to have told the President, with-
out going to the police station for permission. He then
added that a '"long debate in Congress'" might "'tie your
hands completely. You have the right to do it as Commander-
25in-Chief and under the United Nat ions Charter . '
"
Shortly before noon the President issued his first
public statement. It promised vigorous support of the
United Nations resolution and a step-up in aid to Korea,
and closed by warning "those responsible for this act of
aggression" that the United States views such threats to
26
world peace "seriously."
In the Congress that Monday afternoon, the
Republicans continued their attacks against the State
Department, adding a warning against indecisiveness in
^^Ibid.
.
pp. 146-147, 149
'^^Ibid., pp. 149-150.
25"^
Korea. In the evening, at a second Blair House meeting, an
alarming cable from General MacArthur was read. It said
that North Korean tanks were entering the suburbs of Seoul,
the Republic of Korea capital, that the situation was
"rapidly deteriorating," and that "a complete collapse is
27imminent .
"
Once again the Blair group adopted Acheson's
proposals. This time there would be full naval and air
support for the South Koreans limited to the area south
of the 38th parallel. The Seventh Fleet would be inter-
posed between Formosa and mainland China to prevent a new
outbreak of fighting between the Nationalists and Com-
munists. This was intended to confine the area of conflict
to Korea, but it meant the end of United States noninvolve-
ment in the Chinese civil war. It also al ted Mao
Tse-tung's plans to conquer the island in 1950. Finally,
United States forces on the Philippines were to be
strengthened, a military mission was to go to Indochina,
28
and both areas would receive increased aid.
General MacArthur received orders to commit United
States air and naval forces to Korea at his headquarters in
Tokyo. The President telephoned Senator Connally to inform
him, but it was not until the following morning (June 27)
27
Ibid., pp. 151-54; Truman, p. 337.
^^Paige, pp. 161-79; Whiting, p. 22.
260
that Truman met with fourteen Congressmen, including five
Republicans, whom he had selected. Upon Acheson's advice,
it was decided not to seek a joint resolution of support
from the Congress in order to avoid partisan criticism or
general discussion of the costs or consequences of inter-
29
vention.
Truman read the Congressmen his soon- to-be-released
public statement, told them there were no plans to commit
ground troops, and received their support. His statement
noted the Security Council resolution, condemned "Communism"
for going beyond subversion to armed force in order to con-
quer, and declared:
I have ordered United States air and sea forces
to give the Korean Government troops cover and
support . 30
In the Congress that day there was general support
for Truman's action, although Republican Senators Kem
(Missouri) and Watkins (Utah) questioned his authority to
act without Congressional approval. Senator Morse (R-Ore.)
defended the "broad powers" of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. On the House side, only Representative
Marcantonio of New York, a member of the left-wing American
Labor Party, accused the President of usurping the war-
making power with Congressional acquiescence; he denied
^"^Faige, pp. 181-182, 187.
^^Paige, pp. 188-91; Truman, pp. 338-339.
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that the United Nations Charter provided adequate author-
ity. The House then approved the controversial peace-time
extension of the draft. -^^
Finally, in the afternoon (of June 27), with the
Soviets still absent, the Security Council approved a
second resolution on Korea. Noting non-compliance with its
earlier request, the Council then recommended:
that Members of the United Nations furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area. 32
Of course the United States, as the Russians later
took pains to point out, had already begun its "assist-
ance .
"
On Wednesday, June 28, response to the Administra-
tion's action continued to be, as one analyst concludes,
"overwhelmingly favorable." That same day, Washington
time, General MacArthur, on his own initiative, authorized
air strikes against military targets north of the 38th
parallel. In the Senate, the leader of the conservative
wing of the Republican Party, Robert Taft of Ohio, attacked
33
the Administration on constitutional grounds.
-^•^Paige, pp. 196-200; 96 Cong. Rec. 9228-9229,
9231, 9233, 9268 (1950).
^^Paige, pp. 204-205.
^^Ibid., pp. 212-213, 230, 216.
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Taft said he supported intervention in Korea, and
would vote for a joint resolution to that effect if offered.
But, he charged, there has been "no pretense" of consulting
Congress, and so the President lacks legal authority. The
President has brought about "a de facto war with the
Government of northern Korea
. . . without consulting
Congress and without congressional approval." Although
"Presidents have
. . intervened with
. . forces to protect
American lives or interests
. . I do not think it has been
claimed that
. . .
the President has any right to precipi-
tate any open warfare."
As for the United Nations Charter, a special agree-
ment, subject to legislative approval must be negotiated
with the Security Council before the United States could be
obligated to supply troops, Taft reasoned. Therefore the
Charter could not provide the President with authority.
Thus, he concluded, if the legislature does not protest
Truman's action it will have "finally terminated for all
time the right of Congress to declare war
. .
."-'^
Majority leader Lucas of Illinois then rose to
defend the President's right to act as Commander-in-Chief
given the threat of Communism to United States security.
His action, said Lucas, "was within the traditions and
•^^96 Cong. Rec. 9320, 9322, 9323 (1950).
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precedents
.
.
established more than a hundred times" in
United States history. But Lucas went on to agree "whole-
heartedly" with Senator Flanders of Vermont who suggested
lack of authority to pursue the war north of the 38th.
No one in Washington knew that MacArthur had
already ordered air strikes on North Korea. While the
Senate went on to extend the draft, 76-0, MacArthur was
completing a personal tour of Korea convinced that American
combat troops were needed.
One June 29, while Democratic Senators Humphrey of
Minnesota and Gillette of Iowa defended the President
during the day, the National Security Council, which in-
cludes the President, secretly moved the United States
closer to full intervention that evening. Working from
Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson's proposals, a directive
was prepared for MacArthur. The instructions called for
the use of American ground forces in the rear to establish
a beachhead at Pusan, on the southeast tip of the peninsula
Second, "fullest possible" naval and air support for
Republic of Korea forces, including air strikes against
military targets in the north were authorized. Finally,
MacArthur was cautioned to "stay well clear" of the
^^Ibid.
, pp. 9328-9239.
^^Paige, pp. 219, 236-38
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea's northern borders
with Manchuria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics.
In the wee hours of the morning of the 30th,
MacArthur's urgent request for American combat troops
arrived at the Pentagon. He wanted a regimental combat
team at the front line, with an eventual build-up to two
army divisions. Truman approved the combat regiment from
his bedside telephone. But after a morning conference
with his advisors, the President gave MacArthur authority
to use whatever troops were available to him at his
o o
discretion.
That same morning the Administration held a brief-
ing for fifteen Congressional leaders, including seven
Republicans. After the President told of his decision to
commit ground troops, one legislator. Senator Wherry
(R-Neb.), minority floor leader, objected to the lack of
consultation with Congress. But he was the only legisla-
tor to voice criticism. Before the briefing ended a press
statement was released, announcing the meeting with the
Congressmen, and the decision to use air and naval forces
against North Korea. The statement concluded:
^^96 Cong. Rec. 9455, 9462 (1950); Paige, pp.
'
244-51.
38
Paige, pp. 253-56, 260.
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General MacArthur has been authorized to use
certain supporting ground units.
Neither the legislators nor the public was informed
of plans to use the Army in combat in Korea.
On Capitol Hill that afternoon (June 30), Senators
Wherry and Cain (R-Wash.) complained about inadequate con-
sultation with Congress. Wherry suggested that the Presi-
dent address a joint session of Congress. He denied that
the United Nations Charter modified the legislative power
to declare war, and disputed that this action was analogous
to past Presidential efforts to protect American lives and
property abroad. Nevertheless, Wherry called for "unani-
mous support" for Truman's decision.
Senator Knowland (R-Cal.) argued that Presidential
authority "to take the necessary police action" was undis-
puted, and a Congressional declaration of war was neither
"required" nor "desirable."
Senator Flanders (R-Vt.) announced he now doubted
the wisdom of his statement of June 28, in which he denied
that United States forces could be given authority to pur-
sue the enemy or conduct air strikes in North Korea. How-
ever, while the President's authority "to initiate mili-
tary action . . . has been tacitly recognized for generations
and . . has been exercised more than once," Flanders cau-
tioned, the world is now much too "inflammable" for the
"^^Ibid.
, pp. 262-64
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Chief Executive to take that responsibility upon himself.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to resist aggression in
order to preserve the United Nations.
The Senate then approved, 66-30, over $1.2 billion
for mutual defense aid for United States allies, including
$16 million for Korea and the Philippines. Senator Taft
voted for the measure which had provisions allowing the
President to divert $100 million to Korea if he so
desired. In September 1950, this defense aid would be
supplemented by an additional $4 billion.
By the end of June 1950, the North Korean army had
overrun all but the southeastern tip of the country,
destroying half the Republic of Korea army in the process.
A rapid American troop buildup at Pusan (to 65,000 men by
August) enabled the United Nations Command, as it was
formally known, to hold on to a small piece of the penin-
sula. But with their supply lines stretched to the break-
ing point the Communist offensive was halted. On September
15, MacArthur launched an amphibious landing at Inchon, on
the west coast near Seoul, well behind enemy lines. This
96 Cong. Rec. 9526, 9537-41 (1950).
41
Paige, p. 267; Acheson, p. 547; Joint Resolution
making temporary appropriation. 64 Stat. 302 (1950); an
act making supplemental appropriations. 64 Stat. 1044
(1950).
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maneuver ended in a complete rout of the North
Koreans
.
The Inchon landing was a turning point in the
conflict in a number of respects. It shattered Kim II-
sung's effort to unite Korea, and began Syngman Rhee
'
s
drive to do the same. It strengthened the hand of Gen-
eral MacArthur who was increasingly at odds with the
Administration's policy of limiting the conflict to Korea.
Finally, it alarmed Communist China, which saw a unified
anti-communist Korea as a threat to its interests
.
In fact, both the Administration and the communist
Chinese were perturbed by MacArthur, who made public
statements urging United States efforts to promote Chiang
Kai-shek's reconquest of the mainland. The charismatic
General was a force in his own right: virtual dictator
of post-war Japan, popular at home, in charge of all
United States-United Nations military operations in the
Far East, and now lending his prestige to the Republican
policy position on Asia.
The Congress in the summer of 1950 probably
reflected an August Roper poll which showed 73% approval
^^David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (Nevz York:
St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 36; Truman, p. 358;
Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War'
1950-53 (New Yorkl G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), pp. 105-
106, 125-53.
^"^Spanier, p. 83; Whiting, p. 88.
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of Truman's decision to intervene; 15% disapproved. 12%
had no opinion. On July 5, Senator Douglas (D-Ill.)
defended the President's action on constitutional grounds.
Douglas reasoned that the Framers of the Constitution
"did not want to tie our country's hands by requiring
congressional assent for all employment of armed force."
Furthermore, Douglas contended, the speed of con-
temporary warfare and the delays permitted by Congressional
procedure make it "unwise to insist that the President
cannot use armed force in advance of formal congressional
approval." In the case of Korea, the Congress "overwhelm-
ingly approved" the President's action when it extended
the draft and increased military aid.
Third, Douglas cited fifteen leading instances
where armed force was used without a declaration of war,
and although he admitted that "the vast majority" were
unlike Korea in that they involved protection against
"direct" threats to American lives and property, the
"indirect" threat to United States security from unhindered
Communist aggression makes the President's decision con-
sistent with constitutional theory and practice.
Fourth, Douglas noted situations where the "whole-
sale and widespread use of force" implied by a declaration
of war would be inappropriate. On such occasions, as with
Korea, the President should be able to use force without
a formal congressional declaration of war.
269
Finally, although such discretionary Presidential
powers may be abused, the "sobering and terrible respon-
sibilities of the office" and the threat of impeachment
should serve as deterrents
.
On July 10, Senator Wiley (R-Wis.) entered into
the Record a statement urging that the Administration sub-
mit for approval by both Houses a resolution "drawing a
defense line beyond which we will not permit Russian and
Red satellite aggression." Wiley argued that prior
instances of troop use without Congressional approval do
not apply in the Korean situation, where the conflict
could spread to other areas. Given such a possibility
"it is ridiculous" for Congress to take no action.
Wiley noted the erosion of Congressional power and
the growth in the executive, and suggested that if the
Congress did not act on Korea it would increase public con-
cern over legislative "strength and validity." The Senator
found Presidential consultations with a few members of
Congress inadequate, and although he admitted approving
the President's actions, he felt the whole Congress should
approve "for the sake of history . . and for . . . the
integrity of the legislative branch."
Finally, Wiley urged that a resolution was neither
too late nor "a precedent for the executive to initiate
(1950)
^^Paige, p. 270, note 65; 96 Cong. Rec. 9647-49
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action, getting congressional agreement later." Where the
President acts alone as Commander-in-Chief, or under the
jurisdiction of the United Nations, and the action is
"more than the mere utilization of police force ... the
Congress should also authorize" the use of the military.
Even if Korea were the only battlefield, Wiley concluded,
"I don't want the American people to feel that our men
will be dying
.
.
merely at the order of one single
..45man
Needless to say, the Administration's supporters
in Congress had no intention of submitting such a resolu-
tion. During July there were a few other timid suggestions
that the President acted unconstitutionally in bypassing
the Congress, but Republican Congressman Hugh Scott of
Pennsylvania spoke in opposition to this contention. The
Eighty-first Congress passed into oblivion in silent
approval
.
After the success at Inchon on September 15, the
United States would have to decide how far to pursue the
war, i.e., whether or not to cross the 38th parallel.
Actually, the National Security Council had decided on
September 1- -before Inchon- -that MacArthur should conduct
45
96 Cong. Rec. 9737 (1950).
^^Ibid., pp. 9960, A4986, A4901.
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military operations in North Korea. Counsellor George
Kennan of the State Department opposed.
On September 15, the day of the Inchon landing,
MacArthur was told that while final decisions could not
yet be made, the United Nations had "a legal basis for
conducting operations north of the thirty-eight parallel."
On the 27th, he was instructed to destroy the North
Korean army by conducting operations north of the 38th,
"provided that at the time of such operations" the Soviets
or Chinese Communists have not entered or threatened to
enter North Korea in force. MacArthur was then cautioned
to permit only Korean ground troops to near the northern
border with Manchuria and the Union of Soviet Socialists
Republics. He was also prohibited from taking air or naval
action against China and the Soviet Union.
The Communist Chinese increased their armed forces
on the Manchurian-Korea border from 180,000 in mid- July
to 320,000 in October. On October 3, Chou En-lai warned
Washington via India's ambassador in Peking, that if
United States troops entered the Democratic People's
47
Acheson, pp. 584-585.
^^U. S., Congress, Senate, Military Situauion in
the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Services and Committee on Foreign Pv.elations to Conduct an
Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the
Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Doufilas
MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area , 82d Cong. ,
1st Sess., 1951, p. 718; Acheson, p. 586.
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Republic of Korea. China would intervene. This was dis-
counted by the State Department as part of a diplomatic
effort to save the North rather than a military threat.
In short, in the wake of Inchon. Washington sensed
complete victory throughout Korea, and would not be
deterred by anything less than a forceful Soviet response.
This attitude was reflected in America's United Nations
posture. On September 20. Secretary of State Acheson
presented his "Uniting for Peace" speech, designed to by-
pass the Security Council to which the Soviet Union with
its veto power had returned in August. On September 30,
Washington's Ambassador to the United Nations called the
38th parallel an "artificial barrier," without basis
"either in law or in reason." And on October 7. 1950, the
General Assembly recommended that:
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability throughout Korea; (b)
All constituent acts be taken
. . . under the
auspices of the United Nations, for the
establishment of a unified, independent and
democratic government in the sovereign State
of Korea. . . .50
On October 9, MacArthur was told that if the Chinese
intervened "anywhere in Korea," he was to continue opera-
tions as long as they offered "a reasonable chance of suc-
cess." Within a week the first Chinese troops secretly
pp. 585-586
50
49Whiting, p. Ill; Truman, pp. 361-362; Acheson,
Acheson, p. 583; Goodrich, pp. 131, 224,
crossed the Yalu River, boundary between Korea and China.
United States troops had crossed the Parallel the day the
General Assembly recommendation was passed.
Although United Nations forces surged north,
taking Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea on October 19, and Chinese forces crept
south of the Yalu, there was no major battle contact until
late November. During the lull the President met MacArthur
on Wake Island, October 15, where he insists the General
assured him that the fighting would be over by
52Thanksgiving
.
On his drive to the Yalu, MacArthur was determined
to carry out the United Nations recommendations ("a united,
independent and democratic," i.e., a unified, anti-
communist, Korea) by force, despite the risks of wider
war. The Administration did not reject the goal, but it
was unwilling to risk as much as the General in order to
attain it. Underlying this strategic dispute was the
broader foreign policy question of whether or not the
United States had greater interests in Asia or in Europe.
The Administration, influenced by Acheson's State Depart-
ment, and the General, backed by the Republicans in
Congress, never could agree on this issue.
^'"Truman, p. 362; Whiting, p. 115; Rees . p. 108.
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During the fighting lull, from October to late
November 1950. an indecisive Washington allowed MacArthur
to bomb bridges across the Yalu and begin an "end the war"
offensive to gain control of all Korea up to that river
boundary
,
On November 25. 1950. the Communist Chinese
launched a major counteroffensive that would prove the
second crucial turning point in the war. After suffering
heavy losses the United Nations forces began a retreat
which resulted in communist control of all of North
Korea to the 38th parallel by Christmas. MacArthur
announced on November 28: "We face an entirely new war."^^
Chinese entry into the war compelled Washington to
either escalate its efforts to obtain a unified, non-
communist Korea, or abandon this as a war aim. The Far
Eastern Commander did everything he could to convince the
Administration to carry the war to China. He repeatedly
urged bombing, blockading and permitting Nationalist
attacks on the mainland. Washington rejected all these
suggestions for fear of war with the Soviet Union and of
undermining its commitment to the defense of Europe.
MacArthur carried on his campaign to widen the war
throughout the winter of 1950-1951, even issuing public
^"^Acheson, pp. 597-604.
^^Rees, pp. 155-66.
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statements designed to alter Administration policy. This
culminated in the General's dismissal on April 11, 1950.
Shortly after the Chinese intervened President
Truman considered then rejected the idea of addressing a
special session of Congress, presumably to get support for
his Korean policy in the wake of changed circumstances of
the war. Instead Truman issued a public statement calling
for an increase in the size of the armed forces. He then
met with twenty-one Congressmen, briefed them on Korean
developments and urged them to pass supplementary defense
appropriations
.
Twelve days later, December 13, he met another
group of Congressmen and told them he was going to pro-
claim a state of emergency which would enable the President
to rapidly mobilize the armed forces. Senator Taft ques-
tioned the need for such a declaration, as did Senator
Wherry, who suggested that Truman ask the Congress for
whatever authority he thinks he needs. Representatives
McCormack and Vinson and Senator Connally supported the
idea, and in Truman's account, the others present either
gave qualified support or were silent. On December 15,
^^Spanier, chaps. 8-10; Truman, chaps. 26-27;
Acheson, chaps. 49, 53-54; MacArthur Hearings , passim,
56
Truman, pp. 388-91.
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the President announced on the air that he would declare a
national emergency the following morning.
The emergency was not only in response to Chinese
intervention in Korea, but to what the Administration
perceived as an increased global threat from the Soviet
Union. Korea was considered a Soviet diversionary effort,
designed to "dissipate" American strength and "divide us
from our [European] allies." Accordingly, on December 19,
1950, Truman announced that more United States ground
troops would be sent to Europe for NATO.^^
This touched off a "Great Debate" in the Senate in
which the Asia-firs ters
, led by Senator Taft, challenged
both the wisdom and the constitutionality of the Presi-
dent's troops- to-Europe order. We will concentrate only
on the constitutional challenge as it pertains to Korea, or
to the more general question of the President's authority
to despatch troops to engage in hostilities.
Bolstered by Republican gains in the November 1950
Congressional elections, the Eighty-second Congress
launched its attack against the Truman-Acheson foreign
policies on January 5, 1951, with a speech by Senator Taft.
Taft declared that the President "had no authority whatever
^^Ibid.
, pp. 420-28.
58
Truman, pp. 419-21; Rees, p. 172.
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to commit American troops to Korea without consulting
Congress and without Congressional approval." The Senator
then added:
The President simply usurped authority in
violation of the laws and the Constitution
when he sent troops to Korea to carry out
the resolution of the United Nations in an
undeclared war. It may now be argued, of
course, that Congress by appropriating money
for additional Korean action has ratified
the act, but the war was on, and we had no
choice but to back up wholeheartedly the
boys who were fighting in Korea. 59
On January 11, Senator Connally defended the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to send troops to Korea
and Europe, or, in fact, "to any part of the world if the
security and safety of the United States are involved."
Connally noted the view of President Taft, the Senator's
father, and the over "100 occasions" when the Commander-in-
Chief had sent troops without prior Congressional
T 60approval
.
Five days later a Walter Lippmann article was
inserted into the Record by Senator Ives of New York.
Lippmann urged the President to consult with Congress
before sending troops to Europe, and noted that while
Truman "had a right to intervene [in Korea] without the
prior approval of Congress," he should have sought subse-
quent legislative support.
^^Rees, p. 197; 97 Cong. Rec. 57 (1951)
^^96 Cong. Rec. 142 (1951).
^^Ibid.
, pp. 313-314.
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On January 19, 1951. the House resolved that it was
the "sense" of that chamber "that the United Nations should
immediately
.
.
declare the Chinese Communist authorities
an aggressor in Korea." The Senate passed a parallel
62
measure on the 23rd.
On January 22. Senator Kem (R-Mo.) referred to the
"undeclared war in Korea, one of the most tragic episodes
in American history," as an example "of the President
arrogating to himself powers that are not constitutionally
his" because he did not consult with Congress. Congress
still "has not recognized what must be apparent to every-
one--that a state of war exists. This is government by a
man," insisted Kem, "not by the Constitutioti. "^"^
Senator Ferguson (R-Mich.) then rose to read a pre-
pared statement on the constitutional authority of the
President. He concluded that while the Framers of the
Constitution never intended to allow the President to send
troops overseas, in light of historical precedent and
judicial decisions, the power of the President to so act
without Congressional authority "must remain open in
641951."^
But Senator Watkins (R-Utah) found the historical
precedents "clearly distinguishable" from the Korean
^^Ibid.
, pp. 457-64, 558.
^-^Ibid.
, pp. 486-487.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 524-27.
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intervention, since the former were intended to protect
American citizens and their property abroad, or to pursue
lawless elements, or to defend the national honor by
sending marines ashore. Taft seconded Watkins ' view of
the precedents on February 8. adding that "in no case had
it been maintained that the President can even involve
this country in war unless it is attacked. "^^
Taft went on to note that while it was difficult
to stop the President from sending the Army where he
will, "[t]his argument only goes to his power, not to his
right. "^^
On February 28, 1951, the Senate Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees jointly published a pamphlet
entitled, "Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces
Outside the United States." The analysis, which was pre-
pared by the Executive Branch, justified the President's
actions in Korea on the basis of Article 39 of the United
Nations Charter, but added that the President had authority
to use troops "irrespective of the Charter," under his
general constitutional authority "to carry out the foreign
policy of the United States. "^^
65 Ibid.
, pp. 515, 1118-1119
^^Ibid.
,
p. 1120
U. S.
,
Congress, Senate, Powers cf the President
to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Pr e-
pared for the Use of the Joint Committee Made Up of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed
Services
, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, pp. 21-25
.
280
One month later, Taft attacked this document in a
lengthy Senate speech. Ke charged that it made "the most
\mbridled claims" for Presidential authority he had ever
seen in print, and that it presented "an utterly false
view of the Constitution." With regard to sending troops
to Korea, this was clearly a "usurpation of authority."
One limitation on the President's power to send troops
abroad "admitted by every responsible authority," insisted
Taft, is that he cannot do so if the sending "amounts to
the making of war."
Korea was a clear violation of this principle,
Taft contended, "because the war had actually begun, and
the sending of troops
. .
was the distinct entrance into a
real war." Taft then denied that there was any treaty
obligation to Korea, and added that without Congressional
assent, "nothing in the United Nations Charter authorized
the intervention." A statement of Professor Edward S.
Corwin in support of this latter contention was then
inserted.
I agree with Senator Taft that our invocation
of the United Nations Charter in support of
the Korean business is totally phony ... As
the Korean operation took on the dimensions of
war from the beginning, the Constitution re-
quired that Congress should be consulted. 68
On March 22, Taft had said on the Senate floor that
the President could not send troops "to a country such as
^^97 Cong. Rec. 2988-93 (1951).
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Korea when that country is under attack, and when, there-
fore, the sending of troops clearly involves us in a war."
To which Senator Benton (D-Conn.) retorted that the armed
forces "are an instrument of our foreign policy" and he
thought it strange that the President could dispatch them
to "friendly countries such as France and England" but
lacked the power to use them in riskier circumstances when
decisive action might avoid war. Benton said that the
Korean action was taken for the "common defense," words of
the Preamble to the Constitution.
Senator Knowland (R-Cal.) then rose to attack
Benton's argument as establishing "unlimited Presidential
power to involve the country in war." But Senator Humphrey
(D-Minn.) pointed out that the President has certain in-
herent powers in foreign affairs that stem not only from
the Constitution. Senator Case (R-S. Dak.) wanted to know
if the President intervened in Korea under his authority as
Connnander- in-Chief, or under the authority of the United
Nations. Kern of Missouri pointed out that Truman acted
before the Security Council had, but Benton said he was
merely anticipating by a few hours
.
As the Great Debate continued, so did the comments
on Korea. On March 30, Senator Hickenlooper (R-Iowa)
criticized the State Department for hampering MacArthur in
^^Ibid.
, pp. 2852-56
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Korea, which he considered a war and not a "police action."
Senator McMahon (D-Conn.) challenged Hickenlooper to intro-
duce a joint resolution declaring war. Long of Louisiana
suggested that the despatch of troops to Korea illustrated
the need for the kind of decisions Congress could not make,
and Hickenlooper questioned the legality of the despatch in
the first place, although he admitted that Congress later
approved the action.
McMahon then rose to present a lengthy defense of
Presidential power to send troops abroad. With regard to
Korea, the Boxer incident of 1900 provided the "most out-
standing" precedent. He then said he believed, and thought
the "great majority of people" believed, that Truman was
justified in sending troops to Korea because of the
President's "inherent constitutional authority" to promote
United States foreign policy which was to uphold the United
Nations Charter.
The upshot of all this debating came on April 4,
1951, when the Senate approved Truman's plans to send four
divisions to Europe, but called for congressional approval
of any additional ground troops for NATO. Of course the
war in Korea continued.
Late in January 1951, United Nations forces had
been pushed south of Seoul, but by April they had inched
^°Ibid., pp. 3032, 3036-3037, 3042 ff., 3045.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 3282-3283.
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their way back to the 38th parallel. The Communists then
launched their spring offensives, forcing the Americans
below the parallel-only to have them surge back again by
June. It was now evident that the war had stalemated,
although the fighting went on. In June both sides sig-
nalled their willingness to negotiate an armistice.
American and Chinese military representatives met
near the 38th parallel on July 10, 1951, for the first
round of talks. These protracted, often bitter negotia-
tions would go on for two years, as would the bloodshed.
The major points of disagreement were over the truce line
and the repatriation of prisoners. An added complication
was the opposition of Republic of Korea President Rhee to
any agreement leaving Korea divided.
The Communists yielded on the truce line issue
shortly after the talks were moved to their permanent site
at Panmunjom in October 1951. The front line at the time
of the signing of the armistice would serve, rather than
the 38th parallel. The prisoner issue proved more diffi-
cult.
The United States demanded voluntary repatriation
since many of its prisoners did not want to go back to
North Korea or China; indeed, many were from the South.
The Communists wanted a straight non-voluntary exchange.
^^Rees, pp. 192, 243-63
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In the spring of 1953. when agreement on chis issue was
finally reached, Rhee tried to sabotage it by simply
releasing thousands of non- communists held and counted
among the war prisoners.
Nevertheless an armistice was signed, July 27, 1953
Rhee would not sign, but he had promised mot to obstruct
it in exchange for United States military and economic aid
and a mutual defense treaty.''-^
Even before the interminable negotiations had
begun public frustration with the war started to surface.
Back in April of 1951, Senator Cain of Washington offered
two resolutions, one declaring a state of war, the other
calling for an "orderly withdrawal." Neither came to the
floor of the legislature.
In May 1951, Senator Mundt of South Dakota ques-
tioned the legal basis for the war, noting that past mili-
tary ventures ordered by the President were to defend
American lives and property or to fulfill treaty obliga-
tions. These justifications did not apply, Mundt said, to
"the most costly and the bloodiest undeclared war in our
American history. "^'^
In 1952, there were suggestions from the floor of
both chambers that Truman be impeached, for among other
^^Kolko, pp. 611-14, Rees, pp. 289-327, 420-32;
Acheson, pp. 688-689, 831-37.
^"^97 Cong. Rec. 3981, 5078, 5080 (1951).
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things, the decision to intervene in Korea. But less
drastic measures proved satisfactory. Truman declined to
run again, and the voters turned the Democrats out of the
White House, electing the smiling general who had vowed,
"I shall go to Korea. "^^
Eisenhower visited a devastated peninsula. The
United States, which at one point had 350,000 men in Korea,
suffered 33,600 fatalities, over 5.000 missing, and more
than 100,000 wounded. It is estimated that one and one-half
million Communist soldiers were killed, while the Republic
of Korea had 300,000 military casualties. The toll on the
civilian population was also great. Approximately a million
North Koreans were killed or wounded, with equal carnage
below the 38th. Millions more were refugees or on relief .^^
III. The Korean Conflict and the Constitution
A. Effect of the United Nations Charter
The Executive Branch asserted that "[tjhe power to
send troops abroad is certainly one of the powers which the
President may exercise in carrying out such a treaty as
.
. .
the United Nations Charter." Furthermore, "the
President can act under article 39" of the Charter and "is
under a duty as Chief Executive" to see that the objectives
^^98 Cong. Rec. 725, 4325. 4518-4519, 4539 (1952);
Rees. pp. 385-401.
^^Rees, pp. 33, 450-451; Kolko. p. 615.
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of the Charter are carried out. This follows, it is
argued, from his powers to interpret and execute
treaties
.
In a State Department memorandum of July 3, 1950,
it was asserted that article 39 of the United Nations
Charter and the Security Council resolution of June 27,
1950, pursuant thereto authorized United States action in
Korea. It was also contended that the United States has a
paramount interest in the United Nations and its peace-
keeping measures which the President can promote by armed
force without a Congressional declaration of war.^^
The Administration position rests on the general
propositions that treaties are "the supreme Law of the
79Land," and the President, who is obligated to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, "^° therefore has the
duty and the authority to enforce treaty provisions.
Finally, since he is "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
77
See text accompanying note 67, supra; U, S.
,
Cong., Senate, Powers of the President
, pp. 20, 25.
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United States Department of State, Memorandum on
the Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea
,
m U. S., Congress, House, Background Inforniation on the
Use of United States Armed Forces m Foreign Countries
,
H. Rept. 127, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1951, pp. 50, 54.
S. Const, art. VI, sec. 2; Ware v. Hylton, 3
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.
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1
Navy," he may authorize armed force if necessary to carry
out such provisions
.
One difficulty with this reasoning is that not all
treaties are "self-executing." Some pacts or provisions
may require positive Congressional action before they can
be enforced. As early as 1829, Chief Justice John Marshall
declared that in the absence of such implementation, where
required, the treaty was not the law of the land.^^
Senator Taft contended that certain provisions of
the United Nations Charter, which had been approved by the
Senate and ratified by the President, had never been imple-
mented. Pursuant to article 43 of the Charter, Congress
authorized the President in the United Nations Participa-
84tion Act of 1945, to negotiate special agreements with
the Security Council to supply it with American troops for
its use. These special agreements had to be approved by
the Congress, but subsequent use of these troops under
article 42 of the Charter did not. The Act denied the
81
U. S. Const, art. II, sec. 2.
82
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N. Y. : The Foundation Press, 1972), pp. 54-55,
156-157.
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^^59 Stat. 619 (1945).
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President authority to increase the size of these troop
connnitments
,
As a result of Soviet-American hostility, these
agreements were never negotiated, and therefore article 43
never attained domestic legal validity. It is also pos-
sible that article 42, which looked to the use of these
forces by the Security Council in order to impose military
sanctions may also be unenforceable in American domestic
law. Furthermore, that portion of article 39, which
authorizes the Security Council to "decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42," may
be similarly affected.
However, another clause of article 39 authorizes
the Council to "make recommendations," and it is pursuant
to this section that the resolution respecting Korea of
June 27, 1950, was adopted. A Security Council recommen-
dation is not legally binding upon United Nations members.
Thus, Taft's argument is beside the point; but any claim
that the resolution of June 27 imposed a legal obligation
upon the United States and the President is erroneous.
A second objection to the conclusions drawn by the
Administration from the general propositions above, is
^^96 Cong. Rec. 9323 (1950); H. Rept. 127, pp.
4-7.
^^Goodrich, p. 114; H. Rept. 127, pp. 31-32.
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that the President's powers to execute treaties and to com-
mand the armed forces is limited by the power of Congress
"To declare War/'^^ ^^^^^^^ international rights and
obligations of the United States, whatever the President's
duties and authority to order the fulfillment of these
rights and obligations by force, the war
-making powers
granted Congress by the Constitution remain intact. As one
commentator notes,
the United Nations Charter does not deprive
the Congress or the President of constitutional
power: both the Congress and the President
continue to have their powers-- though not the
right under international law--to declare war,
use force or otherwise act in violation of the
United Nations Charter, as they can disregard
other international obligations . 89
In summation, while the United Nations action may
have provided moral and legal justification for the United
States intervention from the standpoint of international
law, it did not cancel the limitations on the power of the
President from the standpoint of constitutional law.^^
B. The Constitutionality of the President's Action
If President Truman's action in respect to Korea
was constitutional, it must rely on domestic law and prece-
dent, not merely international law and treaty. The Supreme
88
U. S. Const, art. I, sec. 8, par. 11.
^^Henkin, p. 191.
^^See Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957), and my
chap. 11, infra.
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Court considered the conflict only obliquely, in the famous
Steel Seizure Case.^-^
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion is of particu-
lar interest. Jackson considered and rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that the President could seize the steel
mills under his authority as Connnander- in-Chief
. He under-
stood the Government's position to be "that the President
having, on his own responsibility, sent American troops
abroad derives from that act 'affirmative power' to seize
the means of producing a supply of steel for them."^^
Jackson viewed this reasoning with alarm. "Nothing
in our Constitution is plainer," he insisted,
than that declaration of war is entrusted only
to Congress. Of course, a state of war may in
fact exist without a formal declaration. But
no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would
seem to be more sinister and alarming than that a
President v/hose conduct of foreign affairs is so
largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal
affairs of the country by his own commitment of
the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture
.
At this point Jackson inserted a footnote comparing
the modest view of presidential power expressed in
Jefferson's message to Congress respecting the first naval
91
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battle with Tripoli. 94 Although the Justice's dicta casts
doubt on Truman's theory of Presidential war-powers, he
did not "consider the legal status of the Korean conflict,"
which he assumed to be a "war de facto
, whether it is or
is not a war de jure . "^^
The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson, felt
that in the context of the global threat and the consequent
need to step up national defense programs, the seizure was
justified. Vinson noted that the United States acted in
Korea in response to a United Nations request, and that
Congress supported the effort "by provisions for increased
military manpower and equipment and for economic stabiliza-
tion. "^^
One area of difference between Jackson and Vinson
is in regard to the role of Congress. While Jackson empha-
sized the unilateral aspects of Truman's actions, Vinson
noted United Nations and legislative support. Our analysis
reveals the following:
(1) The Air Force was ordered to provide cover for
the evacuation of Americans in Korea, and the Seventh Fleet
was dispatched to the region without any Congressional con-
sultation on June 25, 1950.
94
For a discussion of Jefferson's message, see my
chapt. 3, supra.
95Youngs town Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 643 (1952).
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(2) The President ordered full naval and air sup-
port for the South Koreans on June 26 without any prior
Congressional consent. One Senator was informed of the
decision inmediately; a fourteen-man Congressional delega-
tion was advised the following day.^^
(3) Congress approved an extension of the draft on
June 27 and 28. Immediate Congressional reaction was
highly favorable, but Senators Taft, Kern and Watkins ques-
tioned the President's authority.
(4) The President ordered ground troops to Korea
and air attacks on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea on June 29 and 30 without prior Congressional con-
sultation. Fifteen Congressional leaders were briefed,
June 30, but not informed of plans to use American forces
on the front lines. Congressional response continued favor-
able. The Senate passed mutual defense aid which would per-
mit diverting $100 million for Korea. '''^^
Congress increased defense appropriations consider-
ably and on several occasions after the Korean interven-
tion, but not all these increases were directly attribut-
able to Korea. They were part of an overall defense buildup
in anticipation of other Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggres-
sive acts. Thus, it may be concluded that Congress gave
^^See text accompanying note 27, supra.
99See text accompanying notes 30, 32, 33 and 35,
supra.
See notes 36-40, supra.
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tacit and indirect support to the Korean conflict, but never
explicitly either approved or condemned the President's
action.
Given the size of the troop commitment, the inten-
sity of the fighting, and the duration of the hostilities,
there is little doubt that this was in fact "war" in the
full meaning of the word as used in the Constitution.
Thus the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and chief
executor of treaties should have been limited by Congress'
power to declare war.
Although President Trimian's initial decision might
have been justified on the grounds that he was acting to
protect United States citizens in Korea, "^^^ this rationale
could hardly justify his orders from June 26, 1950, on.
In its July 3, 1950, Memorandum, the State Department urged
that as Commander-in-Chief the President could unilaterally
employ the armed forces to promote the security and foreign
policy interests of the United States, including among those
interests the maintenance of the United Nations as an
103
effective peace-keeping instrumentality.
In short, the State Department relied upon neither
treaty nor statute as warrant for Truman's action,
^^^U. S. Const, art. 1, sec. 8, par. 11.
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emphasizing instead the President's powers as Command.
in-Chief. Given the magnitude of the Korean conflict, I
doubt that any more extreme claim for Presidential war-
commencing power has been tendered in American history.
Even in the Vietnam War the President relied, at least
initially, on a joint resolution of Congress, the Tonkin
Resolution. "'^^
The State Department did not claim that the United
Nations Charter and the Security Council Resolution of
June 27, 1950, authorized the President's action. Such a
claim could hardly withstand scrutiny. First, the Resolu-
tion was a non-binding recommendation and therefore created
no legal obligations upon the United States in interna-
tional law.-'-^^
Second, whatever the American obligation in inter-
national law, the President is not thereby authorized in
domestic law to commence war without Congressional approval
In Truman's defense it must be noted that Congress would
undoubtedly have approved a resolution of support had the
administration so urged, and it did appropriate funds and
renew the draft with full knowledge that the troops and
funds would be used in Korea. ''"^^
^^^78 Stat. 384 (1964).
^^^See note 85 and accompanying text, supra
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The courts never resolved the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Korean War. nor do they appear to
have been asked to do so nearly as often as they were dur-
ing the Vietnam War years. The federal courts had an
opportunity when one Bolton refused induction, alleging
that the Selective Service Act as applied was unconstitu-
tional because Congress gave no consent to the war in
Korea.
The Court disposed of Bolton's claim without reach-
ing the merits, declaring:
Any question as to the legality of an order
sending men to Korea to fight in an "unde-
clared war" should be raised by someone to
whom such an order is directed
. .
.108
In summation, the legal justification for the Presi-
dent's action in Korea was that as Commander-in-Chief he
had the authority to deploy the armed forces into combat in
order to promote the interests of the United States, par-
ticularly its interest in supporting United Nations Charter
strictures against aggression. Relying only upon subsequent
and non-explicit Congressional support, Truman thus
stretched Presidential war- commencing powers to the extreme.
107
United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.
1951) .
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CHAPTER VIII
THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION
I. Historical Background
The United States was neutral during the first three
years of the war between the communist
-dominated Vietminh
led by Ho Chi Minh, and the French Union Forces trying to
maintain colonial rule over Indochina. It was only after
the success of the communist revolutionaries on mainland
China and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that the
United States became concerned with southeast Asia,-'-
Thus it was a desire to contain communism, which was
asstimed to be a monolithic movement, not an intention to
abet colonialism that motivated the United States. This is
further demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempts to pres-
sure France into granting more independence to the quasi-
sovereign State of Vietnam, led by Bao Dai, as a native
alternative to the Vietminh.
Nonetheless, from 1950 to 1954, United States policy
was to give increasing financial and arms aid to France,
while France obstructed attempts to aid Bao Dai directly.
^George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United
States in Vietnam (Nevj York: The Dial Press, 1967)
, pp . 30-
3T] The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers ; The
Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking
on Vietnam, 5 vols . (Boston: Beacon Press, inc., j.y/Z),
TTJ^T-,
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The policy failed miserably because the Vietminh were de^
feating France on the battlefield, and the Bao Dai regime,
because of its association with the colonial power, was un.
able to generate much Vietnamese support,
^
As the French military position deteriorated the
United States markedly stepped up aid in 1954, to the point
of shouldering nearly 80% of the war costs that year. Faced
with a rout at Dienbienphu in April, 1954. France urged the
United States to intervene. The Eisenhower Administration
seriously considered an air attack on the Vietminh, but
backed off when Congressional leaders refused to support uni-
lateral American action. Fears of "another Korea" led the
United States to choose diplomatic rather than military
methods.
Although the United States attended the Geneva Confer-
ence of 1954, which produced a cease-fire agreement between
France and the Vietminh and divided Vietnam at the 17th par-
allel into two zones, both Washington and the State of Viet-
nam declined to approve the Final Declaration of the Con-
ference. While the Accords clearly anticipated
2Kahin and Lewis, pp. 31-35, Dean Acheson, Present
At The Creation; My Years in the State Department (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co
. ,
mc
.
,
Signet Books, 1969), pp. 856-63;
Pentagon Papers
.
1:53-55, 61-75, 81; Bernard Fall, The Two
Viet-Nams: A Political and Hilitary Analysis
,
2d rev. ed.
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 196/), p. 219.
-'Kahin and Lewis, pp. 32, 35-40; Pentagon Papers,
1:54-55, 77, 100-101; Fall, pp. 226-28.
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one unified Vietnam—they expressly denied that the divid-
ing line was a political boundary and called for "general
elections" two years hence--loopholes enabled the consolida-
tion of two regimes.^
Around the time of the Geneva Conference in mid-1954,
Bao Dai brought into his government (which had no real power)
an authoritarian, anti-French and ant i- communist Catholic
named Ngo Dinh Diem. Despite near anarchy in southern Viet-
nam in the wake of the French withdrawal and a large influx
(nearly 900,000, some 85% of whom were Catholics) of refugees
from the north. Diem managed, with American encouragement,
to establish a measure of control. He eased Bao Dai out of
power and placed himself and his family- -most conspicuously
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his sister-in-law, Madame Nhu
--in.^
Again with American support (on the grounds that nei-
ther we nor South Vietnam had assented to the Geneva Accords)
Diem refused all northern demands that nation-wide elections
be held. Instead, in October, 1955, he proclaimed
^See Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Vietnam, arts. 1, 10, 14, and the Final Declaration of the
Geneva Conference, pars. 6, 7, 8, in Further Documents Re-
lating to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conter-
ence (Miscellaneous No. ZU 119541, Command Paper, .
London : Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXI
(1953/54), pp. 9-11, 27-38; Pentagon Papers , 1:244
^Fall, pp. 234-53; Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolu-
tion; The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 rev. ed. (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., A Colophon Book, 1966), pp.
100-139.
299
The Republic of Vietnam (GVN)
, wUch the United States
promptly recognized, (Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
or DRV, had been recognized by Communist China and the Sov-
iet Union back in 1950).^
By 1957 it was clear that, whatever the intent of
the Geneva Agreements, Vietnam was de facto partitioned.
Even the Soviet Union recognized this when it proposed, in
January 1957, that the United Nations admit both the DRV
and the GVN.^
In the wake of Geneva, which the United States pri-
vately considered a Communist victory, Washington sought to
guarantee that communist gains in southeast Asia would be
contained to Vietnam north of 17°. On September 8, 1954,
the United States entered into a Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty with the United Kingdom, France, Australia,
Q
New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan.
A Protocol to the pact, signed the same day, extended
the defensive measures provisions to Cambodia, Laos and
"the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State
^Pentagon Papers
,
1:4, 245-246; Kahin and Lewis, p. 72.
^Pentagon Papers , 1 : 247
.
^U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and
Other International Agreements , vol. 6, pt. i, "Southeast
Asia Collective Detense Treaty," TIAS 3170, 8 September 1954;
Kahin and Lewis, pp. 58-63.
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of Vietnam. "9 SEATO, as the Treaty and Protocol were styled,
was more important as a statement of United States contain-
ment policy in Asia, and later as legal justification for
American intervention in Vietnam, than as the establishment
of a truly collective defense organization.
The crucial provision is Article IV, wherein
Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of
armed attack in the treaty area
. . . would en-
danger its own peace and safety, and agrees that
it will in that event act to meet the common dan-
ger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
This article further provides that if any party be-
lieves that "the inviolability or integrity of the territory
or the sovereignty or political independence" of any signa-
tory or state named in the Protocol "is threatened in any
way other than by armed attack
. . ,
,
the Parties shall con-
sult immediately in order to agree on
. , . measures . . ,
for the common defense . ""^'^
In speaking of threats other than airmed attack, this
latter paragraph is generally understood to refer to subver-
sion. The Senate approved SEATO by a vote of 82 to 1, Feb-
ruary 1, 1955. Cambodia withdrew from coverage under the
^United States Treaties and Other International Agree-
ments
,
vol. b, pt. T. "Protocol to the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty," p. 87,
^°Ibid., p. 83.
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Protocol in 1956; Laos did the same in 1962.^^
Having placed South Vietnam under the United States
defensive umbrella, the Eisenhower Administration proceeded
to aid Diem in establishing an independent (of France, but
not of America) non-communist state in southeast Asia. In
a letter to Diem, President Eisenhower promised that the
United States would aid the GVN in order to develop "a strong,
viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or
aggression through military means. "'-^
From 1954 to 1961, the United States provided lavish
financial aid to the Diem regime, 80% of which went to secu-
rity, despite the fact that most of it was nominally economic
aid. American military advisers began training the South
Vietnamese army during this period, although United States
military personnel never numbered over 700 men. At the same
time, consistent with the Cold War pattern, both Moscow and
Peking generously aided North Vietnam.
In sum, it was the policy of both the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations to promote a non-communist Viet-
nam short of committing American troops to a land war on the
^^United States. Congress
,
Senate, Hearing before the
Foreign Relations Committee on Executive K
,
pt. I, 83rd Cong.,
2d sess., 1954, pp. 20. 28; 101 Cong. Rec. 1060 (1955) ; Roger
H. Hull and John C. Novogrod, Law and Vietnam (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y. : Oceana Publications, Inc. , 1968) , p. 137, note 69.
^^Letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem
of 1 October 1954, in Kahin and Lewis, p. 383.
^^Pentagon Papers
,
1:268, 2:433; Kahin and Lewis, p. 88
30:2
Asian continent.
It was the Administration of John F. Kennedy (1961-
1962) which took a major (but not the decisive) step in al-
tering the latter half of that policy. Under Kennedy there
was a significant build-up in the number of American "advi-
sers," to the point where the United States military role
was substantially altered. The change came in response to
the disintegration of the anti
-communist Saigon government;
what caused that disintegration is quite controversial.
Analysts do agree that in 1958 a systematic rebel-
lion against the Diem regime broke out in South Vietnam, and
that Hanoi openly called for the overthrow of Diem in May,
1959. They do not agree on Washington's allegation that
the DRV planned and organized the insurrection from the
start. The evidence supporting this contention is scanty.
But if the charge were true. Diem certainly made things easy
by thoroughly alienating the South Vietnamese peasant who
constitutes 90% of the population.
By the time the National Liberation Front was formed,
a month before Kennedy's January, 1961, inauguration, it is
said that support for Diem was "weak and waning," and that
the Saigon regime was "manifestly out of touch with the peo-
ple." The Front (NLF) was the political arm of the Viet
^
^entagon Papers
,
1:242-65; Kahin and Lewis, pp. 99-
120; Fall, pp. 356-59; United States, Department of State, Ag-
gression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Cam-
paign to Conquer South Viet -Nam (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), passim.
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Cong, or Vietnamese CoB^unists. a term Diem applied loosely
to more than just the anti-Saigon insurrectionists .^5
Thus, while the NLF's structural links with Hanoi
are undeniable, it is also clear that the Viet Cong had popu-
lar support in South Vietnam. Unlike Korea, there was no
regular army of the North attacking the South. (American
intelligence did not detect regular North Vietnamese army
units in the South until late 1964.) There was instead a
wave of terror aimed at Saigon officials in the countryside
starting in 1958 and manned almost entirely by South Viet-
namese. In fact, in 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk es-
timated that "80 percent of those who are called Vietcong
are or have been southerners."^^
By 1960, the guerrillas, who were outnumbered 7-1 by
Diem's forces, claimed control of half of South Vietnam.
Although Kennedy approved a Counter- Insurgency Plan shortly
after assuming office (more United States aid plus demands
for GVN reforms)
,
Vietnam was only an intermittent focus of
Washington's concern in 1961.-^^
Following the Bay of Pigs debacle in late April 1961,
^^Pentagon Papers
,
1:250-251; Kahin and Lewis, p. 118
^^Shaplen, p. 141; Pentagon Papers , 2:1, 18, 23-25,
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and the prospect that the United States^backed faction in
Laos would completely collapse, the Kennedy Administration
decided to renew its commitment to South Vietnam. Vice-Pres.
ident Lyndon B, Johnson was sent to southeast Asia to boost
morale, and returned convinced that the United States must
"battle against Communism
... in Southeast Asia ... or
. . ,
surrender the Pacific . "'^
But more significant to this narrative was Kennedy's
approval on May 11, 1961. of a program for South Vietnam
which included a 100-man increase in regular Army advisers
to a total of 785, and 400 Special Forces (Green Berets) as
part of a covert CIA program. The Green Berets were sent
"to accelerate G.V.N. Special Forces training," not to en-
gage in combat. This was not made public, but J. W. Ful-
bright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
announced after conferring with the President on May 4, that
he would support an Administration decision to send combat
forces to Vietnam. '•^
While the May 1961 decisions were made more in res-
ponse to the Laos situation, in October 1961 Washington res-
ponded directly to developments in South Vietnam. A sharp
upsurge in Viet Cong attacks in September seriously eroded
the morale of the Saigon government. President Kennedy sent
^8penta^on Papers
,
2:22, 33, 57.
^^Ibid., pp. 50-51; Lester A. Sobel, ed. South Viet-
nam: U. S. -Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, Vol-
ume I. 1961-65 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1966), p. 19,
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his military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, and White
House Staff member, Walt W, Rostov to Vietnam on October 11
to assess various military options, including the introduc-
tion of American combat forces.
Taylor
-Rostov recommended that 6-8,000 combat troops
be dispatched on the pretext of providing flood relief, but
the Administration scotched videspread rumors of a United
States ground troops commitm.ent by leaking a contradictory
story to the Nev York Times. In fact, Kennedy deferred de-
cision on the combat troop proposal vhile authorizing the
Defense Department to prepare plans for the large-scale use
of such forces should such a strategy be adopted. Taylor-
Rostov also noted North Vietnam's vulnerability to air attack,
thus presaging by several years what vas to become a pillar
of United States policy.
Following the Taylor-Rostow Mission, President Ken-
nedy approved in November 1961: the expansion of the Army
advisory group (from 785 to over 2000 by January 1962) , an
increase in Special Forces (from 400 to over 800) , the pro-
vision of helicopter companies to transport the South Viet-
namese army into battle, tactical air and artillery support,
as well as provision of small arms, light craft and air
20Pentagon Papers
,
2:4, 447.
^^Ibid., pp. 82, 86, 88, 92, 114, 116-18.
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reconnaissance equipment and personnel.
The decisions following the Taylor-Rostow report es-
tablished the pattern for United States policy in Vietnam for
the next two years
.
During this period Washington and Diem
agreed to what was known as the Strategic Hamlet Program, de-
signed to obtain peasant support via relocation into villages
fortified against the Viet Cong. Both the French and Diem
had tried this before, and as before, it was an utter fail-
23ure
.
The Viet Cong meanwhile, stepped up their wave of
terror in the countryside simultaneous with the introduction
of United States firepower. United States military personnel
increased to 11,000 by the end of 1962, and the number of
Viet Cong kidnappings and assassinations increased to 11,407.
(The latter figure was 2,100 in 1960.) Use of American-man-
ned machine gun crews on the helicopters ferrying the GVN
army into combat, and United States bombing and strafing mis-
sions against suspected Viet Cong locations (850 a month as
of February 1963) were clearly taking their toll on the in-
surgents
.
As a result of unduly optimistic intelligence reports
^^Ibid.
, pp. 114, 454-455.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 128-31.
^^ahin and Lewis, p. 138; Pentagon Papers , 2:703, 722
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Washington even planned to withdraw troops as of the summer
of 1962, These plans were never implemented, and were aban-
doned after the Diem government collapsed in Autiimn, 1963.
At that time United States military personnel reached a Ken-
nedy Administration high of 16,700.
While new information is currently coming to light,
it is clear from the Pentagon Papers that the United States
at least encouraged and tacitly supported the overthrow of
the Diem regime. The surface cause was the conflict between
the Buddhist monks and the Catholic Diem-Nhu family; but
underlying this was the smoldering discontent caused by
Diem's autocratic rule.
After the violent suppression of a Buddhist protest
in Hu6 in May, 1963, widespread demonstrations took place
for most of the summer. Washington's pleas for conciliation
went unheeded, and following a government raid on Buddhist
pagodas in August, the State Department encouraged dissident
military men to overthrow the brothers
.
The August plot fizzled. After reviewing its Viet-
nam policy Washington sent Secretary of Defense Mcnamara and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor to Vietnam in
September. McNamara and Taylor urged various diplomatic and
economic pressures be imposed on Diem. Once again anti-Diem
generals felt they were given a green light to conduct a coup
^^Pentagon Papers , 2:160-65.
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This time, on November 1, 1963, they succeeded; Diem and Nhu
escaped, but were quickly captured and murdered.
In his memoirs. President Johnson, with the benefit
of hindsight, and having been plagued by nearly two years
with virtually no leadership in Saigon, would condemn the
coup as "a serious blunder." If so. Johnson was the immed-
iate "beneficiary," for only three weeks after the coup. Ken-
nedy was himself assassinated.^^
II- Expansion of the War in Vietnam
One could credibly argue that when Lyndon Johnson
took the oath of office on the 22nd of November, 1963, the
United States was already at war, although on a relatively
small scale, in Vietnam. Over 16,000 military men were
there; nearly 200 Americans had died there, half in combat
situations; and the United States was providing combat air
support as well as armed air transport for the army of the
GVN (ARVN) .^^
Nevertheless, the United States was not providing
troops for ground combat . Nor was it yet bombing North Viet-
nam, which was openly aiding the southern revolutionaries.
^^Ibid.
, pp. 201-7, 734, 738.
^
^Johnson, p. 61,
^^Sobel, p. 78.
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:ces
.
although short of sending down uniformed regular for(
Furthermore, United States involvement was small considering
its capabilities. And the Congress approved the large-scale
aid programs for South Vietnam, while only a handful of legis.
lators, most notably Senator Mansfield, voiced disapproval
of the military policy.
The instability of the Saigon government was one of
the major concerns of the Johnson Administration throughout
1964. The GVN suffered six major changes of government from
1964 to mid-1965. All of these governments assumed power
illegitimately, ruled undemocratically
, and were unable or
unwilling to obtain the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasant.
And yet the United States backed them, principally because
these military cliques appeared to provide the only anti-
communist alternative."^^
The ineffectiveness of Saigon served to deepen Amer-
ican involvement on the grounds that only the United States
could do what was needed to maintain an anti-communist South
Vietnam. A second factor was the realization in early 1964
that United States intelligence and assumptions about Viet-
o 1
nam had been overly optimistic.
On March 8, 1964, the President sent General Taylor
2^Ibid., pp. 55-56; 109 Cong, Rec. 7308-7309, 21061
(1963)
.
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Pentagon Papers
,
2:277-79.
•^^Pentagon Papers
,
3:2, 22-24.
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and secretary of Defense McNamara to Vietnam on a "fact-find-
ing mission." In reality, the purpose was a major reassess-
ment of United States policy, and the result was a detailed
policy paper (NSAM 288) establishing a deeper American com-
mitment to Vietnam. "^^
The background to this paper is significant. French
President De Gaulle had proposed first on August 29, 1963,
then again on January 31, 1964, the neutralization of south-
east Asia. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson voiced criticism,
while Senator Mansfield (D-Mont,) urged its consideration.^^
Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff began pressuring
the Administration from late January
,
1964, on to bomb North
Vietnam. And in April, after NSAM 288 was approved, the Sai-
gon government launched a campaign to get Washington to ap-
prove overt attacks on the DRV. A program of covert actions
against the North had been begun February 1, 1964. These
sabotage and psychological warfare missions were directed
by the United States military and CIA, but were to be carried
out by Vietnamese or other nationals.
In the Congress, in March, Senators Morse (D-Ore,)
and Gruening (D-Alas) launched a two-man protest against the
^^Ibid.
, pp. 8, 46-50.
^^Sobel, pp. 86, 97; 110 Cong. Rec. 3114-3115 (1964).
^
^entagon Papers
,
3:8, 44-45, 64-67, 81, 149-52,
496-99.
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increasing Americanization of the Vietnam conflict. Their
criticisms went unheeded, and were said to have cleared the
Senate chamber as they repeatedly presented them in the
months ahead.
NSAM 288, which was approved by the President on the
17th of March, 1964, declared the American objective to be
"an independent non-Communist South Vietnam." But now the
"stakes" were considered to be "high" because of a belief
in the domino effect on "almost all of Southeast Asia," the
increased United States involvement since 1961, and the
sense that Vietnam was seen by the world as "a test case
of United States capacity to help a nation meet a Communist
'war of liberation. ' ""^^
The Memorandum went on to reject bombing the DRV
"at this time," while "preparations for such a capability"
were recommended. Two bombing programs were to be developed,
one called for "{r}etaliatory strikes
. . . on a tit-for-tat
basis," the other entitled "Graduated Overt Military Pres-
sure.
"^^
De Gaulle's neutralization plan was also rejected as
^^See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 4831-35, 6574-6604 (1964);
Anthony Austin, The President's War: The Story of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution and How the Nation was Trapped in Vietnam
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., A New York Times Book,
1971), p. 66.
^Sentagon Papers
,
3:499-500.
^^Ibid., pp. 503-504, 508.
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leading to "a CommuRist take-over," Instead, more United
States aid and advisers were to be sent, and the GVN was ex-
pected to mobilize the entire country to stem what Washington
now knew were significant Viet Cong advances.
In short, the United States was now firmly committed
to defeating the Viet Cong by military means; political ap-
proaches (making the GVN more popular V7ith the peasantry)
and diplomacy (h la De Gaulle) were considered secondary.
For this reason Roger Hilsman, who championed the "political"
approach resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs.
On April 25, 1964, General William C. Westmoreland
was named head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and
a month later General Maxx^ell Taylor replaced Henry Cabot
Lodge as Ambassador to South Vietnam. By mid-June a south-
east Asia resolution had already been prepared in secret by
Administration planners, who met on the 15th to consider the
foreign policy and political implications of going to Con-
gress. In June it was revealed that the United States had
constructed a new air base at Da Nang, part of a network of
new military facilities in South Vietnam and Thailand.
38Ibid.
, pp. 503, 505-7.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
40Ibid,, pp. 10, 11, 77, 180, 182.
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Thus, all the elements for escalation were in place
when the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred the first week of
August, 1964.
On August 2, an American destroyer, the USS Maddox,
was fired on while 28 miles off the North Vietnamese coast.
The attackers apparently believed that the Maddox had parti-
cipated in a raid on an offshore island three days before.
The raid was part of the covert activities planned by the
United States and carried out by the South Vietnamese. The
Maddox \<ras not in fact a participant but was in the Gulf to
conduct reconnaissance patrols to within 8 miles of the DRV
41
coast
,
The Maddox returned fire, disabling one of the three
attacking vessels, and United States jets coming to the res-
cue of the Maddox damaged the other two. The next day the
Maddox continued its reconnaissance patrol along with another
ship, the C. Turner Joy . That night, August 3, another GVN
raid took place. The following evening the destroyers re-
ported another attack, but since nothing could be seen in
the darkness and the American ships were never struck, the
entire incident was based upon sonar readings and intercepted
42
DRV radio communications.
^^Ibid., pp. 182-84.
^^Pentagon Papers , 5:324-26.
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The second incident remains controversial; even more
so because President Johnson ordered retaliatory air attacks
on DRV naval facilities on August 4th, before all the con-
fusing details were passed on to Washington. More important
still, these incidents offered the Administration the oppor-
tunity to go to Congress and get support for its Vietnam
policies
.
Early that same evening, August 4, President Johnson
obtained support from 16 Congressmen who conferred with him
at the White House, including majority and minority party
leaders and key committee chairmen. The next day, Senator
Fulbright introduced what has come to be known as the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, asking that it be sent to the Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services sitting jointly.
Senator Morse immediately condemned it as "a predated declara-
tion of war."^^
The major components of the Resolution are as follows.
It is entitled, "A Joint Resolution to Promote the Mainte-
nance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia."
The Preamble condemns "the Communist regime in Vietnam" for
attacking American vessels as "part of a deliberate and sys-
tematic campaign of aggression . . . against its neighbors
^^Ibid., pp. 326-327: Austin, d. 309: United States
Congress, Senate, The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents ,
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations , 9Qth
Cong., 2d sess., 1968; Johnson, pp. 114-lii>.
^^Johnson, pp. 115-18; 110 Cong. Rec. 18132-18133
(1964).
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and the nations joined with them in the collective defense
of their freedom."
In Section 1,
Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President, as Commander in Chief to take
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and toprevent further aggression.
The second section declares that southeast Asian
peace and security are "vital" to the United States, and that
"in accordance with its obligations under" SEATO,
the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.
The last section provides for expiration "when the
President shall determine that the peace and security of the
area is reasonably assured," or by concurrent resolution of
45Congress
.
On the sixth, brief hearings were held, at which
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, testified.
Only Senator Morse opposed favorably recommending the Reso-
lution, which was reported that day along with the following
statement:
The basic purpose of this resolution is to make it
^578 Stat. 384 (1964).
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clear that the Congress approves the action takenby the President to meet the attack on United Statesforces .... Full support by the Congress is alsodeclared for the resolute policy enunciated by the
President in order to prevent further aggression
or to retaliate with suitable measures should such
aggression take place.
The brief Senate debate that followed was not espe-
cially instructive. Senator Brewster asked floor manager
Fulbright if the resolution "would authorize or recommend or
approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or
China," and was told:
There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it,
that contemplates it ... . However, the language
of the resolution would not prevent it. It would
authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is
necessary. It does not restrain the Executive from
doing it. ^7
Senator Miller asked whether the phrase "further ag-
gression" applied to aggression against South Vietnam as well
as the United States, to which Senator Fulbright responded,
"I believe that both are included in that phrase. "'^^
In a rather tortured colloquy. Senator Fulbright tried
to allay the fears of Senator Nelson that the Congress was
authorizing the President to commit an American land army to
United States, Congress
,
Senate, Southeast Asia Re-
solution, Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and the Committee on Armed Services , 68th Cong., 2d
sess., 1964; United States , Congress , Senate, Promoting the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast
Asia
,
S. Rept. 1329 to Accompany H. J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong.,
:2TTess., 1964.
^^110 Cong. Rec. 18403 (1964).
^^Ibid., p. 18405.
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war against North Vietnam. In essence, the response was
that the proposal neither authorized nor prohibited such ac-
tion, that the President could continue to use "whatever
means seemed appropriate" in order to maintain South Viet-
namese independence, and that if the action "were too inap-
propriate" Congress could terminate the measure.
The exchange with Senator Cooper was the most re-
vealing of all. The Kentuckian wanted to know if section
two of the Resolution was triggering the SEATO pact in accor
dance with our "constitutional processes." "In other words,
he queried,
are we now giving the President advance authority
to take whatever action he may deem necessary re-
specting South Vietnam and its defense
. . .?
MR. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct.
MR. COOPER. Then looking ahead, if the President
decided that it was necessary to use such force
as could lead into war, will we give that authority
by this resolution?
MR. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret
it.
And when Cooper asked if section two authorized the
President to attack "cities and ports in North Vietnam . . ,
to prevent any further aggression against South Vietnam,"
the Chairman responded with a generalization about the inap-
propriateness of formal declarations of war to current day
^9ibid., pp. 18406-18407.
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conditions
.
A few more hours of debate were set aside for August
7. during which both Senators Morse and Gruening condemned
the measure. Morse contended that it violated Article I,
section 8, paragraph 11 of the Constitution by giving thl
President "warmaking power." And Gruening thought it "the
equivalent of a declaration of war by the Congress. "51
Senator Nelson then offered an amendment limiting
United States activities to aiding, training and given mili-
tary advice to the GVN, and declaring it to be the sense of
Congress that
^^^^ Provoked to a greater response, weshould continue to attempt to avoid a direct
military involvement in the southeast Asian con-
Senator Fulbright said he agreed with the policy
enunciated by the amendment, but rejected it in order to
expedite final approval of the resolution.
The Senate then approved by an 88-2 vote, Morse and
Gruening dissenting. The House had already assented with
scanty debate, 416-0, Congressman Powell of Harlem voting
"Present. "^^
SOibid., pp. 18409-18410.
^^Ibid., pp. 18443-48.
^^Ibid.
, p. 18459.
^^Ibid., pp. 18470-18471, 18555.
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On the 10th of August, 1964, the day a Presidential
signature converted the Tonkin Resolution into Public Law
88-408, Ambassador Taylor reported that the latest Saigon
govemment was in danger of collapsing. This news, added to
signs of increased communist infiltration into South Vietnam
led to a general agreement among policy-makers in early Sep-
tember that the United States should bomb North Vietnam.
Following a meeting with his advisers on September
9, President Johnson ordered the Air Force to be prepared to
carry out retaliatory strikes against the DRV. It will be
recalled that a program of retaliatory strikes was called
for in March, in NSAM 288.^^
Bombing was deferred, however, primarily for politi-
cal reasons; and this despite a daring Viet Cong raid on
November 1 at Bien Hoa air base. The President was in the
midst of an election campaign in which he was portraying him-
self as restrained and his opponent, Senator Goldwater, as
trigger-happy, and these circumstances undoubtedly stayed
his hand.^^
But electoral politics was not the only consideration,
because even after his stunning victory. President Johnson
^^78 Stat. 384 (1964); Pentagon Papers . 3:191-192.
^^Johnson, pp. 120-121; see note 37 and accompanying
text, supra.
^^Johnson, p. 121; Pentagon Papers , 3:111.
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refused to permit reprisals for a Christinas attack on a
^
United States army officers' billet in Saigon, This time it
was feared that the Saigon government was "too shaky" to with-
stand any major DRV counter-retaliation.^^
1965, then, was to usher in momentous decisions for
the United States role in Vietnam. In January of the new
year there were 22,755 American military personnel there.
The GVN was going through the throes of yet another politi-
cal crisis. And members of Congress began to publicly ques-
tion United States policy, joining the already-critical New
York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch .^^
Senator Morse criticized the United States for taking
unilateral action in Vietnam, while Senators Cooper and Mon-
roney called for full Senate debate. Senator Mansfield
urged support of colleague Church's neutralization proposal.
An Associated Press survey of Senators of 6 January, 1965,
revealed that of the 63 legislators polled, 31 favored a
negotiated settlement after the United States-GVN bargaining
position improved; 10 favored immediate negotiations; 8
wanted a United States attack on North Vietnam; 3 urged im-
mediate United States withdrawal , and 11 didn't know what to
59do beyond strengthening the GVN.
^^Johnson, p. 121.
^^Pentagon Papers
,
3:90, 259-62, 263.
S^ibid., p. 263.
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In mid-January, following reports of two American
jets downed over Laos, and a wire-service story revealing
that the United States had regularly been flying missions
over Laos, Senator McGovern condemned plans to extend the
war to the North. (The Pentagon Papers reveal that the
United States had been conducting reconnaissance flights and
providing armed escorts for Royal Laotian Air Force strike
missions since May, 1964. Starting in mid-December, 1964,
the United States began bombing Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese
concentrations in northern Laos. Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma, approved the policies.
In fact, of course, Washington had already decided
to bomb the North on a retaliatory basis back in September,
1964, a decision reconfirmed December 1, at which time Presi-
dent Johnson also authorized, at least in principle, a pro-
gram of gradually increasing air strikes. Execution, how-
ever, was contingent upon improvement in GVN performance, a
development which never occurred. ^-^
In January, 1965, the USSR publicly announced support
for the DRV if the United States were to launch open hostil-
ities. Washington was further alarmed by what it perceived
as signs of a new alliance among communist Asian nations,
including Sukarno's Indonesia. All of this reinforced the
^^Ibid., pp. 263-264, 253-254.
^^See note 55 and accompanying text, supra; Pentagon
Papers
, 3:115.
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American tendency to view Vietnam in terms of a global strug-
gle. ^2
'> The decision to begin the bombing came on February
6. 1965, following a spectacular attack upon American mili-
tary installations in and around Pleiku. Word of the attack
was received that afternoon, and the decision to launch the
air strikes was made at a National Security Council meeting
in the evening. House Speaker McCormack, and Senate Majority
Leader Mansfield attended the conference, and Johnson des-
cribed Mansfield as being "strongly opposed" to the bombing .^^
On February 13, President Johnson approved the pro-
gram of sustained, steadily intensifying air attacks on
selected North Vietnamese military targets. The program,
code-named ROLLING THUNDER, was delayed until March 2, 1965.
Thereafter, North Vietnam^ was bombed regularly for the next
three and a half years of the Johnson administration, except
for nine complete halts, six of which lasted less than a
week.
Congress was never asked to give, and never volun-
teered any additional express approval of these overt acts
of war against a sovereign nation. ROLLING THUNDER'S prin-
cipal aim was to discourage the DRV from supporting the com-
62Pentagon Papers
,
3:266-267; Johnson, pp. 135-136.
^^Johnson, pp. 124-125.
^Sentagon Papers
.
3:271-272; Johnson, p. 578.
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-s was
nunist revolution in the South, To the extent that thii
dependent upon breaking the will of the DRV leaders the
bombing failed. For, in the words of the Pentagon Papers
analyst, the air attacks "seemed to stiffen rather than
soften Hanoi's backbone. "^^
On March 6, 1965, the Pentagon announced that 3,500
United States Marines were being deployed to Da Nang air
base to provide base security and free South Vietnamese for
offensive action. These were the first American ground
troops to enter the Vietnam War, and although their initial
mission was base security and not combat, pressure immedi-
ately developed to expand the American ground effort.
Once again. Congress was not asked to approve the
decision. In fact, throughout the Spring of 1965, the de-
bate between proponents of enlarged United States ground com-
bat operations, most notable of which was General Westmore-
land, and those who had misgivings about such an expansion,
67
went on largely in secret.
In mid-March, 1965, President Johnson approved plans
to intensify the air war, and near the end of the month,
press speculation was rife with reports of imminent decisions
respecting ground troops. The President declared that he
^^Pentagon Papers , 3:269.
^^Ibid., p. 423.
^^Ibid., pp. 430, 445.
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knew "of no far reaching strategy that is being suggested
or promulgated." But on April 1, the very day after this
statement was made, Johnson approved deployment of two addi-
tional Marine combat battalions and 18-20,000 more non-com-
bat military personnel. Of equal significance was the al-
teration in the mission of the marines from base security
exclusively to security plus limited offensive operations
.
The April, 1965, decisions not only raised United
States military totals to a new high of 40,200 men, but for
the first time American forces were to engage in ground com-
bat. In the formal memorandum recording these decisions
(NSAM 328, dated April 6, 1965) the attitude of the Adminis-
tration toward public debate on the commitment of ground
forces is easily inferred.
The President desires that with respect to the
actions in paragraphs 5 through 7 , {concerning
ground troops} premature publicity be avoided
by all possible precautions. The actions them-
selves should be taken as rapidly as practicable,
but in ways that should minimize any appearance
of sudden changes in policy .... The Presi-
dent's desire is that these movements and changes
should be understood as being gradual and wholly
consistent with existent policy.
The changes were not announced publicly until June 8,
by which time the President had already approved increasing
troop strength to 70,000. In late June, 1965, the strategy
^^Ibid., pp. 338, 348, 447, 449.
^^Ibid., pp. 456, 703.
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of limited offensive forays from coastal enclaves was altered
at the urging of General Westmoreland, who also had called
for the immediate dispatch of nearly 125,000 combat troops.
United States troops would now take the war to the Viet Cong
under a policy dubbed "Search and Destroy." The President
granted Westmoreland's 125,000 troop request on July 17. 1965,
delaying public announcement until the 28th.
Thus the Vietnam War had been thoroughly Americanized
during the spring and summer of 1965. Congressional involve-
ment in the decision-making was minimal, since most of the
decisions were shrouded in secrecy. Congressional support
over and above the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution would have to
be inferred from the following.
On May 4, 1965, President Johnson asked Congress to
approve a supplemental defense budget appropriation of 700,
000,000 dollars, "to meet increasing costs in Vietnam." In
his message to Congress, the President suggested that "each
member of Congress who supports this request is also voting
to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam." During the
debates several Senators expressed reservations. Morse urged
that this request "for additional warmaking funds" be pre-
ceded by a request for a Congressional declaration of war.^^
Senator Javits favored the appropriation but did not
^^Ibid., pp. 415, 438-40, 445, 476-477,
^^Johnson, p. 142; 111 Cong. Rec. 9282, 9315-9316
(1965).
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on-
ion
think it a substitute for a resolution supporting a ground
war in Vietnam. Javits did not think the Tonkin Resolution
to be adequate support for such a war. But Senator Salt
stall thought that a failure to approve the appropriat
would be a "repudiation" of the August. 1964, measure. To
which Senator Gore responded that he "did not intend by
voting for that joint resolution to approve an escalation
of the war or
. . .
the sending of combat units. "''^
Senator Aiken declared that his support of the appro
priation should not be construed as an intention to grant
"authority to wage war." Senator Church asked the bill's
sponsor, Mr. Stennis
,
if Congress would be conferring Con-
gressional approval on future unanticipated acts of war in
Vietnam. Stennis replied that the language of the resolu-
tion does not set policy, and while it does not restrict the
President, neither is it a declaration of war. "It is not,"
Stennis added,
a blank check .... We are backing up our men
and also backing up the present policy of the
President. If he substantially enlarges or changes
it, I would assume he would come back to us in one
way or another.'^
On the House side, debates reveal that the Republi-
cans also conceived of the appropriation as support for the
President's Vietnam policy. There the measure was speedily
^^111 Cong. Rec. 9453, 9495, 9497 (1965).
^^Ibid., pp. 9499, 9500.
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approved by a 408 to 7 vote on May 5. The Senate assented
the following day, 88 to 3. Morse. Gruening and Nelson the
only "nays."^^
It must be remembered that decisions involving the
United States in ground combat in Vietnam vere closely
guarded by the Administration during the time period in which
the appropriation was passed. Public announcements of troop
buildups were not made until June. Just before the Presi-
dent announced his decision to commit 125,000 combat soldiers
(but ten days after the decision had been made) Mr. Johnson
conferred with several Congressmen.^^
At this July 27 meeting, the President informed the
eleven legislators of his plans to widen the ground war. Ac-
cording to Johnson's account, he told the Congressmen that
he did not want "'to go the full congressional route now,'"
and that the United States' "fundamental policy was un-
changed." The President records Congressmen Carl Albert and
Hale Boggs as favoring the buildup without going to Congress,
Senator Bourke Hickenlooper as undecided on the issue of
going to Congress, and Senator Mike Mansfield as the only
one expressing "serious doubt and opposition" to the expan-
76
sion of the war.
^^Xbid., pp. 9518-41, 9772.
75Pentagon Papers
,
3:445, 4:299.
^^Johnson, pp. 150-151.
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IS re-
And so, no additional supporting legislation wa.
quested, and none was approved. The decisions to connnit
ground combat forces to South Vietnam and launch an air war
over the North, plans made secretly and revealed piecemeal
over the first half of 1965, won the silent approval and
financial support of Congress. Furthermore, public opposi-
tion to the war at this time, while not insignificant, was
not nearly as widespread or vociferous as it would become.
An August, 1965, public opinion survey revealed 61% in sup-
port of the war, 24% opposed, and 15% without an opinion.
Since this essay is concerned with the initiation of
the conflict it will not detail the course of the war with
its terrible destructiveness and its tumultuous consequences
for American domestic politics. The following figures should
convey a sense of the magnitude and intensity of the conflict
If we date the start of the war at spring, 1965, \hen
North Vietnam was first attacked regularly from the air and
American combat troops were dispatched, then the conflict
lasted 7% years, ending with the Paris peace agreement in
January, 1973. During these years, the United States ground
troop commitment went as high as 549,500 men, authorized in
April, 1968.^^
^^John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 54-55.
78Pentagon Papers
,
4:602.
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According to Defense Department figures released in
early 1975, 46,370 Americans were killed in Vietnam, 153,000
were seriously wounded. The Pentagon reports that the South
Vietnamese suffered over a million casualties, while it is
estimated that an equal number of enemy forces were killed 79
The intensity of the air war is revealed by the ton-
nage statistics. By the end of 1967, with the war not three
years old. the United States had, according to the Defense
Department's data, already dropped greater tonnage on Viet-
nam than it had loosed upon the whole European theatre in
World War II; nearly half the tonnage was dropped upon South
Vietnam.
A number of significant legislative actions are
worth noting as well, especially as they pertain to the con-
stitutionality of the conflict. As a direct outgrowth of
the Vietnam War the upper chamber approved on June 25, 1969,
a "sense of the Senate" resolution on "national commitments."
The measure, which is not legally binding, states that the
United States can have a commitment to aid in the defense
of a foreign country only as a result of
affirmative action taken by the legislative and
executive branches ... by means of a treaty.
Statute, or concurrent resolution
. . .specifically
79see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 33 (April
26, 1975) :843:—
80Pentagon Papers, 4:216.
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providing for such commitment
.
Following the controversial Cambodian incursion in
late April. 1970, the Senate passed the Cooper-Church amend-
ment to a foreign aid authorization act. ultimately cleared
on December 22. 1970. The amendment, approved by the Senate
on June 30. prohibited the expenditure of funds to introduce
ground troops or advisers into Cambodia. An earlier act,
approved December 29. 1969, applied similar restrictions to
funds for Laos and Thailand.
During the summer of 1970. the Senate twice voted
repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, once after the Nixon
Administration announced that the law was no longer appro-
priate to its policies. But the necessary House approval
did not come until December 31, 1970. in the form of an amenct
ment to a foreign military sales bill as opposed to a concur-
rent resolution as provided for in section 3 of the Resolu-
tion itself. Furthermore. House approval of the repeal
rested upon the Administration's argument that the Tonkin
resolution was "unnecessary." The Senate then passed the
81Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the
Nation-Volume III 1969-1972 (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1973), pp. 856-857; S. Res. 85, 91st Cong.,
1st sess., 115 Cong. Rec. 17245 (1969).
82
Congress and The Nation
, pp. 910-911, 913-914;
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. 91-652, sec.
7(a), 84 Stat. 1942 (1971); Department of Defense Appropria-
tion Act, 1970, Pub. L. 91-171, sec. 643, 83 Stat. 469 (1969).
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military sales bill (thus voting repeal of Tonkin Gulf for
a third time:), whereupon President Nixon's signature laid
tne once controversial measure to rest 83
By 1970, a number of resolutions to "end the war-
were proposed, of which perhaps the best known is the Hat-
field-McGovern amendment, cutting off military expenditures
in Indochina after a set date. The full Congress never ap-
proved Hatfield-McGovem. but did adopt Senator Mansfield's
amendment to a draft extension bill, passed September 21,
1971. This Mansfield amendment declared it to be the "sense
of Congress" that the United States end military operations
in Indochina "at the earliest practicable date," with a
"date certain" to be set for troop withdrawals.^^
In a bolder assertion of Congressional authority,
the Mansfield amendment was passed again, (now as part of a
defense procurement measure)
,
only this time it declared it-
self to be the "policy of the United States," rather than
merely the "sense of Congress." The Administration was not
oblivious to the change in wording, and when the President
signed the procurement bill in November, 1971, he pointed
83Congress and The Nation
, pp. 910-911; United States
Congress, House, Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments
,
H.
Rept. 1805 to Accompany H. R. 15628, 9^1st Cong., 2d sess.,
1970; Foreign Military Sales Act, amendments. Pub. L. 91-672,
sec. 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
^^H. R. 17123, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (1970); Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, amendments. Pub. L. 92~129,
sec. 401, 85 Stat. 348 (1971); Congress and The Nation , p. 916
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out that the Mend^ent did not enunciate the policy of the
Administration and was "without binding force or effect.
Direct American military activities in Vietnam had
ended by late March, 1973, but air strikes continued over
Cambodia. In June, 1973, Congress approved, and Nixon suc-
cessfully vetoed, an immediate cutoff of funds for combat
activities in Cambodia and Laos. In a compromise with the
Administration, funds were cut off for all American combat
activities in Indochina as of August 15, 1973. Four other
combat expenditure restrictions were enacted after the com-
promise measure cleared on June 29.
From a constitutional standpoint, however, the most
important legislation to come out of the Vietnam conflict
was the War Powers Act, passed over a Presidential veto,
November 7, 1973. The measure, which was designed to limit
Presidential authority to commit armed forces in the absence
of Congressional approval, will be discussed in detail in a
o -1
separate chapter.
III. The Courts and the Indochina Conflict
In no case did the United States Supreme Court con-
ge
Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972,
Pub. L. 92-156, sec. 601, 85 Stat. 423 (1971); Congress and
The Nation
, pp. 916,919.
86
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 29 (1973): 95, 861;
Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, Pub. L. 93-50,
sec. 307, 87 Stat. 99 (1973).
p. 1.
07
87 Stat. 555 (1973); New York Times, 8 November 1973,
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sider on the merits the legality of the southeast Asian war.
It repeatedly denied petitions for the writ of certiorari,
and even suirnnarily refused a State's motion for leave to file
a bill of complaint in an original proceeding . 88
In Atlee v. Richardson, the high Court gave us the
strongest hint as to how it would handle legal challenges
to the war, when it affirmed without connnent the lower court
decision. Atlee had asked a United States District Court
in Pennsylvania to declare the southeast Asian war illegal
by virtue of conflict with various Constitutional and treaty
provisions, and to enjoin further expenditures for it.^^
The District Court granted the Government's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the suit was non-justiciable.
The Court noted several difficulties in deciding cases in-
volving foreign affairs: in getting and managing the facts,
in foreseeing the legal consequences of its ruling, and in
developing standards to apply.
Furthermore, the judges found a decision on the
merits in this case to involve some unanswerable questions.
They would have to resolve whether or not the hostilities
88Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 210,
214; Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
89
°^Atlee V. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 911 (1973).
90
^^347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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amounted to "war," and this, they said, is a "political-
question. Secondly, they would have to determine whether
or not Congress authorized the conflict, which would require
divining the intent of the legislators. Finally, they would
have to decide whether or not the President has the author-
ity to maintain troops in combat, a question so linked to
a determination of the "security interests" of the United
States that it should not be decided by a court. ^1
One judge dissented, thinking the issue justiciable.
And when Atlee was affirmed by the Supreme Court without
explanation. Justices Douglas. Brennan and Stewart averred
that they would note probable jurisdiction and set the case
for oral argument. But the majority of the high court
thought otherwise, and the clear inference is that they too
believed the legal challenges to the Vietnam war to be non-
justiciable.
Certainly they were offered sufficient opportunity
to make use of another legal vehicle to resolve the issue,
and yet the Court consistently declined to grant certiorari.
The Justices even went so far as to agree over the telephone
during their summer recess to overrule a colleague whose
order would have left standing a successful lower court chal-
9^Ibid., pp. 703-7.
^^Ibid., pp. 709-13; 411 U. S. 911 (1973).
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lenge to the bombing in Cambodia following the Vietnam cease-
fire.
Lower federal courts were also reluctant to tackle
head on challenges to the legality of the war. Availing them-
selves of the doctrines of "political questions." non-justi-
ciability, lack of standing to sue, and sovereign imunity.
lower courts avoided decisions on the merits.
When, however, lower federal courts did reach the
merits they invariably ruled in behalf of the government and
against those challenging the conduct of the war. In the
93
rru o
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973)The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the following consti-tutional challenges to the southeast Asia conflict: Ashton
Ins ni^^Q7Q^^?o4o?^V-^- Costa V. Laird,405 U S. 979 (1972); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S 956(1968); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968)- Holtz-
?Q7 n'c^^'Sf^^V^f^^ (1974); Luftig V. McNamara,387 U.S. 945 (1967); McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002
(1968); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970)- Mit-
chell V. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); Mora v! McNamara,
399 U. S. 934 (1967); Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)-Samoff V. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929 (1972); Velvel v. Nixon, 396
U.S. 1042 (1970).
94See Ashton v. United States, 404 F. 2d 95 (8th Cir.
1968); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp
. 689 CE.D.Pa. 1972); Ber-
nath V. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Campen v.
Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal
. 1972); Da Costa v. Laird, 471
F. 2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478
(W.D. Va. 1970); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass.
1973), aff'd, 502 F. 2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 468 F. 2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Luf-
tig V. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mora v. Mc-
Namara, 387 F. 2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hottola v. Nixon,
464 F. 2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.
2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969).
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Mottola and Holtz.an cases, where anti-war litigants were
xnitlally successful, circuit courts reversed the judgnents,"
Typical of the lower courts decisions on the merits
is Orlando v. Laird, decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1971. Orlando, an enlistee, sued to keep from
being sent to Vietnam. He argued that the Executive branch
lacked authority to compel him to participate in a conflict
not expressly authorized by Congress, which alone has the
power to declare war, United States Constitution. Article I.
section 8, paragraph 11.56
The court held that I. 8, 11 requires "mutual parti-
cipation" by the Congress "in the prosecution of the war."
and in the case of Vietnam such participation was initially
evidenced by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and thereafter by
appropriations for military operations and by extensions of
95
^
Lower federal courts reached the merits in the fol-
^d'^nfq nV^'^' ^^07??' n^V- (2d Cir. 1970), 443 F.
r- ^lo^^^'^'^V^^' Laird, 448 F. 2d 1368Ua Lir. 19/1); Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp 544 (ED.N.Y. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp 553 CED.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973)- McArthur
QQQ^i^^c"'''^' tSoo^; ^^^^ 1968); Meyers v. Nixon,
^^^o^-.^'^PP- 1^88 (S. D.N.Y. 1972); Mitchell V. Laird, 488
!;n^^ ^1^- l^''^); Mottola V. Nixon, 318 F. Supp.538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F. 2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972)-
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F. 2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States V. Hart, 382 F. 2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
V. Holmes, 387 F. 2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Kronke, 459 F. 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972); United States V. Mit-
chell, 369 F. 2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Sisson,
294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
96443 F. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the draft.
Orlando contended that military appropriations were
inadequate as ratification of the war because they were made
in response to a Presidential fait accompli
. Furthermore,
Congress had already repealed the Tonkin Resolution. The
court noted that the Tonkin repeal came when the Resolution
"was no longer necessary and amounted to no more than a ges-
ture on the part of the Congress
. .
.
"^^
The court X7ent on to reject the assertion that Con-
gressional authorization for a war could not be inferred from
appropriations
:
The framers' intent to vest the war power in Con-gress IS in no way defeated by permitting an in-ference of authorization from legislative action
furnishing the manpower and materials of war
. .
Thus Orlando lost his suit, and the Vietnam War
found judicial sanction, at least in the second circuit.
Senator Fulbright denoimced the Orlando rule as "utterly in-
consistent" with attempts to preserve Congressional warmaking
power. And Senator Stennis added that military appropriations
have too many "ingredients" to be considered "an endorsement
^^Ibid.
,
p. 1042.
^^Ibid., pp. 1040-1041, note 1, p. 1041,
^^Ibid., p. 1043.
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of the war.^O^
Orlando petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, but was denied, Justices Douglas and Brennan dis-
senting, Meanwhile the second circuit stuck by its Or-
lando rule, reaffirming it in the similar case of Da Costa v.
Laird. The Supreme Court again refused certiorari over the
disagreement of Brennan and Douglas. The latter commented
that "the constitutional questions raised by conscription
for a presidential war are both substantial and justiciable . "102
The Orlando rule was applied a bit differently (by
Judge Judd, one of its creators) in Congresswoman Holtzman's
suit to enjoin military operations in Cambodia in the summer
of 1973. Applying Orlando, the district court held that Con-
gressional authorization was necessary for the bombing of
Cambodia, only this time the court held that "appropriations
bills do not necessarily indicate
. . . approval
. .
/'^^^
The district court ruled in favor of Holtzman only
to have its orders stayed by the circuit court pending ap-
peal. Supreme Court Justice Marshall refused to vacate the
stay, but Douglas agreed a few days later and was promptly
'•OOAnthony A. D'Amato and Robert M. O'Neil, The Judi-
ciary and Vietnam (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1972),
p. ~77
IOI404
u. S. 869 (1971).
^^^448 F. 2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405
U.S. 979 (1972).
"^Holtzman V. Schlesinger, 361' F. Supp. 553, 562 (E.
D. N. Y. 1973)
.
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ionic ex-
countermanded the same afternoon following a telephc
change among the justices. Following this byplay the second
circuit reversed the lower court's orders on the grounds
that determining if the operations in Cambodia represented
a new conflict requiring Congressional approval or a tacti-
cal decision within the authority of the commander-in-chief
was a "political question. ""^^^
In summation, the federal courts were for the most
part unwilling to adjudicate challenges to the legality of
the southeast Asia conflict. Only lower federal courts were
willing to reach the merits, in 13 cases, all of which were
favorable to the government at the circuit level. The Su-
preme Court consistently denied certiorari, breaking stride
only to affirm a district court decision that the anti-war
suit in question was non-justiciable . "'"^^
Not all the Supreme Court justices were content to
duck the issue of the war's legality. Douglas dissented
from his colleagues
' refusals to grant certiorari about a
dozen times, occasionally joined by Justices Stewart and/or
Brennan. In the case of Mora v. McNamara, Stewart's protest
against the Court's unwillingness to take the case provides
^^^Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316,
1321 (1973); 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
^^^See notes 93-'95» supra; At lee v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 911 (1973).
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us with a suggestive formula for examining the constitution-
ality of the conflict. '^^
Mora, an army private, sought an injunction to pre-
vent his transfer to Vietnam on the grounds that the war was
being conducted illegally. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals dismissed his suit
-as inappropriate for judicial
resolution. Mora's petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied, Douglas and Stewart dissenting. Stewart urged the
Court to answer the following questions.
(1) Is the Vietnam conflict a "war" within the mean-
ing of Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution?
(2) If so, may soldiers be compelled to participate des-
pite the absence of a Congressional declaration of war? (3)
Of what relevance are United States treaty obligations? (4)
Of what relevance is the Tonkin Gulf Resolution? Do pre-
sent military operations fall within its terms? Is the Reso-
lution an unlawful delegation of Congressional power to the
President?-^^''
IV. The Vietnam War and The Constitution
The questions raised by Justice Stewart in the Mora
case provide a suggestive basis for analyzing the constitu-
10^387 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389
U.S. 934 (1967).
^^^389 U. S. 934-935 (1967).
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into
:ensions
tionaUty of the conflict. One might also wish to take
account the effect of military appropriations and ext,
of the draft, the relevance of historical precedent, and the
extent of sole Presidential authority under Article II.
We will consider several of these questions, all with
an eye toward assessing the effect of the Vietnam war upon
Presidential war-making powers.
Was the conflict a "war" within the meaning of Article
I, section 8. clause 11? Certainly it was not an all-out
conflict in terms of American military potential. Further-
more, hostilities were confined to a small geographical area,
and Congress had never formally declared war.
Nevertheless, the sustained bombing of the D.R.V.
did constitute an attack upon a de facto international entity,
even if one that lacked some of the attributes of sovereignty.
And a conflict so protracted (lasting over 7% years) , of such
magnitude (involving over one-half million American ground
combat troops at one point) , and so damaging to the United
States (over 46,000 killed, 153,000 wounded), would seem to
defy exclusion from the category of "wars."
A. Effect of the SEATO Treaty
Under Article IV, paragraph 1 of the SEATO pact, the
United States agreed that "aggression by means of armed at-
tack" against any of the parties to the Treaty or any state
or territory designated in the accompanying Protocol, "would
342
an
endanger its own peace and safety," and that in such
event the United States would "act to meet the comon dan-
ger in accordance with its constitutional processes . "^^^
In the view of the United States governm.ent, the in-
filtration of armed men from North to South Vietnam consti-
tuted aggression by armed attack, and thus justified Ameri-
can action under Article IV, paragraph 1, of SEATO. (The
claim that an "armed attack" occurred is controversial in
the absence of a Korean style invasion across the 17th paral-
lel. Article IV, paragraph 2, of SEATO provides for imme-
diate consultation among signatories in order to agree upon
defense measures in the event of threats "other than by armed
attack," and this provision may Inve been more appropriately
invoked. The United States Congress supported the claim
that North Vietnam was guilty of "aggression
. . . against
its neighbors" in the Preamble to the Tonkin Resolution. ) '"^^
In a Memorandum of Law, the State Department asserted
that SEATO served in part as authorization for Presidential
decisions with respect to Vietnam. The reasoning is as fol-
lows. Under Article VI of the Constitution, treaties are
^^^SEATO, Art. IV, par. 1.
109
U. S., Department of State Office of the Legal
Adviser, Memorandum of Law, "The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam," in Richard A.
Falk, ed.
, The Vietnam War and International Law , 4 vols.
(Princeton, N. J . : Princeton University Press, 1968-1976)
,
1 (1968) :583; 78 Stat. 384; see Richard A. Falk, "Internation-
al Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War," in
Falk, 1 (1968):391; Hull and Novogrod,
'
pp. 139-47.
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the supreme law of the land. Thus it is asserted that
Article IV, paragraph 1 of the SEATO treaty
establishes as a matter nf Istt r>
amed attack again^r^L^h iTet'tl nSS^S^'the peace and safety of the United States UO
Should such an attack occur, it is argued, the United
States "has undertaken a commitment" in Article IV, paragraph
1 of SEATO to "act" to meet the danger. "Under our Constitu-
tion," the Memorandum declares,
President who must decide when an armedattack has occurred. He has also the constitutional
responsibility for determining what measures of de-fense are required when the peace and safety of theUnited States are endangered. If he considers
that deployment of U. S. forces to South Viet-Nam
IS required, and that military measures against
the source of Communist aggression in North Viet-
Nam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered
to take those measures
.
In sum, the position of the State Department is that
SEATO empowers the President to send ground troops to South
Vietnam and bomb North Vietnam, provided only that he recog-
nize the occurrence of an armed attack on the GVN.
While it is doubtless true that SEATO obligated the
United States to act in some manner to aid in the defense of
South Vietnam in the event of an armed attack, and while it
is the President's responsibility to recognize the circum-
stances under which treaty provisions are triggered, it is
ll^Falk, 1 (1968) :597.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 597-593.
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not at all clear that the President may unilaterally execute
that treaty, especially where the execution involves placing
the country at war.
In fact, Article IV, paragraph 1 of SEATO calls for
the United States to "act
. .
. in accordance with it:s con-
stitutional processes," and the Congressional debates pre-
ceding approval of the treaty make it clear that SEATO did
not commit the United States to military action without
prior approval by Congress. This being the original under-
standing of the treaty, it could hardly be said to empower
the President to unilaterally order air attacks on the al-
leged aggressor state (North Vietnam) and large numbers of
combat troops into the area designated by Protocol (South
Vietnam) .^^^
A more reasonable interpretation is that SEATO ob-
ligated the United States to act in the defense of South
Vietnam, and the President was authorized to implement the
treaty short of placing the United States at war without Con-
gressional approval. This would be more consistent with
both the "constitutional processes" stipulation of SEATO and
Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution.
But as the Legal Memorandum points out. Congress did
approve Presidential use of armed forces for Vietnam when it
^^^Hull and Novogrod, pp. 147-148.
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passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August, 1964. We
must determine whether or not this act authorized the exten-
sive hostilities that followed, and, if so, was it an unwar-
ranted delegation of Congressional war power.
Effect of the Tonkin Resolution
Much controversy surrounds the meaning of the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution. In Senate testimony, then Under Sec-
retary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach asserted that in
terms of the constitutional requirement of legislative ap-
proval the Resolution was the "functional equivalent" of a
declaration of war
.
Several legislators reacted sharply to Katzenbach 's
testimony, insisting that in voting for the Resolution they
never intended to authorize the extensive and prolonged mili'
tary operations that ensued. (For example, Senator Gore
(D-Tenn.) replied to Katzenbach: "I did not vote for the
resolution with any understanding that it was tantamount to
115
a declaration of war.")
^^^Falk, 1 (1968) :598.
^^^U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Commitments
to Foreign Powers
,
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations ; 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 82, 88.
^^^Ibid., pp. 83, 87, 88, 89, 131, 145, 209.^ But
contrast the views of Senators Ervin and Cooper, ibid., pp.
165. 197-198. 213.
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Later the Senate Foreign Relations Conmiittee confes-
sed that "there was a discrepancy between the language of
the {Tonkin} resolution and the intent of Congress," that
the wording "lends itself to the interpretation that Con-
gress was consenting in advance to a full-scale war."^^^
In section 1 of the Resolution. Congress stated that
it "approves and supports the determination of the President
•
• •
^° ^^^^ all necessary measures to repel any armed at-
tack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression
.
""'""^^
In the floor debates, Senator Fulbright, the bill's
manager, explained that the phrase "further aggression" ap-
plied to future aggression against either the United States
or South Vietnam. Thus, the resolution provided advance
support for measures, including presumably armed force,
taken by the President in order to prevent further aggres-
118
sion against the GVN.
The second section announced that the United States
is "prepared, as_ the President determines
,
to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force
,
to assist"
any SEATO member or Protocol state requesting "assistance
'-^^U. S. Congress, Senate, National Commitments
.
S.
Rept. 797 to Accompany S. Res, 85, 90th Cong. 1st sess.,1967,
p. 21.
^^^78 Stat. 384, emphasis added.
^^^110 Cong. Rec. 18405 (1964).
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in defense of ic$ freadom/'^l^
A colloquy between Senators Fulbright and Cooper sug.
gests that this section triggered the defense provisions of
SEATO. Article IV. It is also clear that the President was
thereby authorized (or perhaps only recognized as having the
power) to unilaterally dispatch armed forces to aid South
Vietnam.
In short, the protesting Senators were probably sin-
cere when they said that they never intended to approve mili-
tary operations of the magnitude of those in Vietnam. Ap-
parently they simply never anticipated what would develop.
At the same time the Johnson Administration was on firm
ground when it claimed that the Resolution authorized the
use of the armed forces in South Vietnam and against North
Vietnam.
If the Tonkin Resolution empowers the President to
dispatch combat troops to Vietnam, does it do so in violation
of the Constitution? Does it delegate to the Executive the
war-making power which is reserved to the legislature under
Article I, section 8, clause 11? If so, it has been asserted
that the act is null and void for having violated the princi-
•''•^78 Stat. 384, emphasis added.
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^
""llO Cong. Rec. 18409-18410 (1964); see text accom-
panying note 50, supra.
^^^Falk, 1 (1968) :598.
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pie of the Separation of Powers . '^'^
The standards used by the Supreme Court in determin-
ing excessive delegation are rather vague, and since United
States V. Curtiss-Wright (1936), have been much less strin-
gent in foreign than in domestic affairs. Even in domestic
affairs, although the doctrines enunciated in Panama Refin-
ing v. Ryan (1935) and Schechter Poultry v. United States
(1935), are probably still vital, no domestic delegation
has been struck down since. '^^
Furthermore, the Tonkin Resolution is not unprece-
dented; Presidents had been similarly authorized to use the
armed forces at their discretion by the Formosa Resolution
of 1955, the Middle East Resolution of 1957, and the Cuba
Resolution of 1962. Thus, given contemporary legal stan-
dards and practice, it is doubtful that the Tonkin Resolu-
tion would be considered unconstitutional on these grounds .-^"^
The Southeast Asia Resolution is assailable on an-
other ground; that it was obtained through misrepresentation
by the Administration of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. It
100
^^^Francis D. Wormuth, "The Vietnam War? The Presi-
dent versus the Constitution," in Falk, 2 (1969) : 781-99
;
Lawrence R. Velvel, "The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional,
Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable," in Falk 2
(1969) :680.
'^^Henkin, pp. 119-120, note 95, p. 366.
10/
Southeast Asia Resolution Hearing
, p. 3; Falk 1
(1968) : 580-82; John Norton Moore, "The National Executive
and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad," in Falk 2 (1969):
817.
on
was
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is true that prior to consideration of the Resolution Con-
gress was never fully informed that the United States des-
troyers were on reconnaissance missions, or that the United
States secretly directed South Vietnamese coastal raids
the days preceding each of the attacks, or that there
confusion in the reports on the second incident in the
Gulf .-'^^
Nevertheless, Congress knew a great deal, could have
been expected to investigate to learn more, and in any case
need not have approved a measure as broad as the one adopted.
Administrations invariably present facts in a way designed
to marshal support for their policies; this does not affect
the constitutionality of the legislative end-product.
In short, although the Administration may have been
deceptive, and the Congress hasty in approving it, the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution did provide authority for the hostili-
ties that followed. And if such a resolution were requested
at the start of the sustained air bombardment of North Viet-
nam in February, 1965, or in the summer of 1965, with the
introduction of large numbers of American ground forces, I
have little doubt that it too would have received legislative
approval
.
125Compare Southeast Asia Resolution Hearing (1964)
and The Gulf of TonHn: The 1964 Incidents Hearing (1968) ;
See also Austin, pp. 182" 183 and passim.
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C. Other Sources of Authority
Did Congress manifest approval of the Vietnam con-
flict in other ways, viz., by military appropriations and
extensions of the draft? A positive answer was given by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Orlando and Da
Costa cases, where it was contended that such legislation
is evidence of "mutual participation" by Congress in the de-
cisions to prosecute the war."^^^
In opposition it is argued that such legislation is
not a good indicator of Congressional support for a war
policy because (1) it provides for national defense in gen-
eral and is not just related to the war; and (2) Congress
has no choice but to supply and protect troops already sent
into battle by the President . ''"^^
We saw that when President Johnson requested a
special appropriation of $700 million in May, 1965, specifi-
cally earmarked for the growing Vietnam conflict, Congress
approved overwhelmingly while a number of legislators denied
that their votes were to be construed as assent to a war.
And similar scenes recurred in successive years, with Con-
128gressmen voting the money while condemning the war.
^^^See notes 96-102 and accompanying text, supra.
•^^Velvel, in Falk, 2 (1969) :667; D'Amatoand O'Neil,
pp. 77-78; compare Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir,
1973)
.
^^^See notes 71-75 and accompanying text, supra; Hull
and Novogrod, pp. 180-83.
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Nevertheless, if Congress has not specified its pol-
icy intentions, and the legislative history is ambiguous in
this respect, it is difficult to see how such laws can be
equated with an express declaration of war. This is espe-
cially true where the legislation establishes or pays for
programs not necessarily related to the war. e.g., the draft,
which the United States conducted in peacetime as well as
during the Vietnam War.
The willingness of Congress to appropriate the bil-
lions of dollars used to conduct the Vietnam War must, how-
ever, be considered at least indirect legislative approval
of the confict, just as the laws to cut off military expen-
ditures in Cambodia display Congressional disapproval. Be-
yond providing evidence of indirect support, the constitu-
tional relevance of such legislation to war making is in
doubt
.
D. Effect of Vietnam Upon Presidential War Power
In terms of the President's constitutional authority
to initiate major armed conflicts, what kind of precedent
is established by the Vietnam hostilities? Assuming that
it was a "war" in the Article I, section 8, clause 11 sense
of the word, then it was fought without a formal declaration
of war by Congress.
The only express Congressional authorization came
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by joint resolution vesting in the President the power to
determine what "steps, including the use of armed force" the
United States would take in defense of any SEATO member or
Protocol state. The resolution was approved one^half a year
before sustained air attacks on North Vietnam began, and
about nine months before large numbers of American ground
combat troops were dispatched to South Vietnam.
Thus, the Vietnam hostilities set a precedent for a
war being fought after a joint resolution recognized Presi-
dential discretion in using armed force to uphold provisions
of a collective security treaty. (There is some confusion
about the role of SEATO. Consider the statement of Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk, that the SEATO pact is "the sub-
stantiating basis for our presence" in Vietnam, but that
"we are not acting specifically under the SEATO Treaty."
But the Secretary may have been trying to justify the fail-
ure of the United States to undertake collective action with
respect to Southeast Asia, as anticipated by the Treaty. )'^^^
At times both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations
made more extreme claims for Presidential power, claims that
the President had the authority to make the Vietnam decisions
without relying on the Tonkin Resolution. The Nixon Admin-
•^^^Southeast Asia Resolution Hearing
,
p. 23.
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istration went so far as to disavow the Tonkin Resolution
altogether, which in part led to its abrogation, effective
January 12, 1971. "'"^^
In the absence of the Tonkin Resolution did the
President, acting on his own constitutional authority have
the power to order attacks upon North Vietna. and the connnit-
ment of large numbers of ground troops to hostilities in
South Vietnam? While the answer must be based in part upon
historical precedent, and while the Korean conflict would
seem analogous, it is doubtful that the President can place
the country at war without Congressional approval. (The
Constitutional standards may differ in the case of a Presi-
dent who inherits on-going hostilities, as did Nixon, as
opposed to one who initiates those hostilities.)
But if the Vietnam conflict led to extreme claims in
behalf of Presidential war-making power, it also, ironically,
spawned the first legislative attempt in United States his-
tory to explicitly curtail that power; the 1973 War Powers
Act.
130See text of President Johnson's Press Conference
of 18 August 1967 in United States Commitments Hearings
, p.
126; see Department of State Letter of 12 March 1970, in U.
S. Congress, Senate, Vietnam Policy Proposals. Hearings be-
fore the Committee on^^reign Relations
,
91st Cong.. 2d
sess., i9/u, p. 311; 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
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CHAPTER IX
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973
I. Background: Other Attempt, to Limit th^, P....-^...
Out of dissatisfaction over the conflict in Southeast
Asia came a number of Congressional attempts to restrict the
war-making powers of the President. While the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 has attracted the most attention and will
be the focus of this essay at least three other approaches
to limiting the Executive are worthy of note.-^
The three other types of restrictions are, first, the
National Commitments Resolution. ^ second, the various amend-
ments to appropriation and authorizations measures prohibit-
ing expenditures for military operations in Southeast Asia,^
^War Powers Resolution, Pub, L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555
(1973)
«
2
17245 (1969^^^'
^''"^^ sess., 115 Cong. Rec.
-"I have found eleven measures : Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1970, Pub. L. 91-171, sec. 643, 83 Stat.
469 (1969); Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Publ L.
91-652, sec. 7(a), 84 Stat. 1942 (1971); Department of De-
fense Appropriation Act, 1971, Pub, L, 91-668, sec. 843, 84
Stat, 2020 (1971); Second Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1973, Pub.L. 93-50, sec. 307, 87 Stat. 99 (1973); Continuing
appropriations, 1974, Pub, L. 93-52, sec. 108, 87 Stat. 130
(1973)
;
Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act
of 1973, Pub. L. 93-126, sec. 13, 87 Stat. 451 (1973); De-
partment of Defense Appropriation Auchorization Act, 1974,
Fub, L. 93-155, sec. 806, '87 Stat. 605 (1973); Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973, Pub, L, 93-189, sec. 30, 87 Stat. 714
C1973) } Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1974, Pub.
L
,
355
and third, the Mansfield Amendirient
.
The Commitments Resolution was a sense-of-the-Senate
measure, approved June 25, 1970. Since it was a simple (one-
house) resolution it had no legally binding effect, and was
therefore more of an expression of Senate dissatisfaction
with the foreign policy making process. Its key passage
declared it to be the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United States
results only from affirmative action taken by
the legislative and executive branches by
means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent
" reso-
lution of both houses of Congress specifically
providing for such commitment
.
A national commitment was defined as the "use of the
armed forces" abroad or "a promise" of foreign assistance,
either military or financial. From the standpoint of encour-
aging Congressional participation in use-of -force decisions,
the Resolution had some obvious weaknesses. First, of course,
was its lack of binding force. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee which prepared the measure called it "an invitation
L. 93-238, sec. 741, 87 Stat. 1026 (1974); Continuing Appro-
priations, 1975, Pub. L. 93-324, sec. 110, 88 Stat. 281 (1974);
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. 93-437,
sec. 839, 88 Stat. 1212 (1974).
4
Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972, Pub.
L. 92-156, sec. 601, 85 Stat. 423 (1971).
-^S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st sess,, 115 Cong. Rec.
17245 (1969).
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was an
to the executive to reconsider its excesses." and although
the tone of this statement is tough, the fact that it
"invitation" rather than a directive says a great deal.^
Second is the fact that only one chamber of Congress
approved the measure, and it is doubtful that the House of
Representatives would have approved such a resolution at that
time. The implication, of course, is that the other house
was not as dissatisfied with foreign policy making procedure.
Third, the language of the Resolution is vague in
that it does not say just what kind of Congressional
"affirm-
ative action" is required before a commitment is made. Since
it calls for a "treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution"
without designating which is appropriate, and without estab-
lishing a procedure for implementation (who decides whether
the requirements of the measure have been met?)
, much is
left tmclear.
For example, the language could be interpreted to
mean that a mutual defense treaty alone is adequate Congres-
sional authorization for American participation in hostili-
ties in defense of the treaty partner although a treaty
"U.S., Congress, Senate. National Commitments
. S.
1969' p^^0° ^' ^^st Cong., 1st sess..
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involves no House action at all. 7 it eould also be read to
say that a non-binding concurrent resolution approved after
a troop comitment has been made by the President is suffi-
cient to authorize his action, despite the absence of any
prior consultation.
Fourth, the measure did not alter already existing
commitments, either to Vietnam or to American treaty part-
ners
.
In short. Senate Resolution 85 did not influence the
division of war-making power between Congress and the Presi-
dent. It served as a warning that there was growing dissat-
isfaction with this division amongst Senators at least, as
well as increased skepticism regarding the extent of such
commitments. In reviewing the background leading up to one
of the War Powers proposals, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee acknowledged the failure of the National Commitments
Resolution as a factor encouraging additional Congressional
action.
^
The requirement of specificity would seem to
strengthen the Resolution here, except that no standard is
offered for judging the degree of specificity required. Was,
e.g., SEATO specific enough to warrant the commitment of
American troops to South Vietnam? In article IV, section 1
of SEATO the United States pledged to "act to meet the com-
mon danger" in the event of aggression by means of armed at-
tack against the parties or those named in an accompanying
Protocol. U.S., Department of State, United States Treatie s
and Other International Agreements
, vol. 6, pt, 1, "South-
east Asia Collective Defense," TIAS No. siyO.'s September 1954
g
U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
.
S. Rept. 220 to
Accompany S. 440, 93d Cong. 1st sess., 1973, pp. 4-5.
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The second approach to restricting Presidential war
power^-cutting off funds-^was more effective and therefore
more significant. The first two measures of this nature had
no effect upon actual combat, The rider to the Defense Ap-
propriations Act of 1970 prohibited expenditures from that
measure for the introduction of United States ground combat
troops in Laos and Thailand. ^ Since the United States had
no ground troops in either of those countries, the United
States air war could continue without running afoul of this
provision.
Furthermore, the measure did not prohibit the intro-
duction of ground troops into Cambodia, thus making it inap-
plicable to the 1970 Cambodian incursion. This latter event
prompted the second funds cut-off measure, contained in the
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. •'•^
While this provision cut off all funds for ground
forces or even advisers in Cambodia, Congress delayed appro-
^83 Stat. 469 (1969). Section 643 of the Act reads as
follows: "In line with the expressed intention of the Presi-
dent of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by
the Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American
ground troops into Laos or Thailand.
^°84 Stat. 1942 (1971). Section 7(a) of the Act says:
"In line with the expressed intention of the President of
the United States, none of the funds authorized or appro-
priated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to
finance the introduction of United States ground combat
troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers
to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."
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val of the cut-off provision until June 30, 1970, the day
President Nixon had said the Cambodian operation would end
In addition, by the time Congress cleared the entire measure,
in December, 1970, and the President signed it into law on
January 5, 1971, it was one half year since the United
States had had ground troops in Cambodia.
The third and fourth measures were much more signifi-
cant, since they appear to be the first acts ever to termi-
nate completely all expenditures for United States combat
forces while they were conducting a military operation. The
background was the air bombardment of Cambodia which contin-
ued after United States military involvement in Vietnam had
ended in March 1973.
After much debate Congress cleared on June 26, 1973,
an appropriations measure containing a rider which called
for an immediate cut-off of all funds for combat activities
in or over Cambodia and Laos.
The next day President Nixon vetoed the measure, de-
claring that "the 'Cambodian rider' to this bill would crip-
ple or destroy the chances for an effective negotiated set-
tlement in Cambodia
. . .
"^^ congress sustained the veto,
but it was essential to the continued smooth functioning of
^^H. R. 7447, 93d Cong., 1st sess. (1973).
12.
manac
. ^^.^ ^..^^i^j.^,^
Quarterly, Inc. 1974), p. 66-A.
Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Al-
,
vol. XXIX, 1973 (Washington, D.C: Congressional
er v. 4V n. 6fi-A.
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a number of governmental agencies that this and another
funding measure go into effect on July 1.
The dramatic deadlock was broken when key legislators
and administrative representatives agreed to a compromise
The President would sign measures containing a complete
funds cut-off which would not take effect until August 15,
1973. The key provision, section 307 of Public Law 93-50
'
reads as follows.
None of the funds herein appropriated under thi.,
rtrrT^
be expended to suppLt* directly or inSi-ectly combat activities in n-r o^7^>. rJu ^- r
North Vietnam and LutrvJetnL°^rUn?fed'stater ^
'
tllt'f ^""^ ^^'^^ ^^S^^^ 1973: no other lundshereto ore appropriated under any other act mav beexpended for such purpose. ^
Note that this provision terminates immediately all
expenditures based upon Public Law 93-50, and prohibits as
of August 15 expenditures based upon any other existing ap-
propriations measure. The immediate cut-off was academic
because none of the funds in Public Law 93-50 could be used
for military operations in Cambodia.
Public Law 93-50, the second Supplementary Appropria-
tions Act, was cleared on June 29. The following day, the
other appropriations bill. Public Law 93-52, was approved.
Section 108 of Public Law 93-52 stipulated the following.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or
after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance
directly or indirectly combat activitiees by the
United States military forces in or over or from
off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam. Laos
or Cambodia.
cut-
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Most Significantly, in a letter of August 3. 1973, to the
Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader, the Presi-
dent, while complaining about the policy effects of the
off, seemed to accept Congress's authority over the matter.
"By legislative action," Nixon wrote,
form^gf law and the Administration wJll obey ?hat
Thus did the Congress use its appropriations power
to restrict the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, To
drive home the point Congress passed at least six other mea-
sures in 1973 and 1974 with funds cut-off provisions similar
to those in Public Law 93-50 and Public Law 93-52, above.
None of these six acts cleared Congress while United States
forces were engaged in hostilities in Southeast Asia.
However, seven of these fund cut-off laws were in
force and seemed applicable to the United States efforts to
evacuate American and Asian nationals when the communists
took control in South Vietnam and Cambodia in the Spring of
^^Ibid.
, p. 862.
J-^Public Law 93-126, section 13 (1973) was broader
in that it forbade use of any future appropriations for
Indochina combat operations without Congressional consent.
The five other acts were: Pub. L. 93-155, sec. 806 (1973),
Pub. L. 93-189, sec. 30 (1973), Pub. L. 93-238, sec, 741
(1974), Pub. L. 93-324, sec. 110 (1974), and Pub. L. 93-437,
sec. 839 (1974).
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1975,15 Initially, the Ford administration requested that
Congress "clarify" these restrictions
,
When no clarification was forthcoming, the President
went ahead with the various rescue operations anyway-despite
the fact that they involved combat troops and even some com-
bat in Southeast Asia. Later, the State Department's legal
adviser told a Congressional subcommittee that
??^-f f
'''''^5 limitation statutes were not intended tolimit and could not limit the President's constitu-
of^danger?^ ^°
''^'^''''^
^' ^' ^^-^^^^^^ from places
To say that the statutes were not intended to prohib-
it rescue of Americans in Indochina by combat troops is to
make a plausible although debatable assertion about legisla-
18tive intent. But to say that Congress could not by its
•'^The seven laws said to be pertinent are: Pub. L
^^'^ (1973), Pub. L. 93-52, sec. 108 (1973), Pub.
L. 90-126, sec. 13 (1973), Pub. L. 93-155, sec. 806 (1973)
Pub. L. 93-189, sec. 30 (1973), Pub. L. 93-238, sec. 741 (19-
74), Pub. L. 93-437, sec. 839 (1974). Congressional Quarter-
ly
»
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, voLXXXI, 1975 (Washing-
ton, DTCTI Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976), p. 15.
16U.S., President, Address, "State of the World,"
April 10, 1975, in CQ Almanac, 1975
. p. 14-A.
^^U.S., Congress, House, War Powers : A Test of Com-
pliance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Inter-
national Relations
,
94th Cong.. 1st sess.. 1975. p. 11. {Here-
inafter, Compliance Hearings }
.
18Congressman Bingham (D-N.Y.) disputed the preferred
interpretation. He declared that "those {cut-off} provisions
were put into the law to curtail what President Nixon at the
time said was his authority as Commander in Chief to protect
and safeguard the evacuation of American troops which was the
reason he gave, for example, for going into Cambodia." Ibid.,
p. 17.
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-S own
appropriations power^^ Umit the President acting on hi.
authority as Connnander-in-Chief20 ,3 xnake a controversial
constitutional argument entailing consideration of Congress'
authority in general to limit the President when he is acting
under constitutional warrant. This is the issue at the very
heart of the War Powers Resolution controversy.
Purely in terms of legal precedent, the Vietnam War
era presents one clear victory for Congressional appropria-
tions power over the Commander-in-Chief and one probable de-
feat. The 1973 victory was dramatic, coming as it did while
military operations were ongoing. That these same triumphant
provisions were probably violated less than two -ears later
is often overlooked.
The third approach to limiting the President was the
Mansfield Amendment, or rather Mansfield Amendments, for there
were two such efforts. The first, attached to an extension
of the draft, " was written as a "sense of the Congress" re-
solution, and therefore was without legally binding effect.
The second Mansfield Amendment was nearly identical,
except that it attempted to declare the "policy of the United
^%.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1; U.S. Const, art,
I, sec. 9, cl. 7,
2^Ibid. , art. II, sec. 2.
^Ij^ichael J, Glennon, "Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions," Minne-
sota Law Review 60 (November 1975): 21-22.
^^Military Selective Service Act of 1967, amendments,
Pub, L. 92-129. sec. 401, 85 Stat. 348 (1971),
364
States," not merely the "sense of the Congress."
States''to1lr^?ni?e1t'?he^''^?-P°'^=>- °' ""^'e^
all mlitar^^perations'ol the'Snitefsta^""^ fchina, and to SrovidP fnr^\-^2 ^^^^^^ States m Indo-
drawai of aU Sn?Ie1%t'°aLf^iHt^?; ToLlTll'l
prison:rs'o?war'^^" '° ^^^"^ ^-ican
Ler^c^nl mLring-in act?oV" ^"°-""|
^e-by urges and\equests°?he President%o°?gir-
meSiatelv'thrf"??"""""^ P"^"^ initialing im-a iy e following actions:
(1) Establishing a final date for the with-
t£^Uniter.^"^°''^'"" °' military forces ofhe United States contingent upon the release of allAmerican prisoners of war
. .
'
and an a^count^ngfor all Americans missing in action ^
TM«^ ^ K Negotiate with the Government of NorthVietnam for an immediate cease-fire
„. ^
Negotiate with the Government of NorthVietnam for an agreement which would provide for aseries of phased and rapid withdrawals of UnitedStates military forces from Indochina in exchangefor a corresponding series of phased releases ofAmerican prisoners of war
. .
.-^^
The implementation sections, including the setting of
a final date for troop withdrawal, were clearly left to Pres-
idential discretion; Congress only urged and requested that
they be undertaken. The first part is more controversial:
can Congress mandate United States policy respecting the
termination of hostilities and is the President obligated
to follow the legislative prescription?
Before signing on November 17, 1971, the Defense Pro-
curement Authorization within which the Mansfield Amendment
was contained, President Nixon made known his views on Con-
23See note 4, supra.
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gress' policy declaration.
tion 601) IS without binding force or Pffa.; ^^
Mv siPTiincr nf ^-P ^° ^ conclusion.
Chalk up another victory for the Executive branch;
Nixon refused to alter his policies to conform with the Mans-
field guidelines. The end result was that the Congressional
declaration of policy on terminating hostilities, although
part of an act signed into law, was totally ineffectual as
a limitation on the President,
It should be noted, however, that there were two sig-
nificant weaknesses in the Mansfield approach. First, al-
though Congress declared to be United States policy withdra^l
of troops by a "date certain," it declined to name the date,
instead urging the President to do so. Second, the Amendment
did not direct the President to do anything; it simply made
policy declaration and requested the President to implementa
it.
As a result, the second Mansfield approach was no
more successful than would have been any other legally non-
^^Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the
Nation, Volume III, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1973), p. 919.
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binding measure (such as the first Mansfield A.endn.ent)
.
Legislative BUrnry
'^l^h^y^r^Po^^^^^^^^^^
Contemporaneous with these various attempts to end
United States military involvement in Southeast Asia was the
effort to write a more permanent limitation upon Presidential
power into law. I„ the wake of the Cambodian incursion an-
nounced by President Nixon on April 29. 1970. several war
power bills were introduced in both houses of Congress. ^5
On the House side. Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.). chair-
man of a Foreign Affairs subcommittee, held hearings starting
in mid-June 1970. focusing much of the time on a bill. House
Resolution 17598, introduced by Representative Fascell (D-
Fla.). The subcommittee also gave careful consideration to
a measure introduced by a member of the other chamber. Senator
Javits (R-N.Y.) (Senate Bill 3964). The Fascell and Javits
proposals both attempted to specify the circumstances under
which the President could introduce forces into hostilities
without Congressional approval.
Significantly, chairman Zablocki announced in late
July that he found such an approach to be unacceptable. "I
25A number of these early proposals are conveniently
reproduced in U.S.. Congress, House, Congress, the President
and the War Powers, Hearings before the iJubeommittee on .Na-
tional aecurity foiicy and Scientitic Uevelopnents omTe
—
Committee on Foreign Attairs
, 9ist Cong.. 2d se.q.s., H7n,
pp. 435-95. tHereinatter, House Hearings. 1970).
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believe," Zablocki declared,
it is simply impossible to spell out all th. .tmgencies in which the Presidpr;^ o uZ .
to move quickly without t-^« o -^^""^^^^ ^^^^
of the Congress. specific authorization
The Nixon administration had taken the same position
in testimony offered a few weeks earlier,27 3,, ^^^^ ^.^^
nificant thing about Zablocki 's stand is that he never re-
versed it, and as a result the House and Senate adopted diver-
gent approaches to war powers measures.
Following the close of hearings in early August 1970,
the House subcommiteee met in executive sessions and drafted
a relatively mild proposal. House Joint Resolution 1355. which
was recommended to the full chamber. The measure reaffirms
Congress' power to declare war. recognizes the President's
authority to defend the United States and its citizens in
certain emergency circumstances, and states that it is "the
sense of Congress that whenever feasible the President should
seek appropriate consultation with the Congress" before making
use-of-force decisions.
The most significant part of House Joint Resolution
1355 is the requirement that the President report "promptly"
^^Ibid., p. 266. See also p. 267.
^''ibid., p. 208.
28U.S., Congress, House, Concerning the Vlar Powers of
Congress and the President
.
H, Rejpt. 1547 to Accompany H. J.
Res, 1355, yist Cong., 2d sess., 1970.
36 S
to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate when-
ever he makes certain commitments of United States armed
forces without specific prior Congressional authorization. 29
Unlike the provision calling for consultation with Congress,
the section requiring a report to Congressional officers is'
mandatory. And. unlike the Fascell and Javits bills (dis-
cussed above) there is no attempt to delineate the respective
war-initiating powers of Congress and the President.
On November 16, 1970. the House overwhelmingly ap-
proved House Joint Resolution 1355, by a 289-39 vote.^^ But
when the Senate failed to act the measure died with the ad-
journment of the 91st Congress.
The House measure was reintroduced in the 92d Con-
gress as House Joint Resolution 1 with only one modification:
the sense of Congress provision calling for consultation now
29A report is required whenever the President "(1)
commits United States military forces to armed conflict- (2)
commits military forces equipped for combat to the territory
airspace or waters of a foreign nation, except for deployments
which relate solely to supply, repair, or training of United
States forces, or for humanitarian or other peaceful purposes;
or (3) substantially enlarges military forces already located'
in a foreign nation." Ibid., pp. 5-8.
30The Javits measure. S. 3964, differed in another
significant respect. It provided for an automatic thirty day
cut-off of hostilities conducted without a declaration of war
unless Congress vzere to authorize an extension by "affirmative
legislative action." Ibid., pp. 474-76.
^"116 Cong. Rec. 37407-37408.
36 9
omitted the modifying phrase
"whenever feasible "32 i„
brief House hearings Administration spokesmen said that the
resolution was "acceptable, "33 and the House approved it on
of Senate action.
However, the upper chamber was far from inactive on
the war powers question. On the contrary, Senator Fulbrighfs
(D-Ark.) Foreign Relations Co^ittee held well-publicized
hearings on various war powers proposals (most notably, a
revised Javits measure, an Eagleton (D-Mo.) bill, and Iven
offerings from conservative Senators Taft (R-Oh.) and Sten-
nis (D-Miss.)-all of which delineated in some fashion the
general circumstances under which presidents could deploy
troops in the absence of Congressional sanction. 35
Secretary of State William P. Rogers testified in op-
position that the Senate bills attempted "to fix in detail,
and to freeze, the allocation of the war power between the
President and Congress," and he complained that they would
32
- ^
U.S., Congress, House, Concerning the War Powers
of Congress and the President. H.-Rept. M to Accompany
Res. 1, yzd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, pp. 1-2.
'
33U.S., Congress, House, War Powers Legislation Hear^ings before the Subcominittee on National Security Policy anJ~gc^entific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
yzd Cong ist sess., iy/1, p. 64. iHereinafter. House Hear-ings 1971}.
34ii7 Cong. Rec. 28878,
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"narrow the power given the President by the Constitution . -36
Specifically Rogers thought the measures unconstitu-
tional to the extent that they (1) restrict the President's
authority to deploy forces abroad short of hostitilites
. and
(2) provide for congressional limitation or termination of
military actions taken under the President's constitutional
authority. 37 Constitutional authorities Alexander Bickel and
J. N. Moore supported Rogers' second point but differed
amongst themselves on his first contention. 38
In 1972 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dis-
tilled the various m.easures before it and favorably reported
a modified Javits bill, Senate Bill 2956.^^ The key element
of the bill was contained in section 3, which codified the
war-making powers of the President. The Senate report de-
scribed these powers as "emergency authorities," and added
that they are
recognized to be authority which the President
enjoys in his independent Constitutional office
as President/Commander-in-Chief
,
Senate Bill 2956 provided for unilateral Presidential
36ibid., p. 498.
^^Ibid., p. 499.
38Ibid., pp. 557 (Bickel testimony), 470 (Moore testi-
mony)
.
39U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
.
S. Rept. 606 to
Accompany S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d sess.
,
1972.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
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action in three sets of circumstances- first In .i , i case of at-
tacU upon the United States or its possessions, second, in
the event of attack upon United States armed forces abroad;
and third, in instances of thre^fc; t-^ .U4. n eats to the lives of United
states citizens and nationals abroad. u was recognized
that the President could forestall, repel and retaliate in
case of attack upon the United States or if= r,„oi-aL Its possessions--in
effect, reaffirming the doctrine of the Prize Cases,
Attacks on armed forces abroad could be forestalled
and repelled, but there was no provision for retaliation.
And threatened nationals abroad could be protected while be-
ing evacuated as rapidly as possible.
The bill provided that the Armed Forces could be in-
troduced into hostilities or "situations where innninent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances," onl^ in the three circumstances discussed above,
plus, of course, when Congress declares war or provides "spe-
cific statutory authorization" for hostilities. The measure
expressly denies that such authorization can be inferred from
general military appropriations,^^ or from mutual defense
treaties without further implementation by Congress.
^^Ibid., p. 2.
42
^ 2 Bl. (U.S.) 635 (1863)
.
43This was aimed at the holding to the contrary o^
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F, 2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971),
^^S. 2956, sec. 4(d), 92d Cong.,'2d sess,, 118 Cong,
Rec. 12611 (1972).
372
The other major features of the Senate bill are the
automatic termination of hostilities after 30 days in the
absence of a declaration of war or an explicit extension by
Congress. ^5 and the possibility of earlier termination by
statute or joint resolution. ^^^.^^^
^^^^^
features reappear in the War Powers Resolution ultimately en-
acted by Congress in 1973.
In April, 1972, the Senate debated Senate Bill 2956
for a week.^^ Among rejected amendments was a Fulbright pro-
posal to substitute for the codification of Presidential
powers a simple recognition of Presidential power to respond
to national emergencies and to prohibit Presidential first
use of nuclear weapons. Fulbright had expressed the fear
that section 3 might inadvertently enhance Presidential war
49 J t .power. and his proposal to eliminate the codification would
have brought the Senate more into line with House thinking on
this matter.
Also rejected were two Dominick (R-Colo.) amendments,
one of which weakened the bill's attempt to circumscribe Pres-
^^Ibid., sec. 5.
^^Ibid., sec. 6.
^^118 Cong. Rec. 11583ff.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 12456.
^^S. Kept. 92-606, pp. 24-25.
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idential use of force pursuant to treaties, 5° and another ex-
pressly permitting retaliation in case of attacks on the
Amred Forces. senators Dominick and Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
led the fight against the bill, joined by liberal Senator
McGee (D-Wyo.).52 senator Ervin (D-N.C.) opposed on consti-
tutional grounds, 53 and even dovish Senator Cooper (D-Ky.)
expressed reservations based upon his understanding of the
Constitution.^^
On April 13, 1972, the Senate approved Senate Bill
2956, along with three perfecting amendments offered by Sen-
ator Javits.^^ At this point both houses had passed war
powers legislation; but the House and Senate measures differ-
ed considerably. In order to get the two bills to a confer-
ence committee, the House repassed its bill with the same
designation. Senate Bill 2956, used in the upper chamber.
A conference committee did meet--once, in October, 1972. But
the differences between the bills were so great, and the at-
50
Ibid.
, p. 12588.
118 Cong. Rec. 12458.
51.
52Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power (New
York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 131.
^•^118 Cong. Rec. 12138-41.
54
Ibid., p. 12578. See also S. Kept, 92-606, pp. 28-33.
^^The vote was 68-16. 118 Cong. Rec. 12611.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Concerning the War Powers of
Congress and the President
,
H. Rept. 1302 to Accompany S. 2956,
i^2d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 2, S. 2956, amended, was passed
by the House on August 14, 1972. 118 Cong. Rec. 28083.
374
mosphere was so dominated by the 1972 elections, that the
war powers question was deferred until 1973.^7
1973 was to be the pivotal year for war powers legis-
lation. In March of that year Representative Zablocki's sub-
committee held further hearings much of which were devoted
to consideration of Senator Javits ' proposal. m May, the
Subcommittee drafted House Joint Resolution 542. which was
reported by the full Foreign Affairs Connnittee, four members
opposing. House Joint Resolution 542 was the toughest mea-
sure to gain House committee approval to date.
Its most notable features as as follows. First, it
directs the President to consult in every possible instance
with the leadership and appropriations committees of Congress
before making use-of
-force decisions. Second, it requires a
report whenever the President takes certain actions commit-
ting the Armed Forces. Third, it calls for an automatic
termination of certain commitments after 120 days unless ex-
tended by Congress, or termination by concurrent resolution
(not subject to Presidential veto) before the 120 day period
ends .^^
^^U.S.. Congress, House, War Powers Resolution of
1973
.
H. Rept. 287 to Accompany H.J. Res. S42, 93d Cong.
.
1st
sess., 1973, p. 2; Eagleton, p. 142.
58
U.S., Congress, House, War Powers, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientiiic
Developments o± the Committee on i'oreign Altairs
, y3d Cong.,
isc sess
.
,
ly /J
. i^.ereinatter , uouse Hearings
.
1973}
.
59H. Rept. 93-287, pp. 5-11.
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The differences between House Joint t •^^^^ Resolution 542
and the Javits bill were apparent. While the . .
,
^ ^
.
^'^'•^^ Senate approachd Uneated
.n advance the circ^stances under which the Pres-ident would unilaterally con.it forces, the House hill simply
provided that certain Presidential actions trigger a report
and the termination procedures. And while the
.avits measure
called for automatic 30-day termination, or earlier by Joint
resolution, the Zablocki bill allowed 120 days before auto-
matic cut-off, with the possibility nf »=^Tf a j.Diii ot earlier termination
by concurrent (veto-proof) resolution.
As the House Foreign Affairs Co«ittee report indi-
cated, the most controversial provisions of House Joint Re-
solution 542 would be the termination proposals. Seven Com-
mittee members expressed reservations about these provisions
and four other members refused to sign the report mainly be-
cause of these provisions
.
The principle objections to the 120-day automatic
termination were: (1) that it did not require affirmative
action by the Congress, (2) that it could rob opponents of
any incentive to negotiate, and (3) that it was unconstitu-
tional when applied to actions taken under the Presidential
independent constitutional authority. The concurrent reso-
lution provision was opposed by some because there is doubt
whether any act of Congress not subject to Presidential
60Ibid., pp. 15-20.
376
ere
approval or disapproval can have the force of law. 61
With the Cambodian bombing controversy as backdrop
House debate began on June 25-27, 1973. House Democrats J
fairly united in support and while Republicans opposed their
Policy Committee was unable to agree upon alternative amend-
ments
,
The Nixon administration also opposed House Joint Re-
solution 542. threatening a veto because of the bill's alleg-
edly dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions . ^3 A vote
was scheduled for July 18. On that day a number of substi-
tute measures and amendments were considered. Representative
Dennis (R-Ind.) offered a substitute providing Congressional
approval or disapproval within 90 days of the President's
action by "a bill or resolution appropriate to the purpose."
This would have replaced the automatic 120^ay termination
and would have made the appropriateness of earlier cut-off
by mere concurrent resolution unclear. The Dennis substitute
was rejected, 166-250.^^
A substitute by Congressman Eckhardt (D-Tex.) might
have eliminated some of the constitutional difficulties of
House Joint Resolution 542. It provided that Congress could
^^Ibid.
^^CQ Almanac 1973, p. 910.
^^119 Cong. Rec. 24663 (1973).
^^Ibid., pp. 24654-24655, 24678 (1973).
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direct disengagement by iolnt resolution, or declare that
the President was trenching on Congressional authority
through use of concurrent resolution. There would be no au-
tomatic termination provision. Other language suggested im-
peachment for failure to faithfully execute this law. The
House did not see its merits, however, voting it down 153-
262.^5
Also rejected were amendments to (1) require a vote
of Congressional approval or disapproval within 120 days,
form not specified,66 (2) require disengagement only if Con-
gress enacts "appropriate legislation" within 120 days,^^
(3) substitute an appropriate bill or resolution for the con-
current resolution clause, (4) require a report and trig-
ger the withdrawal mechanisms for all troop deployments, not
just certain placements
, and (5) committee amendments to
apply the bill to ongoing (i.e., Cambodian) hostilities
.
Having beaten back proposals to either weaken or
strengthen the measure, the House then passed House Joint
Resolution 542 by a 244-170 vote.''-'"
^^Ibid., pp. 24678-24679, 24681.
^^Ibid., p. 24694.
^^Ibid., p. 24693,
68.
Ibid.
, p. 24695,
^^Ibid., p. 24677.
'^^Ibid., p. 24684,
'^^Ibid., p. 24707.
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Two days later, the Senate adopted once again its ver-
sion of the War Powers Resolution by a 72^18 vote, 72 ^he
Senate measure, now designated Senate Bill 440, was virtually
identical with the 1972 Javits bill (Senate Bill 2956). 73
Administration spokesmen had already made clear that the Sen-
ate measure was opposed^^ and the expectation of a veto seemed
to obviate the need for a substantial opposition effort.^S
Before Senate Bill 440 had been approved, two amend-
ents of note were rejected. Senator Fulbright wished to add
a clause empowering Congress to restrict or prohibit all
major troop deployments by concurrent resolution. And Sena-
tor Eagleton tried unsuccessfully to extend the bill's cover-
age to all persons employed by or under contract with the
United States government engaging in hostilities or advising
foreign forces.
A House-Senate conference committee first convened
late in July, 1973, ^^^^ Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington,
72$. 440, adopted July 20, 1973, 119 Cong. Rec. 25119.
73U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
.
S. Reot. 220 to
Accompany S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st sess.
,
1973, p. 1.
7^U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers Legislation 1973,
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relation?";
(Jong., ist sess., ly/J, p. 52. jhereinatter
, Senate Hearing s
1973}. See also. House Hearings 1973
, p. 129.
75 cQ Almanac 1973
, p. 914.
76'j.he Fulbright amendment is at 119 Cong. Rec. 25091
(1973). Eagleton's is at ibid., p. 25092.
^^Eagleton, p. 199.
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Muskle. Aiken. Case and Javits fro. the upper chamber, and
Representatives ZablocU. Morgan. Hays. Fraser, MaiUiard
Fascell. Findley. Broomfield and Frelinghuysen serving as
House conferees. Major concessions having been
.ade by the
senators the Conference Co^ittee issued its report October
A, 1973/^
The most significant changes (the table below enables
comparison of the July 1973 House and Senate measures and
the Conference Committee bill) are as follows. The Senate
language codifying Presidential war powers was trinnned con-
siderably and reduced in importance. The House approach,
designating certain troops commitments as the triggering
mechanism for a Presidential report and termination procedires.
was, with modifications, adopted instead.
The automatic termination feature was maintained, but
a 60 day period was adopted, with provision for 30 additional
days in case of military necessity. Finally, the designated
troop commitments could be terminated during the initial 60-
day period by concurrent resolution not subject to Presiden-
tial veto.^°
78U.S., Congress. House, War Powers
.
H. Kept. 547 to
Accompany H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong.
, 1st sess.
,
1973. Mail-
liard and Frelinghuysen refused to sign the Report.
"ibid.
SOlbid.
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When the Conference bill was returned to the House
and Senate in October. 1973, it ran into opposition both
from those who felt the measure too restrictive of Presi-
dential^power, and those who viewed it as not restrictive
enough. The latter group reasoned that the virtual elim-
ination of the codifiction of Presidential powers contained
in the Senate bill had the effect of eliminating any prior
restraint upon Presidential power to connnit troops to hos-
tilities. From their standpoint, the Conference bill per-
mits 60 to 90 days of Presidentially-initiated war.^^
However, in addition to the fact that Javits, Ful-
bright and Zablocki all urged passage, the Conference bill
had other factors working in its behalf. President Nixon
was becoming increasingly enveloped in the Watergate scandal
and related matters, and his ability to defend Presidential
prerogative against Congressional challenge was weakening.
On October 10, 1973, the day the Senate voted upon
the Conference bill, Vice-President Agnew resigned his of-
fice. The Senate approved House Joint Resolution 542, 75
to 20. "Two days later the House approved the measure, 238-
123, and it was sent to Nixon for an almost certain veto 84
^^119 Ceng, Rec. 33548-69, 33858-73,
82See Eagleton's argument, ibid., pp. 33555-33556,
®^Ibid., p. 33569.
®^Ibid., p. 33873,
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On October 20, President Nb.on dismissed the Special
Prosecutor investigating the Watergate affair, (Nixon's At-
torney General resigned rather than carry out the dismissal,
and when the task fell to the reluctant Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral he too was removed from office, )85 ^nd four days later
President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution
.
Nixon's veto message criticized the Resolution for
restrictions on Presidential authority that "are both uncon-
stitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Na-
tion." Specifically, he contended that the 60-day automat-
ic termination provisions (section 5(b)) and the provision
for earlier termination of hostilities by concurrent resolu-
tion (section 5(c)) are unconstitutional. He further argued
that the bill would undermine American capacity to respond
to international crisis, erode the confidence of allies and
the respect of adversaries.^^
He suggested that such a bill might have impeded
responses in the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue of 1964, the Jordanian cri-
sis of 1970, as well as recent actions in the middle east.
The point here seems to be that troop deployments for diplo-
O Q
matic purposes would be affected.
^^New York Times
.
21 October 1973, p. 1,
^^119 Cong. Rec, 34990-34991.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
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Finally, the 60.day cut-off was attacked on a num-
ber of grounds. First, it was not clear just when the pro-
vision would be triggered. Second, it permits Congress to
assert its authority through inaction: a "yes or no vote-
would not be required. Third, Nixon argued that an auto-
matic cut-off could rob an adversary of any incentive to
negotiate or, encourage a rapid escalation by the United
States in order to successfully end the operation. ^9
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Morgan CD-
Pa.) and subcommittee chairman Zablocki prepared a reply to
the veto message, defending House Joint Resolution 542.^°
In effect, the reply simply denied or attempted to refute
each of the points made by the White House, That Zablocki
was successful cannot be attributed to sheer force of argu-
ment alone.
Congress and especially the Democrats in Congress
were restive. They had been unable to override any of the
eight Nixon vetoes that year. And now with all American
troops home from Indochina and scandal tainting the adminis-
tration, the legislature saw a chance to strike.
In a dramatic November 7th session, following intense
lobbying by both sides, ^ the House voted 284 to 135 to ap-
^^Ibid.
^^119 Cong, Rec, 33868-33869 (1973),
^•^CQ Almanac 1973
. pp, 905-906,
^^Ibid,
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prove the act over the President's veto," ^our hours later
the Senate, as expected, completed the override, 75 to 18,
and the War Powers Resolution became Public Law 93-148.5^'
93119 Cong, Rec. 36221-36222.
94
Ibid., p. 36198; CQ Almanac 1973, pp. 905-906.
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Public Law 93-148
93rd Congress, H, J, Res. 542
November 7, 1973
JOINT RESOLUTION
Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President
Resolved by the Senat^d House of Repr.....^...,...
of the United States of Mer.r. in Congress assemhI.H
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as
the "War Powers Resolution".
PURPOSE AND POLICY
Sec, 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolu-
tion to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution
of the United States and insure that the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President will apply to the in-
troduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the con-
tinued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situa-
tions
.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution,
it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the
power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
291
States, or in any department or officer thereof,
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as
Connnander-in-Chief to introduce United States Anned Forces
xnto hostilities, or into situations where i^^^inent involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces,
CONSULTATION
SEC, 3, The President in every possible instance
shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall
consult regularly with the Congress until United States
Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have
been removed from such situations.
REPORTING
SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war,
in any case in which United States Armed Forces are intro-
duced--
(1) into hostilities or into situation where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances;
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C2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a
foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for
deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement,
repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in number which substantially enlarge United
States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located
in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within
48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report,
in writing, setting forth-
-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduc-
tion of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority
under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hos-
tilities or involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information
as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its con-
stitutional responsibilities with respect to commiting the
Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces
abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced
into hostilities or into any situation described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as
such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities
or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the
393
stacus of such ho3tiUties o. situation, as well as on the
scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in
no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once
every six months.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Sec. 5(a) Each report submitted pursuant to section
4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Sen-
ate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted
shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Connnittee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate for appropriate Action. If, when the
report is transmitted, the Congress haa adjourned sine die
or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar
days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advis-
able (of if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the member-
ship of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the
President to convene Congress in order that it may consider
the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this sec-
tion.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is sub-
mitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4
(a)(1), which ever is earlier, the President shall terminate
any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which
such report is submitted (or required to be submitted) , un-
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less the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a spe-
cific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed at-
tack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be
extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the
President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing
that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of
United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal
of such forces
.
Cc) Notwithstanding subsection (b) , at any time that
United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside
the territory of the United States, its possessions and terri-
tories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution,
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR
JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL
SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pur-
suant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before
the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such sec-
tion shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee
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shall report one such Joint resolution or bill, together
with its reco^endations, not later than twenty-four cal-
endar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period
specified in such section, unless such House shall other-
wise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall be-
come the pending business of the House in question (in the
case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally
divided between the proponents and the opponents)
, and shall
be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless
such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House
shall be referred to the committee of the other House named
in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than
fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-
day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution
or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the
House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar
days after it has been reported, unless such House shall
otherwise determine by yeas and nays
.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two
Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill
passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report
with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period
3)6
specified in section 5Cb). In tKe even.
.Ke conferees are
their respective Hou<?pq ^r, „P ses in disagreement. Notwithstanding
any rule in either concerning the printing of conference re-
ports in the Record or concerning any delay in the considera-
txon of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both
Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
SEC. 7, (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pur-
suant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Conmiittee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may
be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported
out by such committee together with its recommendations with-
in fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become
the pending business of the House in question (in the case
of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided
between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted
on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House
shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House
shall be referred to the committee of the other House named
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in subsection (a) and shall be reported nuti-eporc a o by such committee
•together with its recon^endations within fifteen calendar
days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such
House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, un-
less such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays,
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two
Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution
passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report
with respect to such concurrent resolution within six cal-
endar days after the legislation is referred to the committee
of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House con-
cerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or
concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports,
such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than
six calendar days after the conference report has been filed.
In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours,
they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagree-
ment .
INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred--
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(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in
effect before the date of the enactment of this Joint
resolution)
.
including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act. unless such provision specifically
authorizes the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into such situations and
states that it is intended to constitute specific stat-
utory authorization within the meaning of this Joint
resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter rati-
fied unless such treaty is implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such sit-
uations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
this joint resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed
to require any further specific statutory authorization to
permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate
jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more for-
eign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level
military commands vzhich were established prior to the date
of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the
United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United
States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint re'solution, the term
399
"introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the
assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coor-
dinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regu-
lar or irregular military forces of any foreign country or
government when such military forces are engaged, or there
exists an imminent threat that such forces will become en-
gaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in the joint resolution-
-
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional auth-
ority of the Congress or of the President, or the pro-
visions of existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority
to the President with respect to the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into sit-
uations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circimistances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC, 9. If any provision of this joint resoltuion or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held in-
valid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the applica-
tion of such provision to any other person or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC, 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the
date of its enactment,
401
Analysis of the War PowP.r.. Poo^^^Hl^
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the meaning
and intent of the War Powers Resolution. Section 2, desig-
nated the "Purpose and Policy" section, indicates in subsec
tion (a) that the joint resolution is intended "to fulfill
the intent of the framers of the Constitution
... and in-
sure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to" use-of
-force decisions.
Subsection (b) of that same section asserts as con-
stitutional warrant for the Resolution. Article I. section 8.
Of the Constitution, especially the "necessary and proper"
clause. In Article I, section 8, Congress is given the
power to "declare war" (clause 11) , "make rules for the gov-
ernment and regulation of the land and naval forces (clause
14)," and make "all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution" not only these and other legis-
lative powers, but also
all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States or in any
department or officer thereof.
The theory here is that the President, being an "of-
ficer" of the United States, may be subjected to a legisla-
tive procedure in the exercise of his powers. More specifi-
cally, the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and chief
^^U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
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executive be clarified b. Congress and implemented in
accordance with acts of Congress, A major legal issue sur-
rounding war powers legislation is whether such an act merely
clarifies and provides implementation procedures for Presi-
dential powers, or whether it in fact alters and trenches
upon them. ^
Subsection (c) of Section 2 is one of the most contro-
versial provisions in the Resolution. It was the product of
compromise between the elaborate codification of Presidential
powers in the Senate bill and the absence of any codifica^
tion in the House version. ^7 ^he Senate measure the
President's authority to commit forces to hostilities was
defined and circumscribed as a matter of law. The effect of
Section 2(c) is not nearly so clear.
It states that the constitutional powers of the Com-
mander-in-Chief to make use-of-force decisions
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration
of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or
a national emergency created by attack uponthe United States, its territories or possessions.
However, its location in the "Purpose and Policy"
portion of the Act suggests that it might not have the bind-
ing force that the codification in the Senate bill would
have had,^^ On the other hand, a Purpose and Policy section
See, e.g., House Hearings 1973
. p, 130/ Senate Hear-ings 1973
. p. 19,
97Sen. Fulbright so contended at 119 Cong, Rec. 33548,
98See ibid., p. 33555 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton)
,
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is not a Preamble, and Section 2(c) does follow the "Resolved
by the Congress" clause. 59
Secondly, unlike the Senate bill, this delineation
of Presidential power no longer serves as the triggering
mechanism for the rest of the Act. The Conference Report
makes this quite clear.
Subsequent sections of the joint resolution are notdependent upon the language of the subsection, as
was the case with g similar provision of the SenateDili (section 3)
.
Thirdly, there is no "enforcing language. Instead
of directing the President to exercise his powers in a cer-
tain manner, the clause merely states that they are so exer-
cised, a peculiar use of tense. '"^^
Finally, there seem to have been some serious omis-
sions in this catalogue of Presidential powers. The Senate
bill (S. 440) said that the President had "recognized powers"
to respond not just to attacks upon the United States, but
also to (1) the "imminent threat" of attack on the United
States, (2) the imminent threat of attack on the United States
Armed Forces, and (3) threats to United States citizens and
nationals abroad. None of these are included among 2(c)s
QQ
^^William B. Spong, Jr., "The War Powers Resolution
Revisited: Historic Accomplisliment or Surrender?," William
and Mary Law Review 16 (1975) :837, 840.
IOOr. Rept. 93-547; p. 8.
^°^Spong, p. 838.
102Gerhard Casper, "Constitutional Restraints on the
Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model,"
University of Chicago Law Review 43 (Srping 1976) :484.
enumeration of the President., constitutional powers, Sec-
tion 2(c) may thus be inconsistent with Section 8Cd) which
States that
Nothing in this joint resolut-i'nn * .
senator Eagleton xnay not have been going too far when
ha declared the provision "no more hinding than a 'whereas'
clause in a Kiwanis Club resolution. "103 3^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^
as prljne sponsor in the Senate spoke more authoritatively
regarding the legislative intent, characterized Section 2 CO
as "by no means valueless or inoperative, "^^^ It is, he
went on, "a declaration of the meaning (of the) Constitution
.
.
or, we might add, Congress' understanding of that
meaning
.
In short, Section 2(c) is advisory, and Presidents
may or may not heed its advice. In fact. President Ford pro-
ceeded to ignore 2(c) in the spring, 1975, rescues of Ameri^
can and Indochinese nationals from Southeast Asia,-"-^^
By contrast. Section 3 imposes non-discretionary obli-
gations upon the President
.
j^. directs that the President
"•^^119 Cong. Rec, 33555 (1973),
^^^Ibid., p. 33557.
^°^Ibid., p. 33558,
^^^Spong, p. 840.
Compliance Hearings
. pp, 10-11,
^^^119 Cong, Rec. 33550 (1973),
^05
m ever, possible Instance shall consult with Congress be-fore mtroductlng" forces into hostilities or situations in-dxcatlng i::.inent involvement. (M, emphasis). The phrase
"in every possible Instance" had been carried over fro. the
House bin unmodified and so ve .ay turn to the report accom-
panying that bill for Interpretation.
The use of the word "every" was Intended to make prior
consultation
"Inclusive." i.e.. applicable even to emergency
Circumstances where there is no time for formal Congressional
authorlzation.109
consultation requirement is
modified by the use of the word "possible," by which Congress
recognizes
That a situation may be so dire, e,g.{ } hostile
tinelus Action th'^ require 'such ins
possible P'^'-^'^ consultation will be
Clearly some ambiguity or uncertainty is evident here.
The difference between an emergency requiring prior consulta-
tion and an emergency so dire that none is possible is a mat-
ter of judgment. President Ford complained that in the inter-
national crises of his Presidency it was "literally impossible"
to meaningfully consult with Congress.
It is clear from Section 3 that not all troop deploy-
ments require prior consultation; only commitments to hostil-
109
^H. Kept. 93-287, p. 6.
llOlbid.
^^^New York Times
. 12 April 1977, p. 14,
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ities or imminent hostilities are covered. Although Presi-
dential reports are required for foreign deployments of com-
bat troops (section 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3) ), no prior consulta-
tion is mandated in these instances unless hostilities are on-
going or imminent . -^-'^
"Hostilities" is defined broadly to include both
"actual fighting" and "a state of confrontation" with a "clear
and present danger of armed conflict , "^^^ While this pre-
sents some problems, the phrase "imminent hostilities" is
even more troublesome. This is defined as a situation with
a "clear potential" for either fighting or a state of con-
frontation
.
''^
Consider, however, the difficulties that arise when
we try to apply this standard to a real-life event. When
President Kennedy sent 20,000 military advisers to Vietnam,
was this a commitment to hostilities or imminent hostili-
ties T-'--'-^ If so, consultation would have been required had
the War Powers Resolution been in force.
There is also some ambiguity surrounding the parties
to consultation. The Conference Committee substituted con-
sultation with Congress for consultation with the leadership
^•^^Compliance Hearings
, p. 3.
^^^H, Kept. 93-287, p. 7,
ll^lbid.
^^^The Congressmen favoring war powers legislation
could not agree on this question. See House Hearings 1973
,
pp. 16-17, 73-74,
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and appropriate comittees as designated in the House
bill. This change suggests that the President and Con-
gress were intended to have greater flexibility in select-
ing members of Congress to consult with the executive branch.
Section 3 does not require a minimum number of legislative
consultants, nor does it stipulate that certain Congressional
officers, or committees, or committee chairmen participate,
nor that representatives of the opposing political party be
in on discussions.
Furthermore. Section 3 directs the President to con-
sult, and the report accompanying the House bill says that
"for consultation to be meaningful, the President himself
must participate. "^^^ However, following the Mayaguez inci-
dent of 1975, the State Department noted four separate sets
of executive-legislative communications
--only one of which
apparently involved President Ford personally-
-and claimed
that these constituted fulfillment of the consultation re-
quirements of section 3.-^-'-^
Another issue raised by Section 3 involved the quality
of the executive-legislative communication; i.e., what con-
stitutes consultation? The earlier House report is, once
Kept. 93-547, p. 8,
^"^H. Kept. 93-287, p. 7.
•^•^^Compliance Hearings
, pp. 78-79, Several Congress-
men disputed the claim that the requirements of Section 3
were fulfilled, but not on the basis of che absence of per-
sonal Presidential communication.
408
again, authoritative here. It declared that
A considerable amount of attention was given to thedefinition of consultation
. Rejected was tL notion that consultation should he s^on^ous witS"merely beging informed. Rather. cS^sul^atLn inthis provision means that a decision is pending ona problem and that Members of Congress a?ebe?n.asked by the President for theiridvice and opinionsand, in appropriate circumstances, their approvalof action contemplated. 119
Again the first tests of compliance (the southeast
Asian evacuations and Mayaguez incident of 1975), some legis-
lators contended that Congress was merely advised or informed,
as opposed to having been consulted, -^^^
More recently, former President Ford, citing time fac-
tors, security leak risks, and the President's ability to
stay abreast of fast-breaking developments, declared that
it is impossible to draw the Congress into the
decis ion-making process in an effective way. 121
This seems all but a confession that Congress did not
consult as mandated by Section 3. Ford's point, of course,
was that the Resolution should be re-examined with regard to
loosening the consultation requirement, "^^^
The last clause of Section 3 requires consultation
after troops are committed to hostilities or imminent hostil-
''•^H. Rept. 93-287, pp. 6-7.
120See Compliance Hearings
, p, 82; Spong, pp, 855,
note 182, 856, 856, note 187,
-^^^New York Times
.
12 April 1977, p. 14,
l^^iMd.
^09
ities. This consultation must take place "regularly" until
American forces "are no longer engaged in hostilities or
have been removed" from situations of imminent hostilities.
The term "regularly" is left undefined, but Congress made
clear its intention that "consultation take place during
hostilities even when advance consultation is not possi-
ble. "123
Finally, Senator Javits made this point for the
record: consultation is not intended by Congress to serve
as authorization for executive action; it "is not a substi-
tute for specific statutory authorization. ""^24
We turn then to Section 4, entitled "Reporting," and
thus to the triggering mechanism for the report and termi-
nation procedure. As we have noted, this section, unlike
the Senate bill (S.440), does not attempt to set out in ad-
vance the circum.stances under which the President may com-
mit forces to hostilities. Instead it makes reporting and
the termination of hostilities mechanisms contingent upon
certain kinds of troop commitments
.
There are three types of circumstances, all occurring
in the absence of a declaration of war, in which the intro-
duction of United States Armed Forces serves as a triggering
device. The first entails their introduction into hostil-
123h. Kept. 93-547, p. 8.
124ii9 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973).
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itles or situatipng of imminent hostilities ,^^5
This makes an interesting change in the House bill
(Section 3(1)), which specified that the forces had to be
committed to actual (not just potential) hostilities taking
place outside United States territory exclusively . ^26 This
does not mean that the introduction of forces into hostil-
ities or potential hostilities on United States soil without
a declaration of war is prohibited. But it does mean that
the reporting, and more significantly, the termination pro-
cedures are thereby triggered, and therefore the introduc-
tion of forces into hostilities on American soil in response
to attacks on the United States are, for example, subject to
the automatic 60-day termination rule specified in Section
5(b). Congress' legal authority to provide for termination
of such conflicts is in doubt.
A more compelling problem perhaps is raised by the am-
biguity surrounding the meaning of the terms "hostilities,"
or worse still, "imminent hostilities . ""^^^ We might ask at
this point, who or what agency decides when troops have been
committed to hostilities or imminent hostilities? Is this
a matter for Presidential or Congressional determination?
^2%ar Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, sec. 4(a)(1),
87 Stat. 555 (1973)
.
For emphasis on the latter point see H. Kept, 93-
287. p. 7.
^^^See note 110, supra, and accompanying text.
At bottom this is a political question, to be determined by
the relative power of the two branches; for while the Presi-
dent may initially withhold a report, Congress may insist
that the unreported activities cease nevertheless . 128
In short, 4(a)(1) provides that whenever the armed
forces are introduced into combat, or a state of confronta-
tion presenting a clear and present danger of combat, or a
situation of clear potential for either combat or confronta-
tion, a report is required and the 60-day termination count-
down goes into effect.^^^
Section 4(a)(2), the second of the three triggers in-
volves the introduction of combat troops abroad, even with-
out the existence of hostilities or imminent hostilities.
Congress intended this trigger to be operative even if
there were only "some risk, however small, of the forces
being involved in hostilities
.
"'"^^
Note that the troops would have to be "equipped for
combat," and introduced into the "territory, airspace or
waters of a foreign nation." So for example, war ship de-
ployments to international waters would not be included; nor
would deployments to foreign shores of military advisers who
plicat:
for automata.*- L.t.a.uiJ,i.ia.uj,wi.i oj-A.i__y uayo ctj. ui
mitted "or is required to be submitted."
-"^^See H. Kept. 93-287, p. 7.
^^°Ibid,, pp, 7-8.
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are not equipped foz: combat.
Also excluded are combat deployments related solely
to "supply, replacement, repair, or training" of United
States forces. The legislative intent here was to waive
the reporting requirement in cases of "routine port supply
calls, emergency aid measures, normal training exercises,
and other noncombat military activities , "^31 The meaning
of the phrase "emergency aid measures" is not clear,
The report accompanying the House bill, which was
virtually identical with the final act respecting this pro.
Vision, clarifies the Congress' intentions. It read as
follows
.
A report would be required any time combat mili-tary forces were sent to another nation to alter
or preserve the existing political status quo orto make the United States presence felt Thusfor example, the dispatch of Marines to ThailaAdm 1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the sameyear would have required Presidential reports.
The requirement that such activities be formally re-
ported to Congress is non-controversial and it should be
noted that such reported activities are not subject to the
automatic 60
-day termination rule.
Section 4(a)(3) describes the third of the triggering
events. It calls for a report whenever forces are intro-
duced in numbers which "substantially enlarge" a United
States combat troop commitment abroad. The key word here
^^^Ibid., p. 8,
132
Ibid.
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is "substantially," and once again the House report is in-
structive
.
While the word ' subs^an^^ an,r» j
Ible criterion, il is po"ss?b^e .^"^S'?"^^ ^ flex-
sense understaAding of the n,'^™hn ^
percent increase il numbe?s^ M^^,- * 1°°-
embassy-say from 5 to in "frine guards at an
occasion fo? a Report A'r'h™?""^^ "^'^^'^ ^°
sent to Europe Snder^reln^ •^"'^ additional men
significantly en?frge^tbe ?otaiT"f'r"
tlttTt i'ir ^'hP -^^^^ Ho^ev^r:°?hr5!s?''patch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay Cuba th^rh
oraS^pe^cen^'S would'iean'an IncreaseWO. Z.J percent, which is substantial Undp-r rhi
circumstance {sic?} President Kennedy woSd havebeen required to report to Congress in 1962 whenhe raised the number of tt q ^-.i-i^- j T
Vietnam from ySSto lefoOO.J^a"^'^''"^^ advisers in
Thus, substantiality involves consideration of both
the size of the original combat force commitments as well
as the size of the proportion of the increment. While this
clarifies the term "substantially." it still leaves a great
deal uncertain. There is no strict numerical standard for
determining when a substantial enlargement has been made.
We have described each of the three triggering events
in some detail. If any one of them were to occur, section
4(a) stipulates that the President submit a written report
within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House and President
pro tempore of the Senate. This report is mandatory, not
optional, and is required "within 48 hours of the causal
,,^34
event .
"
Ibid.
134
119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
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m 1975, President Ford sub„,itted four reports pur-
suant to 4(a) respecting the southeast Asian evacuations
and the Ma^aguez incident. "5 These were the first reports
ever submitted under the Resolution. Section 4(a) requires
that the reports set forth the circumstances necessitating
the introduction of forces, the constitutional and legisla-
tive authority for the actinn ^r,^ ^t,/ cn o , and the estimated scope and
duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Section 4(b) provides that the President shall pro-
vide such other information as the Congress may request
. i . e ,
,
over and above what was supplied in the report. This
creates another area of potential legislative-executive con-
flict, especially if a President were to refuse information
requested on grounds of national security.
Section 4(c) requires additional Presidential reports
subsequent to any of the troop introductions described in
4(a). These reports on the status as well as the scope and
duration of the military operations are required "periodi-
cally," but at a minimum "once every six months," for as
135 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Intemation Rela-
tions, The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents. Cor-
respondence, Reports
. January 1976 Kdir-inn m^<.h^^rri-^^ .
Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 40-46. {Hereinafter.
War Powers Documents }
.
136
119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
,
137
For judicial views on executive attempts to maintain
secrecy, see. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), and United States v. Nixon, 418. U.S. 683 (1974).
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long as United States forces are involved in hostilities or
situations described in 4(a) .-'•^^
Section 5(a) requires that reports submitted pursuant
to 4(a)(1) (introduction into hostilities or potential hos-
tilities) be transmitted to the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the Senate "on the same calendar
day," thereupon to be referred to the respective foreign
relations committees. If Congress is not in session when
the report is submitted, 5(a) provides that the Speaker and
President pro tempore "jointly request" the President to con-
vene Congress should they "deem it advisable," or should 30
percent or more of the members of the respective chambers
so petition.
Section 5(b), the automatic 60-day termination clause,
is one of the most controversial provisions of the law.
Thereunder, the President is required to terminate any use
of the armed forces introduced pursuant to Section 4(a)(1)
sixty calendar days after the initial report regarding these
operations was submitted or required. A number of points
require emphasis. It is clear that the termination rule
only applies to forces introduced into hostilities or immi-
nent hostilities; all other troop deployments, even those
requiring reports pursuant to Sections 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3)
^^^87 Stat. 556.
-"^^Ibid. See also H. Rept, 93-^87, p. 9.
616
are not covered. -'^^
This can create some confusion, because if the Presi-
dent does not report or does not specify under which subsec-
tion of 4(a) he is reporting it will be left to Congress to
make clear that the "60-day clock" is running.
However, termination was intended to take place
whether or not a report was submitted, the 60 days to be
reckoned starting 48 hours after the introduction of forces
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Thus a failure
to report, or a late submission would not extend the 60-day
T / 9
limit. (Actually, if we include the 48-hour period set
aside for Presidential reporting, the termination period
runs 62 days from the start of hostilities.)
It is also clear that 4(a) CI) commitments are auto-
matically terminated without any further Congressional ac-
tion; in fact, operations are terminated even if Conges s is
not in session. -^^^
.
1^^119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen, Ja-
vits); H. Kept. 93-547, p. 9.
141
President Ford's Report of April 30, 1975, was non-
specific, but the operation ended long before the two-month
deadline. War Powers Documents
, p. 43. Note Javits ' re-
marks at 119 Cong. Rec. 33551 (1973) . A similar point was
raised by Gerald L. Jenkins, "The War Powers Resolution:
Statutory Limitation on the Commander-in-Chief," Harvard
Journal on Legislation 11 (February 1974): 196.
^^^119 Cong. Rec. 33551 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Ja-
vits) .
143
Ibid., p. 33859 (remarks of Mr. Zablocki)
.
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Soine object to the 60.day cut-off as an implied au-
thorization to the President to conduct "war" for two
months.1^^ Others see the rule as encouraging escalation
by Presidents (to beat the deadline) or negotiating balkiness
by adversaries (to take advantage of an assured United States
retreat. gtiU others criticize the derogation from Pres
idential power created by mandating a deadline without re-
quiring any additional legislative action. There is also
the constitutional question raised by claiming that Congress
may compel withdrawal of American forces which the President
committed, presumably on the basis of his constitutional au-
thority.
The strength of these objections notwithstanding, the
intention of Congress to automatically terminate section 4(a)
(1) operaticns after two months is clear. More problematic
is the standard for determining within 48 hours of a troop
deployment whether or not it is a 4(a)(1) (hostilities or
imminent hostilities) operation.
Section 5(b) also provides for extension or waiving
the 60-day deadline by Congress. Waiver would occur if Con-
gress has declared war, or enacted a "specific authorization"
'•^^Eagleton, pp. v-vi,
^^^119 Cong. Rec. 34991 (1973) (War Powers Resolution
Veto Message of President Nixon)
.
146
"^For example, Rep. Dennis (R-Xnd.) at 119 Cong. Rec.
33861 (1973).
^18
for this use of the anned forces, or is "physically unable
to meet" because of an attack on the United States. Con-
gress may also extend "by law" the sixty-day period.
Finally. 5(b) provides that the 60-day period shall
be extended for an additional 30 days upon written Presiden-
tial notification to Congress that "unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States forces"
requires their continued deployment. This continued use.
however, only applies "in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces . "'^^
The tightly dram criteria of 5(b) require that the
30-day extension apply only when safe extrication of United
States forces on the 60th day (the automatic deadline) is
impossible. Furthermore, the extension cannot be justi-
fied by any policy objectives other than safeguarding the
physical safety of the United States forces involved,
Nevertheless, the language clearly permits the President to
gain an additional 30 days for the conduct of hostilities
simply upon proper certification to Congress,
We turn then to Section 5(c), another lightning rod
for criticism of the Resolution. The clause is brief. It
-•^^87 Stat. 556,
^^«ibid.
149
119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen.Javits),
ISOxbid.
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states that Congress ™ay compel the President to remove
United States forces engaged m hostilities abroad by pas-
sing a concurrent resolution. First, It should be noted
that It only applies to forces outside the United States
proper, or Its territories and possessions ,^51
Second, these forces must actually be "engaged in
hostilities," presumably this would not Include forces In-
troduced into situations where l™,inent involvement in hos-
tilities Is clearly Indicated.
Third, It takes a mere concurrent resolution to com-
pel withdrawal. A concurrent resolution amounts to a legis-
lative veto,153 b,,,„3^ ,^ ^3 ^^^^^^^ ^
of both houses of Congress without PresiHential rpvi.,., for
signature or disapproval. The legal status of such mea-
sures is in doubt because Article I, section 7, clause 3,
of the Constitution stipulates that "Every Order, Resolution,
or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall
15187 Stat. 556.
152ibid.
1 53
^. '/t/°?^P*" ^- K^r^is, Congressional Control of Adminis-
chap^^S
^^^^^^^'^S^^"' Tiie Brookings Institut ion, 1964);
'
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be approved by him ..." Nevertheless, there is a long,
and since World War II. a growing list of enactments con-
taining such provisions . -'-^^
The effect here is to permit a simple majority of
both houses of Congress to "veto" troop commitments to hos-
tilities by the President. However, hostilities cannot be
"vetoed" during the 30-day extention for military necessity,
nor if Congress extends the 60-day deadline by law.^^^ In
addition, as the statute specifies, hostilities authorized
by declaration of war or specific statutory authorization
are excluded from the 5(c) termination procedure . ^"^^
"In effect," the report accompanying an earlier House
measure incorporating this same procedure said,
the joint resolution 'endows' this concurrent reso-lution with the binding force of statute. Since
the language applies to a situation where there
is no congressional authorization for the Presi-
dent's action it thereby avoids the possibility
of a Presidential veto--and resulting impasse--
which would be possible on a bill or joint reso-
lution. 157
Sections 6 and 7, respectively, establish priority
procedures for (1) bills or joint resolutions (provided for
"'^^H. Lee Watson, "Congress Steps Out: A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive," California Law Re-
view 63 (July 1975) : 983-1094. —
—
1 s s
-^^^119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Jarits)
""•^^87 Stat, 556-557.
^^^H. Rept. 93-287, p. 11,
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in 5(b)) to waive or extend the automatic 60-day cut-off;
and (2) concurrent resolutions (provided for in 5(c)) to
terminate hostilities abroad, 158
The procedures are self-explanatory; just a few
points require emphasis. Sections 6 and 7 require all mea-
sures introduced pursuant to Section 5 to be referred to the
respective foreign affairs/relations comittees of the
chamber of introduction. It is the responsibility of these
comittees to report out one bill for a vote, whereupon that
measure becomes the pending business of the chamber. 1^9
On the Senate side, debate time must be divided
equally between proponents and opponents of the measure,
thus eliminating the possibility of filibuster. Although
there are specific deadlines for committee and house action,
each chamber is free to modify these by a simple majority
vote. Furthermore, even if all deadlines are met, a bill
or joint resolution need not, under Section 6, clear both
houses of Congress before 48 days of the 60-day cut-off per-
iod are consumed. (This does not include time for conference
committee. If this is necessary the Resolution allots up to
59 days for the measure to clear.) A concurrent resolution
could, under Section 7, take as much as 51 days to clear,
^^®87 Stat. 557-558.
^^^ibid., p. 557.
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exclusive of conference work, ^60
These procedures do not guarantee that Congress will
act speedily, or at all. While they do eliminate or shorten
various time
-consuming hurdles in the legislative process,
a simple majority vote in one chamber can defer action on
any proposal indefinitely . '^^
Section 8, the last major provision of the Resolution,
is entitled "Interpretation of Joint Resolution," Subsec-
tion (a) denies that the President derives authority to in-
troduce troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities from
either statutes or treaties that do not specifically author-
ize such introductions. 8(a) relies upon language in the
Senate bill (S, 440)."^^^
The intent of 8(a)(1) is to deny that "area resolu-
tions" such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 or defense
appropriations (as alleged to the contrary in Orlando v.
Laird) may serve to authorize the introduction of forces into
hostilities. (At the time the War Powers Resolution was ap-
proved three area resolutions remained on the statute books;
the "Formosa Resolution" (1955) , the "Middle East Resolution"
(1957)
,
and the "Cuban Resolution" (1962) . The Tonkin Reso-
160ibid,
, pp. 557-558.
^^•See Jenkins, pp. 197-198,
^62ii9 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
.
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lution had been repealed by Congress, effective January 12
1971.)
8(a)(1) requires that such area resolutions or appro,
specifically atithorizp, the introduction of forces
into hostilities, and that they do so with reference to the
War Powers Resolution. While the Senate bill (8.440) made
this requirement prospective and upheld the validity of the
three area resolutions in force,163 ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^.^^
retroactively and therefore probably modifies the resolu-
tions to the extent that they cannot, unamended, authorize
troop introductions into hostilities .^^^
8(a)(1) also aims to strike down the doctrine of
Orlando v. Laird, viz., that appropriations to the military
may provide authority for hostilities. To the extent that
Orlando is grounded in the Constitution, it is unassailable
by simple legislation. To the extent that it relies upon
the Court's powers of statutory construction, Congress may
have the final word on the subject. -^^^ As a result, the
effect of this provision is yet unclear.
Subsection (a) (2) concerns the domestic effect of
^^^S. Rept. 93-220, p. 24,
164The legislative intent is not clear on this, Cf
.
.
Jenkins, pp. 199-200.
165Orlando did not receive much wider application,
The U, S, Supreme Court denied certiorari, 443 F. 2d 1039
(2d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U,S, 869 01971),
all treaties "heretofore or hereafter ratified," and thus
would be applicable, e.g., to the NATO pact.^^e
.^^^^^
of 8(a)(2) is to require that all United States treaties be
interpreted as non-self-executing with respect to the auth-
orization of hostilities or imminent hostilities
.
Despite the United States agreement in article 5 of
NATO to view an attack on any one signatory as an attack on
all, the President would not be able to introduce troops in-
to hostilities on the authority of the Treaty without imple-
menting legislation. (It is possible that article 4 of NATO,
the "constitutional processes" provision, requires implement-
ing legislation anyhow.)
Under 8(a) C2) no treaty standing alone could be inter-
preted as warranting hostilities; Congress would have to en-
act "specific statutory authorization" within the meaning of
the War Powers Resolution, There is a serious constitutional
question as to whether Congress may prohibit the chief exe-
cutor of treaties-^^^ and the Commander-in-Chief''^^ from en-
^^^63 Stat. 2341, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949
^^^119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
^^^U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1.
^^^Ibid., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
forcing an international agreement by the use of force short
of_war,^70 ^rj,^^ Powers Resolution speaks of "hostili-
ties," a term considerably broader than "war.")
In order to assure allies that this Resolution does
not affect United States treaty obligations, section 8(d)(1)
expressly declares the following.
Nothing in this joint resolution ... is intended
to alter ... the provisions of existing treaties
However, insofar as implementing legislation was not
intended by existing treaties, 8(d)(1) may be inconsistent
with 8(a) (2)
.
Turning to section 8(b), we note Congress' intent to
avoid disrupting the NATO command structure . "'^^ This provi-
sion is understood to apply to the "high-level military com-
mands" of NATO, the North American Air Defense command
(NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea (UNC)."'-^^
The language makes clear that nothing in the Resolution is
intended to
prevent members of the United States Armed Forces
from participating in certain joint military exer-
cises with ailed or friendly organizations or
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Consti-
tution (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1972), p. 407,
note ICQ.
^71h. Rept. 93-287, p. 12.
^^^119 Cong. Rec, 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
^^^H. Rept. 93-547, p. 10.
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coimtries .^^^
Subsection (c) is designed to broaden the meaning of
the phrase "introduction of United States a:^ed forces" to
include members of the armed forces serving as military ad-
visers assigned to foreign forces, This would not in-
clude non-armed forces personnel, such as CIA advisers ."^76
and it only applies when the foreign forces are engaged in
or face imminent hostilities.
Section 8(d)(1) uses the language of the House bill
"to disclaim any intention of altering the constitutional
grants of war powers to the legislative and executive
17 7branches." This provision, while high-sounding, has very
little significance. The other part of 8(d)(1), denying any
intent to alter treaty provisions, has already been noted.
(See above)
.
Section 8(d)(2) declares that nothing in the Resolu-
tion may be interpreted as granting the President any auth-
ority respecting the introduction of forces into hostilities
that he did not already possess.
8(d)(2) seems clearly inconsistent with sections 4
(a)(1) and 5(b), which assinne the introduction by the Presi-
^•^^S. Rept. 93-220, p. 27.
^'^^The Senate expressly rejected such a proposal. 119
Cong. Rec. 25092 (1973).
^^^H. Rept. 93-287, p. 12.
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dent of forces into hostilities for up to 2 months without
Congressional approval. Although Senator Javits, responding
to Senator Eagleton's charge, denied it was so.^^S sections
4(a)(1) and 5(b) do imply that the President has the author^
ity to conduct hostilities for 60 days, unqualified by any
standards for the exercise of that power. It is doubtful
that before this Resolution the President could have claimed
the unqualified authority to conduct hostilities for two
months without legislative approval.
The last sections (9 and 10) consist of a standard
"separability clause," declaring Congress' intent that the
invalidation of one provision by a court not affect the re-
mainder, and that the Resolution take effect upon day of
179
enactment
,
This completes my analysis of the meaning of the War
Powers Resolution. In the last section of this chapter I
explore some Constitutional problems raised by the law.
IV. The War Powers Resolution and the Constitution
The War Powers Resolution relies upon Congress' Con-
stitutional authority to declare war,''-^^ to make rules for
•'-^^Eagleton's remarks are at 119 Cong. Rec. 33556 0-973).
Javits' are at ibid,, 33558.
^^^87 Stat. 559.
^^%.S. Const, art, I, sec, 8, cl, 11.
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the armed forces. 181 and make all laws necessary and proper
to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution in the
Congress and in the departments or officers of the United
States.
The President has, under the Constitution, the execu-
TOO
tive power, the duty (and power) to faithfully execute
the laws (including treaties)!^^ and those powers associated
with the office of Commander-in-Chief . ^85
The Resolution has three constitutionally controver-
sial sections. Section 2(c) attempts to define the para-
meters of the emergency powers of the Commander in Chief.
Section 5 establishes two procedures for legislative termi-
nation of hostilities begun by the President. And Section
8(a)(2) prohibits the President from using force to execute
treaties without specific legislative action.
Section 2(c) relies upon the "necessary and proper"
clause, especially the last portion, in order to define the
1 QC
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Without Congressional
authorization or declaration of war, 2(c) recognizes Presi-
ISlibid.. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14.
^°^Ibid., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
183ibid.. art II, sec. 1, cl. 1.
18^Ibid., art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1.
185ibid., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
186yithout Congressional authorization or declaration
of war, 2(c) recognizes Presidential authority to introduce
troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities only in "a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."
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tial authority to introduce troops into hostilities or immi-
nent hostilities onl^ in a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or posses-
ions, or its armed forces." While there is little doubt that
Congress may define these powers in order to promote their
exercise in accordance with law. the separation of powers
principle forbids Congress from taking the opportunity to
^^^^^ these powers to its own advantage . "'^^
A simple test for 2(c) is to note whether or not its
enumeration of Presidential powers is complete by contempo-
rary constitutional standards. One measure of contemporary
standards is the Senate's version of the war powers bill,
viz., the measure delineating Presidential power. •'^^ The
Senate measure, approved in an atmosphere hostile to Presi-
dential power, lists at least three "recognized powers" of
the President not to be found in 2(c).
They are the powers of the President to respond to (1)
imminent threats to the nation, (2) imminent threats to its
armed forces, and (3) imminent or actual threats to the
lives of its citizens or nationals abroad. Not only were
these included in the Senate bill, but judicial authority
and long-standing practice would seem to have firmly estab-
IS^see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926),' Cf.
Bickel testimony at pp. 19-20, and Brower testimony at p. 56,
Senate Hearings 1973
.
1885^ 4^Q^ l^^^ approved July 20, 1973. The House of
Representatives rejected this approach because it felt Con-
gress could not develop an enumeration hoth complete and not
over-generous
.
^30
lishad executive claims to them, 189 To the extent that 2(c)
vas intended to be a complete list of Presidential emergency
power (and the use of the word "only" suggests this intent;
see note 186 above)
,
it is woefully under^inclusive and
thus unconstitutional.
5(b) is subject to criticism respecting its constitu-
tionality on the following grounds:
(1) It represents an implied grant of war-making
authority for 62 days and therefore unduly delegates legis-
lative power to the President.
(2) By providing for automatic termination of hos-
tilities short of war it trenches upon Presidential auth-
ority.
Criticism number one evokes the following defense.
First, there is no intent to grant any power to the Presi-
dent that he does not already have; this is explicit in sec-
tion 8Cd) (2). Second, Section 2(c) narrowly defines the
parameters of the emergency powers of the Comm.andp.r- in-Chief
,
and therefore there is no excessive delegation.
The trouble with this defense is that (a) although
Congress may not have intended to amplify Presidential powers,
the statute may in fact extend them, rendering 8(d)(2) mere
surplusage; and (b) Congress intended that subsequent sec-
^•8^5. 440, sec. 2. See J, Terry Emerson, "The War
Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent De-
fense Power," Notre Dame Lawyer 51 (December 1975) : 187-216
,
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:ion
tlons of the Resolution operate independent ly of sect;
2(c), so that Section 5 Is not limited by 2(c). ^^O
The provision can be saved by reading the term "hos-
tilities" to mean armed conflict short of "war." as under-
stood by the Constitution. In the area of armed conflict
short of war, the President can make a substantial claim to
independent authority , 191 therefore Congress cannot be said
to be giving away its powers wholesale, but rather imposing
time limitatiors on the exercise of powers shared by both
branches
.
The trouble with this line of reasonirg. however, is
that such a reading of the term "hostilities" throws us di-
rectly into the arms of the second criticism. That is, 5(b)
must now be read to impose an automatic two-month deadline
all hostilities short of war: an area where Congress can-
not claim exclusive authority. There might be occasions
where the President would introduce troops into hostilities
pursuant to his constitutional authority (say in defense of
Guam, a United States territory) and in the absence of any
legislative action his authority would be terminated by law
Rept. 93-547, p, 8,
191See John Norton Moore testim.ony, Senate Hearings
1971
, p. 479
192Hostilities short of war may be considered a "twi-
light zone" of the Constitution under Justice Jackson's anal-
ysis, where both Congress and the President can claim some
authority. Youngs town Sheet and Tube Cp, v. Sawyer, 343 U,S,
579, 635-37 (1952) (concurring opinion)
.
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on the 62nd da,y,^^^
But could the provision not be saved by another line
of defense, perhaps simply on the grounds that Congress may
regulate all hostilities because the power to declare war
includes the power to regulate those events which might pre-
cipitate war?-^^^
This defense must fail, too, however. It does not
take into account what the legislature recognizes in Section
2(c): Congress does not have authority to regulate all
hostilities. Section 2(c) (which is itself deficient) con-
cedes presidential authority over hostilities issuing out
of certain national emergencies. Can it be claimed that
Congress may mandate an end to such hostilities upon the
62nd day of conflict?
If the above reasoning is correct, 5(b) suffers
serious constitutional infirmities
.
We next examine Section
5(c) which provides for termination of hostilities by con-
current resolution.
5(c) would appear to exhibit the same defect as 5(b),
namely, that it presupposes Congressional power over all hos-
tilities without regard to the President's independent power,
1 go
^Actually, the conflict could be extended thirty
additional days if the President were to certify unavoidable
military necessity,
^^^As "Helvidius," Madison relied upon the same ration-
ale to assert Congressional predominance in foreign affairs
generally. James Madison, Letters and. Other Writings of
James Madison
.
4 vols. (Philadelphia: J, B, Lippincott and
Co,
,
1865) . 1:607-54,
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In addition, it is burdened by its reliance upon the concur-
rent resolution, or legislative veto, which has constitution-
al problems of its own.
However, there is a difference between 5(b) and 5Cc) that is
I believe, crucial: 5(b) is automatic and 5(c) is not. 5(c)
may be invoked selectively
,
it n,ay be applied to unlawful as-
sertions of Presidential authority alone. That the framers
of the Resolution intended it to be so applied is made clear
by the following colloquy on the House floor.
2y neSI-the'p'°"?5^"-"'?^ "^^h''-" -^^ority ormay gative the Presidential authority by virtue of
P?eSden? d'fSof ^^P^^^^ thit thf
me ILl^tL'-l ^^^/^^^i one must infer, it seems to
'
.1 President is acting within an area Dre-empted for Congress by the Constitution except f^rthe passage of this resolution. ^
hp Hn°''' ^! ?
understand the gentleman to answer me,e does not intend to give the President additional
authority, but the gentleman concedes that the Presi-dent may act beyond his authority, and we only includethis section as a means by which Congress can reaffirmthe fact that the Presidential action was wrongful inthe first place.
MR. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, that is exactly right.
Because it applies selectively (unlike 5(b)), section
5(c) is capable of distinguishing lawful and unlawful execu-
tive actions. Thus it avoids the pitfalls of the section
that precedes it.
However, a different problem is raised by the use of
the legislative veto. Article I, section 7, clause 3 requires
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
^9^119 Cong. Rec. 33860 (1973), emph, added.
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currence'' of both chambers is necessary, except adjournment
to get either Presidential approval, or. failing that, two-
thirds of both houses. A concurrent resolution, such as is
called for in 5(c). is intended to take effect without either
Presidential approval or two-thirds vote,^96
Despite the seeming contradition with Article X. sec-
tion 7. clause 3. the legislative veto has been used with in-
creasing frequency since World War XI. most notably in legis-
lation authorizing the President to reorganize the Executive
branch. 197 ^he standard justification for it had been that
Congress was singly reserving to itself the power to approve
or disapprove the exercise of power delegated to the Presi-
dent in the first place, ^^8
However, as Congressman Eckhardt's (D-Tex,) comments
(above) and section 8(d)(1) of the act make clear, the War
Powers Resolution "does not intend to give the President ad-
ditional authority. "199 If we accept this assertion as ac-
curate then we cannot justify section 5(c) as simply a device
to register (dis) approval of the exercise of delegated powers.
196h. Kept. 93-287, p. 11.
197See Harris, chap. 8; Watson, passim; Robert W. Gin-
nane, "The Control of Federal Administrationby Congressional
Resolutions and Committees," Harvard Law Review 66 (February
1953) :569-611. ^
1 QQ
^^°See, e.g., Congressional Research Service. Memoran-
dum, "Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto Amendment to
the Military Sales and Assistance Act," 120 Cong. Rec. 17950
(1973).
199See note 193 and accompanying text, supra
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Tha concurrent resolution in 5Ccl is not attached to a grant
of power. 200 use of the concurrent resolution had been de-
fended on other grounds. For eicample, it is contended that
to compel Congress to pass a bill or joint resolution-both
of which may be vetoed by the President-is to require a two-
thirds vote to override unilateral executive commitments to
hostilities. 201 This assumes a bill or joint resolution
directing withdrawal is vetoed, thus requiring a two-thirds
vote to be enacted into law.
Watson develops this point, noting that while dele-
gated power may be withdrawn by concurrent resolution, asser-
tions of inherent power would go virtually unchecked if con-
trol by statute were required; one-third of either house could
block any limitation of the President.
Relying upon Jackson's opinion in Youngstown v. Saw-
203yer, Watson contends that where the President asserts in-
herent authority to act in an area
vhere Congress would possess power to control exe-
cutive actions by statute, Youngstown
,
as well as
the analysis of the Comment, leads to the conclu-
sion that a (concurrent resolution under an act
such as the War Powers Resolution is a valid exer-
200see Representative Dupont's (R-Del.) remarks at 119
Cong. Rec. 33862 (1973). But see, contra., H. Rept. 93-287,
p. 14.
Representative Thomas E. Morgan and Representative
Clement J, Zablocki, "Reply to the President's Veto Message
on the War Powers Resolution," 119 Cong. Rec, 35868 (1973).
202yatson, p. 1085.
203343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (concurring opinion).
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cise of congressional power,
Watson reasons that enactment of a concurrent resolu-
tion under 5(c) would be analogous to Congress' refusal to
act in a "twilight zone" area. 205 (Congress' refusal to
approve a measure granting the President seizure power was
considered relevant to a determination of the validity of
President Truman's assertion of that power,
When combined wxth the Eckhardt qualification, viz.,
that Congress may only "veto" unlawful assertions of Presi^
dential authority, the Watson rationale seems persuasive.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the Supreme Court
has not determined on the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto, although repeated practice and acceptance by both
Congress and President would appear to have established its
legitimacy.
'-V
To briefly summarize the analysis so far, Section 5(c),
the legislative veto clause, has a better claim on constitu-
tional validity than either the 60-day automatic termination
provision, 5(b), or the rather impoverished delimitation of
^Q^Watson, p. 1085.
^°^Ibid.
, p. 1086.
206Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)
,
207
The Supreme Court touched the issue only obliquely
in Sibbach V. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1940). For
a compilation of statutes making use of a legislative veto
see Watson, pp. 1089-94.
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Presidential powers in Section 2Cc)
.
Finally, we examine section 8(a) C2) which interprets
all treaties heretofore or hereafter ratified as non-self,
executing insofar as the introduction of United States forces
is concerned. 208 provision is reminiscent of the pro.
posed Bricker Amendments to the Constitution which would
have required Congressional implementation before any treaty
could become effective as internal law, 209 The War Powers
Resolution also includes a denial of intent to alter the pro-
visions of existing treaties (section 8(d)(1)).
The possibility that 8 (a) (2) and 8(d)(1) may be in-
consistent notwithstanding, the legal question is whether or
not Congress may require the legislative implementation of
all treaty provisions respecting hostilities. Normally, the
President decides whether or not a treaty or provisions
thereof are self
-executing; this is based upon his executive
power (Article II, section 1) and the powers needed to "take
care" that the laws be faithfully executed (Article II, sec-
tion 2). 210
In addition, where troops are needed to enforce a
treaty, the President may rely upon his powers as Commander-
208See note 167, supra.
209
''^Representative of the Bricker proposals was S.J.
Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99 Cong, Rec. 6777 (1953).
210see Henkin, p, 158.
^38
as
:ies
in-Chief (Article 11, section 1), The Senate however,
part of Its power to give "advice and consent" to trelt
(Article XI, section 2) has frequently required that
treaties be considered non-self
-executing, 211
m the case of 8(a)(2), Congress is apparently assert
ing its authority under the declaration of war (Article 1,
section 8. clause 11) and the "necessary and proper" clauses
(Article I, section 8, clause 18); undoubtedly the grounds
are that the legislature may regulate hostilities resulting
from the enforcement of treaties because they may lead to
212
war. If Congress were simply saying that the President
may not rely upon a treaty provision alone as justification
for initiating a "war," as the term is used in Article I,
section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, they would be on
very solid ground, ^-^^
However, once again the reference is to "hostilities"
(and even situations of potential hostilities), a term much
2^^Ibid., p. 159,
212See note 192 and accompanying text, supra.
Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957), the Su-
preme Court said that ".
. .no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of
the Constitution." At one point the Johnson administration
tried to justify the Vietnam War on the basis of the SEATO
pact and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, to the dismay of
some Congressm.en. See U.S., Department of State, "The Legal-
ity of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam," in Richard A. Falk, The Vietnam War and International
Law, 4 vols. (Princeton, N.J,: Princeton University press,
TMS-ie), 1 (1968) :597-601.
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broader than "war," and as we pointed out i„
.egard to sec-
tion 5(b) of the Resolution, Congressional authority does
not extend to all instances of hostilities short of war
In sum, 8(a)(2) suffers the same defects of overbreadth as
5(b): it was intended to assert Congressional control over
areas reserved to the Executive branch. 215
In conclusion, of the three elements of the War Powers
Resolution whose constitutionality we considered. Sections
5(b), 5(c). and 8(a)(2), only Section 5(c) could, under this
analysis, withstand legal challenge.
V. Conclusion
We have explored the background, history, meaning,
and constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. In its
only practical test to date, the evacuations of Southeast
Asia and the Mayaguez incident of Spring 1975, one of the
principal drafters of the measure gave the executive branch
"mixed marks" on compliance
.
And only recently former
President Ford suggested that some of the provisions were in
need of re-examination because they are too restrictive in
214see notes 189-92 and accompanying text, supra.
215
Cf. Henkin, p. 407, note 100, regarding a similar
provision in S. 2956: "Insofar as this bill, if it becomes
law, applies to hostilities 'short of war' the President might
feel free to disregard it."
216
Representative Zablocki's introduction to the Com-
pliance Hearings
. p. vi.
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a crisis.
Although the n,easure is an attempt to prevent another
Vietnam-type war. one con^entator speculates that had it been
in force at the time it would not have prevented the Indo-
china conflict, but it would have sharpened domestic con-
flict over it.^^^
Whatever the merits of this retrospective application,
the future effect of the Resolution remains unclear. As
long as there is mistrust of the Presidency and presiden-
tially inspired foreign policy the Resolution could be used
to make the executive more accountable to the legislature.
However, there are enough ambiguities219
^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^.^^^
provisions in the measure to encourage, given the proper pub-
lic mood and political balance of power, lax enforcement.
The true test of the War Powers Resolution will come when
memories of the divisive Vietnam "era" have begun to fade.
217Quoted in New York Times
. 12 April 1977, p. 14.
218Graham T. Allison, "Making War: The President andCongress, m Thomas E. Cronin and Rexford G. Tugwell ThePresidency Reappraised
.
2d ed. (New York: Praeger PublTiKers,
Inc.
,
iy/V)
. pp. 228, 241-44.
.
^l^E.g.. the start of "hostilities," or the meaning of
'imminent hostilities,"
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CHAPTER X
THE JUDICIARY AND PRESIDENTIAL WAR-HAKING POWER
We have already discussed a number of court cases
dealing with Presidential war power, cases which arose out
of the "undeclared wars" we have analyzed. Here we wish to
analyze the pertinent cases not yet reviewed, and draw some
generalizations respecting the role of the judiciary.
Our question remains: \7hat is the scope of the Pres-
ident's power to initiate hostilities in the absence of a
Congressional declaration of war? One line of reasoning has
been predicated upon the distinction between defensive war,
that is, war thrust upon the country, and war initiated by
the United States. This theory of defensive war ultimately
became the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in the famous
Prize Cases.
A United States circuit court relied upon it in
United States v. Smith as early as 1806. Smith was accused
of violating a Federal neutrality act by m.aking preparations
to launch an expedition into territory held by Spain, a
country with which the United States was at peace. In his
defense, Smith contended that whatever he did was done with
the "knov/ledge and approbation" of the President and some of
^Prize Cases, 2 Bl, (U.S.) 635 (1863).
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his cabinet officers, and he urged the court to subpoena
Secretary of State James Madison and other executive offi-
cers so they could so testify.
^
The court refused for the reasons which follow
'f^^l
president knew and approved of ' "
*
the military expedition set forth in ?he indict-ment against a prince with whom we are at peaceIt would not justify the defendant in a coSrtof law nor discharge him from the bindinrforce of the act of congress; because the^resi-dent does not possess a dispensing power.
In short, the testim.ony requested would be irrele-
vant because the President could not exempt anyone from the
obligation imposed by the statute to observe neutrality.
Could the President disregard the statute himself and lead
the country into war?
Does he possess the power of making war? Thatpower is exclusively vested in Congress
by the eighth section of the 1st article 'of the
constitution
.
.
The court admits that Congress authorized the Presi-
dent to call forth the militia to repel invasions and sup-
press insurrections by its act of February 28, 1795. But it
goes on to distinguish repelling invasion from initiating a
2United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas
. 1192 (No 16
342) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
"^Ibid.
,
p. 1230.
^Ibid.
war.
people!
-anS^p^^^f^S-l^^SnLlLc'lJ^Lf ^ •trate, who is at their head magis-
chief pZ '^^t commander- in-
invadin: foe B^t'tn^ ^^P^l an
s ions if oneVhfn 5^^^^ aggressions and inva-IS e thi g, and to commit them aeainsta friendly power is another
.
.
. There is^manifest distinction betx^een our goini to war wit-ha nation at peace, and a war being made aglinst
In tL^? ^^^^^^ invasion, or a folmal declarationhe former case, it is the exclusive provinceof congress to change a state of peace iSto'a ^tate
In short, the President may wage defensive war, but
only Congress may authorize the initiation of hostilities
on the part of the United States. Were this not dicta, and
were it not a circuit court as opposed to the United States
Supreme Court speaking. United States v. Smith would no
doubt be an oft-cited landmark.
As it turns out, the act of 1795 came under direct
Supreme Court scrutiny in the case of Martin v. Mott. That
act provided
that whenever the United States shall be invaded,
or be in imminent danger of invasion ... it shall
be lawful for the president of the United States
to call forth such number of the militia ... as
he may judge necessary to repel such invasion
. .
^Ibid.
""l Stat. 424 (1795), quoted in Martin v. Mott, 12
Wheat. (U.S.) 19, 29 (1827).
ir
-S
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The law had been passed pursuant to Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 15 of the Constitution which empowers
' Con-
gress
Ixlcu?rthp% ^^'^ ^i^S militia to
?ect?ons ^ni^""' ""f suppress insur-r i , a d repel invasions.
We wish to call attention to two aspects of this
legislation. First, one of the earliest of the Congresses
interpreted the phrase "and repel invasions" in Article I.
section 8. clause 15. as including the "imminent danger of
invasion," thus lending its authority to a somewhat loose:
understanding of the idea of defensive war. For under thi^
understanding a war would be defensive if the other side
were about to attack but had not yet done so.
This suggests that the doctrine of defensive war
adopted by the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases may legiti-
mately be given a more expansive reading.
Secondly, the phrase, "as he may judge necessary,"
suggests, again with some authority, that the President must
be accorded a measure of discretion, at least in the deter-
mination of the number of militia necessary, but also, as
will be apparent from Martin, in the determination of whether
or not there is sufficient danger to compel the call-up of
any militia at all.
This discretionary element has, as will be seen, its
analogue in the Prize Cases ruling that the courts must be
bound by a Presidential finding of belligerence.
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Martin v. Mott arose when, during the War of 1812
the governor of New York called forth the state militia
'
upon the requisition of President Madison. One Mott. who
was liable for service, failed to show, and was tried and
convicted by a court-martial several years later.
Justice Story wrote for the United States Supreme
Court upholding Mott's conviction. Story had no doubt that
the law was valid, or that Congress could provide for innni-
nent danger as well as actual invasion, "m our opinion,"
said Story in behalf of a unanimous tribunal,
there is no ground for a doubt on this point
inclndP.^^^''
Vrovide for repelling invasions
'
u es the power to provide against the attempt
^ol.o invasion, as the necessary and propermeans to effectuate the object. One of the bestmeans to repel invasions is to provide the requi-
site force for action before the invader himselfhas reached the soil.'
But Mott was not challenging the act of Congress,
he was questioning the authority of the President and the
chief executive of New York. In respect to the President,
Story responded as follows.
The power thus confided by congress to the presi-
dent, is, doubtless, of a very high and delicate
nature. A free people are naturally jealous of
the exercise of military power; and the power to
call the militia into actual service, is certainly
felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude
. But it
is not a power which can be executed without a cor-
respondent responsibility. It is, in its terms, a
limited power, confided to cases of actual inva-
sion, or of imminent danger of invasion. If it
^12 Wheat. (U.S.) 19, 29 (1827).
be a limited power thp mi^o-H-
is the exigent, to'bfUg:fora^5^^:ii,^^,I>^-
Story's answer was unambiguous, and did not rest up-
on statutory construction alone.
whe^LVthre'S^e^^^^L'\??Lr=^"=^^^J"'^S^
addressed, may decide for h?!^?! president are
elusive upon aTT otEer-pefsons /wi^mconstruction neceiii?Il^Tii^ts from ?L natur^of the power itself, and from the manifest obi^ectcontemplated by the act of congress § ^
To be sure, Martin v. Mott concentrates in large mea-
sure upon the exercise of Presidential power pursuant to an
express delegation of power from the legislature. And Pres-
idential power to punish persons under martial law was sub-
sequently trimmed in the Milligan and Endo cases. Neverthe-
less, the case provides authority for a loose construction
of the power to repel invasions as including the power to
provide for imminent danger of invasion. And it also sug-
gests that the determination of whether or not the country
is in such jeopardy is a matter of Presidential discretion,
not subject to judicial review.
^Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 29-30, emphasis added.
^^Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2 (1866); Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). ^
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Now we turn to the renowned Prize Cases, which arose
when, after the firing upon Fort Sumter, President Lincoln
proclaimed a blockade of the Confederacy in April, 1861.
At this time Congress was not in session; subsequently, the
legislature expressly validated all of Lincoln's acts. As
a result of the blockade, and before Congress acted, four
ships, two of them foreign-owned, were captured by United
States naval vessels off the shores of various southern
states
.
Under the internation law of the period, neutral
third parties were bound to respect a blockade, which was
an act of war. And so the foreign ship owners argued that
without a Congressional declaration the United States was
not at war in the legal sense, and therefore could not have
established a blockade which foreign vessels were legally
obligated to observe.
A scant 5-4 majority rejected this line of reasoning
Speaking through Justice Crier, they contended that declara-
tion or no, the United States was at war.
This greatest of civil wars
. . . sprung forth
suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the
full panoply of war
. The President was bound to
meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
^Iprize Cases, 2 Bl. (U.S.) 635, 670 (1863); Clinton
Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Conimander in Chief (Itha-
ca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1^51; reprint ed. , New
York: Da Capo Press, 1970), p. 69.
^^2 Bl. (U.S.) 635, 649 (1863); Rossiter, p. 73.
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waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name-
?he TaclJ^ - could Sge
And while admitting that, "{b}y the Constitution,
Congress alone has the power to declare a national or for-
eign war," and that the President "has no power to initiate
or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domes-
tic State," Grier went on to uphold Lincoln's action. To
do so he relied upon the theory of defensive war, and ex-
panded Presidential power thereunder . "'•^
IL%'^^'''^/ invasion of a foreign nation,the President is not only authorized but boundto resist force by force. He does not initiatethe war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative au-thority. And whether the hostile party be aforeign invader, or States organized in rebellion
It is none the less a war, although the declara-
'
tion of It be "unilateral . "J-5
But more, not only may the President unilaterally
recognize that the United States is at war, but his deci-
sion, once tendered, is binding upon the courts.
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties,
as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insur-
rection, has met with such armed hostile resis-
tance, and a civil war of such alarming propor-
tions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be
decided b^ him
,
and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political depart-
^^2 Bl. (U.S.) 635, 668-69 (1863).
^^Ibid., p. 668.
^^Ibid.
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"trusted "hI ™:" '°
^'-"^
of the blockade is ?tself offlei ^r''^^"""?
iSt:7^^""is° ^He'?:i^.i^^-f3?-,-=^-
This, of course, sounds very much like the "political
questions" doctrine espoused in Luther v. Borden, where the
Court refused to review the President's decision to support
the Charter government of Rhode Island as against Thomas
Dorr's rebel government
,
The dissenters, led by Justice Nelson, held that
while war existed in "the material sense," it did not exist
"in a legal sense" because it was not "recognized or declared
by the sovereign power of the State, and which sovereign
power by our Constitution is lodged in the Congress ..."
The minority insisted that the President
does not possess the power under the Constitution
to declare war or recognize its existence within
the meaning of the law of nations, which carries
with it belligerent rights, and thus change the
country and all its citizens from a state of peace
to a state of war; that this power belongs exclu-
sively to the Congress
. . . and, consequently,
that the President has no power to set on foot a
blockade under the law of nations
. .
.^^
The dissenting rationale is not without problems.
First off, the distinction between war in the "material" and
^^Ibid., p. 670.
"•^uther V. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) 1 (1849),
•^Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (U,S,) 635, 690, 698 (1863),
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war in the
..le.al" sense is difficult to sustain upon anal-
ysxs. Secondly, it is hardly credible that the United
States could have been denied belligerent status with its
attendant rights in international law for want of a fonnal
Congressional declaration of war. As a rule a nation's
internal political arrangements are irrelevant to a deter-
mination of its international rights; and anyway the Presi-
dent is the sole agent of coimnunication for the United
States in its external relations. ^0
But it is the majority's argument, that the Presi-
dent is "bound to resist force by force
. .
. without wait-
ing for any special legislative authority," that most in-
terests us. The Court refers to two contingencies, the ex-
istence of either of which would justify the President in
conducting a war. The contingencies are insurrection or
civil war and "invasion of a foreign nation. "^^
Only the category of "invasion" involves foreign
affairs, and it alone concerns us. Here is where difficulty
enters. The Court intended, undoubtedly, to establish the
legality of unilateral Presidential action in the face of
a foreign attack. While actual invasion of United States
19Fritz Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace (New
Haven: Yale University Press, iy4y)
,
passim.
20Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N.Y.
: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1^72), p, 188.
]
I. I
^^Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (U.S.) 635-, 668 (1863).
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territory is clearly included, ™ay the President lawfully
respond to other threats as well?
Authorities are in disagreement on this. In his
early work. Corwin thought he could so respond. Wright con-
tended that "the fact of war" would have to be "so patent
as to leave no doubt." Among contemporaries, aware of the
possibility of rapid attack by missiles and long-range bomb-
ers, there still seems to be dispute. R. Berger appears to
adhere to the invasion-of
-United
-States-soil requirement,
while Henkin suggests that the President
"probably
... has
authority
... to anticipate by a preemptive strike an at-
tack he believes imminent . "^^
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court in the Prize
Cases cited as precedent for Lincoln's blockade the two bat-
tles fought just prior to the Congressional recognition of
the existence of a state of war between the United States
and Mexico in 1846. But as our study revealed, these bat-
tles were fought upon disputed territory (although President
Polk claimed it was "American soil") and were provoked by
the American President. By offering the Mexican War--scarce-
ly an instance of defense against invasion--as a precedent,
^Edward S. Corwin, The President's Control of For-
eign Relations (1917; reprint ed7, New York: Johnson Re-
—
print Co., 1970), pp. 141-142; Quincy Wright, The Control of
American Foreign Relations (New York: The Macmillan Co.
,1922), p. 289; Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege
. A Consti-
tutional Myth (New York: Bantam Books, Inc.
,
1975)
—
v
—W
and note 107; Henkin, p. 52.
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the Court bolster the position of those who contend ^hat
the President
.ay respond to threats short of actual inva-
This points up another problem, and that is the tend-
ency of American presidents, like all national leaders, to
justify on grounds of self-defense their resort to force
against other states. Polk's claim at the start of the Mex-
ican War is a perfect example. Should the Executive make
such a claim, is it, under the authority of the Prize Cases,
reviewable in court? Recall Justice Grier's contention that
the Court would have to be governed by the President's deter-
mination that a state of war existed.
Thus not only is a Presidentially authorized defen-
sive war legal, but the President's judgment that such a war
was necessary is not justiciable. The ineluctable conclu-
sion is that the determination of whether or not there is a
direct threat to the United States and what degree of force,
if any, is necessary to meet that threat is a matter of Exe-
cutive discretion.
This discretion would no doubt extend to the deci-
sion to launch a preemptive strike in order to abort an at-
tack believed imminent. Would it also cover attacks, conven-
tional or nuclear, upon another country
,
say, a party to a
mutual defense treaty with the United States? Article 5 of
23See my study on Mexican-American conflicts, chap.
5
,
supra
.
2^2 Bl. (U.S.) 635, 670 (1863).
NATO, for example, stipulates "that an ar^ed attack against
one or More" of the Parties "shall be considered an attack
against them all."
If an attack upon western Europe is tantamount to
an attack upon the United States, is the President empowered
to respond to the former as he would to the latter by the
authority of the Prize Cases? A brief answer (we consider
the effect of treaties upon Presidential war-making power
in detail at another point) is that insofar as such an at-
tack is considered evidence of an imminent invasion of the
United States, the President may use such force as is neces-
sary to forestall the latter.
Which is to say that such treaties, while creating
international obligations upon the United States, do not
alter the internal "constitutional processes" of the signa-
tories, in accordance with which they are all pledged to
act. 25
In summary, the doctrine of the Prize Cases, which
rests upon the theory of defensive war, opens the door to
broad claims for Presidential war-making power in four ways:
first, as a result of inflated claims of attacks upon or
threats to the nation; second, because a challenge to a Pres-
idential claim of self-defense raises a non-justiciable pol-
2^63 Stat. 2341, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April
1949, art. 11.
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itical question; third, because technological changes have
made possible widespread destruction with such speed that
a preemptive (first!) strike might be considered an act of
self-defense; and fourth, because an attack upon another
country may justifiably be considered evidence of an innni-
nent threat to the United States.
While the concept of self-defense is quite broad
and subject to abuse, it is not unlimited. The Prize Cases
doctrine could not justify, for example, either the Korean
or Vietnam wars, because neither the attack on the ROK nor
the systematic subversion of the GVN was evidence of an im-
minent attack upon the United States (By Article IV, section
1, each of the parties to SEATO agreed that an attack in the
treaty area "would endanger its own peace and safety," Con-
trast with NATO, Article V, where an attack on one party
"shall be considered an attack against them all.")
The essence of the Prize Cases doctrine is that the
President may recognize that the United States is at war,
either as a result of an attack upon the United States prop-
er or compelling evidence that such an attack is imminent.
Not only may the President recognize war or the immi-
nent threat of attack, we have seen in Durand v. Hollins,
decided by the same Justice Nelson who led the dissenters in
the Prize Cases, that he may also authorize the use of force
^55
for the protection of American nationals abroad. 26
This view was supported by the Supreme Court in the
Neagle case, which involved the use of force domestically
upon Presidential authority, in this instance by a United
States marshal assigned to protect Supreme Court Justice
Field. ^
To defend the marshal the Court adopted an expansive
view of Presidential power under Article II, section 3, wMch
states that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."
"is this duty," the bench asked rhetorically,
limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress
or of treaties of the United States according
^? ^^^^^/^P^^^^ terms , or does it include therights, duties, and obligations growing out ofthe Constitution itself, our international rela-tions, and all the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the Constitution?^^
The answer came by way of example, and the example,
the Martin Koszta incident, involved foreign affairs. It
seems that the Hungarian
-born Koszta, who had begun the pro-
cess of becoming a naturalized citizen, was seized by the
Austrian military while in Smyrna, and not released until
an American war ship turned its guns on the Austrian vessel
^"Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860)
See my study on the Boxer incident, chap. 4, supra.
^^In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
^^Ibid., p. 64.
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in which he was being held captive. 29
"Upon what act of Congress then existing." queried
the Court after relating the incident, "can any one lay his
finger in support of the action of our government in this
matter?" There was none, of course, the point being that
none is necessary when the President authorizes force for
the protection of United States citizens, or even inchoate
citizens
.
The dissenters complained that Koszta's rescue was
a bad example because it involved foreign nations,
and in our intercourse with them, states and
state governments, and even the internal adjust-
ment of federal power, with its complex system
of checks and balances, are unknown
That authority the Constitution vests expressly
and conclusively in the treaty
-making power--the
'
President and the Senate
. .
.31
Having thus distinguished Presidential power in for-
eign and domestic affairs, thereby anticipating the rationale
in the famed Curtiss -Wright case, the dissenters conceded as
much power to the President in the conduct of international
relations as did the majority. Thus no member of the Supreme
Court would have denied the President's authority to act as
he did in defense of Koszta, and by inference, other Ameri-
29lbid.
^hhid.
,
p. 85.
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cans in peril abroad.
***
The doctrine of the double standard in the exercise
of Presidential power, i.e.. greater restrictions in domes-
tic as opposed to foreign policy, only briefly treated by
the Neagle dissenters, received full-blown elaboration in
the 20th century. In United States v. Curtis s
-Wright Export
Corporation, seven of the eight participating Supreme Court
justices upheld the President's authority to embargo arms
sales to the Chaco pursuant to a joint resolution of Con-
32gress
.
Of course, we may not equate the power to embargo
arms with the power to initiate hostilities, and Curtiss-
Wright did involve an act of Congress. Nonetheless. Justice
Sutherland wrote about Presidential power in such sweeping
terms, and the theory upon which the decision rests is so
extraordinary that the case has become of general signifi-
cance to all analyses of executive authority in international
affairs
.
Sutherland reasoned that there was a "fundamental"
difference between Federal powers in foreign as opposed to
domestic affairs, that the latter were "carved from the mass
of state powers" by the Constitution, while the former passed
^^United States v. Curt is s -Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936).
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from the British Crown to the colonies collectively to the
Continental Congress and finally to the Federal government
under the Constitution. "It results." the Court contended,
that the investment of the Federal government withthe powers of external sovereignty did not dependupon the atfirmative grants of the ConsUtut?on^3
Thus, the Federal government possesses those for-
eign affairs powers that are "inherently inseparable from
the concept of nationality" whether or not they are granted
by the Constitution. Furthermore, notes Sutherland, "the
exercise of the {foreign affairs} power is significantly
limited.
"
In this vast external realm, with its im.portant
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representative of the nation ....
It is important to bear in mind that we are
here dealing not alone with an authority vested
in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive pov7er of the
President as the sole organ of the Federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations
--a
power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course,
like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable pro-
visions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent
that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment--perhaps serious embar-
rassment--is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord
^^ibid.
, pp. 315-18
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admissible were domestic affairs alone irivo?ved ?4
In sum, the Federal government possesses foreign af-
fairs powers independent of Constitutional warrant, the exer-
cise of these powers must often be restricted to the Presi-
dent, and Congress may delegate its foreign affairs powers
to the President in accordance with standards less stringent
than those applied to delegations respecting internal affairs,
How this affects Presidential war
-making authority is
not entirely clear, especially since Article I. section I,
clause 11 expressly delegates to Congress the power to de-
clare war. At a minimum it would seem that our earlier state-
ment that there is a double standard for gauging Presidential
power is correct: when it comes to foreign affairs Congress
may more freely delegate its powers to the Executive. I have
argued elsewhere that resolutions authorizing the President
to use force at his discretion, (e.g., Tonkin Gulf, 1964),
are valid delegations under the Curtiss -Wright doctrine.
Beyond that, the contours of that "very delicate, ple-
nary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the Federal government in the field of international rela-
tions" are left to practice and case-by-case determination.
^^Ibid., pp. 318, 319-320.
"^^See my chap. 8, text accompanying notes 122-123,
supra
.
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On other occasions, in cases dealing with for-
eign affairs, notably the power to make and give domes-
tic effect to international agreements, the High Court
has suggested that Federal power is free of some of the
usual constitutional restraints.
Missouri V. Holland is the most famous of these,
and here Justice Holmes swept aside a state challenge to
a treaty and the law effectuating it, declaring that
they could not be held "forbidden by some invisible ra-
diation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."
This despite the fact that similar legislation (regulat-
ing migratory birds) enacted prior to the treaty had been
found bad in Federal court.
In short, the treaty-makers, viz., the President
and the Senate, could do that which the whole Congress
acting without them could not. But if the treaty power
is not limited by the Tenth Amendment, is it also free
of other constitutional restrictions? A nineteenth cen-
tury judge, Mr. Justice Field, thought not.
In Geofroy v. Riggs, Field declared that the
treaty power delineated in the Constitution
is in terms unlimited except by those restraints
which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the govern-
or
"^"^Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
^•51
ment itself and of that- of <-v,«
be contended that U Ltfnds^o f It would not
what the Constitution forbids or f.h' '° authorize
tory of the latt^rSiteC^^i^^l
And more recently it has been suggested that the
Bill of Rights protects citizens abroad, any international
agreements regulating their treatment to the contrary not-
withstanding. Justice Black spoke for himself and three
other judges when he so declared in Reid v. Covert. The
case dealt with a Congressional act providing for trial by
courts-martial of the civilian dependents of servicemen
stationed overseas. Under certain international agreements
between the United States and the host countries, American
soldiers accused of a crime could be so tried.
Note Black's implicit rejection of the Curtiss-
Wright doctrine of extra-constitutional Federal powers.
At the beginning we reject the idea that when theUnited States acts against citizens abroad it cando so free of the Bill of Rights. The UnitedStates IS entirely a creature of the Constitutionits power and authority have no other source It
can only act in accordance with all the limitationsimposed by the Constitution ....
Even though a court-martial does not give an accused
trial by jury and other Bill of Rights protections
the Government contends that {the law being chal-
'
lenged}.
. .
can be sustained as legislation which
^^Geofroy v., Riggs
, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
^^Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
is necessary and proper to car-rv o,,t- +-u tt .
states
• obligations Snder the f^eSatiL^?"^^ments made with those countries S= £ ? ^S""^^"decisive answer to this? of course is°th^?"' ^""^agreement with a forei^A natini^^^^ "°
on the Conaress ni^ ori '^f'^ confer power
ment which^iflree f?o™ °f Govern-
stitution . '^'"^ 'restraints of the Con-
;>^I^T7 2^ nullified by the Executive or bvthe Executive and the Senate combined. 39 ^
Thus, while the Migratory Birds Case establishes
that the Tenth Amendment is no limitation upon the treaty
power, Reid makes clear that other restrictions, such as the
Jury Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, do apply
When the President makes "executive agreements" with
foreign nations solely on his own authority, is the Tenth
Amendment equally inapplicable? Apparently so. for in United
States V. Belmont, the Court stated that
{i}n respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear . '^^
The implication of all of the above cases for Presi-
dential war-making is, once again, unclear. But the general
thrust is that the Federal government, quite often the Presi-
dent alone or in conjunction with the Senate, may exercise
O Q
-•^Ibid., 5-6, 16-17, footnotes omitted.
40
''United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937);
see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.- 203 (1942).
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powers in foreign affairs free of .any of the limitations de-
rived from Federalism or the Separation of Powers.
ive
The Curtiss-Wright and Missouri v. Holland cases,
which take an expansive view of Presidential power, also 'in-
volve authorizing acts of Congress. What if this legislat
support were absent?; or what if the President acted contrary
to the will of Congress? Two landmark cases, only one of
which concerned foreign affairs even obliquely, considered
the scope of Presidential power under just these circum-
stances-and arrived at somewhat conflicting conclusions.
The first, Myers v. United States, involved the Pres-
ident's power to fire an executive officer without obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate as expressly stipulated
by an act of Congress. The President ignored the law, claim-
ing in effect that he was not bound by the will of Congress
when that body encroached upon the constitutional powers of
the Executive
.
The Court upheld the President on the grounds that
removal power was indeed part of the general executive power
vested in the President by Article II, section 1, was neces-
sary if he were to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted," as required by Article II, section 3, and could not
therefore be exercised by Congress without violating the
^^Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Separation of Powers principle. ^2
Chief Justice Taft, who wrote for the majority, con-
sidered the "executive power" and "take Care" clauses to be
positive grants of authority rather than conMands to work
the will of Congress. Thus, when Congress declared that the
removal of postmasters first class required Senate consent,
it was encroaching upon this Presidential authority, and he
could rightfully ignore the law.
To which Justice Holmes, dissenting, retorted:
The duty of the President to see that the laws beexecuted is a duty that does not go beyond thelaws or require him to achieve more than Congress
sees fit to leave within his power. 43
^^^ ^^
Taft's sweeping claims for Presidential removal
power, and much of the constitutional theory upon which they
were based were later disavowed by the Court in the cele-
brated Humphrey's Executor case. But Myers was never re-
versed, and the notion that the President may defy Congress
when that body trespasses upon the Executive realm is still
vital. The Myers Court clung to this position even in the
face of the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson for defy-
ing a law similar to the one at issue in 1926.'^^
The Separation of Powers principle may, however, cut
^^ibid.
43.
'Ibid., p. 177.
44
(1935).
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
two ways: it can be invoked
, p,,3,,,„^
„^^^^^^^
incorrectl/. about the scope of his authority. This is ex-
actly what happened in the famous Steel Seizure Case. ^5
Here the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against
the Secretary of Commerce, who had been directed by the Pres-
ident to temporarily seize the steel mills in order to avert
a strike. The executive order cited no statutory authority
but noted the threat to the national defense posed by a work
stoppage during the Korean War, The President dxd not invoke
the Taft-Hartley Act, which provided for a "cooling-off-
period. When this Act was passed in 1948t'aacKu m i^HB, Congress rejected
an amendment authorizing emergency seizures.
«
Two judges, Black and Douglas, adopted the narrow
view of Presidential authority rejected in Myers. Said Black-
pow2%o''^::e%\1t\'he°"LS"I^:'^:J^ ^"^^"^-^'^
refutes the idea th^t ? I faithfully executed
Constitution^'i^itslis^i^euon^: thrf^^Y-""^process to the recormnendS of W he T'''"^and the vetoing of laws he'thinks baS>7
Since providing for seizures is a legislative
, no^
an executive act, the President violated the Separation of
the court seemed to agree with Justice
(1952). 'lir:rsT2.f:r, lit.'. - ^^-y^^- 3« u.s. 579
46
(1952).
Sheet & Tube Co, v, Sawyer, 343 U,S, 579
^^ibid., p. 587.
A66
Frankfurter's comment that
the considerations relevant- tn i
ment of the nrinn-iT^i^^? '^S^^ enforce-r zn p ciple of separation of powers seem
.
. ,
more complicated and flexible th^n^!!,.from what Mr. Justice Black has written
.
^^i^^^^
Frankfurter considered the President in conflict
with the legislature because Congress withheld the seizure
power from him when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. Jus-
tices Clark and Burton condemned the President for failing
to adopt measures short of seizure as provided by Congress
in Taft-Hartley in case of industrial disputes. Justice
Jackson provided a formula for gauging Presidential power,
and found President Truman's action in the instant case to
fall in the least defensible category because it was under-
taken without regard for the methods which Congress pre-
cribed for conducting seizures.
But none of the above-named judges rejected outright
the concept of inherent Presidential powers to meet emer-
gencies, upon which the three dissenters relied. (Actually,
five of the judges approved the doctrine, two were non-com-
mittal, and two rejected it.) Thus, the essence of the
Youngstown rule is not that the President is limited to exe-
cuting statutory law, but rather, that where Congress has
laid down policy guidelines the President may not simply dis-
regard them.
^Sibid., p. 589.
^^Ibid., pp. 602-603, 663, 657^59, 639.
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;ress
cer-
The corollary
-
also true, i.e.
, where Cong,
has not established guidelines. Presidents
.ay, under ....
tain circumstances not easily defin^ri .-^ ac^ix a rmed m advance, fill the
void on their own authorifv tu^ty. This corresponds with category
two of Jackson's formula
sional inertia indiffprA^.^^ Therefore, congres-
tLrrespInsibiTi^^SS^ °" independent pr4si<le1^^'
The importance of Youngstown for Presidential war-
making power is difficult to assess. The initiation of hos-
tilities short of "war," as the term is used in Article I.
section 8, clause 11, is probably one of those twilight zone
powers-or at least had been until the War Powers Act of
1973.
It has been argued that because Federal courts were
willing to decide the merits of the Steel Seizure controversy,
they should also have taken jurisdiction in cases challenging
the legality of the Vietnam War. Consider Justice Douglas'
statement in one of his several dissents.
Ibid., p. 637.
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In the Steel Seizure Case members of th-ic r^, ^
the issue relaLd to Jhe PresJden^'^ ^f"' "^"^^
extreme emergency should be instructive . 51
Perhaps so. but the required four Justices necessary
to grant appeals were never persuaded. Furthermore, unlike
the Vietnam War cases, Youngs town did not directly involve
foreign affairs, traditionally (as we shall demonstrate fur-
ther) an area of judicial abstinence. That Justice Jackson
recognized the distinction is indicated by his comment.
We should not use this occasion to circumscribe
much less to contract, the lawful role of the
'
President as Commander-in-Chief. I should in-dulge the widest latitude of interpretation to
sustain his exclusive function to command theinstruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world for the security
of our society. But, when it is turned inward,
not because of rebellion but because of a lawful
economic struggle between industry and labor, it
should have no such indulgence . ^2
Jackson's reference to the power of the Commander-in-
Chief in the event of "rebellion" suggests also that he did
not want his opinion to be construed as a refutation of the
doctrine enunciated in the Prize Cases. Justice Burton's
concurring opinion made a similar distinction.
The present situation is not comparable to that of
^^Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 898 (1970).
^^Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 645 (1952). (concurring opinion)..
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an imminent invasion or threat ^npri ot-f. i r, ,
not face the issue nf = ^ • ? ? attack. We doot what might be the Prp<?Tri«r.
i^resident as Commander-in-Chief, toamobiliLdnatxgg waging, or in^inently threatened w^t" total
The Steel Seizure Case, then, leaves matters just as
inconclusive as they had been. It not only does not demolish
the idea of inherent Presidential power in foreign affiars
,
it probably does not even do so for domestic affairs.^^
Writing in 1917, Professor Corwin observed
the lack
.
.
of definite legal criteria for deter-mining the scope of the President's powers in thefield of foreign relations and for deciding those
contests for power in this field which have fre-quently occurred between the President and Congress
or the President and the Senate. Such criterialack because the courts have never had occasion todevelop them
. .
.-'-^
This is not to say that opportunities were not avail-
able, but rather that the courts have been reluctant to step
in when cases involving foreign affairs have arisen. The
refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to thirteen
legal challenges to the Vietnam War is consistent with past
practice,
Judicial non-involvement has been rationalized
^^Ibid., p. 659.
54
C. Herman Pritchett, The American Constitution
,
2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 340-341.
55Corwin, President's Control
, pp. 166-167.
56
See my chap. 8, note 93, suplra.
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through the use of the
-political questions- doctrine. One
observer notes, however, that the Supreme Court did not in-
voke this doctrine with the Vietnam War cases, and attribute
this fact to a desire on the part of the justices to avoid
foreclosing the option of ruling upon the War's constitution
ality should the political climate have permitted. ^7
As early as 1829, Chief Justice John Marshall in-
voked the political questions doctrine in a case involving
the interpretation of an international agreement. Foster
V. Neilson presented a dispute of title to land said by
one party to have been ceded by Spain to France and ulti-
mately to the United States as part of the Louisiana Pur-
chase. The other party, relying upon the Spanish understand
ing, denied that the disputed territory had been ceded.
Justice Marshall announced that it would be odd for
American courts to reject an interpretation given a treaty
by the United States government. He continued as follows.
If those departments which are entrusted with the
foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert
and maintain its interests against foreign powers,
have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion
over a country of which it is in possession, and
which it claims under a treaty; if the Legislature
has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is
not in its own courts that this construction is to
be denied. A question like this respecting the
57philiipa Strum., "The Supreme Court and the Viet-
nam War." in Richard A. Falk, ed.
,
The Vietnam War and Inter -
national Law
, 4 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1968-1976), 4 (197^): 561-562
,
^^Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (U.'s,) 253 (1829).
,boundaries of nations is u.. u
spect the Pronoun^^f
^?nf^L^^^^^^L?;:?e\5?'
Thus did the Marshall Court refuse to decide the con-
troversy. We already noted that while the Court reached
the constitutional issues in the Prize Cases, it invoked the
political questions doctrine and denied authority to judge
a Presidential decision that war had been thrust upon the
country. And in the case of The Protector
, the Court found
it "necessary to refer to some public act of the political
departments," namely Lincoln's proclamations, in order to
determine the dates of the coimnencement and termination of
the Civil War.^°
There are numerous other statements of judicial def-
erence to the "political" branches, including one noted in
an earlier chapter in a case stemming from the Pancho Villa
episode. The statement, which follows, was described in
Baker v. Carr, the most elaborate Supreme Court discussion
of the political questions doctrine, as a "sweeping" one,
"to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations
are political questions . "^'•
^^Ibid., p. 309, emphasis added. See also Williams
v. Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. (U.S.) 415, 420 (1839);
and cases cited in Henkin, p. 451, note 27.
^^See text accompanying notes 16-17, supra. Freeborn
V. The Ship Protector, 12 Wall (U.S.) 700, 20 L. Ed. 463,
464 (1871).
^^Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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The conduct of the foreign rel=,^^„„o rGovernment is conimitted h^^
ations of our
the Executive anTuo^slativ^ ?°"=titution to
Departments of the G^v^J^menr'and't^^''""''"of what may be done in the exercise ol ?^
decis?^r?2- -tject to Judi^^afi^^iLro""
Oetjen involved the determination of the international sta-
tus of the Carranza regime insofar as the United States was
concerned, and it was this very determination that the Court
dubbed "political." But Oetjen broke no new ground since
Chief Justice Marshall asserted back in 1818 that questions
of the international status of rebel governments "are gener-
ally rather political than legal in their character.""
The Supreme Court has also held the vitality of in-
ternational agreements to be a question for the other branches
to decide.
And it has left to the Executive branch the deter-
mination of whether or not the vessels of a foreign govern-
ment are immune from American judicial processes. ^5
The Court has also shied away from interfering with
(1917)
^- Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
^%nited States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 610, 634
(1818). But see United States v. The Three Friends. 166 U
S. 1, 63-65 (1896).
64John Doe ex dem
. Clark, et al. v. Braden, 16 How.
(U.S.) 635, 657 (1^3TT~Terlinden~v."XTnes
, 184 U.S. 270, 288
(1901) i and cases cited in Henkin, p, 451, note 28.
^^Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1942);
Republic oT Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. -30 (1944).
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Presidential control over C.A.B. decisions to grant overseas
axr routes, on the grounds that Presidential determinations
are based upon information in foreign affairs available to
him. Regarding the revelation of such information the
Court said:
osure,
But even if courts could require full disclthe very nature of executive decisions as toforeign policy is political, not jidicial.^§
There is also dictum to the effect that challenges
to the dispatch of American troops abroad by the Commander-
in-Chief are not adjudicable. The statement, quoted below,
came in a case involving the trial by military commission
of German nationals accused of spying on behalf of Japan be-
fore the latter surrendered in World War II. The Commission
was convened in China and the defense challenged its author-
ity in the face of Sino-American agreements that United
States troops would not be stationed in China.
Certainly it is not the function of the Jucidiary
to entertain private litigation--even by a citi-
zen--which challenges the legality, the wisdom,
or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in
sending our armed forces abroad or to any parti-
cular region .... The issue
. . . involves
a challenge to the conduct of diplomatic and
foreign affairs, for which the President is ex-
clusively responsible.
Finally, I have found ten cases challenging the con-
66Chicago 6c Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1947).
^^Johnson v. Eisenstrager , et al., 339 U.S. 763, 789
(1949).
~"
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stitutionality of the Vietnam War where lower federal courts
invoked the political questions doctrine. It should be noted
that the Supreme Court refused to review any of these cases
where asked, with the sole exception of the Atlee decision
which it affirmed without comment.
We must also point out, however, that lower federal
courts reached the merits in fourteen legal challenges to
the Vietnam conflict, and the Supreme Court did not review
any of these either.
What may be concluded from this survey of judicial
statements on foreign affairs and "political questions?"
With respect to our chief concern, the power of the President
to initiate hostilities without a Congressional declaration
of war, the Supreme Court has neither reached the merits nor
invoked the political questions doctrine with finality.
While one scholar concludes that
{w}ar power issues are essentially and inherently
political and not legal^,^
the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, warns us that
^^Atlee V. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1972),
aff'd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973): Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F. 2d
1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.
Va. 1970); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973),
aff'd, 502 F. 2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347
F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp. 521
(E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 468 F. 2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Holtz-
man v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Luftig
V. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mora v. McNamara,
387 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Samoff v. Connally, 457 F.
2d 809 (CD. Cal 1972).
^^Cited in chap. 8, note 95, supra.
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never
was in
ions
Professor Henkin suggests that the Court has
established a doctrine of "extraordinary judicial abs^^on
from constitutional review" in anv foreign affairs case.
Rather, he contends, where the Court has declared some issue
to be appropriate for the "political branches." it
fact deciding that the Constitution gave those institut
authority over the issue.
But even if this were so, the results to date are
still the same: there is no authoritative High Court ruling
on Presidential war
-making. And this is true because, as
Professor Henkin admits, when it comes to foreign affairs,
the Supreme Court
intervenes only infrequently and its
. . . cases
are few and haphazard.'^
If the Supreme Court resisted the temptations and
challenges of the Vietnam era it is likely to do so again
when the issue of Presidential war -making power is raised
in the future. On the other hand, in a less emotional polit
ical climate than that of the Vietnam War period, the Jus-
^^Don Wallace, Jr., "The War-Making Powers: A Con-
stitutional Flaw?" in Richard A.Falk, ed. , The Vietnam War
and International Law
, 4 vols, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1968-1976), 4 (1976) :670; Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
''^Henkin, pp. 213-214.
72 Ibid., p. 224.
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tices might choose to assert themselves.
It seems safe to conclude that while past practice in
the broad area of foreign affairs suggests Judicial inaction
in the future, there is no authoritative ruling precluding
such action. Insofar as the Constitution means what the
judges say it means, then it is still, as Corwin described
it. "an invitation to struggle"-not only for the privilege
of directing foreign policy, but for the awesome responsibi-
lity of initiating hostilities. And. in the absence of any
ahthoritative Supreme Court ruling on the matter, this is
truly in the hands of the "nolitical branches. "^^
73Corwin, President's Control
, p. 171.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
we are dealing in an area where the Constitution is the
Constitution of practice.
Alexander M. Bickel
When the late Professor Bickel made this comment,
he was encouraging a House subconnnittee to draft war powers
legislation.^ He meant that legislation respecting war
powers, like Presidential statements and legislative de-
bates on this issue, were akin to Supreme Court opinions in
giving authoritative meaning to the Constitution.^
Thus if a constitutional theory of Presidential war
powers is to be developed, it must rely not only upon the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution, but upon the
views of Congress, the President and the Courts over the
sweep of American history. In the course of this study we
have examined these views in detail as well as the events
that prompted them. Now we attempt to develop a theory of
Presidential war- commencing power.
^U. S., Congress, House, War Powers, Hearings Before
the Subconmiittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments of the Corrjiiittee on Forei;:;n Affairs 93d Con^i
1st sess.
,
1973, p. iSl.
'
^Ibid., p. 198.
The Intenr of tbf F,-.n,^,-„
478
The United States Constitution unambiguously vests
the power to declare war in the Congress, not the Presi-
dent. By this phraseology it was intended that Congress
participate in all non-emergency decisions to go to war.
Even Hamilton, defender of Presidential primacy in foreign
affairs, conceded this.
The legislature alone can interrupt thoseblessings [ot peace], by placing the Nationin a state of War.
4
The phrase "non- emergency decisions" is designed to
permit exclusion of Congress from necessarily instantaneous
determinations to defend the country against attack or
imminent threat thereof. Thus, the theory of the Constitu-
tion is that in cases of grave threat to the nation's
security, where the need for rapid response precludes
3
_U. S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11. If thedeclaration is made by bill or joint resolution, the
President has to sign it, or if he wishes, veto 'it. Cf
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola,
N. Y.
: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 5, 295,
note 5. This has never happened, but President Cleveland
once threatened to disregard a declaration of war. Edward
S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (New York:
New York University Press, 1948), p. 476, note 93.
4
,Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton
,
ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1961--), 15 (1969) :42.
A 7 9
executive-legislative consultation, the President may act
on his own authority.^
Logically, such a theory of emergency Presidential
power would seem to extend to the defense of American citi-
zens, soldiers and properties (including territorial pos-
sessions) overseas. However, there is no mention of these
powers in the writings of the Framers or in coimentaries of
that period. Perhaps, given America's circumstances in
1789, the Founders simply did not anticipate permanent army
bases overseas, or foreign policy interests of a global
nature
.
There is a second omission in the original under-
standing of the war powers: there is no distinction between
"war" and hostilities short of war.^ This may have been
intentional, in which case all hostilities are subsumed
under the term "war." Under such an interpretation, the
Congress and not the President rightfully controls all but
emergency-motivated hostilities.
5
This was one of the purposes of changing the
phrase "make War" to "declare War" in art. I, sec. 8, cl.
11 of the Constitution. Max Farrand, ed.
, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787
.
3 vols. (New Haven: YaTe
University Press, 1927), 2:318. The Supreme Court affirmed
this doctrine in Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (U. S.) 635 (1863).
6
This was pointed out during debate on the Quasi
War. See Gallatin s comments, chap. 2, note 47, supra.
•^80
If this be so, then the President's power to com-
mence hostilities was intended to be narrow indeed. But
there is yet another issue remaining unclarified, viz «ho
was meant to conduct the foreign policy of the United States
on a day-to-day basis? More particularly, who was intended
to have control over the armed forces, including the
authority to employ them as a threat in order to obtain
diplomatic objectives?
The President has the "executive Power"^ and is the
Coimnander- in-Chief of the armed forces.^ but has he the
power to deploy the armed forces and threaten to use them
in pursuit of American foreign policy objectives? If the
President need not obtain prior Congressional approval for
such deployments, then the legislative monopoly over the
commencement of hostilities is easily broken. Forces de-
ployed as a threat are easily drawn into actual hostilities,
thus presenting Congress with a fait accompli
.
While this might lead one to conclude that the
Framers must have intended that Congress approve any deploy-
ments of this nature, such a conclusion would be premature.
First, there is no evidence that this was intended. Second,
its implications for the conduct of foreign relations today
might be revolutionary indeed: the President might be
7
U. S. Const, art. II, sec. 1, cl. 1.
8
Ibid., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
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denied the power "to make a credible threat to use
force.
em-
For example, before responding to the Soviet
placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba with a naval quaran-
tine of the island. President Kennedy would, under this
theory, have had to obtain Congressional permission, thus
increasing the chances of a breach in security, and per-
haps altering irrevocably the delicate diplomacy so essen-
tial to success.
The failure of the Framers to clarify the respec-
tive roles of Congress and the President in the conduct of
foreign relations leaves a great deal of the war-making
issue to be resolved by inter-branch power struggle. How-
ever, even if hostilities do issue out of a Presidential
deployment in the conduct of foreign relations, there is
nothing to prevent Congress from being asked to give
approval once it appears that the incident is developing
into "war" in the Constitutional sense.
In fact. Article I, section 8, clause 11 requires
that Congress authorize all protracted and large-scale
hostilities regardless of how they were initiated. This,
9
Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law:
The War Powers Act," Texas Law Review 50 (May 1972): 833.
896.
10
See Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision :
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown 6c Co.
,
Inc .
,
1971)
,
passim.
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xt see.s to .e, is the essence of that provision. In short
While the Fran^ers allowed for unilateral Presidential re-
sponse in case of national emergency, and while they did
not make clear which branch was to control the conduct of
foreign relations, thus paving the way for Presidential
predominance, they did require that "war," defined as pro-
tracted and large-scale hostilities, be authorized by the
legislature.
The Effects of Practice I
It was left for actual practice to clarify many of
the ambiguities of the Constitution. This is not to say
that all actions are self-legitimating; we must also take
into account the critical comments of legislators and the
commentaries of scholars. Nor do we accept as conclusive
of Presidential authority the long list of hostilities
abroad without a declaration of war.''"^
11
See my chap. 1, supra.
12
An aide to Senator Goldwater listed 199 such
events. House War Powers Hearin.^s 1973
. pp. 328-66. Other
compilations have been made by Milton Offutt, Protection
of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United
States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, ly2a)~
J. Reuben Clark, The Right to Protect Citizens in Forei,^n
Countries by Landing Forces
.
2d Rev. Ld. (Washington.
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1929); and James
Grafton Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution
(Baltimore: World Peace Foundation, 1945).
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However, there have been some practices which were
repeated so often, and which gained such acceptance in
executive, legislative and scholarly circles, that they
have of necessity become a part of the corpus of Presiden-
tial war power.
The first ambiguity clarified involved the matter
of hostilities short of war. The Framers of the Constitu-
tion did not distinguish between hostilities and war power.
However, in the earliest years of the Republic, President
John Adams ordered, without a full-fledge declaration of
war, but with prior Congressional authorization, naval
action against France.
Adams nearly approached Congress to ask for a full-
blown declaration of war on more than one occasion, but
changed his mind. Congress too was aware of the distinc-
tion between the quasi-war they authorized and all-out war.
And in two distinct cases arising out of the conflict, the
Supreme Court clearly distinguished between "perfect" or
"imperfect" war. and "general" or "partial" hostilities,
saying that Congress could authorize either. •'^
As a result of the Quasi War with France, 1797-
1801, the distinction between war and hostilities short of
war was firmly established. However, it was not established
13
See my chap. 2, supra.
^^Ibid. The cases are Bas v. Tingy, 4 Ball. (U. S.)
37 (1800), and Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cr. (U. S.) 1 (1801).
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that the President could authorize these hostilities on his
own authority. Although there were in fact naval opera-
tions in the Quasi-War that exceeded the limits established
by Congress, the Supreme Court later held that the Presi-
dent had no authority to exceed Congressionally imposed
limitations on the conduct of hostilities."^^
Thus, with the Quasi War, the legitimacy of hostili
ties short of war was established. However, the respective
powers of Congress and President in this area were not yet
fixed, as the bulk of this study clearly indicates.
A second issue not clarified by the Framers. the
threat of force in diplomacy, also received early clarifi-
cation in practice. The whole question of control over
foreign relations in general was debated by Madison and
Hamilton following Washington's Proclamation of American
neutrality in the war between Britain and France. Ironic
ally, Jefferson, who had urged Madison to defend Congres-
sional power, came to assert Presidential control over the
threat of force for diplomatic purposes.
In May 1801, while Congress was not in session.
President Jefferson dispatched a naval force to the
Mediterranean as a show of force against the Barbary coast
• ^^Little v. Barreme, 2 Cir. (U. S.) 169 (1804).'
^^The Proclamation was issued in 1793. The debate
was conducted that same year in the press under the pseudo-
nyms Helvidius and Pacificus . See chap. 1, supra.
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states. Months later. Jefferson informed Congress and Jus-
tified the operation on the grounds that it was defensive
in nature. To add to the irony, fourteen years later
Madison himself ordered a show of force off the Barbary
coast in excess of Congressional authorization.
While these events by no means settle the dispute
over control of foreign relations, they do serve as early
examples of Presidential assertion of authority. In fact.
American diplomatic history is replete with such assertions,
many of which I did not discuss in this study because the
episode did not lead to large-scale, protracted hostilities
or because Congress declared war. Consider the following
description of the period in American history dating from
1809 to 1829.
Although Presidents during this period claimed
no inherent authority to initiate military
actions. Madison and particularly Monroe
secretly used their power in ways that could
have been justified only by some sweeping and
vague claim-
-such as the right to use the
armed forces to advance the interests of the
United States. 19
The author goes on to note the seizure of Baton
Rouge and parts of West Florida in 1810. and Andrew Jack-
son's raid on East Florida in 1818. with the indulgence, if
^^See chap. 3. supra.
18
Ibid.
19
Abraham D. Sofaer, War. Foreign Affairs and Con -
stitutional Power: The Origins (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinge
r
Publishing Co.. 1976). p. 378.
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not the approval of President Honroe.^O other significant
deployments in the 19th century include the movement of
troops to Texas in 1844 to insure her independence from
Mexico, 21 and the dispatch of 50.000 men to the Texas-
Mexico border by President Grant in 1865-1866.22
In the 20th century there have been these additional
mobilizations and deployments. In 1903. Theodore Roosevelt
sent marines to Panama to insure her successful revolt
against Columbia. 2^
In 1914, President Wilson ordered the occupation of
Vera Cruz, Mexico, in order to topple the military govern-
ment there. Congress resolved that the President was "jus-
tified," but it was not asked to authorize his actions. 2^
In fact, throughout the first decades of the 20th
century, the United States was notorious for its "gunboat
diplomacy," especially in the Caribbean. Perhaps the most
blatant example of this was the occupation of Nicaragua
from 1926 to 1933, initiated solely under President
2 5Coolidge's authority.
20
Ibid.
21
House War Powers Hearings 1973
. p. 333.
22
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People
.
9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 353.
^^Ibid.
, p. 493.
2^c U cSee my chap. 5, supra.
^^Bailey, pp. 678-79.
A.37
And, since the Second World War there have been the
following significant forceful demonstrations. President
Eisenhower sent 5,000 marines to Lebanon in 1958.
dent Kennedy placed a naval quarantine around Cuba in
1962. Marines were sent to tne Dominican Republic in
1965 by President Johnson. ^8 And during conflict in the
middle east in 1973, President Nixon put all American
forces on alert as a warning to the Soviet Union.
Each of the military actions cited was undertaken
without specific legislative approval, and although other
justifications were often advanced, the principal motiva-
tion was to promote United States foreign policy. In addi-
tion, before each of the following wars, eventually declared
26
1 ^J^^wPE;.^^^"^^^- ^^^h additional units trooptotals reached 14,000. President Eisenhower did not relv
upon the Resolution of March 9, 1957, which declared thatthe United States ... is prepared to use armed forces
to assist those Middle Eastern states requesting aid
^ against armed aggression from any country controlled byinstitutional communism
. . . consonant with the treaty
obligations
.
.
and the Constitution of the United States."
71 Stat. 5 (1957). For Eisenhower's explanation to
Congress, see Department of Sta te Bulletin 39 (August 4
1958) :182. ^ ^
27
Allison, passim.
28
Bailey, pp. 901-902.
29
New York Times
.
26 October 1973, p. 1.
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by Congress, there were significant mM.-^oox^uxx xlitary actions under-
taken by Presidents acting unilaterally.
President Polk moved troops into disputed territory
between Mexico and the United States before the Mexican War
in 1846. President Wilson armed American merchantships
in 1917, before Congress declared war against Germany.
And before the Second World War, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt exchanged destroyers for bases on British soil,
and ordered the occupation of both Greenland and Iceland,
despite an act of Congress prohibiting the use of inductees
outside the Western Hemisphere
.
In practice, then. Presidential authority to
threaten the use of force by deploying the armed forces
abroad is well established. By implication. Congress con-
ceded as much when it passed the War Powers Resolution
which provides for termination by Congress of Presiden-
tially- initiated hostilities, but requires only a report
when the President deploys combat troops to a foreign coun-
try and neither hostilities nor imminent hostilities are
involved. Deployments in international waters not involv-
33ing hostilities need not even be reported.
30
•^^See chap. 2, note 2, supra.
31•^•^House War Powers Hearings 1973
, pp. 349-350.
32
Ibid., p. 354; Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 885 (1940). See Edward S. Corwin. Total
War and the Constitution (1947; reprint ed.
,
Freeport, N. Y,
Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 22-34.
^^Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555' (1973) . See my
chap. 11, supra.
4J9
Courts and the Effects of Practice_II
When we examine the views of the Federal courts re-
specting war powers, we find only a stray word here, pos-
sible grounds for inference there, discussions of Congres-
sional power, and refusals to decide on "political question-
grounds or on no grounds at all."^^
In one area not fully elucidated by the Framers
,
that of protection of citizens and property overseas, courts
have come down on the side of Presidential power; and prac-
tice has confirmed what the judges have pronounced.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases it was said that one of
the privileges a citizen of the United States could demand
IS
the care and protection of the Federal Govern-
ment over his life, liberty, and property when
on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of
a foreign government . -J
6
If so, then it is likely that the President will
have at least the initial responsibility for meeting that
demand. And this implies that he has the power to do so.
The clearest expression of judicial support for
this view came in Durand v. Rollins, in which a Supreme
34
See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U. S. 297 (1917).
35
See the Vietnam War cases, chap. 8, note 93,
supra.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 79
(1873).
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Court justice riding circuit held that the President has
full power to interpose with force in order to protect
citizens and their property abroad.
Apparently this extends to the protection of those
in the process of becoming citizens as well, as the Supreme
Court affirmed when discussing the Martin Koszta incident
in Neagle' s case. 38
In Neagle it was suggested that the President
needed no laws or treaties to come to the aid of citizens
abroad. Scarcely a decade passed before President
McKinley asserted just such power in dispatching 5,000
soldiers to China to aid American ambassadorial personnel
and Chinese converts to Christianity beseiged by the
Boxers. Congress was not in session when McKinley acted,
and the success of the enterprise precluded any criticism
when the legislature reconvened.
In defensive action of a different sort, President
Wilson, without Congressional authorization, sent the
Pershing expedition deep into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho
Villa, following the latter 's raid on an American city.
37
Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas . Ill (No. 4,186)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
^^In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 64 (1890).
39
Ibid.
40
See my chap. 4, supra.
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Villa eluded Pershing for nearly a year (1916-1917). where-
upon the force was withdrawn 41
In 1973, when the United States Senate was in a
less than charitable mood when it came to Presidential
powers, a war powers measure containing the following Ian-
guage was approved.
.
. .
this Act is not intended to encroach
upon the recognized powers of the President
as Commander m Chief and Chief Executiveto conduct hostilities authorized by the
'
Congress, to respond to attacks or the im-
minent threat of attacks upon the Unitedbtates, including its territories and dcs-
sessions, to repel attacks or forestall theimminent threat of attacks against the ArmedForces of the United States, and, under
proper circumstances, to rescue endangered
citizens and nationals of the United Stateslocated in foreign countries. ^2
In sum, the Senate recognized what the courts and
practice had established, and what, given the institutional
capabilities of Congress and the President, could hardly be
otherwise
.
Treaties and Area Resolutions
Since VJorld War II the United States has been in-
volved in two major armed conflicts, one in Korea (1950)
and one in Indochina (1965). If "war" in the Constitutional
41See my chap. 5, supra.
42
U. S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Make Rules Gov -
erning the Use of the Armed Forces of the United States in
Absence of a Declaration of War by the Congress " sT 440
,
93d Cong.
,
1st sess .
, 1973 , p~. TT This measure was adopted
by the Senate 20 July 1973. 119 Cong. Rec . 25119 (1973).
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sense is to be defined by the magnitude of the conflict,
both in terms of size of the troop- involvement and dura-
tion of the hostilities, then surely these were
-wars.-
The State Department defended President Truman's
dispatch of forces to Korea on the grounds that the United
States had signed the United Nations Treaty, and the United
Nations Security Council had recommended action in defense
of South Korea. Although Congress fully supported the
war at its onset, appropriated money, and drafted troops
to conduct it, there was never any explicit authorization
for the conflict.
Practice would seem to have established that the
President, as Chief Executor of treaties and Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces may Initiate war on his own
authority. However. I believe this argument will not stand
scrutiny. The Korean episode has no analogue in American
history. At no time before 1950 was a conflict of such
major proportions begun and conducted solely upon the Presi-
dent's authority to enforce treaties.
Furthermore, the contention that a treaty could
justify a President in conducting war, in the Constitutional
43
U. S., Department of State. Memorandum of July
3, 1950. in U. S., Congress, House, Background Information
on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Coun -
tries
,
H. Kept. 127, 82d Con^. . 1st sess.. 1951. pp. 49-
54
.
44
See my chap. 7, supra.
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sense of that tern,, is without foundation. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Reid v. Covert, treaty provisions may
not conflict with the Constitution.« Quite simply, this
means that while the United States ma^ commit itself to go
to war in defense of a treaty partner, it may not fulfill
that commitment in violation of Art. 1(8) (U) of the Con-
stitution, which vests the power to declare war in the Con-
46gress
.
It could hardly be said, then, that the President
gains from a treaty the authority to violate the Constitu-
tion by imposing upon Congress' war powers. If the phrase,
"in accordance with
.
. . constitutional processes," in-
serted into a number of our major defense treat ies^'^ is to
be any more than a mere redundancy, it must mean that the
United States is not obligating itself to act in a manner
inconsistent with proper Constitutional procedure. And
under the Constitution both houses of Congress are needed
48to authorize a war, whereas only the Senate need approve
49
a treaty.
45
Reid V. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957).
46Nor did the Court hold to the contrary in Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920). The rule there is that
the Tenth Amendment does not limit the treaty-making power.
See e.g.. North Atlantic Treaty, arts. 5 and 11.
48
U. S. Const, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11.
49
Ibid., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
4^4
The State Department also defended the Vietnam War
on the basis of treaty, the SE..TO pact and Protocol; only
in this case there was also an act of Congress, the notori-
ous Tonkin Gulf Resolution
. m my view, however, the
Tonkin Resolution and the SEATO pact plus Protocol, taken
together did justify the President's use of force in Viet-
nam. The language of the Resolution was sufficiently broad
and the debates on the floor of the Senate sufficiently
clear to conclude that Congress intended to give the Presi-
dent the authority to order the use of force in southeast
Asia.^-*-
However, even if their intent be clear, "area
resolutions," like the Tonkin Resolution, have also been
criticized for unconstitutionally delegating Congressional
war power to the President. It is said that they permit
the President to use force without specific enough guide-
lines. However, this argument is hardly compelling.
In the first place, area resolutions are in fact
quite specific in describing the area to be defended.
^^See my chap. 8, supra.
Ibid.
52
See Francis D. Wormuth, "The Vietnam War: The
President Versus the Constitution," in Richard A. Falk. ed.
The Vietnam War and International Law
.
4 vols. (Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968-1976), 2(1969):
781-99.
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The Tonkin Resolution applied only to SEATO sig-
natories and protocol states. 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
4?5
They are perforce less specific respecting che adversary to
be defended against, and the ti.e when the use of force .ay
begin. However, a "whereas" clause in the Tonkin Resolu-
tion indicated that the "Coo^unist regime in North Vietnam"
was co^itting aggression, and section 3 permitted Congress
to terminate the Resolution at any time by concurrent
(veto-proof) resolution.
Secondly, I thought it settled that the standards
for delegation of power were more relaxed in matters of
foreign as opposed to domestic affairs ever since the
Curtiss-Wright decision. ^5 There the Supreme Court noted
the following:
Practically every volume of the United Statesbtatutes contains one or more acts or joint
resolutions of Congress authorizing action bythe President in respect of subjects affectingforeign relations, which either leave the
exercise of the power to his unrestricted judg-
ment, or provide a standard far more general
than that which has always been considered
requisite with regard to domestic affairs. 56
All told, legal arguments against the authorization
of force by area resolutions (policy considerations not-
withstanding) are unconvincing. In conclusion, while a
^^78 Stat. 384 (1964).
55
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
.
299 U. S. 304 (1936).
56
Ibid., p. 324. For a discussion of more recent
holdings pertaining to delegation, see Rostow, pp. 887-90.
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treaty alone cannot authorize the President to cooMence
war, a treaty and an area resolution combined, as with
Vietnam, or even an area resolution alone is a legitimate
vehicle for Congress to use to warrant Presidential use of
force.
In the case of Vietnam, however, fighting went on
after the Tonkin Resolution had been repealed by Congress
in 1971. The Nixon administration denied it was ever depen-
dent upon the Resolution for constitutional authority to
pursue its policies in Vietnam. in the absence of the
Resolution, however, the President could only rely upon his
own authority as Commander-in-Chief and whatever authority
could be inferred from acts of Congress such as defense
appropriations
.
Under these authorities it is doubtful that the
President had legal justification to do more than withdraw
American forces with due regard for their safety. While
the Nixon administration did remove ground combat forces
steadily, it continued to wage the air war. even conducting
it over Cambodia after the signing of the cease-fire.
Ultimately. Congress cut off all appropriations for combat
58
activities in southeast Asia.
. 57
See chap. 8, note 130, supra.
58
See chap, 8, note 86 and accompanying text,
supra.
Actually, the issue raised by the above events is
more properly related to the President's authority in the
conduct or termination of a war. rather than the con^ence-
ment thereof. As a general rule. war. in the constitutional
sense, may not be commenced or conducted in the absence of
Congressional authorization. However, the Commander-in-
Chief has the obligation to use force even without such
authorization where the defense of the nation or the protec-
tion of armed forces already in combat require it.
Under this analysis, when American ground forces
were safely extricated from southeast Asia (March 1973),
the air attacks could no longer be justified. To draw an
analogy with another incident detailed in this study, after
the Armistice ending World War I was agreed to in November
1918, President Wilson could no longer justify maintaining
United States troops in Siberia and north Russia.
Provided there is no infringement of the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to provide for the protec-
tion of the United States, its forces and citizens. Congress
may regulate and restrict the conduct of war by the Com-
mander in Chief. The Supreme Court so ruled in the Little
Case,^^ and, by implication, in the Steel Seizure Case.^"*"
59^ , ,See chap. 5, supra.
60
Little v. Barreme, 2 Cr. (U. S.) 169 (1804).
^^Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
579 (1952).
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Congress asserted this power recently, and probably exces-
sively, in the War Powers Resolution.
A Theory of Presidential War
-Commencing. Vn^.r-
Having surveyed the views of the Framers of the
Constitution, developments in the "Constitution of prac-
tice," and the few relevant court opinions, we may now
develop a theory of Presidential power to commence war
under the Constitution. This theory will outline the areas
where Presidents have legitimate claims to exercise author-
ity. Thus, what follows is not simply a description of
Presidential claims to power, but rather a combination of
what Justice Frankfurter called the "words of the Consti-
tution and
.
. .
the gloss which life has written upon
them."^^
There are three elements in the theory: (1) emer-
gency authority, (2) authority to enforce treaties, and
(3) authority to carry out United States foreign policy.
Each will be discussed in turn.
(1) There can be little doubt that the President
may respond unilaterally (i.e., in the absence of Congres-
sional authority) to certain emergency situations. He may
^^Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). See chap.
9, supra.
63
Youngs town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S.
579, 610-611 (1952).
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not only use force in these circumstances, but use force
tantamount to war in the Constitutional sense of the term.
The circumstances include attacks or imminent
attacks upon the nation, its territorip^ t.^oo
.
-^<-o ucii xc es or possessions,
or its armed forces, even if stationed overseas.
Furthermore, he may also employ force short of war
in the Constitutional sense should there be an attack on
or threat to American citizens or their property on the
high seas or in a foreign nation. Should war in the Con-
stitutional sense follow, the President would be obligated
to obtain Congressional authorization in order to conduct
it.
The rationale for requiring Congressional authori-
zation in cases of war stemming from attacks upon citizens
or property, but not in cases of attacks upon American
territory or troops, is that the latter is likely to be a
more serious threat to the nation.
This is the only legitimate exception to the gen-
eral rule that war in the Constitutional sense must be
authorized by Congress. The exception is based upon the
President's ability to respond quickly in cases of grave
national peril.
(2) Equally, there is little doubt that as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief, the President may employ
force in order to execute treaty provisions. However, a
treaty alone bestows no authority to commence war in the
500
Constitutional sense. Should war ensue as a result of such
a use of force, the President would be obligated to obtain
Congressional authorization.
(3) "The President." John Marshall said while in
Congress, "is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign
,,64
nations. Although the Framers were unclear or divided
(witness the Pacificus-Helvidius debate) on the question of
control over foreign relations, the President has at vari-
ous times in American history predominated.
It is no longer doubted that the President may de-
ploy the armed forces for non-hostile purposes anywhere in
the world. Congress conceded as much in the War Powers
Resolution, where legislative authority to terminate troop
commitments was asserted only where hostilities or imminent
hostilities are involved.
It would also seem beyond doubt that the President
may deploy the armed forces so as to threaten the use of
force in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States. However, any hostilities ensuing as a result of
such deployments are not within the exclusive power of the
64
U. S.
,
Congress, Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States", 1789-1824 (Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 1834- 1856) , 10 : 613 (1800) . The Supreme
Court reconfirmed this in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936).
^^87 Stat. 555-556 (1973).
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President to conduct. Rather, both Congress and the Presi-
dent have concurrent authority to control hostilities short
of war where (a) a treaty provision is not being enforced,
and (b) there is no national emergency as described in sec-
tion one, above.
In the absence of Congressional regulations to the
contrary, the President has full authority to connnence hos-
tilities short of war in the course of the conduct of United
States foreign relations. With the exception of the en-
forcement of treaty provisions, and certain defensive opera-
tions, however, Congress is entitled to the last word on
this subject. The War Powers Resolution may be viewed as
an assertion of Congressional authority to regulate hostili-
ties short of war, while tacitly recognizing Presidential
power in this area.
Should war in the Constitutional sense develop out
of the hostilities or troop deployments issuing out of the
conduct of foreign relations. Congress would have to
authorize it.
I do not believe that Congress has the power to re-
strict the President in the areas of his exclusive control.
These areas are: (1) the use of force short of war to pro-
tect United States citizens or their property; (2) the use
of force up to and including force tantamount to war in the
Constitutional sense to protect the nation, its territories,
possessions and armed forces; (3) the use of force short of
512
war to implement treaty provisions; (4) the deployment of
troops for non-hostile purposes; and (5) the deployment of
troops so as to threaten the use of force for diplomatic
purposes.
To the extent that the War Powers Resolution is in-
tended to restrict the President in these areas of exclu-
sive control the Resolution is unconstitutional.^^
One obvious difficulty with the three-part theory
outlined above is the inability to distinguish with pre-
cision "war" and hostilities short of war. I have sug-
gested a "magnitude" test;^^ however, I am not confident
that a precise distinction can be made in the abstract.
Another likely objection to this theory is that it
opens the door to too many abuses of power by the Presi-
dent. For example, I have urged that the use of force to
protect American forces is within the exclusive province
of the President. However, President Nixon justified the
controversial Cambodian Incursion of 1970 on the grounds
that as Commander-in-Chief he had the duty and power to
protect United States troops in Vietnam.
°°See my chap. 9, supra.
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See text accompanying notes 11 and 46, supra.
Cf. the testimony of John Norton Moore in U. S., Congress,
Senate, War Powers Legislation, Hearings Before the Com -
mittee on Foreign Relations
,
92d Cong., Isc sess., 1971,
p. 465.
68
Department of State Bulletin 62 (May 18, 1970):
617.
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But the answer to this objection is not only that
all power invites abuse, but also that over the course of
American history the legislative branch has not been less
inclined toward war than the executive branch. In fact,
this study indicates that at the start of every conflict
Congress is at least as "hawkish" as the President.
This being the case, Congress is more likely to
support the initial use of force rather than oppose it. or
even press for escalation in order to obtain a quick or
sure victory. (That this occurs is often forgotten. But
consider the support for General MacArthur's expansive
Korean strategy.) In short, Congress may not be a very
reliable check upon the President at the commencement of
hostilities. (The Cambodian Incursion is no exception; it
occurred in the middle of an on-going war.)
Furthermore, placing too many checks upon Presiden-
tial power has risks for the conduct of American diplomacy,
especially in a crisis situation. Consider the disadvan-
tages of a handcuffed Presidency in the midst of a Cuban
Missile affair; that would be to truly render the Constitu-
tion a "suicide pact."^^ (On the other hand do we want one
69
Cf. the views of Senator John Sherman Cooper
(D-Ky.) in U. S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
, S. Kept.
606 to Accompany S. 2956, 92d Cong. , 2d sess
. ,
1972, p. 32.
''^"There is danger," warned Justice Jackson in a
freedom of speech case, "that, if the Court does not temper
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it wi
convert the Constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 37 (1949) (dis
senting opinion) . The risks would seem even greater where
war powers are involved.
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man to make the awesome decisions that could lead to nuclear
war?)
.s
.on
The Constitutional ideal, and the ideal of this
theory is the cooperation of the branches in the decisic
to make war. The President can cooperate by consulting
with Congress, in the most meaningful sense of the word.
He can keep Congress informed, and he can request legisla-
tive support before taking action.
For its part, the legislature can support the
President any number of ways short of a full-blown declara-
tion of war. including the use of "area resolutions" as
authority for the conduct of war in the Constitutional
sense. Congress must also appropriate funds for the con-
duct of foreign affairs, and although general defense
appropriations are probably insufficient to authorize the
conduct of war proper. Congress is free to terminate finan-
cial support if it disapproves of an activity
.
Legal arguments aside, the absence of inter-branch
cooperation in war-making is politically risky for the
President, as Presidents Johnson and Nixon found out.
Although, as the case of Lyndon Johnson demonstrates. Con-
gressional cooperation upon the commencement of a conflict
is no assurance of support thereafter.
71
See my chap. 9, supra
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Nevertheless, while Congress may be fickle, it is
prudent for a President to have its support at the start
of hostilities. In the current political climate it is more
than prudent--it is essential.
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